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on  tfjc  #uern£«ep  Center  i«oore  jf ounUation 

Season   of   1922 


CROSS  CURRENTS 
IN   EUROPE  TO-DAY 


CROSS  CURRENTS 
IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 


BY 
CHARLES  A.  BEARD,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 


BOSION 
MARSHALL  JONES  COMPANY 


COPYRIGHT   .    1922    •    BY 
MARSHALL   JONES   COMPANY 


TRINTED    IN    THE    INITED    STATES    OP    AMERICA 


PREFACE 

The  following  pages  form  the  substance  of  eight 
lectures  on  contemporary  Europe  delivered  at  Dart- 
mouth College  on  the  (juernsey  Center  Pvloore 
Foundation  in  June,  1922.  The  lectures  were  in 
fact  informal  and  in  the  delivery  many  passages 
in  the  manuscript  were  materially  reduced.  The 
reader  may  be  assured  that  the  discourses  were  not 
as  formidable  as  the  printed  pages  might  imply,  and 
the  auditors  w^ho  did  me  the  honor  of  attending  the 
lectures  may  here  discover  that  some  of  the  most 
casual  remarks  were  based  upon  independent  in- 
quiry. The  volume  is  not  a  thesis,  but  a  collection 
of  notes  pertinent,  I  hope,  to  the  great  case  of  Man- 
kind -vs.  Chaos. 

Charles  A.  Beard 

New  Milford,  Conn. 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE  PAGE 

Preface   v 

I.     Diplomatic     Rii\ELATioxs:        Franco-Rus- 
sian   I 

II.     Diplomatic  Ri<:vELATioNs:     English  Under- 
standings      28 

III.  Diplomatic    Revelations:     The    Central 

Powers         56 

IV.  The  Economic  (Outcome  of  the  War  .     .     83 
V.     The  New  Constitutions  of  Europe   .      .    140 

\'I.     The    Russian    Revolution 163 

\'II.     The  Rise  of  New  Peasant  Democracies  .  182 

VIII.     Socialism  and  the   Lahor   Movement       .  202 

IX.     AMt;RicA  AND  the  Balance  of  Power  .      .  239 

Conclusions 263 

Note  on  Sources  for  I.  II.  and  III.      .      .  273 

Bibliograpliy 276 


di 


CROSS  CURRENTS 
IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 


CROSS  CURRENTS 
IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

I 

DIPLOMATIC  REVELATIONS: 
FRAXCOAWSSIAN 

TIIF  study  of  European  affairs  is  no  academic 
exercise  for  Americans;  it  runs  to  the  roots  of 
our  national  destiny.  Our  fate  is  not  fashioned 
by  domestic  policies  alone.  Indeed,  no  wise  domestic 
policies  can  be  framed  without  reference  to  the 
course  of  world  events.  There  has  been  no  gen- 
eral war  in  I'^.urope  for  more  than  two  hundred  years 
in  which  America  has  not  taken  part.  As  Knglish 
colonies  we  participated  in  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession  at  the  opening  of  the  eighteenth  century; 
as  an  independent  nation  we  shared  in  the  responsi- 
bilities of  the  World  War  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twentieth  century.  F,\'ery  concept  of  civic  dutv  in 
war  and  peace,  e\'erv  dream  of  national  grandeur 
has  rested  and  must  rest  at  bottom  upon  some  foun- 
dation of  international  policy. 

True  as  this  was  in  1914,  it  is  still  more  true 
today.  In  foreign  trade,  in  mercantile  maritie.  in 
world  finance,  in  sea  power — in  all  matters  respect- 

I 


2    CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE 

ing  responsibilities  and  menaces  in  the  international 
sphere — the  United  States  has  marched  in  sev^en 
league  boots  since  August  i,  19 14.  Rome  in  the 
days  of  the  first  Triumvirate,  Britain  under  the 
administration  of  William  Pitt,  America  at  the  hour 
of  Lincoln's  first  inauguration  faced  no  problems 
greater  than  those  which  confront  the  government 
and  people  of  the  United  States  today.  Their  own 
fate  they  might  control,  ijut  it  is  not  in  their  hands 
alone.  A  single  shot  at  Serajevo  may  send  boys  from 
the  hills  of  New  England  and  the  plains  of  Kansas  to 
die  upon  the  banks  of  the  Piave.  There  is  now  a  web 
of  international  relations — trade,  finance,  and  inter- 
course— so  fine  in  mesh  and  so  tough  in  fibre  that 
no  sword  can  cut  it.  The  East  and  the  West  have 
met  and  they  are  one.  The  world  is  an  economic 
unit  and  the  United  States  is  being  woven  into  the 
very  fabric  of  that  unity.  To  study  the  nature  of  the 
fabric  and  the  operations  that  weave  it — surely 
there  Is  no  greater  obligation,  public  or  private, 
than  this. 

In  this  spirit  the  topics  which  follow  were  chosen. 
These  pages  attempt  no  mere  chronicle  of  a  few 
momentous  years.  They  do  not  deal  with  personal- 
ities as  such.  They  pass  no  judgments  upon  the 
motives  and  policies  of  the  actors  in  the  great  drama 
that  opened  on  August  1,1914.  It  is  no  part  of  my 
design  to  discuss  the  remote  or  immediate  causes  of 
the  Avar  or  to  consider  In  any  form  the  question  of 
responsibility  for  bringing  that  calamltv  upon  man- 
kind. These  pages  simply  deal  with  facts  and 
themes  which,   in  my  opinion,  most  vitally  concern 


DIPLOMATIC     REVELATIONS  3 

Americans  here  and  now  confronted  with  the  task 
of  arriving  at  some  worthy  concept  of  national 
policy,  domestic  and  foreign. 

The  task  ot  selecting  the  material  is  necessarily 
a  delicate  one.  I'lach  of  us  must  perforce  see  what  is 
behind  his  own  eyes.  Xo  person,  aware  of  the 
mysteries  and  presences  that  surround  the  path  of 
mankind,  as  it  stumbles  forward  through  the  years, 
will  have  overweening  confidence  in  his  ability  to 
divine  the  future  through  the  murky  shadows  of 
the  past.  Still  we  cannot  escape  an  obligation  by 
confessing  its  difficulties  and  it  may  be  that  in  a  mul- 
titude of  councils  there  is  some  wisdom  along  with 
much  error. 

From  what  has  just  been  said,  it  is  clear  that  no 
apology  need  be  offered  for  devoting  two  lectures  to 
the  diplomatic  methods  of  Europe  which  have  re- 
cently been  revealed  to  us  by  one  of  the  strangest 
strcjkes  of  fortune  in  all  history.  Diplomacy,  as  a 
score  of  writers  have  warned  us,  is  the  danger  point 
of  democracy.  The  management  of  relations  among 
nations  must  of  necessity  be  entrusted  to  a  small 
number  of  persons.  No  congress  of  435  members, 
no  parliament  ot  ^570  members  could  possibly  carry 
on  the  diplomatic  intercourse  required  by  modern 
international  life.  TTow  European  diplomats  have 
operated  within  their  sphere  during  the  past  few 
years  becomes  therclore  a  theme  ot  absorbing  in- 
terest to  Americans,  for  the  gentlemen  who  sit 
around  the  council  tables  of  luirope  help  to  deter- 
mine our  tate  as  well  as  their  own. 

I'V)r  many  long  years  we  have  lived  in  the  mists 


4    CROSS  CURRENTS  IX  EUROPE 

of  official  propaganda.  Shortly  after  the  Great 
War  opened,  each  of  the  belligerent  governments 
published  a  volume  of  carefully  selected  papers. 
The  purpose  in  every  case  was  the  same,  namely,  to 
prove  the  guilt  of  the  enemy  and  the  innocence  of  the 
publisher.  On  the  basis  of  these  official  papers,  skill- 
fully chosen  by  the  parties  to  the  case,  editors,  pro- 
fessors, and  publicists  wrote  books,  pamphlets,  and 
leading  articles,  all  designed  to  support  the  official 
theses  put  forward  by  their  respective  governments 
and  to  stir  up  the  war  fever  necessary  to  sustain 
the  fighting  to  the  bitter  end.  The  propriety  of  this 
is  not  here  questioned.  In  time  of  war  reason  as 
well  as  law  must  be  silent;  but  to  continue  fostering 
in  time  of  pe'ace  the  passions  of  war  surely  has  no 
defenders  among  those  who  seek  guidance  for  the 
future  in  the  experience  of  the  past. 

Had  the  war  ended  in  a  stalemate,  our  knowledge 
of  the  origins  of  the  conflict  and  the  diplomatic 
methods  which  precipitated  it  would  be  limited  to 
the  official  statements  made  by  the  gentlemen  respon- 
sible for  it.  But  the  war  did  not  end  in  a  stalemate. 
The  several  belligerents  did  not  emerge  with  the-ir 
political  machines  intact.  The  Germans,  during 
their  occupation  of  Belgium,  searched  the  Belgian 
archives  and  published  sheaves  of  important  secret 
papers.  The  Bolsheviki,  on  overthrowing  the  old 
Russian  government,  exposed  to  the  gaze  of  the 
astonished  world  the  Secret  Treaties  and  hundreds 
of  diplomatic  documents  relative  to  l^ntente  diplo- 
macy before  the  wdv.  The  (ierman  Social  Demo- 
crats,   alter  the   November  rex'olution,   opened   the 


DIPLOMATIC    RF-VF.  LATIONS  5 

archives  of  Wilhelmstrasse.  In  \'ienna,  the  down- 
fall of  the  Dual  Monarchy  was  followed  by  the  pub- 
lication of  important  papers  taken  from  the  Austrian 
foreign  office.  The  archives  of  London,  Paris,  and 
Rome  are  still  secure  under  lock  and  key,  but  the 
thousands  of  secret  papers  from  other  capitals  enable 
us  to  form  some  idea  of  the  marvels  concealed  from 
our  gaze  in  those  quarters. 

Never  before  has  a  generation  called  upon  to 
wage  a  great  war  been  given  an  opportunity  to  dis- 
cover the  methods  which  precipitated  the  crisis 
from  which  it  suffered.  Usually  fifty  or  a  hundred 
years  are  allow'cd  to  pass  before  the  public  is  given 
access  to  the  pertinent  papers;  that  is  to  say, 
when  it  is  too  late  for  citizens  to  form  any  judgment 
on  current  policies  and  practices,  governments  open 
their  archives.  But  the  fortunes  of  the  last  war 
proved  an  exception  to  the  rule.  Now  within 
eight  years  of  the  opening  of  the  conflict  we  have 
the  most  priceless  records,  the  most  secret  docu- 
ments, the  most  confidential  memoranda  revealing 
the  spirit  and  technique  of  the  diplomacy  which 
preceded  the  war.  We  are  now  able  to  compare 
official  theses  with  official  tacts  and  to  measure  prop- 
aganda against  reality.  The  debts,  deficits,  indemni- 
ties, paper  money,  and  industrial  crisis  from  which 
F.urope  suffers  present  nothing  new  to  students  of 
human  affairs,  but  the  revelation  of  the  methods 
which  diplomats  employed  for  vears  before  the  war 
is  new  and  marxellous  beyond  anything  that  has 
happened  since  Xo\-ember    ii,    19  iS. 

Students  of  history  and  diplomacy  knew,  of  course. 


6  CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

long  before  the  Great  War  burst  upon  the  world  in 
19 14  that  the  embattled  powers  on  both  sides  were 
united  by  ties  of  some  kind;  but  the  nature  of  these 
agreements,  the  extent  of  the  obligations  created,  the 
inner  designs  of  the  diplomatic  negotiations  accom- 
panying them  were  all  mysteries  .  In  vain  did  mem- 
bers of  parliamentary  bodies  elected  by  millions  of 
voters  ask  foreign  ministers  for  explanations,  de- 
tails, and  precise  information.  In  vain  did  citizens, 
editors,  publicists,  and  political  leaders  demand  to 
know  the  character  of  the  obligations  which  in  the 
hour  of  crisis  the  masses  would  be  called  upon  to 
assume.  Their  pleas  and  their  demands  alike  met 
indifference,  contempt,  or  evasion.  Behind  closed 
doors  diplomats  exchanged  pledges  and  created  sit- 
uations which  drove  Europe  relentlessly  into  the 
abyss.  Out  of  the  millions  that  went  forth  to  die, 
out  of  the  millions  that  stayed  at  home  to  suffer 
and  bear  burdens,  only  a  handful — a  score  or  more — 
knew  by  what  process  the  terrible  denouement  had 
been  brought  to  pass. 

The  remedy  for  this  state  of  affairs  in  diplomacy 
lies  in  no  mere  institutional  changes.  It  lies  in  an 
ever  growing  body  of  enlightened  citizens  who  do 
their  own  thinking  and  are  not  deceived  by  official 
propaganda.  They  will  find  in  the  diplomaticrevela- 
tions  of  the  past  five  years  lessons  of  prime  impor- 
tance for  the  future.  Europe  may  live  forever,  if  it 
so  chooses,  under  the  shadow  of  diplomatic  delusion 
and  deception,  but  It  is  not  necessary,  certainly  it  is 
not  expedient,  that  America  should  do  so. 


DIPLOMATIC   ri:vi:latioxs  7 

N  !•:  W     M  A  ']•  F  R  I  A  L  S     O  X      R  I'  S  S  I  A  's 
I?  A  L  K  A  X      P  O  L  I  C^  Y 

Wc  shall  start  uith  the  Russian  documents,  for 
in  the  order  of  time,  Russia  was  the  first  to  bare 
her  records.  It  is  important  however  to  warn  the 
reader  against  forming  any  final  conclusion  until  the 
data  of  the  Austrian  and  German  papers  are  all  in. 
J'ven  then  it  must  be  remembered  that  we  are  not 
dealing  with  the  fundamental  and  underlying  causes 
of  the  war,  but  with  secret  diplomacy  as  such. 

Immediately  after  the  overthrow  of  the  Tsar 
in  March,  19 17,  all  kinds  of  rumors  and  reports 
about  domestic  dissensions  over  foreign  policy  be- 
gan to  flow  out  of  Russia.  The  new  revolutionary 
government,  hard  beset  bv  a.  still  more  revolutionary 
peace  party,  found  it  difficult  to  defend  the  war 
program  of  the  old  regime  and  the  avowed  aims  of 
the  Allies.  Indeed  the  revolutionary  leaders  in  the 
streets,  who  were  in  time  to  possess  the  machinery 
of  state,  demanded  a  repudiation  of  all  designs 
sax'oring  of  annexations,  indemnities,  and  imperial- 
ism. When  the  Bolsheviki  finally  got  possession 
of  the  government,  they  found  it  in  keeping  with 
their  principles  and  useful  in  their  tactics  to  discredit 
the  policies  of  the  Tsar.  Accordingly  they  began 
to  publish  treaties,  notes,  and  papers  taken  from 
the  Russian  archives  all  tending  to  show  the  im- 
perialist ambitions  of  I'ngland,  France,  Italy,  and 
the  Isar's  government.  In  \o\ember,  191 7,  they 
ga\e  out  to  the  world  a  long  report  composed  ot 
notes   and   extracts    from   letters   exchanged   amorg 


8  CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

the  Entente  Allies  relative  to  the  proposed  distribu- 
tion of  the  spoils  at  the  close  of  the  war — the 
famous  "Secret  Treaties."  Among  other  things, 
England  was  to  take  a  benevolent  attitude  toward 
Russian  pretensions  at  the  Straits  and  receive  in 
return  adequate  compensations.  Russia  was  to  have 
a  free  hand  in  arranging  her  Polish  frontiers; 
France  was  to  have  Alsace-Lorraine  and  create  a 
neutral  autonomous  state  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine.  In  the  months  and  years  that  followed,  the 
Bolsheviki  continued  to  iscue  selections  from  the 
Russian  archives.  Some  of  these  were  published  in 
booklets  and  others  in  the  official  newspapers, 
Pra-cda  and  Isvestia. 

In  these  documents  we  may  trace,  as  under  the 
rays  of  a  great  searchlight,  the  important  relations 
of  Russia  to  Europe  and  Asia  from  1908  onward. 
In  particular,  is  it  easy  to  trace  the  plans  adopted 
by  Russia  to  counteract  the  relentless  economic 
advance  of  Germany  and  Austria  in  southeastern 
Europe. 

The  story  opens  with  the  record  of  measures  to 
be  taken  in  the  Balkans.  In  January,  1908,  after 
its  accounts  had  been  settled  with  England  and  Japan 
the  Russian  government  had  a  free  hand  and  began 
a  forward  policy  in  southeastern  Europe.  This 
policy,  in  its  general  terms,  had  been  agreed  upon 
several  months  before  the  annexation  of  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina  by  Austria.  It  was  discussed  at 
a  grand  council  of  the  civil  and  military  authorities' 
held  early  in  the  year;  but  it  was  not  immediately 
put  into  active  force.     1  here  was  no  want  of  desire 


DIPLOMATIC     RF.VI-.LATIOXS  9 

but.  as  the  military  men  pointed  out,  the  Russian 
army  had  not  recovered  from  the  defeat  at  the 
hands  of  Japan  and  the  Tsar,  who  had  just  escaped 
from  a  revolution  by  the  skin  of  his  teeth,  did  not 
dare  to  risk  another  crisis  soon.  So  for  several 
months,  the  Russian  forei<rn  office  was  circumspect 
though  determined.  It  confined  its  activities  to 
very  moderate  and  restrained  diplomatic  maneuvers 
preparatory  to  something  more  vigorous  to 
follow. 

When  later  in  the  year,  Austria-Hungary  seized 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  the  Serbs  appealed  to  St. 
Petersburg  for  aid;  but  the  Russian  government, 
aware  that  it  was  in  no  condition  for  another  war, 
gave  counsels  of  caution  while  adding  assurances  of 
something  substantial  to  come  later.  In  October, 
1908,  the  Russian  ambassador,  Isvolski,  said  to  the 
Serbian  minister  at  Paris:  "Serbia  will  lose  nothing 
as  a  result  of  the  step  taken  by  Austria,  but  will  ac- 
tually gain  from  it.  "^'ou  Serbs  cannot  think  of  dis- 
loilging  Austria-Hungary  from  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina by  arms.  .  .  .  Hitherto  we  have  always  sus- 
tained Serbia  and  we  shall  support  her  in  the  future, 
always  and  with  all  possible  means."  A  few^  months 
later,  namely  in  March,  1909,  the  Russian  govern- 
ment informed  Serbia  that  "when  her  equipment 
is  ready,  Russia  will  renew  the  matter  with  Austria- 
I  lungary.  Serbia  should  not  go  to  war.  because  that 
would  be  suicide.  .  .  .  Conceal  your  intentions  and 
prepare  yourselves  because  the  days  of  joy  will 
come."' 

l'ri)m   that  time   forward,   as  the   records  clearly 


lO        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

show,  Russian  diplomacy,  restless,  aggressive,  and 
covert,  was  directed  toward  one  end:  the  formation 
of  combinations  of  power  and  the  pursuit  of  meas- 
ures likely  to  dissolve  the  Austro-Hungarian 
empire  in  a  general  European  war.  This  is  the 
substance  of  the  first  revelations  from  the  Russian 
archives.  Russian  diplomats,  having  made  sure  of 
Asiatic  matters  by  understandings  with  England  and 
Japan,  had  firmly  resolved,  by  1908,  to  break  up 
the  Dual  Pvlonarchy.  For  six  years  they  bent 
every  energy  to  that  enterprise.  The  Tsar's  agents 
knew  that  Germany  was  allied  with  Austria  and 
would  not  stand  idly  by  while  Russia  and  Serbia 
carried  out  their  plans.  For  that  reason  Russia 
resolved  to  make  the  issue  general,  drawing  into 
the  affair  both  France  and  England.  Meanwhile 
Russia  kept  Serbian  nationalism  aflame  by  assuring 
the  Serbs  that  the  day  of  liberation  would  come. 
In  January,  19 14,  the  Serbian  minister,  Pashitch, 
asked  the  Tsar  whether  he  would  give  one  of  the 
grand  duchesses  in  marriage  to  the  Serbian  Crown 
Prince.  The  Tsar  was  delighted  with  the  idea,  al- 
though he  declined  to  dictate  in  an  affair  of  the  heart. 
Then  the  minister,  in  a  burst  of  ecstacy,  said:  "She 
would  enjoy  the  affection  of  all  the  Serbian  people, 
and  if  (iod  and  circumstances  permit  she  will  become 
the  (jucen  of  all  the  Slav  nations  of  the  South.  Her 
glory  and  her  influence  will  spread  throughout  the 
Balkan  peninsula."  Such  was  the  grand  Serb  dream : 
Break  u]i  Austria-!  lungary,  unite  the  South  Sla\'S, 
and    bind    Russia    and    Slavia    in    matrimony.      So 


D I  P  LOM  AT  1  C     R  I.  V  T.  LA  IK)  X  S 


I  1 


ScM-bi;i  and  Russia  set  out  together  on  their  way 
to  the  "joyous  days." 

On  the  lengths  to  which  the  Russian  leaders  were 
prepared  to  go  and  the  means  which  they  were 
willing  to  employ,  there  are  two  important  letters 
from  the  Russian  arcliives.  In  191  i,  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  Paris  wrote  home:  ''If  we  have  de- 
cided to  raise  the  (]uestion  of  the  Straits  [the  Turk- 
ish question],  it  is  ot  the  highest  importance  in  that 
regard  to  have  a  favourable  prcss  here.  Lnlor- 
tunately,  I  am  in  that  respect  deprived  of  the  most 
important  means,  since  my  insistent  requests  for 
funds  for  the  press  have  produced  no  results.  I 
shall  naturally  tlo  all  that  is  in  my  power,  but  it  is 
a  matter  in  which  public  opinion,  for  traditional 
reasons,  is  against  us.  As  an  example  of  the  utility 
of  having  monev  for  the  press,  I  mav  cite  the  affair 
of  Tripoli.  I  know  how  Tittoni  ( It:'.] ian  ambassador 
at  Paris)  won  over  the  leading  French  journals  aicc 
III  ma'ni  largcmcnt  ouz'crW." 

This  compelling  argument  evidently  had  the  de- 
sired result  at  St.  Petersburg,  for  shortlv  afterward, 
M.  Isvolski  wrote  to  his  supcricM-  at  home:  "1 
am  trying  to  maintain  the  desirable  feeling  in  gov- 
ernmental and  political  circles  and  at  the  same  time 
am  attempting  to  intiuence  the  press.  In  this  respect 
verv  remarkable  results  ha\"e  been  attained,  thanks 
partK'  to  measures  prexIousK'  taken.  As  n'ou  know 
I  do  not  distribute  tiie  subsidies  directlx',  but  tlie 
distribution  is  made  in  co-ojUTatlon  witli  the  1- rench 
minister,  aiul   has  alreai^h'  had  the  necessar\-  eftect. 


12         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

I  myself  am  endeavoring  to  guide  the  more  important 
newspapers  in  Paris,  such  as  the  'Temps,'  the  'Jour- 
nal des  Debats,'  and  the  'Echo'  through  personal 
influence." 

THE    FRANCO-RUSSIA.N   ALLIANCE 

It  was  obvious  to  the  directors  of  the  Muscovite 
foreign  policy  that  Russia  alone  could  not  effect  a 
dissolution  of  Austria-Hungary  and  bring  about  a 
realization  of  the  grand  Pan-Slav,  Pan-Serb  dream. 
It  was  well  known  that  Germany  and  Austria  Hun- 
gary, to  say  nothing  of  Italy,  were  knit  together  in 
a  firm  alliance  and  that  the  former  would  not  stand 
idly  by  while  her  only  undoubted  friend  in  Europe 
was  overwhelmed  in  battle.  It  was  necessary,  there- 
fore, to  secure  active  assistance  from  France  and 
if  possible  from  England.  This  was  an  accepted 
axiom  in  Russian  diplomatic  circles.  The  formula 
is  set  forth  with  great  clearness  in  a  letter  from 
the  Russian  ambassador  at  London  directed  to  his 
home  government  on  November  20,  19 12.  After 
speaking  of  a  conversation  with  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
who  disclaimed  any  intentions  of  aggression  against 
Germany,  the  ambassador  said:  "He  has  told  me 
enough  to  prove  to  us  that  under  certain  special 
conditions,  England  would  enter  the  war.  For  this, 
in  my  opinion,  two  conditions  are  necessary:  in  the 
first  place,  the  active  intervention  of  France  must 
make  this  war  a  general  one;  secondly  it  is  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  responsibility  for  the  aggression 
fall  upon  our  opponents.  I  believe  it  is  imperative 
that  we  keep  this  point  well  in  mind.     First  of  all  it 


DIPLOMA  lie     RK  VKLA  riONS  I  3 

involves  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  principle 
of  our  own  disinterestedness.  ...  It  will  he  neces- 
sary to  emphasize  the  aggressive  character  of  Aus- 
trian and  (jerman  policy.  .  .  .  The  question  of  who 
is  to  he  the  aggressor  will  he  of  greatest  signif- 
icance. Only  under  these  circumstances  would  the 
British  government  have  the  support  of  public  opin- 
ion which  the  government  needs  for  energetic  action. 
Cirey  and  his  ministerial  colleagues  are,  no  doubt, 
occupied  with  reflections  of  this  kind.  I  see  the  echo 
ot  them  in  the  answer  he  has  given  to  the  question  I 
put  to  him."  Without  doubt,  this  Russian  analysis 
of  the  problem  in  19 12  was  a  sound  one.  If  the  de- 
sign was  to  succeed,  it  was  imperative  that  the 
active  intervention  of  France  should  make  the  war 
a  general  one,  in  which  b'ngland  might  participate, 
under  special  conditions,  particularly  if  the  burden  of 
aggression  fell  upon  the  Teutonic  powers. 

The  Russian  approach  to  France  was  natural  and 
easy.  The  two  countries  had  been  united  by  a  firm 
alliance  since  1891,  and  their  diplomatic  negotiations 
were  close  and  active.  The  exact  nature  of  the 
alliance,  however,  was  not  known  outside  the  official 
circles.  Again  and  again  questions  had  been  put 
by  curious  members  ot  the  French  Parliament,  but 
the  ministry  had  carefully  avoided  giving  any  pre- 
cise information. 

It  was  not  until  after  the  Bolsheviki  had  begun  to 
publish  the  old  Russian  archives  that  the  French 
government  thought  it  wise  and  fitting  to  let  the  pub- 
lic know  the  exact  nature  ot  the  obligations  that 
bouiui   France   and   Russia  under  the   agreement  of 


14        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

1 89 1.  In  19 1 8  the  French  ministry  issued  its  famous 
Yellow  Book  containing  a  number  of  selected  papers 
bearing  on  the  alliance.  These  have  been  subjected 
to  many  critical  examinations.  A  member  of  the 
Institute,  M.  \Yelschinger,  for  example,  has 
reprinted  most  of  the  papers  and  illuminated  them 
by  invaluable  comment  in  his  L'/lUiance  Franco- 
Riisse.  In  this  small  but  valuable  treatise  we  can 
trace  the  history  of  this  fateful  combination  of 
powers. 

Without  going  back  of  1886,  it  appears  that  Kat- 
kof,  the  editor  of  the  Moscozi-  Gazette,  and  Elie  de 
Cyon  began  in  that  year  their  propaganda  for  a 
Franco-Russian  understanding.  We  may  dismiss 
as  hardly  relevant  the  German  accusation  that  Kat- 
kof  received  money  from  de  Lesseps  to  carry  on  his 
operations.  The  next  year,  between  May  and  Dec- 
ember, important  relations  were  established  between 
the  Russian  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Haute- 
Banque  Francaise  which  ended  in  an  arrangement 
with  the  Rothschilds  for  a  grand  debt  conversion 
and  opened  the  French  financial  market  wide  for 
Russian  loans. 

Between  1880  and  1905,  according  to  Welsch- 
inger's  estimates,  at  least  sixteen  Russian  loans  were 
floated  in  France  amounting  all  together  to  about 
twelve  billion  francs,  not  counting  underwritings  for 
many  railways,  banking  institutions,  and  private  en- 
terprises. After  1905  the  amount  was  Increased  by 
still  greater  advances.  "The  success  of  the  Russian 
loan  of  1888,"  remarks  Welschinger,  "facilitated  by 


DIPLOMATIC     KI.VELATIONS  1 5 

the  Credit  Foncier,  had  a  remarkable  effect  upon 
the  concord  so  heartily  desired." 

Newspaper  propaganda  was  under  way.  Finan- 
cial relations  were  being  forged  in  bonds  of  gold. 
The  French  government  sent  a  squadron  to  the 
Baltic  on  a  pleasure  trip,  and  the  Tsar  received  it 
with  a  great  show  of  affection  even  though  it  in- 
vohed  his  standing  hat  in  hand  while  the  Marseil- 
laise, played  by  a  band  of  sansculottes,  beat  upon  his 
imperial  ears  !  At  the  same  time,  General  Boisdeffre, 
of  the  French  general  staff,  attended  the  grand 
Russian  manoeuvres  and  was  delightfully  entertained 
by  his  new  companions-in-arms.  The  Marquis  de 
Brcteuil,  a  French  gentleman  of  the  old  school, 
visited  the  Russian  ambassador  at  a  watering  place 
and  discussed  with  him,  quite  informally  of  course, 
the  idea  of  an  entente  between  the  two  countries. 
Then  the  head  of  the  Russian  foreign  office  wrote,  in 
a  general  way,  that  a  cordial  understanding  between 
the  two  countries  would  be  the  best  guarantee  of 
peace  and  necessary  to  maintain  a  just  balance  of 
Furopean  powers.  The  French  foreign  minister 
replied  favorably,  saying  that  he  was  prepared  to 
''examine  the  suggestions"  on  the  subject  of  an  alli- 
ance as  a  protection  In  case  of  a  threat  of  hostilities 
on  the  part  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

Al  ter  manv  pourparlers  and  much  correspondence, 
the  understanding  was  embodied  In  an  exchange  of 
notes.  tormalK'  concluded  on  August  2r,  iSqi.  The 
text  of  the  document  is  very  short.  The  object  of 
tiic  accord  Is  said  to  be  tlie  maintenance  of  the  gen- 


l6         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

eral  peace.  The  two  governments  agree  to  act  in 
concert  on  every  question  that  threatens  to  put 
peace  in  jeopardy.  They  also  agree  to  discuss  at  once 
the  measures  necessary  for  simultaneous  cooperation 
in  case  of  war/ 

The  gentlemen's  understanding  was  supplemented 
by  conversations  between  representatives  of  the  two 
general  staffs — conversations  which  bore  fruit  in 
a  military  convention  formally  concluded  on  January 
4,  1894.  This  convention  provided  for  combined 
and  instant  operations  in  case  either  of  the  parties 
was  attacked  by  any  of  the  powers  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  for  immediate  mobilization  without  pre- 
liminary notice,  and  for  forward  movements  to  the 
frontiers.  The  number  of  men  to  be  employed 
against  Germany  was  agreed  upon,  future  conferen- 
ces were  provided  for,  a  no-separate-peace  clause 
was  inserted,  the  duration  of  the  convention  was 
fixed  at  the  life  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  strict 
secrecy  was  pledged. 

Fetes,  exchanges  of  visits,  military  conferences, 
felicitations,  and  vague  allusions  to  the  new  friend- 
ship between  France  and  Russia  followed  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  agreements.  There  was  an  abundance  of 
conversations  and  correspondence.     But  no  one  out- 

1  Tliis  remained  a  secret  until  1918.  As  late  as  1916,  a  pro- 
fessional >tudent  of  European  diplomacy,  Professor  Hayes,  had  to 
write  of  this  alliance:  "Of  the  exact  steps  by  which  the  friendship 
of  the  two  nations  was  transformed  into  a  defensive  alliance 
between  the  two  governments  little  is  actually  known,  but  it  ap- 
pears that  a  diplomatic  protocol  for  an  alliance  ^vas  signed  in  1891 
and  that  a  military  convention  was  agreed  upon  in  1S94."  If  this 
is  what  a  careful  >cho!ar  could  find  out  about  the  alliance,  what 
must   the  a\'eragc  French  or  Russian   soldier  have  known  about  It? 


niri.DMAric'    rkv illations  17 

side  of  the  official  circles  knew  just  what  had  taken 
place.  Wise  men  exchanged  knowing  looks  and  ciid 
all  that  they  could  to  strengthen  the  tics  thus  formed. 
The  French  purse  was  opened  wide  to  Russian  bor- 
rowers. The  Paris  police  were  more  active  in  ap- 
prehending Russian  refugees  from  justice.  Criticism 
of  the  Russian  autocracy  was  outlawed  in  polite 
circles. 

As  time  went  on  it  occurred  to  French  diplomats 
that  the  accord  was  not  exactly  in  the  precise  terms 
which  the  situation  demanded.  In  the  summer  of 
1S99  xM.  Delcassc  broached  the  subject  in  a  conver- 
sation with  the  Tsar.  FIc  pointed  out  two  very 
significant  things:  First,  that  the  accord  was  a 
purely  defensive  one,  directed  against  the  Triple 
Alliance  and  designed  merely  to  maintain  the  peace 
of  Furopc,  and  secondly,  that  the  military  conven- 
tion would  come  to  an  end  with  a  dissolution  of  the 
Triple  Alliance.  The  interesting  suggestions  pro- 
foundly impressed  the  Tsar,  especially  as  W.  Del- 
cassc accompanied  them  by  these  ingenious  reflec- 
tions: "What  would  happen  if  the  Triple  Alliance 
should  be  dissohed  otherwise  than  by  the  will  of 
its  members;  if,  for  example,  the  I^mperor  Francis 
Joseph,  who  appears  at  the  moment  to  be  the  sole 
bond  of  unicm  between  the  rival,  yes,  belligerent, 
races  of  Austria-I  Tungarv,  should  suddenly  die;  it 
Austria  were  menaced  by  a  dislocation  which  per- 
haps is  desired  in  some  quarters,  which  perhaps  one 
might  la\-or,  and  in  which  one,  in  any  case,  might 
be  led  to  wisli  to  take  part?  What  matter  is  more 
likely   to  break   the   general   peace   and  destroy  the 


l8        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

European  balance  of  power?  And  what  matter 
more  seriously  requires  the  union  of  France  and 
Russia  not  only  in  the  same  design  but  in  its  execu- 
tion? Now  it  is  exactly  at  the  precise  hour  when 
the  military  convention  should  come  into  play  that 
it  ceases  to  exist;  born  of  the  Triple  Alliance  it  would 
vanish  with  it." 

The  argument  of  M.  Delcasse,  the  implications  of 
which  are  too  patent  to  call  for  comment,  touched  the 
Tsar  in  a  tender  spot.  An  exchange  of  notes  was 
at  once  begun  ending  in  a  revision  of  the  accord  of 
1 89 1.  The  original  understanding  stated  that 
France  and  Russia  were  desirous  of  maintaining  the 
general  peace;  the  revision  of  1899  adds  "and  the 
equilibrium  of  the  European  powers."  The  orig- 
inal military  compact  provided  that  it  should  last 
as  long  as  the  Triple  Alliance;  the  revision  of  1899 
stipulates  that  it  shall  remain  in  force  as  long  as  the 
diplomatic  agreement  concluded  for  the  purpose  of 
safeguarding  the  common  and  permanent  interests  of 
the  two  countries. 

From  year  to  year  the  military  bonds  of  the  high 
contracting  parties  were  strengthened  by  numerous 
conversations.  Finally,  in  19 12,  the  Tsar  expressed 
to  the  French  ambassador  his  desire  for  a  naval  con- 
vention drawn  along  the  lines  of  the  military  under- 
standing. The  appropriate  negotiations  were  held 
and  in  midsummer  the  new  document  was  signed. 
This  agreement  provided  for  naval  co-operation  in 
case  of  war.  The  details  were  to  be  worked  out 
by  supplementary  conversations.  The  proper 
naval  authorities  were  instructed  to  study  the  vari- 


DIPLOMATIC    REVELATIONS  19 

ous  hypotheses  of  war,  to  correspond  directly,  to 
arrange  strategic  programs,  and  to  keep  their 
affairs  under  the  bond  of  secrecy. 

In  the  light  of  what  we  now  know  of  the  Russo- 
French  alliance,  of  the  modifications  made  in  the 
text  in  1899,  ^"J  of  the  long  military  negotiations, 
between  the  two  powers,  the  debates  that  arose  in 
the  French  Parliament  from  time  to  time  between 
1 89 1  and  1 9 14  on  the  fateful  agreement  take  on  a 
new  significance.  More  than  once,  members  of  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies  attempted  to  draw  the  min- 
isters out  on  the  question  of  the  exact  relations  es- 
tablished by  the  understanding.  In  November, 
1896,  M.  Millerand  asked  whether  it  was  a  simple 
treaty  or  a  military  convention  that  bound  the  two 
countries  and  what  were  the  extent  and  bearing  of 
the  agreement.  In  the  midst  of  considerable  dis- 
turbance he  expressed  astonishment  that  he,  a 
deputy,  was  not  permitted  to  inquire  about  the  na- 
ture of  the  accord.  "Is  the  republic,"  he  exclaimed, 
"the  government  of  the  people  bound  to  hand  over 
to  a  few  men  the  uncontested  direction  of  its  des- 
tiny?" M.  Jaures  said  that  It  followed  from  the 
uniform  silence  of  the  minister  on  the  subject  that 
the  treaty  was  an  illusion  or  more  likely  that  the  gov- 
ernment of  France  had  lost  the  right  to  speak  freely 
to  PVance.  The  minister  of  foreign  affairs  replied 
simply  that  the  country  and  all  reasonable  statesmen 
approved  the  Russian  policy.  He  added  that  every- 
thing that  could  and  should  be  safely  said  In  public 
had  already  been  said.  He  refused  to  go  into  de- 
tails and  the  Chamber  approved  his  reticence. 


20        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Two  years  later  another  debate  arose.  Again 
M.  Millerand  and  M.  Jaures  wanted  to  know  the 
exact  nature  of  the  treaty.  Once  more  the  minister 
of  foreign  affairs  replied  simply  in  generalities.  He 
told  them  that  it  was  impossible  to  make  known  the 
terms  of  the  entente — the  facts  spoke  so  loudly 
that  it  was  not  necessary  to  say  anything  more. 
For  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  that  laconic  remark 
was  sufficient  to  warrant  a  vote  of  approval. 

Thirteen  years  more  elapsed.  Momentous 
events  had  taken  place.  All  members  of  the  inner 
circle  knew  that  Europe  trembled  on  the  verge  of 
a  crisis.  On  April  6,  191 1,  a  stormy  debate  arose 
in  the  Senate.  Pacifists  assailed  the  treaty  as  a 
cause  of  war.  Intransigents  wanted'  to  know 
whether  the  treaty  had  not  merely  guaranteed  the 
status  quo  to  the  advantage  of  Germany.  That 
was  a  delicate  subject,  but  the  minister  of  foreign 
affairs  did  not  shrink  from  it.  He  replied  hotly 
that  the  treaty  did  not  merely  guarantee  the  status 
quo  but  covered  all  eventualities  and  permitted  the 
contracting  parties  to  conceal  their  policies  and 
draw  all  possible  advantages  from  the  concert.  He 
warned  them  that  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
would  have  to  be  settled  before  the  pacifist  idea  of 
general  arbitration  could  be  adopted — a  statement 
which  brought  the  assembly  to  its  feet.  "We  are 
pacific,"  he  declared,  "but  we  say  that  too  often 
and  sometimes  too  loudly."  Pie  closed  by  telling 
them  that  France  would  be  firm  in  respecting  all 
rights  and  equally  firm  In  discharging  all  her  duties. 
Once  more  the  answer  of  the  minister  proved  satis- 


DIPLOMATIC     RF.VELA  riOXS  2  1 

factory  to  the  great  majority  of  his  colleagues.  The 
grand  alliance   remained  curtained   in  darkness. 

Running  through  the  serried  documents  is  the 
thread  of  the  lost  provinces.  I'he  Tsar  once  re- 
marked to  M.  tie  Montebello:  ''1  often  hear 
people  speak  of  the  ideas  of  revanche  which  exist 
among  you  and  are  used  as  a  menace.  I  see  no  justi- 
fication for  that.  You  would  not  be  good  French- 
men if  you  did  not  cherish  the  thought  that  a  day 
will  come  in  which  you  may  enter  into  possession 
of  your  lost  provinces;  but  between  that  sentiment 
and  the  idea  of  a  provocation  to  realize  it  there 
is  a  great  distance,  and  you  have  proved  it  many 
times — and  have  proved  it  again — that  you  wish 
peace  abo\'e  all  and  that  you  know  how  to  wait  with 
dignity."  While  the  negotiations  were  on  between 
the  military  men  ot  the  two  countries,  the  Russian 
representative  frankly  asked  this  question:  "When 
you  once  have  your  military  convention  signed  will 
you  not  precipitate  things  and  make  war?''  It  was 
for  that  very  reason  that  the  Tsar  once  insisted  on 
a  provision  declaring  the  treaty  void  if  war  was 
provoked  by  France;  but  his  tears  seem  to  have  been 
allayed — to  some  extent,  as  the  above  remark  im- 
plied. 

In  the  course  of  the  debates  in  the  French  Parlia- 
riicnt,  the  same  theme  came  up  in  various  forms. 
In  1896,  M.  Millerand  wanted  to  know  what  ad- 
\'antages  had  been  secured  in  return  tor  the  engage- 
iiients  \\itli  ixussia  anil  whether  obligations  ot  ac- 
ti\e  tnendship  had  been  imposeel  on  the  new  ally. 
I  le    bluntly    asked    whether    it    was    necessary    tor 


22         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

France  to  resign  herself  to  the  acceptance  of  the 
fait  accompli — making  an  evident  allusion  to  Alsace- 
Lorraine  that  called  forth  great  applause.  He  was 
especially  eager  to  know  whether  the  country  in- 
curred the  risk  of  being  abandoned  in  an  hour  of 
grave  danger.  In  the  later  debates,  the  same  burn- 
ing issue  arose  and  the  minister  for  foreign  affairs, 
while  refusing  to  be  precise,  gave  his  auditors  to 
understand  that  the  accord  with  Russia  did  not  pro- 
vide for  a  mere  guarantee  of  the  status  quo,  but 
for  all  eventualities.  It  was  not  necessary  to  say 
more. 

FRANCO-RUSSIAN     DIPLO  M  A  T  I  C 

NEGOTIATIONS, 

I  9   I   2  -  I  9   I  4 

Such  was  the  union  between  France  and  Russia 
when  the  latter  decided,  in  1908,  upon  a  liquida- 
tion of  the  Austro-Hungarian  empire;  but  for  the 
moment  the  outlook  at  Paris  was  not  favorable. 
It  was  not  until  19 12  that  the  Russian  diplomats 
at  work  on  the  new  forward  policy  found  condi- 
tions in  France  somewhat  in  line  with  their  purposes. 
In  that  year  there  came  a  turn  in  French  affairs. 
The  action  of  Germany  in  forcing  a  readjustment  of 
the  Moroccan  estate  in  191 1,  aroused  France  and 
was  represented  in  the  intransigent  French  press  as 
a  piece  of  brutal  aggression.  In  January,  19 12,  the 
Caillaux  cabinet,  committed  to  a  policy  of  friendly 
relations  with  Germany,  was  forced  out  of  office, 
and  there  then  came  to  power  M.  Raymond  Poin- 
care,  an  avowed  champion  of  peace,   "united  with 


DIPLOMATIC     REVKLATIOXS  23 

firmness  and  preparedness."  An  eminent  French 
publicist,  M.  Alhin  remarks  of  M.  I'oincare: 
"From  his  clear  and  trained  mind,  from  his  firm 
will,  from  his  character  as  a  Lorrainer,  little  given 
to  accommodations,  I'Vancc  expected  enlightened  di- 
rection, a  beneficent  influence  on  political  e\"ents, 
and  in  foreign  affairs  a  firm  and  active  policy  worthy 
of  the  past  of  France,  worthy  of  the  role  she  had 
played  in  the  world  and  of  the  place  she  should 
occupy  in  the  future.  .  .  .  As  the  result  of  a  coin- 
cidence ciue  to  no  mere  play  of  ministerial  combina- 
tions, AL  Poincare,  at  the  same  time,  took  charge 
of  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs."  I\)r  a  year 
yi.  Poincare  directed  the  French  foreign  policv  as 
prime  minister.  Then  he  was  elected  President  and 
for  seven  years  more  exerted  a  powerful  influence 
on  French  foreign  and  domestic  policies. 

It  is  evident  from  the  documents  taken  from 
the  Russian  archives  and  published  to  the  world, 
that  M.  Poincare  took  an  active,  rather  than  a  pas- 
sive, attitude  in  the  matter  of  Russian  relations.  If 
the  Russian  ambassador  at  Paris  had  found  nego- 
tiations difficult  before  19 12,  he  had  no  reascMi  to 
complain  upon  the  installation  of  M.  Poincare. 
ShortU'  alter  the  latter  became  prime  minister  and 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  M.  ls\()lski,  the  f'sar's 
representative  in  I'rance,  wrote  home  a  \ery  illumi- 
nating letter  to  the  effect  that  the  new  Trench 
leader  was  taking  the  initiati\-e  and  that  Russia 
should  by  all  means  meet  him  half  way.  A  part 
of  this  note  follows:  "M.  Poincare  has  several 
times   asked   me   what  1    know   about   tlie   exchange 


24         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

of  opinions  concerning  Balkan  affairs  which,  ac- 
cording to  reports  in  the  newspapers  and  those  com- 
ing from  other  sources,  had  taken  place  between 
you  and  the  Vienna  cabinet;  in  connection  with  this, 
he  reminded  me  once  more  of  his  readiness  at  al- 
most any  moment  to  enter  into  negotiations  con- 
cerning these  matters  and  gave  me  to  understand 
that  he  expects  us  to  give  him  the  same  thorough 
information  concerning  our  negotiations  with 
Vienna  that  he  had  received  from  the  London  cabi- 
net after  the  journey  of  Lord  Haldane  to  Berlin. 
I  write  all  this  to  you  in  the  fullest  sincerity,  for 
it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  above  all  important  to  keep 
in  mind  and  to  meet  half  way  the  purposes  which 
M.  Poincare  expressed  to  me  upon  his  entrance  into 
office.  The  present  prime  minister  and  minister  for 
foreign  affairs  is  an  exceedingly  great  personality 
and  his  cabinet  shows  itself  as  the  strongest  com- 
bination of  power  that  has  existed  for  a  long  period 
of  years." 

Later  in  the  same  year,  M.  Isvolski  wrote  home 
a  very  important  letter.  He  had  it  from  M.  Poin- 
care that,  in  the  event  of  a  crisis  in  the  Balkans, 
such  as  an  attack  by  Austria  on  Serbia,  Russia 
would  receive  "the  most  sincere  and  most  energetic 
support"  from  France  during  the  diplomatic  stage 
of  the  negotiations.  In  this  stage,  M.  Poincare 
had  said,  the  French  ministry  would  not  have  the 
support  of  Parliament  or  of  public  opinion,  but  that 
was  only  the  preliminary.  M.  Poincare  went  on  to 
add  that  if  diplomatic  negotiations  led  by  Russia 
resulted  in  armed  intervention  on  the  part  of  Ger- 


DIPLOMATIC    REVELATIONS  25 

many,  France  "would  not  hesitate  a  minute  in  ful- 
filling her  obligations  towards  Russia."  This  letter 
which  flashes  light  into  the  Balkan  darkness  must 
be  reproduced  at  length : 

"M.  Poincarc  told  me  that  the  French  govern- 
ment is  first  of  all  considering  the  question  of  pos- 
sible international  eventualities.  It  quite  realizes 
that  this  or  that  event,  as  for  instance,  the  destruc- 
tion of  Bulgaria  by  Turkey  or  an  attack  upon  Serbia 
by  Austria  might  force  Russia  to  give  up  its  passive 
attitude  and  first  take  diplomatic  steps,  to  be  fol- 
lowed afterwards  by  military  measures  against  Tur- 
key or  Austria.  According  to  assurances  received 
by  us  from  the  French  government  we  can  in  such  a 
case  count  upon  the  most  sincere  and  most  energetic 
diplomatic  support  on  the  part  of  France.  In  this 
phase  of  events,  the  government  of  the  Republic 
would  not  be  in  a  position,  however,  to  obtain  the 
sanction  of  Parliament  or  of  public  opinion  for 
any  active  military  measures.  If  the  conflict  with 
Austria,  however,  should  result  in  an  armed  inter- 
ference on  the  part  of  Germany,  France  would,  as 
a  matter  of  course,  look  upon  this  as  a  'casus  foe- 
deris' and  not  hesitate  a  minute  to  fulfil  its  obliga- 
tions towards  Russia.  'France,'  M.  Poincarc 
added,  'is  undoubtedly  peaceably  inclined,  neither 
looking  f(^r  war  nor  desiring  it.  If  Germany  goes 
against  Russia,  however,  this  state  of  mind  will 
change  immediately.'  and  he  is  convinced  that  in 
this  case  Parliament,  as  well  as  public  opinion  will 
unaniniouslv  back  the  gcnernnient's  resolution  to 
render  armeil  assistance  to  Russia. 


26        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

"M.  Poincare  further  told  me  that,  in  view  of  the 
critical  position  in  the  Balkans,  the  highest  authori- 
ties of  the  French  Military-Command  are  studying 
with  increasing  attention  all  possible  military 
eventualities  and  it  was  known  to  him  that  expert 
and  responsible  personages  held  an  extremely  op- 
timistic view  of  the  Russo-French  chances  in  case  of 
a  general  collision.  This  optimistic  view  is  based 
on  the  value  attributed  to  the  diversion  exercised 
by  the  united  forces  of  the  Balkan  states,  in  draw- 
ing off  a  corresponding  number  of  Austro-Hun- 
garian  forces.  The  fact  that  Italy  is  deprived  of 
freedom  of  movement,  owing  to  the  African  war 
and  a  special  agreement  with  France,  is  another 
point  in  favor  of  Russia  and  France. 

"As  to  the  position  in  the  Mediterranean,  the 
resolution  just  taken  of  removing  the  third  French 
squadron  from  Brest  to  Toulon  has  enhanced  the 
supremacy  of  the  French  fleet  in  these  waters.  This 
resolution,  M.  Poincare  added,  has  been  taken  in 
concurrence  with  England  and  forms  the  further  de- 
velopment and  completion  of  the  agreements  for- 
merly concluded  between  the  French  and  British 
naval  staffs." 

A  few  weeks  later  in  the  same  year,  the  Russian 
ambassador  at  Paris  wrote  home  again,  this  time  in 
a  more  decisive  tone,  reporting  a  conversation  with 
M.  Poincare.  Here  is  the  important  part  of  the 
Communication:  "  'It  is  for  Russia,'  he  remarked 
to  me,  to  take  the  initiative  in  a  question  [the 
Austro-Scrbian  affair]  in  which  she  is  interested 
above  all  others;  whilst  it  is  France's  task  to  give 


DIPLOMATIC    REVKLA'I  IONS  27 

her  full  and  active  support.  If  the  French  gov- 
ernment were  to  take  the  initiative  itself,  it  would 
either  run  the  risk  of  exceeding  the  intentions  of 
its  ally  or  of  not  doing  them  full  justice.  .  .  .  All 
in  all,'  Poincare  added,  'this  means  that  if  Russia 
makes  war  France  will  also  make  war,  because  we 
know  that  Germany  will  stand  by  Austria  in  this 
question.'  In  answer  to  my  inquiry  whether  he 
knew  England's  view  in  this  matter,  Poincare  said, 
that  according  to  his  information,  the  London  cabi- 
net would  for  the  moment  confine  itself  to  promis- 
ing Russia  its  entire  diplomatic  support,  but  that 
this  would  not  under  certain  conditions  exclude  more 
energetic  assistance." 

It  Is  no  doubt  hazardous  to  draw  conclusions  from 
these  documents,  but  two  or  three  seem  to  be  un- 
avoidable. Russia  decided  early  in  1908  on  an 
active  policy  which  could  not  fail  to  lead  to  a  clash 
with  Austria.  France  later  gave  her  a  free  hand 
either  without  knowing  what  the  program  of  St. 
Petersburg  really  was  or  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
policy  and  the  consequences.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  French  prime  minister  told  Russia  to  take 
the  initiative  and  promised  active  diplomatic  sup- 
port. It  is  clear  also  that  the  French  prime 
minister  was  aware  that  this  might  lead  to  a  general 
war  by  drawing  In  Germany  and  Involving  France. 
It  may  be  that  circumstances  warranted  M.  Poin- 
care in  following  this  line,  but  one  thing  is  certain: 
nobody  In  France  outside  of  the  diplomatic  circle 
knew  what  commitments  were  being  maile — com- 
mitments fraught  with  such  agony  for  mankind. 


II 

DIPLOMATIC    REVELATIONS:     ENGLISH 
UNDERSTANDINGS 

STUDENTS  of  European  politics  who  watched 
the    drift    of    English    foreign    policy   between 
1898  and  19 14  were  well  aware  of  certain  marked 
tendencies.     By  an  alliance  with  Japan  consummated 
in  1902,  by  a  treaty  with  France  concluded  in  1904, 
clearing  up   all  points  of  controversy  between  the 
two  countries,  and  by  a  treaty  with  Russia  signed 
in    1907    settling   disputed   questions,   England  had 
removed  a   number  of  dangerous  issues  in  foreign 
affairs.      In  defending  the  Japanese  alliance  against 
the   advocates   of  isolation,    Lord   Lansdowne   said 
in  1902:      "What  do  we  see  on  all  sides?     We  ob- 
serv^e  a  tendency  to  ever-increasing  naval  and  mili- 
tary  armaments    involving   ever-increasing   burdens 
upon  the  people  for  the  defence  of  whose  countries 
these   armaments   are   accumulated.      There   is   also 
this — that  in  these  days  war  breaks  out  with  a  sud- 
denness which  was  unknown  in   former  days  when 
nations  were   not,   as   they  are  now,   armed   to  the 
teeth  and  ready  to  enter  upon  hostilities  at  any  mo- 
ment.  ...    If  there  be  no  countervailing  objections, 
the  country  which  has  the  good  fortune  to  possess 
allies  is  more  to  be  envied  than  the  country  which  is 
without  them.''      The  renewal  of  the  Japanese  alli- 

28 


KXCLISII     INDKRSTAN'DINGS  29 

ance  in  another  form  in  1907  became  doubly  signif- 
icant, because  within  a  period  of  a  few  months  the 
world  learned  of  the  continuance  of  the  Anglo- 
Japanese  arrangements  and  the  formation  of  a 
Franco-Japanese,  a  Russo-Japanese,  and  an  Anglo- 
Russian  agreement.  There  were  in  addition,  as 
wc  now  know,  secret  treaties  and  negotiations  be- 
tween Russia  anci  Japan,  with  England's  consent, 
which  had  a  vital  relation  to  the  alignment  of  mili- 
tary and  naval  powers  for  the  Cjreat  War.  But 
English  statesmen  denied  all  allegations  to  the  effect 
that  these  arrangements  were  connected  with  a  de- 
liberate policy  of  "encircling"  Germany.  They 
said  at  the  time  that  all  these  agreements  grew  out 
of  the  laudable  desire  of  England  to  be  at  peace 
with  the  world  and  clear  away  all  possible  sources 
of  misunderstantlings  with  neighboring  powers. 

SIR      EDWARD     GREY     ()  V     Til  E 
A  X  G  I.  O  -  E  R  i;  X  C  H      I'.  X  T  i:  X  T  E 

It  was  known  in  19 14,  however,  that  England's 
understandings  with  France  had  gone  beyond  mere 
cordiality,  for  the  Moroccan  crises  of  1906  and 
191  I  had  revealed  a  close  cooperation  of  the  two 
powers  in  the  dealings  with  (iermany.  Still  the  ex- 
act character  of  the  relations  between  the  two  coun- 
tries was  shrcnided  in  mystery.  The  naturally  sus- 
picious in  l-'nghind  thought  that  some  positive  agree- 
ments as  to  cooperation  in  war  had  been  secretly 
made.  \  here  were  rumors  in  the  press  to  that 
effect  and  more  than  once  the  matter  came  up  tor 
dis.;ussion  in  I'arlianicnt.      In  March,    1913.  \or  ex- 


30    CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

ample,  a  responsible  statesman,  Lord  Hugh  Cecil, 
put  the  question  very  bluntly  to  the  government: 
"There  is  a  very  general  belief  that  this  country 
is  under  an  obligation,  not  a  treaty  obligation,  but 
an  obligation  arising  owing  to  an  assurance  given  by 
the  Ministry  in  the  course  of  diplo'matic  negotia- 
tions, to  send  a  very  large  armed  force  out  of  this 
country  to  operate  in  Europe.  This  is  the  general 
belief."  To  this  clear-cut  query  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter, Mr.  Asquith,  made  a  categorical  reply:  "I 
ought  to  say  that  it  is  not  true." 

Twice  during  the  next  year  the  question  was 
again  raised  as  to  ( i )  whether  the  country  was  free 
from  all  obligations  to  engage  in  military  operations 
on  the  continent,  and  (2)  whether  there  \rere  any 
unpublished  agreements  with  Russia  or  France  which 
would  "restrain  or  hamper"  the  freedom  of  the  gov- 
ernment or  the  Parliament  in  making  a  decision 
about  taking  part  in  a  European  war.  On  both  oc- 
casions the  answer  of  the  responsible  ministers  was 
emphatically  in  the  negative.  The  world  was 
given  the  impression  that  there  was  no  obligation 
on  the  part  of  England  to  come  to  the  aid  of  France 
on  the  continent  and  that  no  understandings  existed 
with  either  Russia  or  France  which  in  any  way 
bound,  restricted,  or  hampered  the  government  and 
Parliament  of  England  in  case  a  crisis  arose  in 
Europe. 

When  on  August  3,  19  14,  the  great  decision  had 
to  be  taken.  Sir  I'.dward  Grey,  in  his  memorable 
plea  for  the  support  of  France,  rc\ealed  for  the 
first  time  the  nature  of  the  conversations  and  un- 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  31 

derstandings  that  had  been  drawing  the  two  coun- 
tries together  during  the  previous  ten  years.  He 
explained  how  the  French  admiralty,  on  the  basis 
of  its  belief  in  English  friendship  and  the  arrange- 
ments made  with  the  English  admiralty,  had  con- 
centrated its  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean  and  left 
the  Atlantic  coast  of  France  undefended  and  how 
the  day  before  he  had  assured  France  that,  if  the 
German  fleet  came  out,  England  would  protect  the 
defenceless  ports  across  the  channel.  He  explained 
how  nav^al  conversations  extending  over  many  years 
had  prepared  for  the  immediate  and  effective  co- 
operation of  the  two  powers  in  case  of  war.  But, 
he  added,  it  had  always  been  understood  that  these 
consultations  did  not  "restrict  the  freedom  of  either 
government  to  decide  at  any  future  time  whether  or 
not  to  assist  the  other  by  armed  force."  What, 
therefore,  was  the  nature  of  the  obligation?  On 
this  point,  Sir  Edward  said:  "How  far  that  entails 
an  obligation,  let  every  man  look  into  his  own  heart 
and  his  own  feelings  and  construe  the  extent  of  the 
obligation  for  himself.  I  construe  it  myself  as 
I  feel  it,  but  I  do  not  wish  to  urge  upon  anyone  else 
more  than  their  feelings  dictate  as  to  what  they 
should  feel  about  the  obligation." 

To  say  the  least,  this  was  a  most  extraordinary 
statement.  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  been  carrying  on 
secret  negotiations  and  conversations  with  France 
for  many  years.  Complete  plans  for  the  landing 
of  English  troops  on  tlie  continent  had  been  made 
and  the  disposal  of  tlic  naval  forces  of  the  two 
countries  had  been   agreed  upon.      In  the  presence 


32   CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

of  a  crisis  Sir  Edward  had  to  reveal  them  for  the 
first  time  to  an  astounded  Parhament.      He  pointed 
out  that  in  the  written  records  of  the  negotiations 
and  understandings,  full  freedom  of  action  had  been 
reserved.     Nevertheless,   some  kind   of  an   obliga- 
tion existed.      Its  extent  he  left  to  the  consciences 
of  the  gentlemen  who  just  heard  of  it  for  the  first 
time  in,  their  lives — gentlemen  who  in  the  crisis  had 
but  one  choice  left  to  them.      As  for  himself,  he  felt 
that    England    now    had    obligations    of    friendship 
with    France    that    compelled    cooperation    in    war. 
Still,  he  did  not  "wish  to  urge  upon  any  one  else 
more   than   their   feelings   dictate   as   to   what  they 
should  feel  about  the  obligation."     Whatever  view 
one  takes  of  this  amazing  revelation,  one  must  admit 
that  it  makes  strange  reading  beside  the  statement, 
made  by  the  same  speaker  earlier  in  that  very  year, 
to  the  effect  that  "there  were  no  unpublished  agree- 
ments which  would  restrict  or  hamper  the  freedom 
of    the    government    or    of    Parliament    to    decide 
whether  or  not  Great  Britain  should  participate  in 
a  war." 

Judgments  upon  Sir  Edward  Grey's  revelations 
have  varied.  A  highly  critical  English  writer,  Mr, 
E.  D.  Morel,  in  attacking  what  he  regards  as  the 
bitter  fruit  of  secret  diplomacy,  summarizes  his 
opinion  of  the  "conversations"  arranged  secretly 
under  Sir  Edward's  management  as  follows: 
"These  particular  'conversations'  meant  the  elabora- 
tion of  an  entire  plan  of  campaign,  replete  in  every 
detail,  affecting  the  disembarkation  and  transport 
over    rail   and    road   of   an   expeditionary   force   of 


ENGLISH     UXDKRSTANDIXGS  33 

1 61;, 000  men — or  whatever  the  exact  number  may 
have  been — with  enormous  quantities  of  cannon, 
horses,  motors,  waggonsr,  stores,  and  all  the  impedi- 
menta of  a  modern  army.  As  with  the  military,  so 
with  the  naval   'c(Miversations.' 

"You  may  speak  of  an  understanding;  whereby 
France  concentrated  her  Heet  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  left  her  western  and  northern  coast  line  unde- 
fended, in  order  to  leave  us  freer  to  concentrate 
in  the  North  Sea  as  a  'conversation'  of  no  bindinLj; 
force  until  authorized  by  Parliament.  But  this  is 
the  sort  of  conversation  which  decides  the  destinies 
of  nations,  and  when  carried  on  in  secret  leaves 
the  nations  concerned  entirely  helpless  to  control  the 
outcome.  The  secret  conversations  begun  in  1906 
and  thenceforth  persisted  in  constituted  morally 
speaking  a  pledge  given  to  France  by  the  most 
powerful  personalities  in  the  British  Liberal  minis- 
try to  join  with  France  In  the  event  of  a  war  be- 
tween France  and  her  only  potential  foe.  (jcrmany. 
Materially  speaking  they  constituted  an  Anglo- 
French  military  and  naval  alliance.  I  can  under- 
stand the  argument  which  says  that  it  was  right  to 
gi\-e  that  pledge.  I  can  even  understand  the  argu- 
ment which  says  that  it  was  right,  having  given  that 
pledge,  to  deny  to  the  1  louse  of  Commons  that  it 
had  been  gixen.  But  1  do  not  understand  the  argu- 
ment wliich  sa\s  that  the  moral  obligation  and  the 
material  fact  alike  meant  nothing,  until  at  the 
ele\'enth  hour  the  House  ot  Commons  became  aware 
ot   both  and  endorsed  them." 

A'lother   l-',nglish  writer,  at  the  opposite  pole  of 


34        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

opinion  from  Mr.  Morel,  namely,  Lord  Esher,  in 
his  book  on  Lord  Kitchener,  speaking  of  this  curi- 
ous "obligation"  revealed  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  on 
August  3,  says:  "To  Mr.  Asquith  the  nation  owes 
the  redemption  of  its  honor,  for  although  he  re- 
pudiated the  assumption  of  a  definite  agreement  with 
France,  he  has  been  credited  by  the  French  ambas- 
sador, M.  Cambon,  with  the  fixed  determination  of 
fulfilling  the  moral  obligation  to  that  country  to 
come  to  her  assistance  in  case  of  an  unprovoked 
attack  when  the  occasion  arose;  for  the  obligation, 
as  Mr.  Asquith  knew  well,  was  the  inevitable  sequel 
to  the  conversations  which  had  been  carried  on  be- 
tween the  General  Staffs  of  the  two  Armies  for  some 
years.  Foch,  then  but  little  known  in  England,  had 
been  present  in  London  at  some  of  these  confer- 
ences, where  his  influence  permeated  the  discussions 
of  the  principal  Staff  Officers  of  the  War  Office. 
He  also  acquired  even  great  influence  over  the  mind 
of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  of  Russia  and  had 
planned  with  him  the  opening  moves  of  a  defensive 
war  on  the  Eastern  battle  front.  .  .  .  The  Ger- 
man invasion  of  Belgium,  although  it  made  no  vital 
difference  to  the  resolve  already  taken  by  Asquith 
and  Grey,  preserved  the  unity  of  the  nation,  if  not 
the  integrity  of  the  government." 

THE    ANGLO-RUSSIAN    UNDER- 
STANDING 

None  of  the  entanglements  woven  in  Europe  dur- 
ing the  years  preceding  the  Great  War  proved  to 
be  more  fateful  than  those  uniting  Russia  and  Eng- 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  35 

land.  None  of  them  was  more  secret.  None  of 
them  seemed  so  unnatural.  Nowhere  in  Europe  did 
the  Tsar's  autocratic  government  receive  such  exe- 
crations as  in  London  and  nowhere  were  the  exiles 
from  his  terrible  wrath  more  cordially  welcomed. 
There  was  of  course  a  general  rejoicing  in  1907 
when  it  was  announced  that  England  and  Russia, 
historic  enemies,  had  signed  a  treaty  disposing  of 
their  quarrels  in  Southern  Asia  and  delimiting  their 
spheres  of  influence  in  Persia.  Liberals,  devoted 
to  peace,  retrenchment,  and  reform,  could  not  do 
otherwise  than  approve.  People  of  pacific  tenden- 
cies and  delusions  hailed  the  treaty  as  new  proof 
that  the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  was  taking 
the  place  of  the  cruel  arbitrament  of  war.  Sea- 
soned diplomats  in  London,  Paris,  Berlin,  and  St. 
Petersburg,  however,  knew  that  the  treaty  had  an 
entirely  different  meaning  and  bearing. 

Between  1907  and  19 14  Anglo-Russian  friend- 
ship was  made  manifest  by  the  usual  exchange  of 
visits  and  speeches  of  felicitation  on  ceremonial  oc- 
casions. Still  it  was  not  believed  in  hZngland,  out- 
side of  the  government  group  at  least,  that  any 
commitments  had  been  made.  Lideed  the  hatred 
of  English  Liberals  for  autocratic  Russia  was  so 
marked  that  intelligent  observers  did  not  dream 
that  the  English  government  would  favor  Russia 
rather  than  Germany  in  the  ordinary  course  of 
e\-ents.  In  the  spring  of  1914,  however,  persistent 
rumors  were  afloat  to  the  efiect  that  some  kind  of  an 
understanding  or  alliance  had  been  concluded  with 
Russia  iru'olving  commitments  of  a  military  charac- 


36        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

ter.  These  rumors  seemed  so  well  authenticated  that 
direct  questions  were  put  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  the 
House  of  Commons.  With  diplomatic  correctness, 
Sir  Edward  replied  cautiously  that  "there  were  no 
unpublished  agreements  with  European  powers  apt 
to  restrain  or  hamper  the  free  decision  of  the  Gov- 
ernment or  Parliament  as  to  whether  England  was 
to  participate  in  a  war  or  not."  This  was,  in  a 
formal  sense  of  the  word,  accurate,  but,  of  course, 
it  meant  one  thing  to  Sir  Edward  and  quite  another 
thing  to  the  minds  of  people  who  knew  nothing  about 
the  diplomatic  operations  of  the  British  govern- 
ment dtiring  the  previous  ten  or  fifteen  years.  Such 
was  the  state  of  public  knowledge  in  England  on 
the  very  eve  of  the  mighty  cataclysm. 

Although  the  English  government  has  not  seen 
fit  to  publish  any  documents  on  Russian  relations 
similar  to  those  issued  by  the  French  government  in 
the  Yellow  Book  of  191  8,  a  great  deal  of  light  has 
been  thrown  upon  Anglo-Russian  relations  by  the 
new  materials  made  public  from  the  Belgian  and 
Russian  archives.  In  these  it  is  possible  to  trace 
with  a  certain  degree  of  accuracy  the  policies  and 
understandings  of  Russia  and  England  between 
1 906  and  1 9 1 4.  In  the  documents  of  the  first  group 
we  have  the  expert  opinions  of  Belgian  diplomats 
stationed  in  Berlin,  Paris,  and  London  as  to  the 
nature  and  significance  of  the  new  entente.  These 
papers  are,  of  course,  neither  Russian  nor  English, 
but  they  give  us  the  sober  and  official  judgment  of 
informed  neutrals.  They  show  how  persons  accus- 
tomed to  deal  with  affairs  of  state  looked  upon  the 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTAXDINGS  37 

new  understanding.  They  are  In  part  founded  upon 
rumor,  but  rather  authentic  rumor. 

The  first  among  them  is  a  letter  of  May  7,  1906, 
from  the  Belgian  ambassador  at  Paris,  which  throws 
light  upon  the  events  that  led  up  to  the  Anglo- 
Russian  treaty  of  1907.  It  reads:  "The  king  of 
Fngland  left  Paris  to-day  a'fter  having  spent  five 
days  here.  .  .  .  Some  are  pleased  to  ascribe  to  the 
presence  of  the  king  of  I^ngland  in  Paris  another  ob- 
ject and  there  is  reason  for  believing  that  he  wishes 
by  the  mediation  of  France  to  bring  about  a  seri- 
ous rapprochement  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia.  That  new  triple  arrangement,  fortified  by 
the  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance  and  by  the  friendship 
which  Italy  shows  more  and  more  for  France  and 
England,  is  already  viewed,  by  those  who  love  to 
prophesy,  as  an  event  soon  to  be  realized  and  one 
which  will  assure  for  a  new  and  long  period  the  peace 
of  Europe  because  Cjerjiiany,  in  spite  of  the  bad 
spirit  which  she  may  feel,  cannot  oppose  effectively 
the  current  of  ideas  which  now  move  toward  that 
new  political  combination.  If  it  is  regarded  as  a 
certain  pledge  of  peace  by  some,  it  Is  \-Ieu'ed  by 
others  as  such  an  evident  mani testation  of  the  de- 
sire to  isolate,  (lermany  that  she  cannot  fail  to 
search  for  all  possible  means  with  which  to  break 
the  Iron  circle  drawn   about  her." 

The  second  document  is  from  the  Belgian  ambas- 
sador at  Berlin  and  bears  the  date  of  June  S,  1906. 
It  rcHects  tlie  diplomatic  rumors  and  bellets  ot  the 
(ierman  capital  and  gives  an  Impression  ol  the  opin- 


38    CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

ion  current  at  that  strategic  centre.  The  language  of 
the  paper  runs  as  follows:  "In  spite  of  the  friendly 
discourses  of  English  statesmen,  the  visit  of  the 
German  mayors,  and  the  correctness  of  official  re- 
lations, the  attitude  of  the  British  government  does 
not  appear  to  have  changed  since  the  advent  of 
the  Liberal  ministry.  Sir  Edward  Grey  assures 
the  public  that  there  is  no  arrangement  between 
England  and  Russia,  but  evidently  a  rapprochement 
is  being  prepared,  and  is  already  half  accomplished. 
Otherwise  what  would  be  the  significance  of  the  an- 
nouncement of  the  visits  of  the  English  and  Russian 
fleets?  Is  it  on  account  of  the  soundness  of  Russian 
credit  that  the  English  market,  hitherto  closed 
to  Russian  loans,  has  just  been  opened?  What 
can  England  hope  or  fear  from  a  country  paralysed 
by  long  years  of  military  disaster  and  by  a  revolu- 
tion the  outcome  of  which  cannot  be  foreseen?  As 
has  been  said  with  reason  the  dominant  thought  of 
the  English  statesmen  favorable  to  a  rapprochement 
with  Russia  seems  to  be  to  complete  and  to  maintain 
the  isolation  of  Germany."^ 

As  to  the  early  operations  of  the  Anglo-Russian 
entente,  which  grew  out  of  the  treaty  of  1907,  the 

1  An  economic  background  is  given  in  thi';  extract  from  a  letter 
written  by  the  Belgian  ambassador  in  London  on  April  aS,  1906: 
"The  English  portion  of  the  Russian  loan  has  been  co\ered  in 
London  without  difficulty  by  the  aid  of  the  house  of  Baring 
Brothers.  It  is  learned  from  a  well-informed  source  that  the 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  semi-officially,  has  urged  high  finance 
in  the  capital  to  sustain  the  loan  for  a  political  object  with  a  vie\v 
to  improving  relations  with  Russia.  The  Anglo-Russian  en- 
tente is  in  the  air.  There  is  talk  of  mutual  assurances  to  be 
exchanged   between   London   and    St.   Petersburg." 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  39 

documents  published  from  the  Russian  archives  do 
little  more  than  illustrate  what  was  well  known 
in  19  14.  A  note  written  by  the  Russian  ambassador 
in  London  on  January  28,  1909,  while  the  Bos- 
nian crisis  was  distracting  Europe,  contains  a  state- 
ment that  Sir  Edward  Grey  "has  declared  to  Cam- 
bon  that  he  wishes  to  inform  the  French  govern- 
ment that  the  London  cabinet  has  promised  the 
Russian  government  its  diplomatic  support  in  the 
question  of  the  compensation  of  Serbia  and  Monte- 
negro. Grey  tells  me  that  he  has  taken  this  step  in 
order  to  clear  the  situation  of  every  misunderstand- 
ing. .  .  .  The  Serbian  demands  must  be  limited 
as  much  as  possible  in  the  interests  of  peace." 

Supplementing  this  note  are  important  docu- 
ments which  show  how  Russian  diplomats  looked 
upon  the  Balkan  problem  and  especially  the  stroke 
of  Austria-Hungary  in  annexing  Bosnia  and  Herze- 
govina. Minutes  of  the  grand  civil-military  con- 
ferences in  St.  Petersburg  from  1908  onward  prove 
that  nothing  but  the  low  state  of  Russian  military 
forces  after  the  Japanese  w^ar  prevented  the  Tsar's 
foreign  office  from  adopting  an  intransigent  Balkan 
policy  at  once.  English  support  had  already  been 
offered  in  that  connection.  As  weakness  compelled 
Russia  to  accept,  with  a  wry  face,  the  outcome  of 
the  Austrian  maneuver  in  the  autumn  of  1908,  her 
diplomats  decided  that  better  preparations  should 
be  made  for  tuture  exigencies.  On  April  i,  1909, 
the  Russian  ambassador  in  Paris  wrote  home : 
"German  and  Austrian  journals  have  emphasized 
the  success  of  Austrian  diplomacy  and  the  predomi- 


40        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

nant  position  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  in  the  Balkans. 
In  consequence  of  this,  public  opinion,  in  France  as 
well  as  in  England,  demands  more  and  more  a 
greater  rapprochement  between  Russia,  France,  and 
England  as  they  hav'e  already  acted  in  common 
during  the  Austro-Serbian  conflict.  Foreseeing  the 
further  development  of  the  J^uropean  situation, 
many  newspapers  come  to  the  conclusion  that  pre- 
cisely as  Germany  and  Austria  have  now  achieved 
a  brilliant  victory,  so  must  the  two  Western  powers, 
together  with  Russia,  now  pay  their  attention  to 
the  systematic  development  of  their  forces  in  order 
to  be  able,  once  they  are  in  a  position  not  to  fear 
a  challenge  of  the  Triple  Alliance — and  in  this  case 
Italy  would  separate  herself  from  the  Triple  Alliance 
— to  set  up  on  their  part  demands  that  would  re- 
store the  political  balance  which  has  now  been  dis- 
placed in  favour  of  Germany  and  Austria.  The  ex- 
perience of  the  last  five  years  has  shown  that  a  policy 
of  this  sort  need  not  necessarily  lead  to  war." 

In  suggesting  a  closer  agreement  with  England, 
the  same  ambassador  gave  cogent  reasons  of  a 
practical  kind  for  such  a  program.  In  a  report 
of  the  same  date  as  the  above  note  he  said:  "I  he 
movement  of  the  Central  European  states  towards 
the  Mediterranean  is  contrary  not  only  to  our 
own  intentions  but  also  to  the  interests  of  our  allies 
and  friends,  the  French  and  the  English.  The  latter 
are  particularly  concerned  with  protecting  the  road 
from  the  Suez  Canal  to  India  and  deem  it  necessary 
to  oppose  every  effort  to  interfere  with  this  route. 
...    In  view  of  Germany's  position  at  Constanti- 


ENGLISH     rXDERSTANDIXCS  4I 

nople,  the  presence  of  the  German  fleet  in  the 
Mediterranean  wouUl  be  just  as  dangerous  to  Rus- 
sia as  was  the  predominant  position  which  Kng- 
land  occupied  in  Turkey,  until  the  agreement  which 
you  have  concUided  with  London  eliminated  the 
causes  of  possible  conflicts  between  Russia  and  Eng- 
land. All  these  circumstances  show  how  necessary 
it  is  for  us  to  bind  ourselves  still  more  closely  to 
FYance  and  England  in  order  to  oppose  in  common 
the  further  penetration  of  Germany  and  Austria 
into  the  Balkans." 

The  policy  outlined  in  these  notes  expressed  very 
precisely  the  opinions  cherished  in  Russian  Imperial 
circles.  While  huge  sums  of  money  were  borrowed 
in  England  and  France  for  the  reconstructi(m  of 
the  Russian  army  and  navy,  diplomats  redoubled 
their  eftorts  to  seal  more  firmly  Anglo-Russian 
friendship.  In  19 12,  the  year  that  M.  Poincare 
was  installed  as  prime  minister  at  Paris  and  M. 
Isvolski  began  his  remarkable  negotiations  with  the 
French  premier,  another  Russian  diplomat,  M.  Sa- 
zonov,  undertook  1  delicate  mission  to  I'Jigland  to 
discover  the  temper  and  opinion  of  the  English 
government.  The  results  of  his  inquiries  he  re- 
ported to  his  home  government  with  full  knowledge 
that  they  would  be  the  basis  of  serious  antl  momen- 
tous steps  in  St.  Petersburg.  In  one  of  these  reports 
to  the  Tsar,  M.  Sazonov  thus  sums  up  his  findings 
in  England: 

''As  a  general  indication  of  the  feeling  respecting 
Russia  which  I  ha\'e  observed  in  I-'ngland,  I  must 
mention  that  the  leader  of  the  opposition,  Mr.  Bo- 


42         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

nar  Law,  was  also  a  guest  at  Balmoral  for  several 
days  at  the  same  time  as  myself,  I  expressed  to 
him,  amongst  other  things,  my  satisfaction  at  the 
speech  he  had  recently  made  in  the  name  of  the  op- 
position in  the  House  of  Commons  in  which  he  ap- 
proved of  Sir  Edward  Grey's  policy  in  the  sense 
of  a  closer  approach  to  Russia.  In  the  presence  of 
Grey,  Bonar  Law  confirmed  the  words  mentioned 
and  in  fact  stated  that  this  was  the  only  question 
upon  which  there  existed  no  difference  of  opinion 
between  the  Conservatives  and  the  Liberals  in 
England. 

"Making  use  of  the  favorable  circumstances,  I 
thought  it  advantageous  during  one  of  my  conver- 
sations with  Grey  to  acquire  information  as  to 
what  we  might  expect  from  England  in  case  of  an 
armed  conflict  with  Germany.  The  statements 
which  I  myself  thereupon  heard  from  the  responsi- 
ble leader  of  the  English  foreign  policy  as  well  as 
afterwards  from  the  lips  of  King  George  himself 
appear  to  me  to  be  worthy  of  notice. 

"Your  Imperial  Majesty  is  aware  that  Poincare 
during  his  visit  to  Petersburg  last  summer  expressed 
to  me  the  wish  that  I  should  ascertain  the  extent  to 
which  we  could  depend  upon  the  assistance  of  the 
English  fleet  in  case  of  such  a  war. 

"After  I  had  confidentially  initiated  Grey  into 
the  contents  of  our  naval  agreement  with  France 
and  pointed  out  the  fact  that  according  to  this 
settled  compact,  the  FVench  fleet  would  be  con- 
cerned with  the  safeguarding  of  our  interests  in 
the  southern  scene  of  war  in  that  it  would  prevent 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  43 

the  Austrian  fleet  from  breaking  through  into  the 
Black  Sea,  I  asked  the  Secretary  of  State  whether 
England  on  its  part  could  not  render  us  a  similar 
service  in  the  north,  by  diverting  the  German  squad- 
ron from  our  coast  in  the  Baltic. 

"Without  hesitating,  Grey  stated  that  should  the 
conditions  under  discussion  arise,  England  would 
stake  everything  in  order  to  effect  the  most  seri- 
ous  blow  to  German   power.   .   .   . 

"Arising  out  of  this.  Grey,  upon  his  own  initia- 
tive confirmed,  what  I  already  knew  from  Poincare, 
namely,  the  existence  of  an  agreement  between 
PVance  and  Great  Britain,  according  to  which  Eng- 
land engaged  herself,  in  case  of  war  with  Germany, 
not  only  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  France  on 
the  sea,  but  also  on  the  continent  by  landing  troops. 

"The  king  who  touched  upon  the  same  question 
during  one  of  his  conversations  with  me,  expressed 
himself  still  more  decidedly  than  his  minister. 
With  visible  emotion,  His  Majesty  mentioned  Ger- 
many's aspirations  toward  naval  equality  with 
Great  Britain  and  exclaimed  that  in  case  of  a  con- 
flict it  would  have  disastrous  consequences  not  only 
for  the  German  fleet  but  also  for  German  com- 
merce as  the  English  'would  sink  every  single  Ger- 
man merchant  ship  they  got  hold  of.' 

"The  last  words  probably  not  only  reflect  the 
personal  feelings  of  His  Majesty  but  also  the  pre- 
\  ailing  mood  in  I'.ngland  with  regard  to  Germany." 

Delighted  with  this  report  on  the  state  of  affairs 
in  England,  Russian  and  French  diplomats,  as  the 
great    crisis    approached,    set    systematically    about 


44       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

the  task  of  turning  the  understanding  between 
Russia  and  England  into  something  Hke  a  fighting 
agreement.  Hearing  of  an  impending  visit  of  King 
George  V  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  to  Paris  in  April 
19 14,  the  Russian  foreign  office  suggested  to  the 
French  government  that  the  latter  take  advantage 
of  the  occasion  to  propose  a  naval  understanding 
between  England  and  Russia,  one  similar  to  that  ex- 
isting between  France  and  England.  The  design 
worked  to  perfection,  for  the  architects  of  the 
enterprise  found  Sir  Edward  Grey  quite  prepared 
to  entertain  the  proposition  and  to  enter  heartily 
into  the  arrangement.  A  letter  written  home  by 
the  Russian  ambassador  in  Paris  on  April  29,  19 14, 
gives  a  full  account  of  the  transaction  from  the  in- 
side: 

"The  exchange  of  opinion  between  the  English 
and  the  French  statesmen  dealt  above  all  with  the  re- 
lation between  England  and  France.  Before 
entering  into  the  exchange  of  opinions  it  was 
recognized  by  both  parties  that  the  existing 
agreements  between  the  two  countries  required 
no  kind  of  formal  modification  or  supplement 
and  that  France  and  Fingland  by  continuing  a 
consistent  and  loyal  practice  of  the  so-called  'en- 
tente cordlale'  in  all  political  questions  that  might 
arise,  would  strengthen  and  develop  the  bonds  unit- 
ing them  from  day  to  day.  Thereby  it  was  also 
acknowledged  that  Russia  entered  in  the  closest 
manner  into  the  union  between  T'ngland  and  France 
as  to  their  joint  policy.  This  thought  has  been 
very  clearly  expressed  in  the  press  notice  published 


KxcLisii    r  XDKRS  r.wniXGS  45 

here  and  in  London  after  the  above  mentioned  con- 
ference. M.  DoimieriTue  told  me  that  each  word 
of  this  notice,  which  was  edited  by  M.  Cambon,  had 
been  carefully  considered  and  revised  not  only  by 
himself  but  in  lact  also  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  who 
had  completely  approved  of  the  mention  of  Russia 
contained  in  the  notice,  as  well  as  the  reference  to 
the  fact  that  the  aim  of  the  three  powers  was  not 
only  the  maintenance  of  'peace,'  but  also,  of  the 
'balance  of  power.'  ^ 

"After  the  conclusion  of  the  discussion  on  dif- 
ferent questions  of  the  current  policy  that  were  on 
the  program,  M.  Doumerfrue  proceeded  to  the  ques- 
tion of  the  relations  between  Russia  and  France  and 
laid  before  Sir  l^dward  the  plans  he  and  I  had 
agreed  upon.  He  particularly  referred  to  two 
arguments  in  favor  of  a  closer  Anglo-Russian 
agreement:  (i)  The  efforts  of  (Germany  to 
divert  us  from  a  triple  agreement  as  being  merely 
an  insecure  and  weak  political  combination,  and 
(2)  the  possibility  of  freeing  a  part  of  the  English 
na\'al  forces  tor  energetic  action  not  only  in  the 
Baltic  and  North  Sea,  but  also  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. (M.  Doumergue  pointed  out,  among  other 
things,  to  Sir  I.'dward  that  we  would  have  a  power- 
ful Baltic  squadron  of  dreadnoughts  in  two  years.) 

"Sir  lulward  replied  to  M.  Doumergue  that  he 
personallv  completelv  s\mpathi/ed  with  the  thoughts 
which  had  been  expressed  to  him  and  that  he  was 
quite  prepared  to  conclude  an  agreement  with 
Russia  similar  to  the  one  that  existed  between  l^ig- 

'  Src   ah(>\-r,   yi.   iS,    in   cniiiiet'tioii    with   t!u'  Kii:---(i-FrL'iich   alliance. 


46        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

land  and  France.  He  did  not  conceal  from  M, 
Doumergue,  however,  that  not  only  among  the  gov- 
ernment parties  but  also  among  the  members  of  the 
cabinet,  elements  were  present  that  were  prejudiced 
against  Russia  and  that  were  little  inclined  toward  a 
closer  approach  to  that  power.  He  expressed  hope, 
however,  that  he  would  succeed  in  inclining  Mr. 
Asquith  and  other  members  of  the  cabinet  to  his 
standpoint  and  suggested  the  following  modus  pro- 
cedendi :  In  the  first  place  the  cabinets  both  in  Lon- 
don and  Paris  after  mutual  agreement  could  inform 
the  St.  Petersburg  cabinet  of  the  agreement  exist- 
ing between  France  and  England  as  follows:  (i) 
The  military  and  naval  convention  worked  out  by 
the  General  and  Naval  staffs,  which  as  you  are  al- 
ready aware,  has,  so  to  speak,  a  conditional  char- 
acter, and  (2)  the  political  agreement  which  is 
formally  sealed  by  the  letters  exchanged  between 
Sir  Edward  Grey  and  the  French  ambassador;  it 
is  stated  in  these  letters  that  in  case  England  and 
France  decide  upon  a  joint  active  step,  according  to 
the  course  of  events,  the  above  mentioned  conven- 
tions 'would  be  taken  into  account.'  Simultane- 
ously with  giving  this  information,  the  cabinets  in 
London  and  Paris  could  ask  us  W'hat  our  attitude 
was  toward  the  proposal  relative  to  this  action, 
which  in  turn  could  give  us  occasion  to  enter  into 
an  interchange  of  ideas  with  England  concerning 
the  settlement  of  a  corresponding  Anglo-Russian 
agreement.  In  the  opinion  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
only  a  naval  and  no  military  convention  could  be 
drawn  up  between  us  and  England  as  the  land  forces 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS 


47 


of  England  are  allotted  in  advance  and  obviously 
could  not  operate  conjointly  with  Russian  military 
forces.  Sir  Edwarti  Grey  added  that  immediately 
upon  his  return  to  London  he  would  place  the  above 
represented  plan  of  action  before  Mr.  Asquith  and 
his    other  colleagues    for   their  judgment.    .   .   . 

"All  three  of  those  present  at  the  conference, 
MM.  Doumergue,  Cambon,  and  de  Margerie  told 
me  that  they  were  astonished  at  the  clearly  stated 
and  definite  readiness  to  enter  upon  a  closer  ap- 
proach to  Russia,  which  Sir  Edward  Grey  had  ex- 
pressed. According  to  their  conviction,  the  reser- 
vations made  by  him  concerning  Mr.  Asquith  and 
the  other  members  of  the  cabinet  have  a  purely  for- 
mal character  and  had  he  not  been  convinced 
in  advance  of  their  agreement  he  would  have  ab- 
stained from  making  such  concrete  suggestions.'' 

On  the  same  day,  the  Russian  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don wrote  to  St.  Petersburg  that  Sir  Edward  Grey 
had  secured  the  assent  of  the  prime  minister,  Mr. 
Asquith,  and  a  few  days  later  added  that  the  con- 
sent of  the  r.ngllsh  cabinet  had  been  obtained. 
Thereupon  iollowed  the  naval  conversations  as  ar- 
ranged between  the  Russian  and  English  naval 
staffs.  The  understandings  existing  between  I'-^ng- 
land  and  Erance  were  made  known  to  the  Russians 
and  a  program  ot  cooperation  among  the  three 
powers  on  the  sea,  In  case  ot  a  Cinnmon  war  against 
Ciermany,  was  worked  out  in  the  closest  secrecy. 
This  adjustment  was  matle  elurlng  the  months  of 
May  and  June,   i  9  i  4. 

Sir  r'dward  Grey  was  not  prepared  to  make  an 


48        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

alliance  but  he  pointed  out  that  no  alliance  existed 
with  France.  The  Russians  accepted  this  situation, 
as  inevitable.  On  May  i8,  while  the  conversations 
were  being  formulated,  the  Russian  ambassador  in 
London  wrote  to  his  government  that  "even  a  most 
careful  but  public  alliance  would  meet  with  strong 
and  undisguised  opposition  in  England  and  that  not 
only  on  the  part  of  the  Liberal  Party,  and  a  great 
part  of  the  political  effect  intended  would  be  frus- 
trated by  it.  I  believe  that  under  such  circum- 
stances an  alliance  would  not  be  worth  much.  It 
would  merely  in  a  very  slight  degree  increase  the 
guarantees  which  are  offered  to  France  and  Russia 
by  England  and  it  would  on  the  other  hand  offer  a 
far  more  fertile  soil  for  agitation  in  favour  of  Ger- 
many. .  .  .  Even  those  Englishmen  who  are  firmly 
convinced  that  sooner  or  later  a  conflict  with  Ger- 
many will  prove  inevitable  would  be  frightened  by 
the  idea  of  binding  England  by  means  of  decisive 
treaties  of  alliance  which  would  impose  obligations 
upon  her,  the  conditions  and  consequences  of  which 
cannot  be  as  yet  foreseen." 

In  spite  of  the  secrecy  that  shrouded  the  negotia- 
tions and  the  naval  conversations,  German  news- 
papers, perhaps  through  the  secret  service,  got  hold 
of  the  story  and  published  a  flaming  account  of  this 
new  proof  of  the  encircling  policy  of  the  Entente. 
The  Russian  government  flatly  denied  the  allega- 
tion and  informed  the  German  ambassador  at  St. 
Petersburg  that  there  was  nothing  in  it.  Accord- 
ing to  the  notes  of  the  Russian  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don, Sir  Edward  Grey  was  "greatly  alarmed  by  the 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  49 

false  rumors  which  were  circulatinpj  in  the  German 
press  concerning;  the  contents  of  the  alleged  Naval 
Convention  between  I''nf2;land  and  Russia  in  connec- 
tion with  the  question  of  the  Straits/'  Sir  I''dward 
assured  the  German  ambassador  in  London  that  the 
matter  of  the  Straits  had  not  been  discussed  by  the 
two  powers  in  iwc  years  and  also  assured  him  "that 
between  I''nj:^land  on  the  one  hand  anci  France  and 
Russia  there  existed  neither  an  alliance  nor  a  con- 
\-ention."  He  frankly  added  that  there  was  a  great 
intimacv  among  the  three  powers  and  said  that  they 
had  come  to  an  understanding  on  all  questions  just 
as  if  they  were  allies. 

As  the  leak  matle  such  a  noise  in  Kurope,  Sir 
I'dward  (irey  could  not  escape  the  necessity  of 
facing  the  issue  in  the  House  of  Commons.  In 
June,  1914,  he  was  asked  point  blank  whether  "any 
naval  agreement  has  been  recently  entered  into  be- 
tween Russia  and  (jreat  Britain;  and  whether  any 
negotiations  with  a  \iew  to  a  naval  agreement  have 
recently  taken  place  or  arc  now  pending  between 
Russia  and  (ircat  Britain?"  1\)  this  question  Sir 
I'.dward  replied,  with  great  circumspection,  that  a 
sii7iilar  {]ucsti()n  had  been  asked  a  year  before  and 
that  the  Prime  Minister  liad  then  answered  that 
tliere  \\'ere  no  unpublished  agreements  "which  would 
restrict  or  hamper  the  h-eedom  ot  the  (io\'ernment 
or  of  R:irliament  to  decide  whether  or  not  (ireat 
l^ritain  should  participate  in  a  war.  V\\:\t  answer 
co\'ei-s  bolh  the  questions  on  the  jKiper.  It  rejiiains 
as  true  t()-da\-  as  it  was  a  \'ea!"  ago." 

"The  cliai-acter  of  this  reply,  ingenious  and  care- 


50        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

ful,  has  been  the  subject  of  much  discussion.  Its 
technical  and  diplomatic  correctness  has  been  ad- 
mitted but  it  has  been  suggested  that,  owing  to  the 
formula  used  by  Sir  Edward,  his  statement  was 
susceptible  of  a  double  Interpretation  and  that,  to 
gentlemen  w'ho  did  not  possess  his  exact  Informa- 
tion, It  did  not  convey  the  same  meaning  as  It  did 
to  Its  author.  This,  however.  Is  a  problem  In  ethics 
and  casuistry.  At  all  events  as  the  Russian  ambas- 
sador in  London  wrote  home  sometime  later.  Sir 
Edward  would  "find  It  difficult  to  issue  a  denial  and 
go  on  negotiating  at  the  same  time — a  role  which  he 
would  be  obliged  to  play  towards  Germany  as  well 
as  towards  a  considerable  portion  of  his  own  party 
and  the  English  press."  The  situation  was  indeed 
delicate  and  embarrassing,  but  Anglo-Russian  naval 
preparations  were  not  halted  by  the  disturbances 
among  the  statesmen  and  politicians.^  When  the 
war  came  a  few  weeks  later  all  the  two  powers  had 
to  do  was  to  order  the  execution  of  plans  already 
prepared. 

BELGIAN  PAPERS  AND  PREPARA- 
TIONS FOR  LANDING  ENGLISH 
TROOPS  ON  THE  CONTINENT 

After  their  occupation  of  Belgium,  the  Germans 
searched  the  archives  of  that  country  and  made 
public  many  volumes  of  valuable  papers.  One  set 
of  five  volumes,  composed  of  reports  from  Belgian 
representatives  stationed  at  various  capitals,  makes 

1  For  light  on  this  subject  from  the  German  archives,  5ee 
p.  72. 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS 


51 


available  a  mass  of  secret  and  informed  opinion 
relative  to  the  policies  and  measures  of  the  leading 
governments  of  Europe  for  many  years  previous  to 
the  great  war.  Another  group  of  Belgian  papers 
bears  upon  allegeel  negotiations  between  Belgium 
and  England  with  respect  to  the  landing  of  English 
troops  on  the  continent  in  the  e\'entuality  of  a  war. 
The  German  interpretation  of  these  papers,  par- 
ticularly the  second  group,  has  been  vigorously  at- 
tacked, but  their  authenticity  apparently  has  never 
been  officially  denied.  Indeed  their  authenticity  is 
implicitly  admitted  by  M.  van  den  Heuvel,  the  Bel- 
gian minister  of  state,  who  in  speaking  of  them 
declares  that  the  papers  show  clearly  that  Belgium 
had  no  con\-^ntion  or  treaty  with  England,  and  that 
she  had  "taken  the  most  scrupulous  care  to  recon- 
cile the  precautions  exacted  by  the  necessity  of  safe- 
guarding the  independence  and  maintaining  the 
honor  of  the  country  with  the  duties  of  the  strictest 
neutrality." 

The  first  of  these  important  documents,  published 
in  fac  simile  in  the  Xorddriitsclie  AUyemcinc  Zjcit- 
iing  on  November  2:;,  1914,  was  a  letter  from  the 
Belgian  chief  of  staff  to  the  Belgian  minister  of  war 
respecting  his  "confidential  interviews"  with  the 
English  military  attacJic  at  Brussels  and  with  a 
member  of  the  General  Staff  of  the  English  War 
Office.  These  conversations  dealt  with  the  proposed 
disposition  of  English  forces  on  the  Continent  in 
case  of  a  war  with  (iermany.  With  the  details  of 
the  arrangements  we  are  not  here  concerned.  The 
point  of  note  is  that  the  English  representative  in- 


52        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

sisted  on  the  following:  "(i)  Our  conversation 
was  absolutely  confidential;  (2)  it  was  in  no  way 
binding  on  his  government;  (3)  his  Minister,  the 
British  General  Staff,  he,  and  myself  were  the  only 
persons  then  aware  of  the  matter;  (4)  he  did  not 
know  whether  his  Sovereign  had  been  consulted." 
This  was  in  1906. 

In  another  one  of  the  documents,  dated  April  24, 
1912,  a  conversation  between  the  British  military 
attache  and  the  Belgian  general,  Jungbluth,  is  re- 
corded: "The  British  government,  at  the  time  of 
recent  events,  would  have  immediately  landed 
troops  on  our  teritory  even  if  we  had  not  asked  for 
help.  The  general  protested  that  our  consent 
would  be  necessary  for  this.  The  military  attache 
answered  that  he  knew  that  but  that,  as  we  were  not 
in  a  position  to  prevent  the  Germans  passing 
through  our  territory.  Great  Britain  would  have 
landed  her  troops  in  any  event." 

On  the  basis  of  these  documents,  the  Germans  ac- 
cused Belgium  of  perfidy,  declared  that  there  had 
been  a  conv^ention  or  agreement  between  England 
and  Belgium  against  Germany,  and  alleged  that 
England  and  France  would  have  violated  Belgian 
neutrality  if  Germany  had  not  done  it.  These  ex- 
travagant charges  were  not  at  all  warranted  by  the 
documents;  and  the  English  go\'ernment  flatly  de- 
nied that  any  such  agreement  with  Belgian  had  ever 
existed. 

The  English  government  did  not  however  deny 
that  "conversations"  had  taken  place  with  Belgian 
military    authorities.      It    said:      "In    view    ol    the 


ENGLISH    UNDERSTANDINGS  53 

solemn  guarantee  given  by  Great  Britain  to  pro- 
tect the  neutrality  of  Belgium  against  violation 
from  any  side,  some  academic  discussions  may, 
through  the  instrumentality  of  Colonel  Barnardis- 
ton,  have  taken  place  between  General  Cirierson 
(now  dead)  and  the  Belgian  military  authorities 
as  to  what  assistance  the  British  army  might  be  able 
to  afford  Belgium  should  one  of  her  neighbors  vio- 
late that  neutrality.  Some  notes  with  reference  to 
the  subject  may  exist  in  the  archives  at  Brussels. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  date  mentioned,  namely, 
1906,  was  the  year  following  that  in  which  Ger- 
many, as  in  19 II,  adopted  a  threatening  attitude 
towards  France  with  regard  to  Morocco,  and  in 
view  of  the  apprehensions  existing  of  an  attack  on 
France  through  Belgium  it  was  natural  that  pos- 
sible eventualities  should  be  discussed." 

It  may  seem  rather  strange  to  those  unaccus- 
tomed to  the  cautious  restraints  of  I^nglish  di- 
plomacy that  the  English  government  should  have 
been  officially  unaware  of  the  "conversations"  in 
question.  From  the  point  of  view  of  English  prac- 
tice, there  was  nothing  unusual  about  the  matter. 
The  government  at  London  frankly  confessed  that 
such  interviews  "may  have  taken  place"  and  that 
they  were  perfectly  "natural"  in  view  of  possible 
eventualities.  We  are  constrained  to  believe  the 
English  declaration  that  there  had  been  no  formal 
agreement  and  that  such  interviews  as  may  ha\e 
occurred  were  quite  "natural."  We  should  also 
take  note  of  the  fact  that  Lord  Haldane  in  1914 
officially  denied  the   German   allegations   and  said: 


54       CROSS   CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

"We  had  never  committed  ourselves  at  all  to  the 
sending  of  troops  to  the  continent,  and  had  never 
contemplated  the  possibility  of  sending  troops  to 
Belgium  to  attack  Germany."  Perhaps  his  Lord- 
ship was  a  bit  too  emphatic  and  sweeping  when  he 
added:  "We  never  thought  of  sending  troops  to 
Belgium  until  Germany  had  invaded  it  and  Belgium 
had  appealed  for  assistance  to  maintain  the  inter- 
national treaty."  Possibly  the  contingency  had 
been  "thought  of,"  at  least  unofficially,  while  at  the 
same  time  the  English  government  retained  a  free 
hand.  Certainly  the  landing  of  troops  in  France 
had  been  carefully  arranged. 

After  the  war  was  over,  Lord  Haldane 
explained,  with  considerable  and  pardonable  pride, 
how  as  minister  of  war  from  1905  to  19 12  he  had 
reorganized  the  department  and  prepared  for 
"eventualities"  on  the  continent.  This  was  done 
on  the  occasion  of  the  coal  inquiry.  We  may  quote 
the  questions  of  the  Chairman  and  the  answers  of 
Lord  Haldane  from  the  minutes  of  the  commission: 

"Chairman.  Am  I  right  in  thinking  that  during 
that  time  you  organized  the  territorial  forces  of 
the  crown  and  that  also  you  provided  for  a  speedy 
mobilization  of  our  forces  in  the  event  of  the  na- 
tion being  called  upon  to  go  to  war?  [Lord  Hal- 
dane.]     That  is  so. 

"I  think,  as  a  result  of  your  efforts,  a  very 
speedy  mobilization  of  our  forces  was  effected  when 
war  was  declared  against  Germany? — Yes.  The 
thing  we  concentrated  upon  was  extreme  rapidity  of 


ENGLISH     UNDERSTANDINGS  55 

TTiobiHzation  and  concentration  in  the  place  of  as- 
sembly, and  that  we  carried  out. 

"T  suppose  it  is  no  longer  a  secret,  but  war  was 
declared  on  Tuesday,  August  4th,  19 14  and  I  think 
within  a  matter  of  twelve  or  fourteen  hours,  under 
the  scheme  of  mobilization  which  you  had  prepared, 
some  of  our  troops  were  already  in  France? — Yes, 
within  a  very  short  time;  within  a  very  few  hours 
troops  were  in  France. 

"How  long  was  it  before  the  whole  of  the 
British  Expeditionary  Force  was  placed  in  the  field 
at  the  appointed  place? — On  Monday,  August  3rd, 
19 14,  at  the  request  of  the  Prime  Minister,  T,  as 
Lord  Chancellor,  went  back  to  the  War  Office  and 
mobilized  the  machine  with  which  I  was  familiar. 
That  was  done  at  1 1  o'clock  upon  Monday,  August 
3rd,  and  the  giving  of  the  orders  took  only  a  few 
minutes;  everything  was  prepared  years  before." 


Ill 

DIPLOMATIC  REVELATIONS:     TLIE 
CENTRAL  POWERS 

ON  the  other  side  of  the  grand  line-up  of  19 14 
stood  the  embattled  Central  Powers,  with 
Italy  an  uncertain  factor  in  the  background.  It  was 
known  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  as  early 
as  1879  had  entered  upon  a  close  alliance.  It  was 
also  a  matter  of  public  record  that  the  Triple 
Alliance  had  been  formed  three  years  later  between 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Austria-Hungary  and  had  been 
renewed  from  time  to  time.  When  however,  in 
19 1 6,  a  professional  student  of  history,  Professor 
C.  J.  H.  Hayes,  came  to  write  on  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance he  could  only  say  of  the  treaties  which  formed 
that  association:  "Their  terms  have  never  been  pub- 
lished in  full,  but  it  is  safe  to  say  that  they  were 
defensive  In  character,  each  party  promising  the 
others  military  assistance  against  attacks  by  outside 
powers,  that  they  were  mainly  directed  against  lears 
of  I- rcnch  and  Russian  aggression,  and  that  they 
were  binding  for  a  term  ot  years."  Critical  pub- 
licists among  the  Pntente  powers,  however,  re- 
garded the  'i'riplc  Alliance  as  a  mere  cloak  to  cover 
Teutonic  aggression  in  Central  and  S(jutheastern 
Europe,  and  a  grand  design  for  colonial  and  com- 

S6 


Tin:     CENTRAL    POWERS  57 

mcrcial  aggression  beyond  the  seas.  Such  criti- 
cisms were  warmly  resented  by  the  Cjermans  whose 
spokesmen  insisted  upon  their  pacific  intentions. 
\\)n  Buelow,  for  example,  declared  that  the  Triple 
Alliance  was  "an  insurance  company,  not  a  com- 
pany for  profit."  The  veil  of  secrecy,  if  not  com- 
pletely removed,  has  at  last  been  rent,  and  we  can 
read  for  ourselves  the  terms  of  the  long  discussed 
documents. 

DISCLOSURES      FROM     7MI  E 
A  U  S  T  R  I  A  X     A  R  C  1 1  I  \'  i:  S 

From  the  Austrian  archives  have  come  two  sets  of 
important  papers.  The  first  embraces  the  secret 
treaties  of  Austria-Hungary  from  1879  to  19 14. 
This  has  been  published  with  English  translations 
as  well  as  the  originals,  so  that  American  students 
will  have  no  difficulty  in  tracing  the  course  of  many 
important  international  relations  which  were  hid- 
den from  public  view  before  1920.  The  second 
group  of  Austrian  documents  relates  to  the  negotia- 
tions which  took  place  during  the  weeks  immediately 
preceding  the  outbreak  of  the  Cjreat  War.  These 
papers  supplement  aiul  enlarge  upon  the  inaterials 
which  the  Austro-Hungarian  government  laid  be- 
fore tlic  j)ublic  In  1914  as  records  justit\Ing  Its  poli- 
cies and  measures.  Through  these  papers,  our 
knowledge  ol  the  background  of  the  war  lb  im- 
mensely enriched.  In  them  we  can  trace  more 
clearly  than  e\-er  tlie  mighty  forces  that  steadily 
con\  ergcd  tlirough  the  xcai's  until  the\-  met  In  deadly 
collision    In    August,    1914.       I  hese   documents   also 


58         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

give  us  a  better  perspective.  They  remove  many 
uncertainties.  Above  all  do  they  give  us  an  insight 
into  the  foreign  policies  of  the  Italian  government 
and  link  up  the  entrance  of  Italy  into  the  war  with 
the  policies  which  preceded  that  action. 

Students  of  international  relations,  as  intimated 
above,  have  known  for  years  that  an  alliance  had 
been  formed  between  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany 
in  1879  and  renewed  from  time  to  time.  They 
have  also  known  that  a  Triple  Alliance  between 
Germany,  Italy,  and  Austria-Hungary  had  been  es- 
tablished in  1882  and  extended  from  time  to  time 
on  the  basis  of  new  negotiations.  These  compacts 
were  often  referred  to  in  veiled  language  by  states- 
men and  debated  with  fervor  by  members  of  the 
various  European  parliaments,  but  the  high  con- 
tracting parties  did  not  divulge  the  complete  and 
precise  terms  of  their  agreements.  "Thus,''  as 
Professor  Pribram  says,  "it  came  about  that  on  the 
disruption  of  the  Triple  Alliance  by  Italy  in  19 15, 
no  one  had  an  accurate  knowledge  of  the  tenor  of 
the  treaties,  aside  from  the  surviving  statesmen  and 
diplomats  who  had  participated  in  framing  and  exe- 
cuting them:  certainly  an  honorable  testimony  to 
the  discretion  of  a  class  against  which  the  reproach 
of  indiscretion  has  so  often,  and  not  unjustly,  been 
made/'  After  Italy  cast  off  the  Triple  Alliance, 
Austria-Hungary  made  public  certain  articles  of  the 
Triple  compact  but  kept  complete  silence  as  to  the 
remaining  clauses.  This  was  the  state  of  affairs  in 
19 1 8  when  the  revolution  in  Austria  threw  open 
the  imperial  archives.      Although  students  will  give 


THE    CENTRAL    POWERS  59 

thanks  for  the  papers  now  laid  before  them  for  ex- 
amination, they  cannot  forget  that  the  whole  story 
is  not  yet  available.  The  archives  of  Italy  and 
Germany  have  not  yet  yielded  their  secrets  bearing 
upon  the  Triple  Alliance.  Italy  has  kept  silent. 
Germany  has  concentrated  her  efforts  on  exposing 
the  documents  relative  to  the  outbreak  of  the  War. 
Yet  the  bold  outline  of  the  Triple  Alliance  stands 
clear  and  firm. 

I'irst  among  these  new  papers  are  the  text  of  the 
treaty  of  1879  between  Germany  and  Austria-Hun- 
gary and  certain  accompanying  documents.  The 
text  of  the  treaty  confirms  the  assertion  always  made 
by  German  statesmen  to  the  effect  that  it  was 
"purely  defensive"  in  character.  Indeed  the  con- 
tracting parties  state  that  while  solemnly  promis- 
ing each  other  never  to  allow  the'ir  purely  defensive 
agreement  to  develop  an  aggressive  tendency,  they 
have  determined  to  conclude  an  alliance  of  peace 
and  mutual  defense.  They  agree  to  assist  each 
other  in  case  either  is  attacked  by  Russia.  If  any 
other  power  attacks  either  of  them,  the  other 
promises  not  to  support  the  aggressor  but  to  ob- 
scrxc  an  attitude  of  benevolent  neutrality.  In  case, 
however,  Russia  enters  into  the  conflict  precipitated 
by  another  po^^■er,  both  ot  the  high  contracting 
parties  are  to  sup{M)rt  each  other  \\ith  all  available 
strengtli  and  to  ^^■age  war  together  until  the  conclu- 
sion ot  a  common  peace.  I  he\'  express  the  hope 
that  Russian  armariients  may  not  be  menacing  to 
them  but  should  this  hope  pro\-e  illusorv  thev 
"would  consider  it  their  loval  oblirratlon  to  let  the 


6o        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Tsar  Alexander  know,  at  least  confidentially,  that 
they  must  consider  an  attack,  on  either  of  them  as 
directed  against  both."  It  is  clear  from  this  docu- 
ment signed  just  after  the  check  administered  to 
Russia  at  the  Berlin  congress  of  1878,  that  Austria- 
Hungary  and  Germany  looked  upon  Russia  as  the 
potential  disturber  of  European  peace,  but  at  the 
same  time  felt  it  necessary  to  reckon  with  the  pos- 
sibility of  an  attack  from  other  quarters.  It  is 
also  clear  that  the  document,  on  its  face,  like  the 
Franco-Russian  Alliance  of  1891,  bears  no  trace  of 
aggressive  purposes. 

The  Triple  Alliance  concluded  in  1882,  which 
supplemented,  but  did  not  supersede  the  alliance 
between  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany,  was  also 
in  its  first  form  a  defensive  arrangement.  The  high 
contracting  parties  mutually  promise  peace  and 
friendship  and  agree  to  enter  into  no  alliance  or 
engagement  directed  against  any  one  of  them.  In 
case  France  makes  an  unprovoked  attack  on  Italy, 
the  Central  Powers  pledge  their  aid;  the  same  ob- 
ligation devolves  upon  Italy  in  case  Germany,  with- 
out provocation  on  her  part,  is  attacked  by  France. 
These  specifications  are  followed  by  general  pro- 
visions. If  any  one  or  two  of  the  parties,  with- 
out direct  provocation  on  their  part,  should  be  at- 
tacked by  two  or  more  outside  powers,  the  "casus 
foederis"  will  arise  simultaneously  for  all  the  con- 
tracting parties.  In  case  any  one  of  the  three  finds 
its  security  threatened  by  some  outside  power  and 
is  forced  to  make  war  on  that  account,  the  other  two 
signatories  bind  themselves  to  observe  a  benevolent 


Tin:   ri:\TKAL    powfrs  6i 

neutrality,  each  of  them  reserving  the  right  to  make 
a  common  cause  with  its  ally  if  thought  desirable. 
Such  were  the  essential  terms  of  the  famous  Triple 
Alliance  of  18S2.  A  supplementary  note  declared 
that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  not  hostile  to  Eng- 
land. 

The  first  treaty  was  on  its  face  a  purely  defensive 
treaty.  When  it  was  renewed  in  1887  it  was  sup- 
plemented by  special  agreements.  One  o'f  them, 
concluded  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary, 
states  that,  in  case  it  becomes  impossible  to  maintain 
the  status  quo  in  the  Balkans,  along  the  Ottoman 
coasts,  and  on  the  islands  of  the  Adriatic  and  the 
Aegean,  the  two  parties  are  to  cooperate  in  the 
division  of  the  territory,  on  the  basis  of  reciprocal 
compensation.  In  a  far  more  significant  agree- 
ment between  Germany  and  Italy,  there  are  two  as- 
tounding articles.  The  first  of  them  runs:  "If 
it  were  to  happen  that  France  should  make  a  move  to 
extend  her  occupation  or  even  her  protectorate  or 
her  sovereigntv,  under  any  form  whatsoever,  in  the 
North  African  territories,  whether  of  the  \"ilayet 
of  Tripoli  or  of  the  Moroccan  I'.inpirc  and  that  in 
consequence  thereof  Italy,  in  order  to  safeguard 
her  position  In  tlie  Mx,'d«Itcrranean,  should  feel  that 
she  must  herself  undertake  action  in  the  said  North 
African  territories  or  e\en  have  recourse  to  ex- 
treme measLn"es  in  Trench  territory  In  I'.uropc,  the 
state  of  war  whicli  \\-()uld  thereby  ensue  betweeii 
Ita]\-  and  France  would  constitute  ipso  facto,  on 
the  demand  ot  ltal\'  and  at  tlie  common  charge  ot 
tlic  two  allies,  the  'casus  foederis'  with  all  the  effects 


62        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

foreseen  by  Articles  II  and  V  of  the  aforesaid 
treaty  of  May  20,  1882,  as  if  such  an  eventuality 
were  expressly  contemplated  therein." 

The  second  of  the  astounding  articles  (IV)  in 
the  treaty  between  Italy  and  Germany  adds:  "If 
the  fortunes  of  war  undertaken  in  common  against 
France  should  lead  Italy  to  seek  for  territorial  guar- 
anties with  respect  to  France  for  the  security  of  the 
frontiers  of  the  Kingdom  and  of  her  maritime  posi- 
tion, as  well  as  with  a  view  to  the  stability  of  peace, 
Germany  will  present  no  obstacle  thereto  and  if 
need  be,  and  in  a  measure  compatible  with  circum- 
stances, will  apply  herself  to  facilitating  the  means 
of  attaining  such  a  purpose." 

In  the  renewal  of  1891,  the  three  treaties  were 
consolidated  with  textual  modifications.  Italy's 
plans  for  action  in  Northern  Africa  were  approved 
and  Tunis  as  well  as  Tripoli  was  brought  within  the 
purview  of  the  Alliance.  In  the  renewal  of  1902, 
Austria-Hungary  agreed  to  a  declaration  giving  Italy 
a  free  hand  in  Tripoli,  and  in  the  last  renewal,  that 
of  19 1 2,  the  sovereignty  of  Italy  over  Tripoli  was 
recognized.  While  taking  care  of  her  territorial 
interests  in  Africa,  Italv  also  notified  the  Central 
Powers  as  early  as  1896  that  "she  could  not  partici- 
pate in  a  war  in  which  England  and  France  should 
figure  as  the  joint  adversaries  of  any  state  included 
in  the  Triple  Alliance."  The  Central  Powers,  how- 
ever, refused  to  accept  this  declaration  on  the 
ground  that  it  was  incompatible  with  the  terms  of 
the  treaty  itself. 

Professor  Pribram,  the  Austrian  editor  of  the  new 


r HI-:   c: i: x  r k a l   p o w i: r s  63 

secret  papers,  in  very  restrained  language,  takes 
Italy  to  task  for  turning  a  treaty  for  peace  and  de- 
fense into  a  treaty  supporting*  her  imperial  ambi- 
tions. He  shows  from  the  documents  how  the  pre- 
tensions of  Italy  in  every  direction — Africa,  Al- 
bania, the  Balkans  and  Turkey — rose  with  the  pass- 
ing years  and  how  Ciermany  in  her  anxiety  to  keep 
Italy  in  the  Alliance  forced  Austria-Hungary  to 
make  ever  new  concessions  to  Italian  aspirations. 
He  states  that  some  Austrian  leaders,  notably  the 
Chief  of  the  Military  Staff,  opposed  constant  com- 
pliance with  Italian  demands  and  advocated  an 
open  break  in\olving  the  settlement  of  their  dis- 
putes by  war.  Professor  Pribram  is  not  sure  that 
this  would  not  have  precipitated  a  general  war  and 
made  matters  worse,  but  he  is  convinced  that  Italy 
was  a  disturbing  and  aggressive  factor.  The 
papers  at  present  available  are  used  to  support  this 
conclusion.  He  obviously  feels  that  Italy  cut  a 
sorr\'  figure  in  the  negotiati(^ns  from  18S2  to  191^ 
and  then  assailed  her  ally  in  the  rear.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  pass  judgment  on  the  merits  of  this 
opinion.  The  direction  gi\"en  to  the  1  riple  Alliance 
by  Italy's  demands  is,  h()^^•e^■er,  indisputable.  It 
stands  written  in  the  bontl.  Italy  got  support  from 
(icrmany  and  Austria-Hungary  lor  her  imperial  am- 
bitions in  Atrica  against  I-'rance,  and  then  after  191  ^ 
got  support  from  the  Allied  Powers  for  her  ir- 
redentist and  other  designs  along  the  Adriatic. 
Students  of  diplomacy  must  admit  that  tlie  Italian 
statesmeti  dui'uig  this  [XTiod  rose  to  the  opportuni- 
ties  betore    them    and    represented    the    interests    ot 


64        CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

their  country  with  a  skill  seldom  equalled  in  the  his- 
tory of  international  relations. 

The  new  Austrian  papers  connected  with  the  im- 
mediate outbreak  of  the  Great  War  are  so  volumi- 
nous that  it  is  difficult  to  summarize  them  in  a  brief 
sketch.  Though  an  attempt  to  do  this  is  hazard- 
ous, still  there  are  certain  fundamental  matters  that 
cannot  escape  observation.  The  first  is  that  the 
negotiations  carried  on  by  Austria-Hungary  during 
the  mid-summer  of  19 14  were  shaped  with  regard  to 
a  large  general  policy  and  not  merely  with  respect 
to  the  exigencies  immediately  at  hand.  This  is 
fully  demonstrated  by  the  long  memorandum,  pre- 
pared with  the  cooperation  of  the  Minister  of  For- 
eign Affairs  and  sent  with  the  personal  letter  written 
by  the  Emperor  Franz  Joseph  to  the  German  Em- 
peror on  July  2,  1914.  In  this  highly  important 
document  it  is  said : 

"If  Russia,  supported  by  France,  strives  to  unite 
the  Balkan  states  against  Austria-Hungary,  if  an 
attempt  is  made  to  becloud  the  already  disturbed  re- 
lations with  Rumania,  this  hostility  is  not  directed 
alone  against  the  Monarchy  as  such,  but  in  final 
analysis  against  an  Ally  of  the  German  Empire — 
against  the  most  accessible  part  of  the  European 
bloc  which  on  account  of  its  geographical  position 
and  internal  structure  is  most  exposed  to  attack 
and  bars  the  way  to  the  realization  of  Russia's  plans 
as  a  world  power.  To  break  the  military  superi- 
ority of  the  two  Imperial  Powers  with  the  aid  of 
Balkan  troops  is  the  goal  of  the  Dual  Alliance,  but 


THE    CEX'I'KAL    POWERS 


65 


not  the  final  goal  ot  Russia.  While  I'Vance  seeks 
to  weaken  the  Monarchy  hecause  she  expects  from 
that  an  advancement  ot"  her  plans  lor  revenge,  the 
designs  of  the  Tsar's  empire  arc  far  more  wide 
reaching. 

"If  one  surveys  the  development  of  Russia  during 
the  last  two  centuries,  the  steaely  extension  ol  her 
territory,  and  the  enormous  growth  of  her  popu- 
lation, lar  exceeding  that  oi  the  other  great  Euro- 
pean powers,  and  it  one  rememhers  that  this  great 
Empire  is  as  good  as  cut  off  from  the  free  ocean  by 
her  position  and  by  treaties,  then  one  understands 
the  imminently  aggressive  character  ot  Russian 
policy. 

"Territorial  ambitions  at  the  expense  of  Germany 
cannot  be  reasonably  ascribed  to  Russia,  but  the  ex- 
traordinary armaments  and  warlike  j^reparations, 
the  de\"el()pment  of  strategic  railways  in  the  west, 
etc.,  in  Russia  are  certainly  directed  more  against 
Germany  than  against  Austria-1  lungary.  bor  Rus- 
sia has  recognized  that  the  realization  ot  her  plans 
in  Europe  and  Asi;!,  which  sj^ring  from  internal 
necessity,  must  injure  the  most  important  interests  of 
(iermany  and  there  tore  must  incur  her  unyielding 
opposition.  I  he  |.^()]ic\'  ot  Russia  is  determined  by 
unchangeable  relations  and  is  therefore  contiinuuis 
and  far  seeing.  I  he  e\"u]cnt  encircling  tendencies 
ot  Russia  as  against  the  Monarchv,  \\"hich  in\'()l\"e 
no  world  po]ic\\  liaxe  as  thc'w  tmal  purpose  making 
it  impossible  lor  the  (icrinan  i''mpii-e  to  withstand 
the  ultimate  designs  ot  Russia  an^l  to  resist  her  po 
litical  aiui  economic  supremac\". 


66         CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

"On  these  grounds,  the  directors  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  Austria-Hungary  are  convinced  that  it  is 
in  the  common  interest  of  the  Monarchy,  no  less  than 
of  Germany,  in  the  present  Balkan  crisis,  to  oppose 
seasonably  and  energetically  Russia's  development — 
a  development  that  is  systematically  striven  for 
and  promoted, — a  development  which  perhaps  never 
again  can  be  frustrated." 

Such  is  the  large  background  to  Austro-Hunga- 
rian  diplomatic  maneuvers.  In  detail  the  new  secret 
papers  show  the  directors  of  the  Dual  Monarchy's 
policy  firmly  convinced  that  the  murder  of  the  Arch- 
duke was  the  result  of  a  well-organized  Pan-SlaV 
plot  generated  in  Belgrade,  that  weakness  in  this 
case  would  not  only  lower  the  prestige  of  the  Mon- 
archy but  fatally  weaken  it  for  future  resistance, 
that  in  a  few  years  the  military  position  of  the  Cen- 
tral Powers  as  against  Russia  and  France  would  be 
materially  worse,  and  that  the  immediate  punishment 
of  Serbia  was  necessary  and  could  be  undertaken 
then  with  more  safety  than  in  the  years  to  come. 
"The  crime  committed  against  my  nephew,"  wrote 
Franz  Joseph  to  the  Kaiser,  "Is  the  direct  result  of 
the  Pan-Slav  agitation  driven  by  the  Russians  and 
the  Serbs — an  agitation  which  has  as  Its  goal  the 
weakening  of  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the  ruin  of  my 
Empire.  According  to  all  information  received  up 
to  the  present  the  bloody  deed  in  Serajevo  was  not 
the  act  of  an  Indlvltlual,  but  the  result  of  a  well  or- 
ganized plot,  the  threads  of  which  reach 
Belgrade.  .  .  .  Vou  will  be  con\"Inccd  by  the  latest 
terrible  events  In  B.osnia  that  a  removal  of  the  an- 


THE    CENTRAL    POWERS  67 

tagonism  which  divides  us  and  Serbia  is  not  to  be 
thought  of,  and  that  the  existing  peaceful  policy  of 
all  European  monarchs  will  be  in  danger  as  long  as 
this  mass  of  criminal  agitation  goes  on  in  Belgrade 
unpunished."  So  Austria-1  lungary  went  about 
punishing  Serbia,  if  not  with  full  knowledge  of  the 
consequences,  at  least  with  an  understanding  that 
fatal  things  might  be  set  in  train. 

It  is  evident  from  the  new  documents,  that  the 
Austro-Hungarian  government  set  out  on  its  pro- 
gram of  positive  action  wMth  the  belief  that  it  would 
have  the  support  of  Germany.  At  a  meeting  of  the 
ministerial  council  on  July  7,  19  14,  the  presiding  of- 
ficer, Count  Berchtold,  said  that  conversations  in 
Berlin  had  led  to  the  happy  result  of  assuring  to  Aus- 
tria-Hungary the  unconditional  support  of  (jcrmany, 
with  all  its  energy,  in  case  of  a  military  collision  with 
Serbia.  It  is  equally  evident  that  the  Austrians 
were  fully  aware  of  the  fact  that  their  program 
might  very  well  lead  to  a  European  war.  Berch- 
told said  that  it  was  quite  probable  that  an  armed 
conflict  with  Serbia  might  have  as  its  result  a  war 
with  Russia.  It  does  not  appear,  h()we\'er,  that 
either  the  (iei'man  or  Austriati  leaelers  during  the 
early  stages  of  the  negotiations  calculated  on  the 
active  armed  inter\'cntion  ol  l.ngland.  I  he  Aus- 
trian ambassador  in  Berlin  wrote  to  Berchtold  on 
July  12.  "File  (icrnian  goxcrnment  believes  that 
it  has  convincing  e\ideiKe  that  England  will  not 
take  pai-t  in  a  war  that  breaks  out  in  the  Balkans,  not 
e\t'n  it  It  leads  to  a  conllict  with  Russia,  and  e\'en- 
tuall\-  b'rance." 


68         CROSS     CURRENTS    IX     EUROPE     TO-DAY 

Though  aware  of  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
the  Austrians  were  convinced  that  sooner  or  later, 
Russia  would  have  her  Balkan  combinations  com- 
pleted and  that  they  would  have  to  hght  for  their 
existence  whether  they  liked  it  or  not.  Berchtold 
said  at  the  ministerial  conference  just  mentioned 
that  "Russia  pursues  for  the  present  a  policy,  based 
on  a  long  view  of  things,  which  has  for  its  goal  the 
union  of  the  Balkan  states,  including  Rumania,  in 
order  to  plav  them  off  at  the  proper  moment 
against  the  Monarchy.  He  was  of  the  opinion 
that  we  must  reckon  with  this  and  that  our  capacity 
to  resist  such  an  operation  must  steadily  grow 
worse,  all  the  more  so  as  an  inactive  drift  in  things 
would  be  interpreted  by  our  South  Slavs  and  Ruma- 
nians as  a  sign  of  weakness  and  would  give  an 
impetus  to  the  recruiting  forces  of  the  two  neigh- 
boring states."  This  position  was  sustained  by  the 
Chief  of  Staff  who  said  bluntly:  "From  a  military 
standpoint  he  must  emphasize  the  fact  that  condi- 
tions would  be  more  favorable  now  for  waging  war 
than  at  some  future  time,  as  the  relative  weight  of 
forces  in  the  future  would  run  against  us."  As 
these  conclusions  are  from  documents  that  were  not 
intended  for  the  public,  it  may  be  assumed  that  the 
diplomats  and  niilitarv  men  were  speaking  the 
truth  according  to  their  sincere  con\'ictions  and  not 
creating  a  fiction  for  mass  consurription.  The  Cen- 
tral Powers  hail  long  been  building  up  their  combina- 
tions in  the  Balkans  and  had  long  lu'cn  oju'rating  on 
the  assumption  that  a  crisis  ^^■ould  ine\"itably  C(mie 


THE    CENTRAL    POWERS  69 

some  day.      It  seems  pretty  clear  that  both  of  them 
thought  the  hour  had  struck  on  August  r,  19  14. 

One  more  document  may  he  taken  from  the  price- 
less records  of  the  Austrian  archives.  The  public 
was  informed  more  than  once  that  the  Austro-I  lun- 
garian  government,  in  waging  war  on  Serbia,  had 
no  territorial  ambitions  and  was  merely  eager  to 
safeguard  its  own  integrity  by  punishing  the  trouble- 
some neighbor.  In  a  general  council  meeting  the 
prime  minister  of  Austria,  Stiirgkh,  said:  ''Although 
the  seizure  of  Serbian  territory  by  the  Monarchy  is 
out  of  the  question,  still  it  is  possible  to  bring 
Serbia  into  a  state  of  subjection  to  the  Monarchy 
by  overthrowing  the  dynasty,  drawing  up  a  military 
convention,  and  other  corresponding  measures. 
Also  the  resolution  of  the  ministerial  council  did  not 
make  it  impossible  to  rectify  the  boundaries  In  the 
interest  of  strategic  necessity."  The  minister  of 
war  thereupon  declared  that  he  would  vote  for  the 
resolution  on  the  understanding  that  certain  boun- 
dary rectifications,  the  occupation  of  bridgeheads, 
and  other  similar  measures  were  not  excluded.  The 
ministry  then  agreed  that  at  the  opening  of  the  war 
on  Serbia,  an  announcement  would  be  made  to 
foreign  powers  to  the  effect  that  the  Monarchy 
waged  no  war  of  concjuest  and  did  not  contemplate 
annexing  the  KIngelom  ot  Serbia. 

(;  i:  R  M  A  \    I)  I  p  I.  0  M  A  r  s    a  t    \v  o  r  k 

The  Austrian  revelations  are  supplemented  In 
e\"er_\-  detail  by  the  papers  troiii  Berlin  archl\-es.    In 


70        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

addition,  the  latter  show,  as  none  of  the  other  col- 
lections do,  the  high  state  of  nervous  tension  created 
by  the  armed  peace  of  Europe.  The  feverish  prep- 
arations of  the  Russian  government  were  con- 
strued by  the  German  military  group  as  implying 
war  in  the  near  future,  and  it  is  not  surprising  to 
find  the  German  documents  opening  with  Russian 
affairs.  On  June  13,  19 14,  the  German  ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg  sent  home  a  clipping  from  a 
leading  Russian  journal,  headed  "Russia  is  ready, 
France  must  be  ready  also,"  and  inspired  by  the 
Tsar's  minister  of  war,  General  Sukhomlinov.  The 
article  recited  the  fact  that  Russia  would  soon 
have  an  army  of  2,300,000  men  as  against  Ger- 
many's 880,000  and  Austria's  500,000  and  in- 
formed France  that  she  must  furnish  770,000 
through  the  extension  of  her  military  service  to  three 
years. 

Along  the  margins  of  a  German  newspaper's 
translation  of  this  article  are  comments  by  the 
Kaiser  in  his  own  handwriting.  He  opened  by  say- 
ing: "This  deserves  a  clear,  ringing  answer  in  the 
form  of  deeds."  When  the  Russian  writer  speaks 
of  Germany's  880,000  men,  the  Kaiser  comments, 
"God  be  praised!"  When  the  Russian  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  network  of  railways  for  the  (juickest 
possible  mobilization  of  troops  in  case  of  war,  the 
Kaiser  exclaims:  "All  against  Germany!"  When 
the  Russian  professes  motiv-es  of  peace  for  France 
and  Russia,  the  Kaiser  cries:  "Nonsense!"  At 
the  conclusion  of  the  whole  document,  he  sums  up 
his      judgment:      "Well!      Finally      the      Russians 


THE     CENTRAL    POWERS 


71 


have  shown  their  hand.  Any  person  in  Germany 
who  does  not  now  believe  that  the  Russo-Gauls  are 
not  working  together  at  high  tension  for  a  war  with 
us  very  soon  and  that  we  should  take  corresponding 
counter-measures  deser\es  to  be  sent  to  the  lunatic 
asylum  at  Dalldorf."  The  (jerman  newspaper 
which  reprinted  the  Russian  manifesto  had  added 
that  "Russia  began  her  colossal  armaments  two 
years  ago  in  accordance  with  arrangements  with 
France."  The  Kaiser  comments:  "What  my 
General  Staff  has  steadily  asserted."  This  doc- 
ument was  handed  back  to  the  I\)reign  Office  on 
June  15,  1 9 14,  two  weeks  before  the  murder  at 
Serajevo. 

The  publication  in  (jerman  papers  of  the  Russian 
call  to  arms  created  an  immense  sensation  within 
and  without  official  circles.  The  situation  was  fully 
described  by  the  Chancellor,  Bethmann  Hollweg,  in 
a  letter  to  Lichnowsky,  the  ambassador  in  London, 
on  the  following  day.  Speaking  of  the  hrebrand 
article  from  Russia,  he  said :  "The  reaction  on 
German  public  opinion  has  been  unmistakable  and 
serious.  Whereas  formerly,  it  was  only  the  extrem- 
ists among  the  Pan-Germans  and  militarists  who 
urged  that  Russia  was  making  systematic  prepara- 
tion tor  a  war  of  aggression  upon  us  \ery  soon,  even 
moderate  public  men  are  now  inclined  to  this  view. 
The  next  result  is  a  call  tor  another,  immediate, 
and  extensi\e  strengthening  ot  the  army.  As  a  re- 
sult of  that,  as  things  stand  with  us,  the  competition 
ot  the  na\-y  will  be  awakened  tor  it  is  ne\'er  tar  be- 
hind when  aiu'thing  is   done   tor  the  arinw      1   add 


72        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

very  confidentially  that,  as  His  Majesty  the  Kaiser 
has  been  drawn  Into  this  current  of  thought,  I  ap- 
prehend In  the  summer  and  autumn  an  outbreak  of 
armament  fever  here.  Although,  owing  to  the 
uncertainty  of  Russian  relations,  the  actual  goal  of 
Russian  policy  can  not  be  forcast  with  any  degree 
of  assurance,  and  although,  In  our  political  arrange- 
ments, we  must  reckon  with  the  fact  that  Russia,  of 
all  European  powers.  Is  the  most  Inclined  to  Incur 
the  risk  of  a  warlike  adventure,  still  I  do  not  believe 
that  Russia  plans  an  early  war  against  us.  Never- 
theless, she  desires — and  this  cannot  be  viewed  in 
an  evil  light — she  desires  to  appear  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  next  Balkan  crisis  protected  by  extensive  mili- 
tary armaments  and  more  powerful  than  In  the  last 
Balkan  disturbance.  Whether  it  will  then  come  to 
a  European  conflagration  depends  entirely  upon  the 
position  of  Germany  and  England.'"' 

At  this  very  moment  when  the  Germans  were 
alarmed  by  Russian  sword  rattling,  they  were  ex- 
cited over  rumors  that  England  and  Russia  had 
entered  Into  naval  conversations,  or  had  drawn  up  a 
naval  convention.  The  rumors  were  founded  on 
fact,  for  the  English  and  Russian  naval  staffs  had, 
as  we  have  seen,  entered  upon  such  negotiations  in 
Alay,  19 14,  but  Sir  Edward  Grey,  by  a  skillfully 
worded  denial,  had  given  the  world  the  Impression 
that  the  rumors  were  false.  In  fact  the  civil  branch 
of  the  German  government  apparently  understood 
Sir  Edward's  denial  to  mean  that  there  had  been  no 
conversations   at   all   whereas   he   had   merely   said, 


THK     CENTRAL    POWERS  73 

rather  inf^eniously,  that  nothing  had  happened  to 
bind  the  hands  of  the  government  and  parliament 
in  case  a  war  was  impending. 

As  the  Russian  gox-ernment  declared  the  rumors 
utterly  unfounded  and  Sir  Iidward  made  a  state- 
ment that  was  susceptible  of  being  construed  as  a 
denial,  the  German  Chancellor  expressed  great  re- 
lief. He  wrote  to  his  ambassador  in  London  :  "It 
is  thoroughly  gratifying  to  learn  that  Sir  Edward 
Grey  has  challenged  with  decision  in  the  lower 
House  the  rumors  of  an  Anglo-Russian  naval  con- 
versation and  has  also  allowed  his  Dementi  to  be 
emphasized  in  the  JVestminster  Gazette.  Had  these 
rumors  been  confirmed,  and  in  fact  only  to  the  effect 
that  the  English  and  Russian  navies  were  preparing 
for  cooperation  in  case  a  common  war  should  be 
fought  against  Germany — an  arrangement  similar 
to  the  agreement  which  England  had  made  with 
France  at  the  time  of  the  Moroccan  crisis — had  this 
been  true,  then  not  only  would  Russian  and*  French 
Chauvinism  have  been  strongly  excited,  but  there 
would  have  arisen  with  us  a  not  unjustified  distur- 
bance of  public  opinion  which  would  have  found  its 
expression  in  a  navy  'scare'  and  in  another  poisoning 
ol  the  slowly  improving  relations  with  I'"ngland.  In 
view  of  the  nervous  tension  in  which  luiropc  has 
li\'ed  during  recent  vcars  the  results  would  have 
been  obvious.  At  all  e\  ents  the  idea  of  a  common 
mission  by  whicli  I\ngl;uK]  aiul  Germanv  would 
guarantee  peace  would  be  endangered  by  complica- 
tions arising  at  any  time. 


74        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

"I  earnestly  beg  Your  Highness  to  convey  to  Sir 
Edward  Grey  my  special  thanks  for  his  open  and 
straightforward  declarations  and  thereupon  bring 
to  his  attention  in  a  prudent  and  informal  way  the 
general  considerations  which  I  have  indicated 
above." 

The  German  alarm  over  the  news  of  Anglo-Rus- 
sian naval  arrangements,  temporarily  allayed  by  Sir 
Edward  Grey's  public  denials  and  a  later  denial 
made  privately  to  Lichnowsky,  was  raised  again  by 
secret  information  that  came  to  Berlin  from  Russia. 
On  June  27,  after  reading  one  of  Lichnowsky's  re- 
ports from  London,  declaring  the  correctness  of  Sir 
Edward's  position,  the  Undersecretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  Herr  Zimmerman,  wrote  to  the 
Chancellor:  "By  this  conversation  [with  Grey] 
Lichnowsky,  as  was  to  be  expected,  has  allowed 
himself  to  be  completely  bamboozled  again  by  Grey 
and  is  strengthened  anew  in  the  opinion  that  he  has 
to  deal  with  an  honorable,  truth-loving  man.  There 
is  nothing  left  to  do  but  to  give  to  Lichnowsky 
some  naturally  quite  prudent  hints  as  to  the  un- 
doubtedly trustworthy  information  coming  to  us 
secretly  from  St.  Petersburg  which  lea\es  no  ques- 
tion about  the  existence  of  continuous  political  and 
military  arrangements  between  England  and  I^-ance 
and  about  the  already  effected  negotiations  be- 
tween England  and  Russia  leading  to  identical 
results." 

From  the  German  papers  before  us,  the  conclusion 
must  inevitably  be  reached  that  while  the  civil  wing 
of  the  German  government  believed  in  the  peacelul 


TIIK    CENTRAL    POWERS  75 

intentions  of  the  mcmhcrs  of  the  Triple  Entente, 
the  TTiilitary  branch  protessed  to  believe  that  an 
aj^gressive  war  was  about  to  be  precipitated  by  Rus- 
sia with  the  support  of  I-'rance  and  England  and  that 
Russia  and  Enghuul  were  actively  engaged  in  mak- 
ing arrangements  similar  to  those  already  existing 
between  I'^ngland  and  France.  It  is  still  an  open 
question  whether  Russia  did  actually  contemplate  an 
carlv  war  on  the  Central  Powers,  but  it  is  not  to  be 
doubted  that  I\ngland  and  Russia  were  in  fact  mak- 
ing arrangements  for  naval  cooperation,  in  case  of 
war,  along  the  lines  of  the  Anglo-French  under- 
standing. At  all  events  when  the  Archduke  was 
assassinated  at  Sarajevo,  the  German  Government 
was  laboring  under  considerable  excitement.  The 
military  group  was  certainly  convinced  that  Russia 
was  preparing  to  execute  some  plans  on  the  field  of 
battle. 

At  the  exact  moment  when  high  tension  existed 
in  Cierman  official  circles  came  the  murder  of  the 
Archduke.  Naturally,  the  Kaiser  was  \"cry  much 
exercised  bv  the  news  of  the  aftair,  and  he  spurred 
on  his  subordinates  in  supporting  Austria  by  vigor- 
ous comments  on  the  margins  ot  tlie  secret  papers. 
A\'hen  i'schirschkv.  the  (ierman  ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin, wrote  home  that  apparently  only  young  men  had 
been  iiu'oKed  in  the  crime  ot  Serajex-o  and  onU' 
miklcr  lornis  of  punisliment  were  therefore  possible, 
the  K;iiscr  exclaimed:  "Let  us  hope  not."  His 
minister  liaJ.  heard  that  tliere  was  going  to  be  a 
thoroughgoing  reckoning  with  Serbia,  and  he 
added:  "Now  or  ne\'er.""       1  schirschk\'  warned  the 


76        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Austrians  against  hasty  action;  on  this  point  the 
Kaiser  wrote:  "Who  authorized  him  to  do  that? 
That  is  very  stupid.  It  is  not  his  business,  as  it 
is  entirely  Austria's  affair  to  decide  what  shall  be 
done  in  this  matter.  .  .  .  Tschirschky  should 
please  let  nonsense  alone.  The  Serbs  must  be  re- 
duced to  order  ajid  that  certainly  soon."'  The  Kai- 
ser vigorously  objected  to  treating  "murderers"  like 
"gentlemen."  Counsels  of  prudence  and  modera- 
tion he  characterized  as  "imbecility"  and  "childish." 
He  chafed  at  delays  and  urged  Austria  to  carry 
out  her  plan  for  making  demands  that  Serbia  could 
not  possibly  accept.  He  declared  that  "the  rascals 
had  followed  agitation  by  murder  and  must  be 
humbled."  He  gave  Austria  a  free  hand  and  his 
unconditional  support  shortly  after  the  opening  of 
the  crucial  negotiations — unconditional  support 
backed  by  angry  and  insistent  assertions  that  nothing 
moderate  be  done.  Whether  in  his  blind  rage  he 
dreamed  of  all  the  terrible  consequences  to  follow 
is  not  apparent,  but  certainly  he  was  well  in- 
formed as  to  the  possibilities  of  a  general  con- 
flagration. No  one  is  more  responsible  than  Wil- 
liam II  for  encouraging  Austria  to  light  the 
European  fire. 

In  the  formal  official  papers  the  Kaiser  does  not 
appear  as  angry  and  petulant  as  in  his  side  com- 
ments on  documents  sent  to  him  for  consideration. 
Nevertheless  he  was  zealous  In  his  support  of  Aus- 
tria in  her  plans  for  punishing  the  Serbs,  although  he 
seemed  a  bit  cautious  at  first,  as.  Indeed,  were  his 


TIM':     CIIXTKAL     POWl.RS  77 

close  official  ad\iscrs.  When  the  Austrian  ambas- 
sador called  on  him  on  July  5,  19 14,  William  II 
said  that  he  had  expected  serious  action  on  the 
part  of  Vienna  against  the  Serbs,  but  that  the  possi- 
bility of  grave  complications  must  be  kept  in  mind 
and  that  furthermore  he  would  not  make  a  definite 
reply  to  the  request  for  support  until  he  had  con- 
sulted his  Imperial  Chancellor.  After  lunch,  how- 
ev'er,  the  Kaiser  appears  to  have  warmed  up.  He 
told  the  Austrian  ambassador  that  Austria  could 
count  upon  the  full  support  of  (jcrmany.  He  added 
that  while,  as  he  had  said,  it  was  necessary  for  him 
to  obtain  the  opinion  of  his  Chancellor,  he  had  no 
doubt  Bethmann  Hollweg  would  approve  his  posi- 
tion in  the  matter.  The  next  day  the  (ierman  gov- 
ernment officially  informed  Vienna  that  Austria 
must  be  the  judge  ot  what  should  be  done  to  Serbia 
and  that  she  could  count  upon  the  support  of  her 
ally  and  friend,  (jermany.  A  tew  days  later,  in  a 
personal  letter  to  the  Austrian  Emperor,  the  Kaiser 
reiterated  his  pledge  given  through  ministerial 
channels  and  said:  "In  these  tragic  hours  you  will 
find  me  and  my  empire  in  complete  unity  on  your 
side,  true  to  our  old  and  tested  triendship  and  to 
our  obligations  as  an  ally."  Perhaps  the  spirit  ot 
German  diplomacy  at  this  moment  is  reflected  in  a 
message  written  in  I'.nglish  tor  the  Kaiser  to  send 
to  the  Fsar  but  withheld  tor  scwiie  reason.  It  ran 
in  part:  "It  is  the  common  interest  of  \-ou  and 
me  and  in  fact  of  all  monarchs  that  this  crime  and 
all    that   are   morally   responsible    tor   it   should   re- 


78        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

ceive  the  punishment  it  deserves.  Austria  must  be 
allowed  a  free  hand  to  take  the  evil  by  the  root  and 
wipe  out  the  revolutionary  movement  in  Servia, 
which  may,  by  spreading  over  other  countries,  one 
day  threaten  your  throne  as  well  as  mine.  The 
spirit  of  the  people  that  murdered  their  own 
king  and  his  wife  still  governs  the  country.  It 
would  be  folly  and  suicidal  on  our  part  to  do 
anything  to  spare  them  the  penalty  they  have 
incurred." 

This  position  was  taken,  it  seems,  with  the 
thought  that  the  conflict  could  be  localized,  that 
Austria-Hungary  could  be  permitted  to  thrash  the 
Serbs  on  her  own  account.  It  is  true  that  the 
Austrian  memorandum,  quoted  above,  showing  the 
political  philosopihy  of  Vienna  in  the  large,  was 
sent  to  Berlin.  It  appears  among  the  German  docu- 
ments. In  spite  of  this  fact,  so  far  as  the  evidence 
before  us  goes,  the  German  foreign  office  was  not 
aware  of  the  hidd£n  designs  under  the  Austrian  ulti- 
matum and  war  policy.  Neither  was  that  office 
kept  fully  informed  on  the  various  aggressive 
maneuvers  executed  in  \'ienna.  Taking  the  offers 
of  German  support  at  their  face  value,  the  Aus- 
trians  assumed  that  there  was  no  limit  to  the  puni- 
tive measures,  they  could  take.  It  may  be  said, 
therefore,  that  the  Cierman  government  was  not  a 
party  to  all  the  operations  in  Vienna  which  pro- 
duced the  great  calamity.  At  the  same  time  it 
must  be  adtled  that  the  (lerman  officials  were  aware 
that  the  conflict  might  not  be  localized,   and  they 


Tin:    CENTRAL    POWERS  79 

knew  that  in  case  it  could  not  be,  they  would  have 
to  accept  the  responsibilities  of  the  Alliance  and 
the  challenge  of  war. 

The  truth  is  that  the  (jerman  documents  repre- 
sent a  confused  state  of  mind  in  Berlin.  Some  of 
the  officials  thought  that  I'ngland  and  France  did 
not  want  war  and  that  Russia  had  not  yet  com- 
pleted her  military  preparations,  at  least  to  such  an 
extent  that  she  was  ready  tor  war.  Others  took 
the  position  that  both  Russia  and  England  were  not 
telling  the  truth  when  they  denied  the  rumors  afloat 
as  to  their  naval  agreements.  On  one  day  it  was 
thought  that  German  relations  with  England  were 
improving;  on  the  next  day  they  appeared  to  be 
worse.  So  the  tide  of  opinion  Howed  and  ebbed. 
L^ncertainty  reigned  in  all  departments,  until  at 
length  it  became  clear  in  Berlin  that  England  would 
not  stand  aside  and  wait  in  case  Russia  and  I- ranee 
were  drawn  into  the  conflict.  That  was  definite  at 
least  by  July  30.  On  that  day  Bethmann  Hollweg 
transmitted  to  \',ienna  a  message  from  Eichnowsky 
which  proposed  mediation  oitcc  more  and  indicated 
that  Sir  I'.dward  Grey  now  took  a  rather  positive 
position.  As  il  in  some  anguish  of  spirit  the 
Chancellor  added:  "II  Austi'ia  rejects  this  media- 
tion, we  shall  stand  in  the  presence  ot  a  conflagra- 
tion in  wliich  l''nglantl  will  be  against  us,  Italv  and 
Rumania  not  with  us — we  two  against  tour  great 
powers.  Owing  to  the  enmltv  of  I\ngland,  the 
chief  weight  ot  the  conflict  will  fall  on  Germain'. 
Austria's   political   prestige,    the   militarv   lionor   ot 


8o        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

her  army,  and  all  her  just  claims  against  Serbia 
can  be  satisfactorily  guaranteed  by  the  occupation 
of  Belgrade  or  a  few.  other  places.  By  the  humilia- 
tion of  Serbia,  Austria  would  make  her  position  in 
the  Balkans  and  in  Russia  strong  again.  Under 
these  circumstances  we  must  invite  the  Vienna  Cabi- 
net, in  an  urgent  and  emphatic  manner,  to  accept 
the  mediation  under  the  honorable  conditions 
specified.  The  responsibility  for  the  results  aris- 
ing from  contrary  action  would  be  exceedingly 
heavy." 

On  the  day  that  this  letter  was  written,  the  con- 
trol of  affairs  was  passing  from  the  hands  of  the 
civil  branch  of  the  German  government  into  the 
hands  of  the  military  division.  Austria  had  de- 
clared war  on  Serbia  and  was  feverishly  carrying 
forward  her  military  preparations.  By  July  29, 
at  least,  Russia  had  ordered  "partial  mobilization." 
Then  the  Tsar,  timid  and  vacillating,  attempted  to 
draw  back  and  cancel  his  own  orders.  "But,"  as 
Professor  Fay  has  shown  from  painstaking  re- 
searches, "the  Tsar  was  flatly  disobeyed  and  de- 
ceived by  the  Russian  militarists  who  thereby  ren- 
dered futile  the  Kaiser's  efforts  to  check  Russian 
military  measures  until  he  could  effect  a  settlement 
by  his  mediation  at  Vienna.  On  July  30,  the  Tsar 
was  persuaded  to  approve  'general  mobilization,' 
thereby  at  last  making  legal  and  regular  the  secret 
military  measures  which  his  militarists  had  disobedi- 
ently been  carrying  on  behind  his  back."  The  Ger- 
man military  party,  when  news  of  Russian  mobiliza- 


Tin:    CEXIKAL    POWERS 


tion  was  confirmed  in  Berlin,  insisted  that  Russian 
mobilization  meant  war  and  that  further  diplomatic 
negotiations  would  only  give  the  Russians  tremen- 
dous advantages  by  enabling  them  to  bring  their 
vast  horde  together  betore  action  was  started.  At 
\'ienna  and  Berlin,  exents  had  placed  the  military 
parties  in  the  saddle,  (jcrniany  mobilized  at  once 
and  the  issue  was  tried  by  battle. 

From  the  facts  presented  above,  certain  general 
conclusions  seem  to  emerge.  The  first  and  perhaps 
most  important  is  that  formal  treaties,  either  secret 
or  published,  are  not  necessary  to  draw  nations  into 
warlike  combinations.  This  may  be  done  by  "con- 
versations," exchanges  of  diplomatic  notes,  and  un- 
derstandings. Moreover,  circumstances,  rather 
than  the  form  and  language  of  the  understandings, 
determine  the  outcome.  Italv  x\as  bound  by  a 
solemn  alliance  with  Austria  anel  (iermanv;  she  de- 
cided that  it  did  not  operate,  was  not  binding,  did 
not  apply;  she  entered  the  war  against  her  f(n-mer 
allies,  h'ngland  had  onK'  held  "conversations"  ^\•ith 
France;  she  construed  them  to  be  "obligations  of 
hon(n-"  and  fulfilled  them.  l!ie  relations  between 
I'.ngland  and  Russia  were  still  more  tenuous,  but 
thev  proN'cd   to  be   hooks   of    steel. 

rile  second  conclusion  is  tliiit  all  the  diplomats  of 
I'Airope  were  coiuinced  tliat  a  general  war  was  in  the 
highest  degree  probable  and  tlexotCLl  theniseh'es  to 
special  alliances  and  agi'ecnicnts  m  [^reparation  for 
the  tcn-ibL'  exenrualitw 

Ihe  third  conclusion  is  that  neither  the  members 


.82    CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

of  parliaments  nor  the  masses  of  the  people  knew 
what  was  going  on  behind  their  backs.  Had  all  the 
records  been  open  what  would  have  been  the  result? 
That  is  the  question. 


IV 


THE  ECOXOMIC  OUTCOME 
OE  THE  IIJR 

FOR  many  years  before  the  (jreat  War,  the 
statesmen  and  diplomats  of  ]"lurope  pursued, 
let  us  say  patriotically  aiul  honorahl)',  the  interests 
of  their  respective  nations  as  they  were  gi\'en  to 
see  those  interests.  To  accomplish  their  purposes, 
they  relied  upon  secret  negotiations,  alliances, 
ententes,  conversations,  and  understandings  and 
upon  huge  military  and  naval  equipments.  There 
were  some  critics  who  protested  against  these 
methods  and  these  reliances,  but  the  statesmen  and 
iliplomats  were  above  all  things  practical  men. 
Their  ways  were  old  and  tried  while  all  new  ways 
A\-ere  the  wa\s  of  visionaries.  The  practical  men 
had  their  (\:\\.  Fhe  (ircat  War  and  its  results  are 
the*  full  truit  ot  tlicir  planting  and  their  culti\ating. 
'I'he  ['jrcsent  state  of  i'urope  is  a  tribute  to  their 
powers  ot  di\'inati()n  and  to  their  genius  tor  the 
instant  need  of  things. 

There  is  no  doubt  about  the  present  state  of 
l''urope.  l'.\'erv  da\-  news.  e\'(.r\-  book.  e\"er\-  arti- 
cle dealing  with  l^'urope  bears  witness  to  the  chaos 
that  has  tolloued  the  armistice.  Statistical  taldes 
that   will    not   be    denied    tell    ot    staggering    debts, 


84        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

mounting  deficits,  paralyzed  industries,  inflated  cur- 
rencies, and  growing  bitterness.  At  the  end  of  four 
years  of  peace,  Europe  is,  in  many  respects,  in  a 
worse  condition  than  at  the  end  of  four  years  of 
war.  Conference  after  conference  has  been  held 
and  the  assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations  has  con- 
vened,  but  these  things  have  not  brought  health  or 
understanding.  In  the  midst  of  gathering  difficul- 
ties statesmen  are  frantically  talking  about  "restor- 
ing the  economic  order  of  Europe,"  "getting  back 
to  normal  conditions,"  and  "re-establishing  pros- 
perity." This  is  uppermost  now  in  the  minds  of 
leaders  like  Mr.  Lloyd  George  who,  weary  of  the 
snarling  voices  of  the  Old  World,  are  striving  to 
forget  the  past  and  bring  some  order  out  of  chaos. 

THE     ECONOMIC     F  O  U  .N  D  A  T  I  O  N 
OF     T  II  !•:     O  I,  D     O  R  D  i:  R 

It  is  fitting  therefore  that  before  examining  the 
present  state  of  European  economy  we  should  in- 
quire what  was  the  basis  of  the  vanished  "normalcy" 
which  statesmen  would  fain  restore.  It  is  not  diffi- 
cult to  find  a  satisfactory  answer  to  this  question. 
The  prosperity  of  Europe  in  July,  19 14,  depended 
on  the  relatively  free  and  easy  operation  of  eco- 
nomic forces  on  a  w^orld  stage — a  ready  exchange  of 
commodities,  unimpeded  intercourse,  friendly  nego- 
tiations, and  spirited  rivalry  among  all  the  commer- 
cial nations.  There  were  of  course  tariffs,  bounties, 
monopolies,  state  subsidies,  and  other  hindrances  to 
complete  freedom,  but  In  point  of  fact  the  mer- 
chants, manufacturers,   and  capitalists  of  all  coun- 


ECONOMIC"    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR         85 

tries  had  before  them  an  immense  and  varied  mar- 
ket for  the  fruits  of  their  enterprise. 

Now  strange  as  it  may  seem — and  this  is  one  of 
the  paradoxes  of  the  situation — the  most  important 
branch  ot  the  trade  of  all  I'.uropean  countries  was 
not  with  the  backward  races  of  the  earth  which  they 
were  so  eagerly  struggling  to  conquer  and  hold,  but 
with  their  powerful  and  enlightened  neighbors.  In 
iQii,  for  example,  Great  Britain,  sold  to  Ger- 
many fifty-seven  million  pounds  worth  of  goods. 
That  was  more  than  the  value  of  her  exports  to  her 
immense  Indian  empire  with  its  two  hundred  million 
subjects.  In  the  same  year  England  sold  to  Russia 
goods  to  the  value  of  twenty-two  million  pounds. 
That  was  more  than  she  sold  to  all  the  dusky  na- 
tives of  her  African  and  distant  insular  possessions. 
In  19 13,  England's  business  with  Germany,  count- 
ing exports  and  imports,  was  equal  to  more  than 
one-third  her  entire  business  with  all  her  colonies, 
dominions,  and  dependencies.  In  other  words,  on 
the  eve  of  the  war.  Great  Britain's  business  with 
(ierrnanv — her  bitterest  rival — was  a  vital  part  of 
her  economic  life.  There  is  anotlier  tact  worth  re- 
membering, namely,  that  (ireat  Britain,  in  1913, 
did  live  hundred  million  pounds  worth  ot  business 
with  her  imperial  possessions  and  a  billion  pounds 
worth  of  business  with  the  lands  she  did  not  rule, 
naiiicK,  the  free  nations  of  the  earth.  When  we 
recall  that  the  World  War  cost  (ireat  Britain  about 
ten  billion  pounds  and  that  the  annual  interest  and 
other  charges  on  her  debt  in  192  i  amounted  to  three 
Inuulrcd  tifty  million  pounds,  we  may  be  permitted 


S6        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

to  raise  a  question  as  to  whether  commercial  war- 
fare by  arms  "pays"  in  any  sense  of  the  word. 

The  immense  trade  which  Great  Britain  enjoyed 
with  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and  eastern 
Europe  generally  was  built  upon  the  prosperity  of 
those  sections;  upon  a  vast  economic  complex  with 
centres  at  Berlin  and  Vienna — especially  upon  the 
huge  net  work  of  agencies  and  enterprises  which 
Germany  had  constructed  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Even  Vienna  was  the  metropolis  of  a  large  free 
trade  empire.  It  was  an  important  financial  seat 
with  branch  banks  in  the  leading  cities  of  the  prov- 
inces. At  Vienna  large  undertakings  were  con- 
ceived, planned,  and  executed.  It  was  also  a  rail- 
way centre  with  radii  in  every  direction,  affording 
ready  intercourse  with  the  whole  economic  area 
of  the  empire  and  making  excellent  connections  with 
the  outside  world.  It  fostered  industries  of  the 
finer  sort  dependent  for  markets  upon  distant 
places.  If  so-called  Middle  Europe  constituted  a 
menace  to  England,  France,  and  Russia,  it  also, 
by  virtue  of  its  prosperity,  offered  them  business 
opportunities  both  alluring  and  lucrative. 

Eastward,  beyond  the  (jerman  frontier  lay 
Russia.  This  huge  agricultural  country,  then 
welded  into  a  vast  economic  unitv,  afforded  a  grow- 
ing market  for  Western  manufactures  and  poured 
millions  of  bushels  of  wheat  into  the  industrial 
centres  of  (icrmany  and  England.  In  19 to  Russia 
exported  produce  to  the  value  of  1,383,000,000 
roubles  and  bought  abroad  goods  worth 
9^3.000,000    roubles.      Swift    and    direct    expresses 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR   87 

from  Paris  to  St.  Petersburg  carried  merchants  and 
capitalists  to  and  from  Russia.  1  he  Siberian  rail- 
way system,  in  process  of  improvement,  gave  con- 
stantly increasing  facilities  for  intercourse  with  the 
heart  of  Asia,  where  virgin  resources  awaited  the 
touch  of  western  skill  and  enterprise.  Time  does 
not  permit  us  to  trace  more  closely  the  net- 
work of  economic  ties  that  made  l^urope  in  19  14,  in 
spite  of  Its  shortcomings,  the  most  prosperous  sec- 
tion of  the  world,  save  the  L  nited  States  alone. 
Whoever  has  a  taste  for  the  intricacies  of  chess  may 
work  opt  the  details  of  the  great  economic  mechan- 
ism from  the  voluminous  trade  statistics  of  the  pre- 
war days. 

Of  no  less  vital  Importance  to  the  business  pros- 
perity of  Europe  In  19 14  was  the  currency  system 
which  then  rested  upon  a  gold  basis.  Ihc  rates  of 
exchange  Huctuated  but  slightly.  Belgium,  France, 
and  Switzerland  used  their  francs  Interchangeably. 
The  Austro-1  lungarlan  crown  was  the  medium  ot 
exchange  for  liftv  million  people.  Within  each  ol 
the  several  nations  the  stability  ol  the  currency  at- 
tor(.led  a  sc^lld  tountlatlon  for  business  operations. 
Merchants  could  lav  in  stocks,  manut acturers  could 
hll  their  warehouses,  wholesalers  could  count  on 
long  term  market  conditions.  Among  the  se\'eral 
nations,  the  clejncnt  ol  sjicculation  was  relati\'ely 
slight.  hew  people  bought  loreign  currenc\'  with 
the  Idea  ot  holding  it  lor  a  rise.  I  he  relatl\-lt\-  ol 
exchange  N'alues  tlcpendcd  maiiiK'  uj'ion  tlie  bona  lule 
sale  and  [uirchase  ot  goods.  I  iiere  was  [iracticalK" 
no  element  ol   uncertaint\   m  the  matter  ol   currencv 


88        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

values.  Dealers  in  goods  could  look  ahead  for 
months  or  even  years  without  having  to  take  into 
their  reckoning  the  possibility  of  great  depressions 
or  inflations  in  the  currency. 

THE  ECONOMIC  RESULTS  OF 
THE  WAR  AND  THE  PEACE 

Such  were  the  foundations  of  world  economy  in 
August  I,  1 9 14.  Of  the  ruin  wrought  by  the  war 
itself  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  speak.  The  loss  in 
human  power  was  beyond  calculation.  The  physi- 
cal damage  done  by  contending  armies  was  enor- 
mous. For  four  years  immense  energies  were 
turned  from  constructive  to  destructive  purposes. 
The  foreign  trade  of  all  the  belligerents  was  dis- 
organized and  that  of  Germany  was  almost  de- 
stroyed. The  strains  of  revolution  worked  signifi- 
cant changes  in  the  outlook  and  opinions  of  labor. 
Had  the  war  been  followed  by  an  immediate  restora- 
tion of  the  status  quo  of  19 14,  the  process  of  re- 
covery would  have  been  slow  and  painful.  But  to 
the  disturbances  brought  about  by  the  armed  conflict 
itself  were  added  the  profound  commercial,  ter- 
ritorial, and  financial  readjustments  made  at  the 
peace  table. 

These  new  factors,  introduced  at  Versailles,  were 
not  the  result  of  accident  but  of  policy.  There  was 
a  large  school  of  economic  writers  in  each  belliger- 
ent country  who  believed  that  the  hope  of  their 
nation's  prosperity  lay  in  the  destruction  of  com- 
mercial rivals  by  military  force. 

From  the  German  side,  we  heard  a  great  deal  of 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR        89 

this  philosophy  both  before  and  during  the  war. 
Grumbach  in  his  remarkable  collection  of  extracts 
from  German  sources,  Das  Anncxionistische 
Dciitschland,  has  convicted  the  German  imperial- 
ists out  of  their  own  mouths.  Long  before  the 
world  ever  discovered  Bernhardi's  startling  thesis, 
Treitschke  had  written:  "We  must  never  become 
rigid,  as  a  purely  continental  policy  will  make  us, 
but  see  to  it  that  the  outcome  of  our  next  successful 
war  must  be  the  acquisition  of  colonies  by  all 
means." 

After  the  war  had  been  raging  a  year,  came  the 
petition  of  three  hundred  and  fifty-two  German  pro- 
fessors demanding  the  annexation  of  a  part  of  the 
French  Channel  coast,  the  seizure  of  the  iron  dis- 
tricts, the  retention  of  Belgium,  the  occupation  of 
a  large  domain  in  Russia,  the  enlargement  of  the 
colonial  empire,  especially  in  Africa,  the  permanent 
establishment  of  Middle  Europe  under  German 
hegemony,  and  the  collection  of  the  heaviest  possi- 
ble indemnity  from  France.  A  host  of  German 
writers  declared  the  war  to  be  In  essence  a  vast  com- 
mercial struggle  between  their  empire  and  Great 
Britain  and  called  for  the  liquidation  of  the  British 
system  on  the  day  of  \ictory.  The  plan,  the  hope, 
and  the  will  were  there  but  tate  decreed  otherwise. 
IhiC  distribution  ot  the  commercial  spoils  of  the 
world  was  committed  by  destln\-  to  other  hands,  but 
the  distribution  took  place. 

Such  theories  were  bv  tio  means  confined  to  the 
Ciermans.  I'A-eryone  at  all  familiar  with  Fjigllsh 
newspapers,  magazines,  and  parliamentarv  speeches 


90        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

between  the  years  1890  and  19 14  knows  how  Insis- 
tant  was  the  reiterated  clamor  In  many  quarters  for 
protection  and  retaliation  against  German  compe- 
tition. The  demands  ranged  from  appeals  for  high 
tariffs  against  things  "made  in  Germany"  to  calls 
for  war.  In  1897,  a  hotheaded  writer  in  the 
Saturday  Review  voiced  the  sentiments  of  many 
Englishmen  when  he  exclaimed:  "A  million  petty 
disputes  build  up  the  greatest  cause  of  war  the 
world  has  ever  seen.  If  Germany  were  extin- 
guished tomorrow  there  is  not  an  Englishman  in  the 
world  who  would  not  be  the  richer.  Nations  have 
fought  for  years  over  a  city  or  a  right  of  succession; 
must  they  not  fight  for  two  hundred  and  fifty  mil- 
lion pounds  of  commerce?  ....  England  has  not 
awakened  to  what  is  alike  inevitable  and  her  best 
hope  of  prosperity.  Gerinaniam  esse  deleiidam." 
"Sweep  away  the  whole  of  the  over-sea  possessions 
of  Germany,  and  whatever  the  cost  of  this  war  may 
be  to  us  In  men  and  money,  we  shall  breathe  freely 
for  generations  to  come,"  declared  a  writer  in  the 
Daily  Nezvs  of  August  25,  19 14.  "A  steady  war  of 
attrition  must  be  waged  against  German  com- 
merce, finance,  credit,  and  means  of  livelihood," 
wrote  another  correspondent  in  the  London  Times 
of  December  13,  19 14.  "To  defend  British 
industry  and  Britlsli  labor  against  German  compe- 
tition. To  fight  against  German  influence  in  our 
social,  financial.  Industrial,  and  political  life.  To 
expel  Ciermans  from  our  Industries  antl  com- 
merce"— such  was  the  avowed  purpose  of  the  Antl- 


ECONOMIC'    OUTCONTE    OF    THE    WAR        9I 

Cjcrman  Union  formed  under  high  auspices  shortly 
after  the  outhreak  of  the  war. 

The  victorious  allies  at  Paris  applied  with  a  ven- 
geance the  theory  that  the  commercial  ruin  of  Ger- 
many would  work  for  their  benefit,  and  we  have 
been  able  to  see  the  concrete  results  of  that  partic- 
ular economic  doctrine.  Since  nearly  all  the  nations 
of  the  earth  had  been  brought  into  the  fray  against 
the  Central  Powers,  the  Allies  were  able  to  destroy 
the  banks,  inxcstments,  concessions,  industries,  and 
commercial  agencies  belonging  to  alien  enemies  in 
all  parts  of  the  world.  Fnirthermore  in  the  treaty 
of  peace,  the  Allies  expressly  reserved  "the  right  to 
retain  and  liquidate  all  property,  rights,  and  inter- 
ests belonging,  at  the  date  ot  the  coming  into  force 
of  the  present  Treaty,  to  German  nationals  or  com- 
panies controlled  bv  them,  within  their  territories, 
colonies,  possessions  and  protectorates,  including 
territories  ceded  to  them  bv  the  present  Treaty." 
B\'  wa\'  of  supplement,  the  Allies  t(K)k  awav  from 
Germanv  all  hei*  overseas  colonies  and  posses- 
sions, seized  the  railways  and  other  government 
property,  and  lelt  (iermany  responsible  for  the 
payment  of  debts  incurred  in  creating  this  property. 
Ila\ing  disrupted  (ierman\'s  world-wide  trade  net- 
work, atul  ha\"ing  sc./cd  her  colonial  dominions, 
the  Allies  ga\e  her  the  finishing  blow  by  taking 
awa\-  (rorii  her  all  merchant  \essels  o\'er  160(1  tons 
buiTlicn  ;ind  lialf  the  ships  betn"een  that  1600  and 
!()()!)  tons. 

This    is    not    all.      Cierman    propertv    in    enemy 


92        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

countries  was  not  automatically  restored  at  the  close 
of  the  war.  It  had  been  largely  liquidated,  often 
in  the  interests  of  commercial  rivals,  and  no  general 
restoration  could  have  taken  place  if  it  had  been 
thought  desirable.  Moreover  all  the  enterprises 
and  concessions  owned  by  the  Germans  in  Russia, 
Turkey,  and  China  were  taken  from  them. 
Article  235  of  the  treaty  also  provided  that  Ger- 
man business  concerns  even  in  neutral  countries 
could  be  liquidated  for  the  benefit  of  the  Allied 
powers.  Thus  it  seems  that  nothing,  absolutely 
nothing,  was  overlooked  which  might  contribute  to 
the  commercial  ruin  of  Germany.  The  economic 
foundations  of  her  prosperity  were  torn  away. 
Middle  Europe  was  broken  up  and  her  world-wide 
system  of  colonies  and  trade  agencies  was  dissolved. 

It  may  be  said  that  all  this  was  merely  just  retri- 
bution for  sins  committed.  Those  whose  minds  are 
fixed  upon  punishment  rather  than  restoration  must 
of  course  be  prepared  to  accept  the  consequences  of 
their  policies  in  the  economic  sphere.  There  seems 
to  be  no  doubt  that  the  cosmic  process  often  departs 
from  the  rules  and  aspirations  of  the  shop  keeper. 

The  same  clash  over  ethics  and  economics  has 
arisen  in  connection  with  the  next  troublesome  factor 
introduced  by  the  Treaty  of  \'ersailles,  namely,  the 
reparations  bill  assessed  against  the  vanquished. 
The  (jermans  insist  that  they  made  their  appeal  for 
peace  on  the  basis  of  President  Wilson's  principles 
and  they  have  never  grown  weary  of  calling  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  he  had  openly  repudiated  an- 
nexations,  contributions,    and    punitive    indemnities. 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR         93 

Those  who  are  given  to  viewing  politics  and  diplo- 
macy somewhat  coldly  reply  that  the  Germans  had 
a  year  and  a  halt  to  leap  at  the  opportunity  of  mak- 
ing peace  on  Mr.  \\'ilson's  principles  but  did  not 
take  the  matter,  seriously  until  they  were  beaten  on 
the  field  of  battle.  Still  the  fact  stands  that  on  the 
face  of  things  the  armistice  was  made  upon  the 
broad  and  general  terms  laid  down  by  President 
Wilson,  with  some  reservations. 

It  is  idle  perhaps  to  discuss  the  contractual 
nature  of  the  terms  of  the  armistice  as  a  basis  for 
the  \"ersallles  Treaty.  One  thing  Is  certain  and 
that  Is  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  M.  Clcmenceau 
had  no  thought  of  offering  anything  but  severe 
terms  to  the  Germans.  The  former  declared  a  few 
days  after  the  armistice  and  long  before  the  Yer- 
sallles  settlement  that  "all  the  I'uropean  allies  have 
accepted  the  principle  that  the  Central  Powers 
must  pay  the  cost  of  the  war  up  to  the  limit  of  their 
capacity."  The  latter,  more  given  to  silence,  set- 
tled down  in  grim  determination  to  get  what  he 
could  get  without  resort  to  rhetoric.  It  is  true  that 
both  premiers  admitted  for  verbal  purposes  the  prin- 
ciple that  they  were  limited  by  President  Wilson's 
doctrines  and  the  armistice  terms,  but  thcv  found 
the  broad  generalities  of  both  programs  susceptible 
of  generous  interpretation.  In  the  armistice  pro- 
visions Germany  had  agreed  to  "make  compensa- 
tion for  all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population 
of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  to  their 
property  .  .  .  bv  such  aggression  b\  land,  bv  sea, 
and  from  the  air."      \\'!icn  the  bill  tor  such  dama<ies 


94    CROSS  CURRENTS  IN  EUROPE  TO-DAY 

was  tentatively  figured  up  at  Paris  it  fell  far  short 
of  the  amount  which  the  victors  hoped  to  extract 
from  the  vanquished.  The  question  was  raised  as 
to  whether  pensions  and  separation  allowances 
could  not  be  included  under  the  general  terms  of 
the  armistice.  The  American  experts  at  the  peace 
conference  argued  that  such  a  charge  was  in  fact  a 
cost  of  war,  not  a  civilian  damage,  and  therefore 
could  not  be  included  in  the  total  amount  assessed 
against  the  enemy;  but  President  Wilson  when  con- 
fronted by  what  was  called  the  logic  of  the  armistice 
obligations  exclaimed:  "Logic!  Logic!  I  don't 
care  a  damn  for  logic.  I  am  going  to  include  pen- 
sions.'' So  pensions  were  included,  more  than 
doubling  the  amount  of  Germany's  bill. 

Having  done  their  best  to  conciliate  the  angry 
public  opinion  in  their  respective  countries  by  keep- 
ing to  generalities,  the  Allied  negotiators  shrank 
from  fixing  in  the  treaty  the  exact  sum  to  be  col- 
lected from  the  defeated  foe.  They  made  a  long 
and  imposing  list  of  items  for  the  grand  account  but 
appended  no  exact  figures.  This  was  not  because 
fi'gures  in  abundance  were  wanting,  but  because  it 
was  easier  to  agree  on  generalities  and  postpone 
the  evil  day  of  an  exact  reckoning.  In  \"ain  did 
many  experts,  especially  on  the  American  side, 
insist  upon  the  healing  advantages  of  a  specific 
amount.  Thev  were  overborne.  The  difficult 
and  thankless  task  of  fixing  the  bill  of  damages  was 
handed  over  tr)  a  Reparation  Commission  charged 
with  the  duty  of  presenting  the  grand  total  to  tfic 
Cicrman  Cjo\'crnmcnt  not  later  than  May   i,    192  i. 


ECOx\OMIC'    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR        95 

So  for  two  years  the  victors  did  not  know  hcnv 
much  they  were  to  get  and  the  vanquished  did  not 
know  how  much  they  were  to  pay — a  state  of 
affairs  perhaps  convenient  for  politicians  but  dis- 
astrous to  sound  pubhc  and  private  economy. 

Leaving  out  ot  account  the  ships  turned  over  to 
the  Allies,  the  property  restored  to  occupied  coun- 
tries, the  territories  ceded,  the  economic  privileges 
granted,  and  a  few  other  things,  the  grand  bill  of 
obligations  under  the  reparation  clauses  of  the  Ver- 
sailles treaty  was  completed  and  handed  to  the 
Germans  on  May  5,  192 1.  Anticipating  the  diffi- 
culties in  C()llectit)n,  the  Allied  statesmen  pro\'ided 
that  the  total  should  be  represented  by  three  classes 
of  bonds.  The  first  class  is  for  $3,000,000,000; 
the  second  for  .$9,500,00(3,000;  and  the  third  is  for 
v$20,500,ooo,ooo,  making  in  all  $33,000,000,000. 
To  meet  the  interest  and  amortization  charges, 
Germany  must  pay  every  year  two  billion  marks 
gold  in  money  or  in  kind  and  an  atlditional  amtnmt 
e(]ual  to  iG'/,  of  the  value  ot  her  exports,  subject  to 
possible  modifications  bv  agreement. 

Thus  the  entire  bill  is  at  last  made  up,  at  least  on 
the  face  of  things,  but  those  who  made  it  act  as  if 
thev  thought  it  could  not  be  paid.  I  hcv  have  pro- 
vided that  the  last  class  ot  bonds  shall  not  be 
issued  and  shall  not  bear  interest  until  it  seems 
probable  that  tlie  interest  ami  amortization  charges 
can  be  met  bv  (iermany.  How  much  can  be  col- 
lectetl  imder  the  export  tax  scheme  remains  uncer- 
tain. As  (ierman\'  had  enjow'tl  a  i-espite  tor  more 
than  two  \ears  she  readiK'  met  the  first  installments 


g6       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

of  the  grand  bill.  Such  is  the  irony  of  history  that 
she  was  able  to  do  this  partly  out  of  paper  marks 
sold  to  speculators  in  the  United  States.  How 
long  Germany  can  continue  to  meet  her  successive 
installments  remains  uncertain.  Perhaps  it  is  use- 
less to  indulge  in  any  reflections  on  the  subject. 
That  indefatigable  student  of  the  economic  aspects 
of  the  peace,  Mr.  Keynes,  estimates  that  the  repara- 
tion demand,  under  the  settlement  mentioned 
above,  will  "by  itself  absorb  more  than  the  whole 
of  the  existing  revenue"  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment. 

When  all  arguments  about  the  ethics  of  the  repa- 
ration bill  are  closed  there  remains  what  Carlyle 
would  call  the  immense  and  indubitable  fact  that  all 
payments  on  it  must  be  made,  in  the  long  run,  in 
goods.  Germany  cannot  pay  in  gold  because  she 
does  not  have  it.  To  take  away  from  her  the  little 
gold  she  has  left  would  complete  the  ruin  of  her 
currency  system.  Germany  must  -pay  in  goods, 
mainly  manufactured  goods — the  very  goods  with 
which  the  Allied  countries  are  already  overstocked. 
Before  the  war,  they  were  in  mortal  peril  of  having 
these  very  goods  dumped  on  their  markets  at  low 
figures.  Now,  if  the  reparations  bill  is  to  be  paid, 
Germany  must  dump  them  free  of  charge.  The 
paradox  is  amusing,  but  there  it  Is.  The  claimants 
want  to  be  paid  but  not  in  the  one  kind  of  coin  in 
which  pa^Tncnts  can  lie  made. 

In  addition  to  disturbing  trade  and  manufactur- 
ing, the  reparations  requirements  keep  the  rates  of 
exchange    in    an    uncertain    and    troubled   condition. 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR        97 

No  kind  of  stabilization  can  be  attained  while  such 
huge  transactions  must  be  made — not  as  the  result 
of  normal  trading  operations  but  as  the  price  of 
victory  and  defeat.  Reparations,  therefore,  con- 
tribute to  the  paralysis  of  industry  in  England, 
France,  and  Italy,  and  make  impossible  the  stability 
of  exchange  which  is  the  foundation  of  normal  busi- 
ness. 

Commercial  disruption  and  rivalry,  heavy  in- 
demnities,— the  catalogue  is  not  yet  complete.  The 
application  of  the  fine  principle  of  "nationalism" 
has  wrought  a  havoc  in  the  economic  texture  of 
Europe  which  can  only  be  repaired  in  the  course  of 
many  years,  if  indeed  it  is  not  made  worse  with 
the  sharpening  of  racial  conflicts.  Nationalism  is 
based  upon  ethnic  and  moral  considerations.  It 
means  unity  and  self-government  for  peoples  akin 
in  race  and  language  and  occupying  a  given  geo- 
graphical area.  It  has  no  necessary  connection 
with  economic  fcnindations  of  prosperity.  Racial 
unity  in  itself  ignores  such  matters  as  coal,  iron, 
and  raw  materials.  It  disregards  the  former  mar- 
ket connections  which  made  tor  local  prosperity. 
It  creates  states  without  taking  into  account  the 
material  basis  necessary  tor  the  liie  of  the  inhabi- 
tants, this  in  spite  of  the  tact  that  all  peoples  must 
li\-e  by  agriculture  and  industry. 

Once  esta!"»li8!u'd  on  its  racial  foundations,  the 
new  natHMi  disco\"crs  how  unsatisfactory  are  its  eco- 
nomic boundaries.  Indeed,  e\-ery  one  of  the  inde- 
pendent nations,  recently  created  on  the  principle 
ol     abstract    nationalism,    has    discovered    its    eco- 


98        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

nomic  limitations  and  showed  a  remarkable  will- 
ingness to  violate  the  principle  of  nationalism  in 
efforts  to  get  coal  and  other  resources  at  the  ex- 
pense of  its  neighbors.  In  addition  to  reaching 
out  for  more  territory,  each  ethnic  unity  seeks  to 
build  up  its  economic  sufficiency  by  tariffs,  bounties, 
and  subsidies.  The  small  and  backward  industrial 
countries  struggle  to  maintain  "infant  industries" 
for  national  purposes  and  in  doing  this  create  arti- 
ficial barriers  in  the  way  of  trade. 

The  fruits  of  nationalism  are  particularly  striking 
within  the  borders  of  the  former  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire.  Efficiently  operated  railway  systems  have 
been  broken  up  and  reconstructed  along  national 
lines.  New  currencies  with  extraordinary  fluctua- 
tions have  appeared.  Alany  of  the  small  countries 
fmd  themselves  in  possession  of  industries  that 
never  would  have  developed  locally  had  it  not  been 
for  the  large  economic  complex  of  which  the  former 
province  was  a  part.  Hence  a  new  struggle  for 
markets  and  raw  materials.  New  diplomatic  in- 
trigues for  new  balances  of  power  have  been  Intro- 
duced, each  independent  nation  having  its  large 
corps  of  ambassadors,  consuls,  and  ministers. 
EInancial  mechanisms  such  as  that  centering  in 
Vienna  before  the  war  have  been  disrupted  and 
local  and  restricted  enterprises  substituted.  In  ad- 
dition, the  new  territorial  adjustments  in  the  in- 
terests of  nationalism  were  carried  out  In  such  a  way 
as  to  lay  the  germs  of  new  hatreds  by  the  inclusion 
of  many  aliens  within  the  new  ethnic  unities. 

Moreover,   the  brethren   now  united   are   not   as 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR    99 

happy  with  their  kinsmen  as  they  had  hoped  to  be. 
Although  lor  many  a  long  decade,  orators,  poets, 
and  editors  never  wearied  of  telling  the  world  about 
the  splendid  unity  of  Pan-Slavism,  their  prophecy 
is  far  short  of  fulfillment.  It  is  an  open  question 
to-day  whether  the  Czechs  do  not  hate  the  Poles 
more  cordially  than  they  do  the  Germans.  Once 
united  by  their  antipathy  to  the  Teutons,  the  vari- 
ous branches  of  the  Slavic  race,  now  that  the  old 
enemy  is  prostrate,  are  vigorously  contending 
among  themselves.  Nothing  but  the  fear  of  the 
return  of  the  Hapsburgs  forced  the  formation  of 
the  Little  Entente  between  Czechoslovakia  and 
Jugoslavia,  with  Rumania  as  a  strange  partner. 
Recently  when  Dr.  Benes,  one  of  the  archi- 
tects of  this  union,  was'  asked  whether  the  politi- 
cal understanding  might  not  develop  into  a  cus- 
toms union,  he  replied:  "We  shall  ha\"e  treaties 
regarding  tariffs  according  to  our  mutual  needs." 
When  he  was  asked  about  the  export  duties  laid 
on  (ierman  goods  according  to  the  adjustments 
under  the  \'ersaillcs  treaty,  he  replied:  "Ger- 
manv  will  fall.  If  she  agrees  to  pay  she  will 
fall,  and  equally  if  tlic  sanctions  are  ap- 
plied, she  will  fall.  She  will  not  go  so  low  as 
Austria,  because  she  is  a  much  stronger  national 
organism,  but  her  exjiort  trade  will  be  ruined  and 
the  mark  \\-ill  become  ot  almost  no  value.  The  ap- 
plication ot  rlie  export  thit\-  on  (ierman  gooils  is 
not  popular,  but  we  are  aj'tpKing  it.  It  will  raise 
the  cost  ot  li\'ing  ami  be  a  great  incon\"enience  to 
many  businesses  which  dejTend  upon  Ciermaru',  but 


lOO     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

on  the  other  hand  some  of  our  younger  industries 
may  be  helped  by  such  a  measure  of  protection." 
The  Czechs  even  complain  that  the  government  of 
Poland  seizes  whole  trains  loaded  with  goods  sent 
into  that  country,  and  the  Poles  make  equally  un- 
complimentary remarks  about  the  Czechs.  It  may 
be  that  in  time  these  frictions  will  disappear.  In- 
deed they  are  already  being  reduced  but  for  the 
present  they  constitute  formidable  barriers  to  eco- 
nomic prosperity  and  international  Intercourse. 

In  addition  to  the  restrictions  imposed  on  inter- 
course by  racial  jealousies,  there  are  the  limitations 
made  necessary  by  the  disruption  and  deterioration 
of  railway  lines,  roadbeds  and  rolling  stock. 
European  travellers  who  have  been  Into  southeastern 
Europe  all  agree  on  the  general  derangement  of 
transportation.  "The  trains  go  at  a  snail's  pace 
through  Serbia,"  writes  Stephen  Graham.  "One 
day  we  went  all  day  and  part  of  the  night  at  an 
average  of  five  kilometers  the  hour.  .  .  .  The  rea- 
son is  because  the  permanent  way  has  been  almost 
ruined  and  will  need  years  of  work  upon  it  and  all 
the  bridges  have  been  blown  up.  The  train  halts 
now  and  then,  and  then  most  fearfully  budges  for- 
ward, scarcely  moves,  budges,  budges  upon  tem- 
porary wooden  structures  of  bridges  and  the  work- 
men down  below  seem  veritably  holding  the  bridges 
up  whilst  the  trains  go  over  them.  ^  ou  stop  hours 
at  little  villages,  the  exhausted  and  damaged  en- 
gines being  hopelessly  out  of  repair  and  always  in 
repair."  Another  traveller,  Dr.  Haden  Guest  tells 
how  it  took  him  an  afternoon,  two  nights,  and  one 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      IQI 

day,  in  192  i,  to  make  the  journey  from  Bucharest  to 
Sofia — a  journey  that  in  the  piping  times  of  peace 
could  be  made  in  twenty  hours.  "And  this,"  he 
adds,  speaking  of  his  tiresome  trip,  "is  first  class 
express  passenger  traffic.  The  goods  traffic  is  very 
much  slower,  and  months  elapse  before  goods  de- 
livered at  a  Rumanian  port  reach  their  destination 
in  the  country  itself.  As  for  the  ordinary  postal 
service,  no  one  who  can  find  any  other  means  of 
distributing  mails  uses  it." 

When  to  the  difficulties  of  railway  travel  are 
added  the  irritating  requirements  of  the  passport 
service,  it  is  clear  why  a  merchant  would  rather  en- 
dure what  he  now  suffers  than  search  tar  and  wide 
for  new  enterprises.  For  hours  one  must  stand  in 
line  at  passport  and  consular  offices  to  get  one's 
document  approved  or  stamped.  I-Vequently  one  can 
not  stop  anywhere  over  night  without  reporting  to 
the  police  on  arriving  and  departing.  To  all  this 
is  added  the  vexation  of  spirit  caused  by  long  delays 
at  frontiers  while  passports  are  examined  and 
stamped  by  officious  busy-bodies.  Moreover  the 
process  is  expensive,  for  tlie  unhappy  traveller  has 
to  pav  a  hantlsome  tec  at  the  outset  tor  his  privileges 
and  then  additional  tees  to  the  officials  who  spread 
their  rubber  stamp  marks  and  signatures  over  the 
wide  margins  ot   the  precious  parchment. 

Any  one  who  has  Ik'cii  tlirough  the  mill,  can 
testitv  to  the  vi\'id  accuracy  ot  tlie  tollowing  ac- 
count gi\'en  In'  Stephen  (iraham  ot  his  acK'cntures 
in  passport  wondcrlaiul  :  "In  januarx',  1921.  I  took 
a  general  passport  tor  h'.urope.    ...    1  spent  a  week 


102      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

getting  visas  in  London.  I  remembered  his  Ex- 
cellency of  Greece  had  changed  his  address.  When 
the  taxi-driver  had  located  his  new  office  in  Great 
Tower  Street  we  found  that  he  was  having  a  holi- 
day, celebrating  New  Year's  day  in  orthodox  Greek, 
style  about  the  fourteenth  of  the  month.  I  re- 
turned in  a  few  days'  time  and  his  Excellency  was 
celebrating  Epiphany.  Next  time  I  resolved  to  take 
a  precautionary  twenty  minutes  at  the  telephone  and 
find  out  whether  there  were  any  other  festivals  on. 
The  Poles,  I  remember,  asked  for  answers  to  ques- 
tions on  two  sheets  of  foolscap  and  charged  thirty 
shillings  for  a  visa  that  went  out  of  date  before  I 
could  get  to  their  country.  His  Excellency  of  Bul- 
garia I  made  several  trips  to  Kensington  to  find, 
and  gave  him  up  as  apparently  non-existent.  With 
the  representative  of  Latvia  I  had  a  troublous  con- 
versation and  finally  obtained  another  useless  visa 
for  forty  shillings.  The  Germans  would  not  give 
a  visa  as  I  was  entering  Germany  from  the  other 
side.  I  spent  about  ten  pounds  in  London  merely 
for  the  application  of  rubber  stamps  and  consuls' 
signatures.  In  the  course  of  my  travels  that  pass- 
port became  an  appalling  wilderness  of  visas  and 
remarks  climbing  out  of  their  legitimate  spaces  to 
get  mixed  up  with  wife's  signature  and  the  color  of 
the  hair.  The  most  fiattering  of  these  remarks  is  no 
doubt  that  affixed  at  Sofia's  station — 'Not  danger- 
ous to  society.'  But  I  had  to  show  that  passport 
not  only  to  the  police  and  military  of  all  nations 
but  also  on  entering  the  gambling  halls  ot  Monte 
Carlo    on    the    one    hand    and    before    enternig    the 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      1 03 

gates  of  the  Cathedral  of  Sancta  Sophia  at  Con- 
stantinople on  the  other."  Among  the  nations 
whose  practices  are  thus  condemned  by  Mr.  Gra- 
ham must  be  reckoned  the  United  States  which 
became  one  of  the  worst  offenders  in  the  charges 
made  and  the  red  tape  evolved. 

Any  one  who  had  the  physical  and  moral  stamina 
necessary  for  a  battle  over  a  passport  did  not  have 
to  fear  the  rigors  and  hardships  of  European  travel.' 
The  effect  of  all  these  of^cial  operations  on  the  free 
intercourse  and  travel  so  necessary  to  commercial 
prosperity  can  readily  be  imagined.  Though  some 
of  the  restrictions  have  been  slightly  modified  under 
pressure,  the  main  structure  of  the  bureaucratic 
system  remains  intact  to  this  hour.  It  gives  em- 
ployment to  rubber  stamp  artists,  it  flatters  national 
pride,  and  it  serves  to  keep  alive  all  the  precious 
antipathies  aroused  by  the  war. 

If  the  Great  War  had  been  of  short  duration, 
perhaps  the  Carthaginian  Treaty  made  at  Ver- 
sailles would  have  produced  less  catastrophic  re- 
sults. But  to  the  effects  of  the  peace  must  be  added 
the  costs  of  a  long  and  exhausting  war,  the  increase 
in  debts,  and  the  derangement  of  the  currency 
systems.  During  the  four  years  of  actual  fighting, 
the  debt  of  England  rose  from  seven  hundred  mil- 
lion to  seven  billion  pounds.  The  government  of 
France  owed  thirty-tour  billion  trancs  in  1914;  it 
owed  one  hundred  and  litty  billion  in  19 18.  The 
(icrman  national  debt  stood  at  five  billion  marks 
when  the  war  began  ami  at  one  hundred  and  torty 
when  it  closed,  nt)t  counting  obligaticjns  impose*.!  at 


I04     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Versailles.  It  is  not  necessary  to  go  into  greater 
detail.  The  fact  stands  out  that  all  the  belligerent 
nations  are  loaded  with  a  burden  of  debt  which,  if 
it  had  been  imposed  in  the  interest  of  science,  the 
arts,  and  humanity,  would  have  produced  nothing 
short  of  a  revolution  on  the  part  of  the  taxpayers. 
Financiers  who  groaned  and  labored  over  pennies 
voted  for  education  and  public  health  in  1914  lived 
to  sow  millions  of  pounds  right  and  left  with  lavish 
recklessness  in  a  world  war.  When  a  nation  is 
struggling  for  existence  finance  as  well  as  the  laws 
are  silent.  Only  after  the  armistice  when  the 
nations  had  recovered  their  breath,  did  they  realize 
the  magnitude  of  their  obligations.  Nevertheless, 
if  all  the  belligerents  had  set  quickly  to  work  to  hold 
their  debts  within  the  limits  of  November,  1918, 
even  the  enormous  totals  we  have  just  recited 
would  not  have  been  beyond  their  financial  strength 
(leaving  out  of  account  reparations). 

Instead  of  balancing  their  budgets  at  once, 
all  of  them,  with  one  exception,  namely  Cireat 
Britain,  incurred  larger  expenditures  than  before. 
The  French  government,  for  example,  has  added  to 
its  outstanding  obligations  since  the  armistice  about 
one  hundred  and  sixty  billion  francs,  that  is,  more 
than  its  increase  in  war  debt.  In  other  words, 
the  French  national  debt  has  more  than  doubled 
since  19  18.  It  is  true  that  a  great  deal  of  this  ex- 
penditure must  be  ascribed  to  demobilization  and 
reconstruction.  Against  this  increase  of  course  we 
must  set  the  sums  recoverable  from  (iermany, 
amounts    estimated     at     littecn     or     twenty    billion 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR   105 

francs.  I'.ven  assuniino;  that  the  money  can  be  ex- 
tracted from  (iermany,  there  yet  remains  the 
astounding  fact  that  between  January  i,  1920  and 
March  i,  1921,  the  net  debt  of  !■  ranee,  after  de- 
ducting the  (German  obligations,  increased 
'^9, 000, 000, 000  trancs.  Recently  there  has  been  a 
tendency  to  retrench  but  It  makes  little  impression 
on  the  mountain  of  debt.  The  French  people  either 
will  not  or  cannot  tax  themselves  heavily  enough  to 
give  the  government  revenues  sufficient  tor  its  ex- 
penditures. It  may  be  that  this  process  can  be 
kept  up  for  a  long  time,  assuming  a  proportionate 
increase  in  national  productiveness,  but  it  would 
seem  that  a  day  of  reckoning  must  come.  It  the 
hopes  now  cherished  in  I'rance  of  making  the 
Germans  pay  all  the  charges  laid  upon  them  under 
the  treatv  settlement  are  not  realized,  then  some 
kind  of  drastic  financial  reorganization  can  hardly 
be  avoided. 

The  case  ot  (iermany  stands  alone  in  many 
resjiects,  and  deserves  separate  treatment.  -At  the 
opening  ot  the  ^^"ar  tlie  financial  condition  of 
Cicrmanv  was  unusuallv  good.  I  nlike  b'rance,  the 
Impei^ial  (iovernmcnt  had  not  financed  its  increases 
in  armaments  largel\-  out  oi  borrowings.  The 
huge  militarv  ci^edlt  x'otcd  In  1913  carried  with  it 
two  hca\'\'  taxes,  one  on  capital  itself  and  the  other 
on  increases  in  prl\'ute  tortunes.  So  it  happened 
tliat  in  1914  \\iiile  IVaiicc  Iiad  a  debt  of 
"^4, ()()!),<)(  )i ),( >()()  francs  tlic  (icrman  delit  stood  at 
little  more  than  ;.i  >«  n  i.^  mk  i.mi  )n  marks.  As  the 
Cierman   militar\'   part\'   counted   upon   a   short   war 


I06      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

and  a  satisfactory  indemnity  at  the  end,  there  semed 
to  be  no  reason  for  alarm  over  the  financial  situa- 
tion. As  time  wore  on  and  the  expected  triumph 
did  not  come,  the  government  shrank  more  and 
more  from  the  idea  of  arousing  discontent  by  new 
and  heavy  taxes.  It  financed  the  war  by  floating 
loans  and  issuing  paper  money.  The  indirect 
taxes  levied  between  19 16  and  19 18  proved  to  be 
disappointing  in  the  results  obtained.  The  two 
great  direct  levies,  the  War  Tax  of  19 16  and  the 
"extraordinary  war  tax"  of  19 18  laid  upon  excess 
profits  were  looked  upon  as  merely  temporary  and 
not  as  a  means  of  balancing  the  budget.  So  the 
crisis  of  defeat  came  without  finding  Germany  ready 
for  it.  On  the  day  of  the  armistice,  the  national 
debt  stoood  at  about  140,000,000,000  marks  not 
counting  paper  money  afloat.  To  this  burden  were 
then  added  the  cost  of  demobilization  and  the 
charge  for  the  reparations  levied  under  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  of  peace. 

While  waiting  to  learn  the  worst  about  repara- 
tions and  wrestling  with  perplexing  constitutional 
and  economic  problems  at  home,  the  German  gov- 
ernment allowed  its  finances  to  collapse.  The  na- 
tional debt  rose  from  140,000,000,000  marks, 
the  armistice  figure,  to  418,000,000,000  marks  in 
1920,  not  including  the  reparations  bill.  The  mere 
deficit  in  the  budget  of  192 1  amounted  to 
71,000,000,000  marks.  The  amount  of  paper 
money  in  circulation  rose  from  about  two  billion 
marks  in  i'9  1-3  to  more  than  80,000,000,000  marks 
in   1 92  I.      The  end  is  not  yet  in  sight  and  the  real 


ECONOMK^    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      107 

pressure  of  the  reparations  charges  is  still  to  come. 
I'igured  in  paper  marks  the  total  national  obliga- 
tions of  Germany  amount  to  more  than  seven  tril- 
lion marks.  Still  she  has  been  given  sixty  years  or 
more  to  discharge  her  reparations  bill. 

The  paper  money  disease  from  which  Germany 
suffers  acutely  is  raging  in  all  the  other  countries 
that  were  involved  in  the  war.  The  circulation  of 
the  Bank  of  PVance  rose  from  5,723,000,000  in 
19 13  to  37,000,000,000  francs  in  192 1.  In  the 
early  months  of  1922  the  German  Reichsbank  had 
outstanding  over  eighty  billion  marks  of  paper 
notes.  To  the  currency  of  established  banking  in- 
stitutions are  added  the  notes  of  local  banks  and 
chambers  of  commerce.  There  are  one  franc  notes 
and  even  twenty-five  centime  notes  in  France.  Woe 
to  the  unlucky  traveller  who  tries  to  pass  the  cur- 
rency of  Nice  or  Marseilles  in  Paris.  Vvcn 
postage  stamps  were  fixed  inside  of  campaign  but- 
tons and  handed  out  as  change  on  the  buses  and  in 
the  restaurants  of  Paris.  Notes  of  all  colors  and  in 
all  conditions  of  servitude,  torn,  ragged,  and  dirty, 
pasted,  glued,  and  stamped  by  many  possessors  bore 
microbes  bv  the  billions  to  tlic   innocent   recipients. 

The  further  east  the  tra\-eller  goes  the  worse  the 
rawagcs.  I'he  star  of  the  new  fiscal  empire 
makes  its  way  toward  tlie  rising  sun.  Polish  marks 
that  were  worth  thirteen  one-hundredths  of  a  cent 
in  192  I  dropped  hea\"il\-  to  two  or  three  one-hun- 
dredths of  a  cent  in  1922.  A  thousand  mark 
Warsaw  six  per  cent,  bond  was  offered  on  the  New 
'^  ork  market  in   b'ebruarw    1922,   at  Si.y^    but  au- 


I08     CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

daclous  buyers  only  cared  to  bid  the  sum  of  one 
dollar  for  such  a  treasure.  As  to  Russia,  the  ver- 
itable wonderland  of  paper  money,  one  hesitates  to 
speak.  The  figures  are  so  large  that  only  astron- 
omers can  handle  them  with  safety.  Not  long  ago 
it  was  estimated  that  some  printers  who  stole  fifteen 
billion  roubles  had  really  got  away  with  only  $70. 
Czechoslovakia,  the  home  of  relatively  sound 
finance  in  eastern  Europe,  issues  marks  worth  less 
than  two  cents,  but  issues  them  with  comparative 
moderation.  The  franc  and  the  lire  show  signs  of 
vitality,  but  mainly  because  the  foreign  trade  of  the 
two  countries  is  prostrate.  Three  years  after  the 
close  of  the  war,  all  the  former  belligerents  of  con- 
tinental Europe  are  in  far  worse  financial  condition 
than  on  the  day  of  the  armistice. 

Commercial  disruption,  rivalry,  heavy  indem- 
nities, huge  debts,  inflated  currencies,  and  national- 
istic explosions — the  catalogue  is  not  yet  complete. 
Thrones,  princely  houses,  aristocracies,  and  vast 
economic  systems  have  been  overturned  by  domestic 
revolution.  We  have  witnessed  for  the  first  time 
the  seizure  of  a  great  government  by  the  proleta- 
riat and  an  attempt  to  establish  a  communistic  sys- 
tem of  production.  We  have  seen  wh(^le  industries 
and  large  cities  in  the  hands  of  workingmen  bent 
upon  destroying  the  bourgeois  processes  of  business 
and  government.  We  have  seen  classes  that  fought 
shoulder  to  shoulder  upon  the  battle  field  against 
a  common  foe,  turn  upon  each  other  in  terrible 
civil  war.  The  tide  of  reaction  has  undoubtedly 
set  in  against  radical  experiments.      It  may  go  far, 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      109 

but  it  has  not  allayed  the  passions  and  aspirations 
roused  by  re\olution.  European  labor,  though 
divided  over  matters  ot  policy,  is  better  organized 
than  ever;  trade  unions  have  multiplied  their  mem- 
bership two  or  three  told.  It  may  be  that  labor 
will  prove  unable  to  establish  a  prosperous  civili- 
zation by  its  own  efforts;  but  from  all  appearances, 
labor  will  not  rest  content  with  the  present  distri- 
bution of  wealth  which,  it  alleges,  has  produced  war 
profiteers  at  one  end  and  slums  at  the  other.  When 
the  lowest  strata  of  society,  speaking  economically, 
can  read  and  write  and,  through  the  newspapers, 
books,  pamplets,  and  moving  pictures,  are  pro- 
foundly stirred  by  all  the  currents  of  thought  that 
run  through  modern  lite,  it  is  e\-ident  that  we  have 
reached  a  new  stage  in  the  history  (^t  civilization. 
The  "normalcv"  of   19  14  will  never  return  again. 

On  top  of  commercial  disorganization,  indemni- 
ties, huge  debts,  inflated  currencies,  nationalistic 
rivalries,  and  revolutionary  levers,  there  came  one 
of  tlie  worst  industrial  crises  that  has  plagued 
I'-urope  In  manv  a  generation.  I'.conomlsts  familiar 
with  the  paralysis  that  struck  luirope  after  the  set- 
tlement of  I  S  1  :;  had  j'tredicted  that  a  similar  crisis 
wouKl  follow  the  close  ot  the  World  War.  Thelr 
predictions  j')i"o\ed  to  be  correct.  I  he  cheerful 
prophec\-  that  e\  erv  bngllsliman  would  be  richer 
tlie  dav  after  the  downhill  ot  dermain'  was  belled 
bv  events.  The  year  following  the  peace  saw  a 
collapse  of  commerce  and  manufacturing  In  all  the 
\-IctorIous  countries.  Hnc  group  ot  tigures  tell  the 
stor\.      In    the    third   quarter   ot    the   great   business 


no     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

boom  in  Great  Britain  during  1920  exports,  which 
stood  at  £124,000,000  for  the  fourth  quarter  of 
19 1 8,  rose  to  £370,000,000.  In  the  second  quarter 
of  1 92 1,  the  export  trade  had  collapsed  and  the 
figure  for  that  period  was  £141,000,000.  In  spite 
of  the  predictions  of  professional  optimists,  no  signs 
of  genuine  recovery  are  yet  on  the  horizon.  France 
and  Italy  are  passing  through  a  similar  crisis. 
Everywhere,  business  depression  has  been  accom- 
panied by  its  usual  associates:  unemployment, 
failures,  reductions  in  wages,  poverty,  and  discon- 
tent. An  additional  strain  was  placed  upon  national 
finances,  especially  in  England,  where  huge  unem- 
ployment benefits  were  paid  by  the  government  as  a 
sort  of  insurance  against  social  unrest.  Months 
wore  into  years  and  still  no  revival  of  business  ap- 
peared. 

At  the  conclusion  of  a  careful  survey  of  European 
economic  conditions,  Bass  and  Moulton,  in  their 
important  book  published  late  in  1921,  declare 
"that  European  trade  this  year  has,  on  the  whole, 
been  very  much  less  satisfactory  than  it  was  in 
1920.  According  to  the  foreign  trade  index,  Europe 
is  not  yet  coming  back;  on  the  contrary,  the  real  eco- 
nomic aftermath  of  the  war  is  now  making  itself 
felt."  These  authors  are  also  of  the  opinion  that 
the  present  crisis  is  not  comparable  to  the  business 
depressions  of  previous  periods  when  the  finances 
and  currencies  of  the  various  countries  involved 
were  on  a  relatively  sound  basis.  The  existing 
panic  they  regard  as  a  political  rather  than  a  purely 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      ill 

economic  affair  and  they  believe  that  "without  a  re- 
turn of  prosperity  many  existing  European  govern- 
ments will  sooner  or  later  succumb  under  the  finan- 
cial strain  to  which  they  are  now  being  subjected." 

In  all  the  belligerent  countries,,  agriculture,  like 
manufacturing,  seems  to  have  suffered  from  a  de- 
pression more  or  less  extended.  In  L'ngland  and 
Wales,  the  production  of  wheat,  barley,  and  oats 
in  1920  fell  back  to  about  the  pre-war  figure  of  19  13. 
In  1918,  the  production  of  wheat  was  10,530,000 
quarters;  in  1920  it  fell  to  6,669,000  quarters.  In 
France  where  a  large  area  was  laid  waste  by  war, 
the  crops  of  1920  as  compared  with  those  of  19  13, 
not  adding  the  production  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  were 
twenty  five  per  cent  below  the  pre-war  basis.  In 
Germany  where  agriculture  suffered  none  of  the 
devastating  effects  of  war,  the  crops  show  a  decline 
from  the  high  tension  of  war  days,  but  taking  all 
things  into  account  seem  to  amount  on  the  average 
to  the  normal  pre-war  output.  The  same  mav  be 
said  of  Austria  proper,  although  there  and  in  (ler- 
many  the  situation  as  regards  live  stock  is  by  no 
means  normal. 

Over  wide  readies  ot  eastern  F.urope,  the  output 
of  farm  produce  is  far  below  that  of  19  14.  1  he 
ravages  ot  war  are  partly  responsible.  To  this 
cause  must  be  addetl  the  breakdown  of  Russian 
econom\'  under  B()lslie\'ik  management.  Ihe  ab- 
olition ot  private  trading,  as  the  Bolsheviki  tlicrn- 
selves  admirteil,  had  an  iniinecliate  and  ruinous  ef- 
fect   upon    agricultural    protluction,    and   tlie    policv 


112     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

has  been  abandoned  in  favor  of  private  economy. 
On  top  of  this  however  came  the  terrible  famine 
which  added  to  the  distress  of  Russia. 

In  Poland,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Rumania,  where, 
as  in  Russia,  the  destruction  of  great  feudal  estates 
has  been  in  progress,  agriculture  is  in  a  transition 
stage.  Impartial  witnesses  testify  to  the  fact  that, 
at  least  in  the  beginning,  the  system  of  peasant  pro- 
prietorship is  not  as  productive  as  that  of  large 
estates  under  more  efficient  management.  The 
ignorance  of  the  peasantry  in  states  like  Rumania  is 
a  handicap  to  the  rapid  recovery  of  agriculture  and 
will  cause  a  drag  on  progress  in  that  field  for  a  long 
time. 

Such  is  the  rather  doleful  picture  which  econo- 
mists draw  of  Europe  and  we  are  told  that  the 
worst  is  yet  to  come.  Nevertheless  strange  as  it 
may  appear  the  course  of  life  in  western  and  cen- 
tral Europe  seems  to  the  outward  eye  to  flow  along 
very  much  as  before  the  war.  The  mill  hands  that 
swarm  the  streets  of  Manchester  look  like  the  peo- 
ple who  cheered  the  news  of  Kitchener's  triumph  at 
Khartoum  and  the  relief  of  Mafeking.  Oxford 
Street  and  Piccadilly  in  Eondon  are  the  same,  except 
for  the  veterans  of  the  World  War  turning  hand 
organs  and  begging  coppers  at  the  curb.  Paris,  a 
bit  subdued,  is  still  Paris.  Rome  is  unchanged  ex- 
cept for  the  new  excitement  made  by  bands  of  1'  as- 
cisti.  The  cafe's  are  crowded  with  soldiers  while 
in  the  countryside  the  old  men  and  women  with  their 
gnarled  liands  dig  in  the  lields  and  on  the  hills. 
Restoration  on  the  northern  battlefields  goes  on  like 


ECOXOMIC    (n   TfOME    OF    TIIK    WAR       1  13 

magic.  The  thrones  in  the  beer  gardens  of  Berlin 
and  the  cottee  houses  ot  N'ienna  tiiscuss  defeat  in- 
stead ot  victory,  hut  they  are  as  hirge  and  enthusi- 
astic as  in  the  gay  tiiiies  ol  the  I  lohenzollerns  and 
the  I  lapsburgs.  Only  to  the  eastward  are  there  un- 
niistakahle  signs  ot  ruin  and  despair.  But  econo- 
mists warn  us  that  the  peace  of  Murope  is  only  the 
calm  hetore  the  stoi'm,  that  trade  grows  worse,  that 
attempts  to  collect  tlie  indemnities  will  produce  a 
crash,  and  that  unless  something  drastic  is  done  the 
deluge  will  he  upon  us.  1  heir  ai-guments  seem  con- 
^■incino:,  hut  still  their  rcasonino;  may  be  a  delusion. 


s  c  u  1:  M  i:  s    F  0  K    I  II  i:    r  i:  s  r  o  r  a  i'  i  o  x   o  f 

E  U  R  O  P  F  A  X    i:  C"  0  X  0  M  V 

The  sickest  man  in  I'urope  is  no  longer  Turkey; 
all  I'.urope  is  sick,  and  the  doctors  are  on  hand  with 
remedies.  It  \\()uKl  take  an  enc\  clopaedia  of  medi- 
cine to  summarize  all  their  prescriptions,  but  some 
of  the  most  striking  m;i\'  he  hriefU'  examined. 

1  here  !s  first  ol  all  the  school  ot  doctors  who  pre- 
fer to  let  nature  take  its  course.  1  hey  ha\"e  a  theory 
that  the  designs  and  will  of  iiian  can  a\'ail  little  while 
iniconscious  and  hal  I -conscious  forces  struggling  for 
expression  may  accomplish  much. 

Next  is  the  growing  scliool  of  I-^-ench  intran- 
sigents represented  hv  Clu'radame  and  dautier,  who 
rouiul]\'  condemn  h'.nglaiul  tor  hetraying  h  ranee  into 
t!ie  hands  ot  the  eneniw  a.nd  demand  a  vigorous 
t  o:-\'.;;!rd  jiohcw  (uiutier  la\'ors  cutting  loose  from 
I'.ngland  and  ta.king  tlie  (lermans  aside  tor  a  jM'i\"ate 
con\'ci"sat!on.       lie    ^^■ould    sa\'    to    the    fallen    foe: 


114     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

"Complete  and  rapid  reparation  of  the  ruins  in 
France  and  Belgium,  in  kind  or  in  money,  indemni- 
ties to  the  victims  of  the  war  which  you  have  made, 
and  finally  the  delivery  of  the  armament  required 
by  the  Treaty.  ...  If  these  demands  are  not 
fully  carried  into  effect,  we  have  decided  to  employ 
to  the  limit  all  the  means  of  coercion  which  our 
actual  military  position  permits  us  to  apply."  Chera- 
dame,  who  thinks  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  is  in  the 
hands  of  Pan-Grerman  Jews,  calls  for  the  formation 
of  an  eastern  bloc  against  Germany  and  the  exer- 
cise of  compulsion  by  relentless  encirclement.  These 
plans  contemplate  a  balance  of  power  under  French 
hegemony — with  Germany  and  Russia  driven  into 
an  alliance.  What  lies  beyond  almost  any  short- 
sighted person  can  guess. 

At  the  opposite  pole  almost,  are  two  experienced 
American  economists,  Bass  and  Moulton,  who  after 
a  careful  survey  of  the  present  economic  condition 
of  Europe,  reach  certain  decided  conclusions  as  to 
the  remedies  for  the  disease.  To  those  who  think 
that  time  cures  all  things,  they  reply  with  a  touch 
of  dry  sarcasm,  that  it  does — it  did  for  Babylon 
and  Nineveh.  All  minor  remedies  they  reject. 
They  tell  us  that  the  continued  extension  of  Ameri- 
can credits  to  Europe  will  not  help  the  situation. 
Indeed  it  may  make  confusion  worse  confounded. 
They  do  not  think  that  devices  for  extending  our 
trade  abroad  will  touch  the  fringe  of  the  dilemma. 
They  bluntly  tell  us  that  exchanges  can  not  be  sta- 
bilized until  luiropean  budgets  have  been  read- 
justed and  until  trade-balances  are  put  on  an  even 


ECONOMIC"    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      II5 

keel.  Still  more  bluntly:  "Foreign  exchanges  can 
not  be  stabilized  so  long  as  reparations  and  Allied 
debts  require  to  be  paid." 

Here,  then,  is  the  bitter  medicine  which  Bass  and 
Moulton  prescribe:  (i)  reparation-demands  must 
be  reduced  and  inter-Kuropean  war-debts  can- 
celled; (2)  tariff-barriers  must  be  reduced  and  gov- 
ernment support  for  trade-promoters  abandoned; 
(3)  national  budgets  must  be  balanced,  debts  re- 
duced, and  paper  money  curtailed;  (4)  the  United 
States  must  cancel  the  war  debts,  reduce  armaments, 
lend  some  more  money  to  Europe  for  constructive 
purposes,  and  lower  its  tariffs;  (5)  there  must  be 
some  kind  of  league  of  nations  to  manage,  in  a 
spirit  of  honesty  and  fairness,  the  common  con- 
cerns of  the  world.  The  United  States  is  in  a 
strategic  position  to  make  Europe  take  notice  and 
set  her  h(nise  in  order. 

An  alternative  is  presented  by  these  two  au- 
thors. The  United  States  may  let  Europe  stew  in 
her  (nvn  juice,  go  in  for  armaments  and  imperial- 
ism, and  clean  up  everything  in  sight,  now  that 
the  chief  artists  in  that  line  are  hors  dc  combat. 

Another  American,  a  financier  of  large  experience, 
Mr.  Frank  X'anderlip,  after  a  visit  to  many  Euro- 
pean countries,  has  come  to  similar  conclusions.  He 
believes  that  a  radical  revision  ot  the  \'ersailles 
Treatv  must  come;  and  that  measures  similar  to 
those  put  forward  bv  Bass  and  Moulton  cannot  be 
avoided  if  "restoration"  is  to  be  effected.  He  sug- 
gests also  the  creation  ot  an  international,  or  it 
possible  a  super-national,  banking  corporation,  per- 


Il6     CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

haps  under  the  auspices  of  the  League  of  Nations. 
It  would  be  established  on  a  gold  basis  and  be  di- 
rected by  a  body  of  European  and  American  finan- 
ciers. It  would  make  loans  against  material  goods, 
raw  or  in  process  of  manufacture,  not  against  cor- 
porate stocks  or  government  bonds.  It  would  issue 
notes  on  a  gold  basis  designed  to  circulate  on  identi- 
cal terms  in  all  countries,  thus  giving  at  least  one 
uniform  world  currency.  It  would  receive  deposits 
and  transact  through  its  various  branches  a  truly 
international  business.  The  effect  of  such  an  insti- 
tution, It  is  thought,  would  be  to  place  the  economy 
of  all  countries  on  a  sound  financial  basis,  leaving 
the  currencies  of  the  several  governments  to  battle 
with  fate  against  real  money.  Whatever  may  be 
the  merits  of  this  proposal,  and  its  merits  are  un- 
doubtedly great,  it  has  against  it  the  special  interests 
of  the  various  nations  that  would  be  affected  by  it. 
French,  German,  Italian,  Polish,  and  other  bankers 
think  that  it  is  still  possible  to  drag  through  the 
present  paralysis  or  at  least  postpone  indefinitely 
the  evil  day  of  reckoning — perhaps  on  the  well 
known  theory,  "after  us  the  deluge."" 

The  eminent  English  economist,  Mr.  John  Mav- 
nard  Keynes,  who  aroused  the  interest  of  the  whole 
world  by  his  book  on  the  economic  consequences  ol 
the  peace,  brought  out  early  in  1922  a  second  book 
on  the  same  subject  entitled  ''A  Revision  of  the 
Treaty."'  In  this  new  work,  he  suggests  four  things 
as  necessary  to  the  restoration  ol  I-"urope:  (  i  )  the 
cancellation  of  inter-allicd  indebtedness  including 
the  amounts  owing  to  the  United  States;      (2)   the 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR   117 

reduction  of  the  German  reparations  bill;  (3)  a 
fair  distribution  of  the  amount  collected  between 
France  and  Belj2jium;  and  (4)  economic  assistance 
to  the  new  states  of  eastern  Europe.  By  this 
method,  he  thinks,  "peace  and  amity  might  be  won 
for  Europe." 

In  fact  there  is  a  large  school  of  economists  in 
Europe  and  the  United  States  who  insist  that  a 
restoration  of  old  Europe  is  impossible  by  purely 
national  efforts  and  that  it  would  be  undesirable  if 
possible  because  it  would  lead  to  the  renewal  of  all 
the  old  hostilities  and  imperial  rivalries  which  pre- 
cipitated the  late  crisis.  Thev  insist  upon  the  for- 
mation of  the  United  States  of  luirope,  and  in  this 
they  have  the  support  of  the  American  analogv. 

In  17S3  our  country  came  out  of  a  seven  years' 
war,  with  commerce,  industry,  finance  and  currency 
in  a  chaos  resembling  that  of  the  Old  World  today. 
Though  not  as  dependent  as  modern  peoples  upon 
foreign  commerce  tor  their  livelihood,  the  Ameri- 
cans had  found  the  I'.nglish  blockade,  loose  as  it 
was,  ruinous  to  their  shipping  and  trade.  Ihe 
neutral  vessels  that  plied  their  arts  in  the  midst  ot 
great  hazards  had  not  been  able  to  make  up  tor 
the  loss  of  I'.nglish  business.  Commerce  was  pros- 
trate. Industry,  slight  but  yet  important,  had  been 
either  turned  into  Tiiilitar\-  ser\'ice  or  alloued  to 
lapse.  The  artisans  ot  the  to\\'ns,  e\'en  tliougli 
comparati\'elv  tew  in  numbers  as  measured  bv  mod- 
ern standards,  sutlered  t  i-oin  unem}-)lo\-ment.  The 
go\'ernments  ot  the  American  C  on  federation  and  ot 
the    se\'eral    states   were    staggering   under    a    hcax'N- 


Il8      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

burden  of  debt,  domestic  and  foreign.     The  reve- 
nues of  the  former  dwindled  away  as  patrotic  fervor 
died  down  and  those  of  the  latter  were  seldom  suf- 
ficient to  meet  the  fixed  obligations.      The  disorders 
in  the  currency  were,  if  possible,  even  worse  than 
in  the   other  branches  of  economic  life.      Like  all 
other  governments   confronted  by  necessity,   those 
of  our  revolutionary  times  resorted  to  the  printing 
press.      "Do    you    think,"    exclaimed    one    of    the 
Fathers,  "that  I  will  consent  to  load  my  constituents 
with  taxes  when  we  can  send  to  the  printer  and  get  a 
whole   wagon  load  of  money,   one  quire   of  which 
will   pay   for    the   whole?"      When   once   this    rock 
of  public  resource  was  struck,  paper  money  gushed 
forth  in  never-ending  streams.     At  the  close  of  the 
Revolution  there  was  outstanding  about  $450,000,- 
000  in  the  currency  of  the  states  and  the  national 
government.      When  peace  came  at  last  the  habit 
could  not  be  broken.      It  was  easier  to  print  and 
borrow  than  to  tax  and  collect.      The  printing  press 
was  thought  to  be  the  cure  for  all  the  ills  from  which 
trade,  commerce,  and  Industry  suffered  but  each  new 
issue  proved  more  disappointing  than  Its  predeces- 
sor and  finally  leaders  In  public  affairs  decided  that 
the  country  would  have  to  choose  between  putting 
its  house  In  order  and  falling  Into  a  chaos  followed 
by    destruction.     The    Constitution    of   the    United 
States  was  the  outcome  of  this  decision. 

The  medicine  offered  by  the  Constitution  was  ex- 
tremely bitter  to  large  sections  of  the  country  and 
its  adoption  was  brought  about  only  by  the  use  of 
the  most  heroic  methods.      But  It  was  finally  car- 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  II9 

ried.  Under  its  terms  a  number  of  fundamental 
economic  reforms  were  accomplished.  The  im- 
mense outstanding  debt,  state  and  national,  was 
funded  into  one  grand  consolidated  debt  under- 
written by  the  authority  of  a  central  government  en- 
dowed with  power  to  tax.  The  national  paper 
currency,  fallen  into  utter  contempt,  was  redeemed 
at  the  magniHcent  figure  of  one  cent  on  the  dollar. 
Most  of  it  expired  in  the  hands  of  the  unhappy 
holders.  Tariff  barriers  erected  by  the  states 
against  one  another  were  broken  down  and  trade 
on  a  national  scale  made  free.  Measures  were 
taken  to  adjust  relations  with  foreign  countries  and 
to  restore  commerce  to  a  normal  basis.  The 
states  were  forbidden  to  emit  bills  of  credit  or  to 
make  anything  but  gold  and  silver  legal  tender  in 
the  payment  of  debts.  Thus  there  was  laid  out  a 
new  course  based  upon  established  business  princi- 
ples, and  under  the  new  order  the  country  recovered 
Irom  its  paralysis  and  entered  upon  an  era  of  work 
and  prosperity.  Still  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  Revolutionary  war  lasted  seven  years  and  that 
the  period  of  confusion  which  had  followed  the  war 
continued  tor  six  years  more.  It  was  a  long  "criti- 
cal period,"  and  nothing  but  grinding  necessity 
brought  about  the  final  cooperative  efiort  that  cre- 
ated tiie  Constitution. 

T  II  i:      D  R  1  F   r     OF     THINGS 

It  we  look  beneath  the  schemes  ot  the  reformers, 
who  seek  peace  in  a  kind  ot  constitution  for  I'urope, 
to  the  realities  ot   I'.urope  we  cannot  escape  seeing 


I20     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

certain  very  striking  tendencies  in  the  practical  con- 
duct of  affairs.  On  the  side  of  restoration  and  re- 
covery may  be  set  many  things.  In  Eastern  Europe, 
the  new  republics  are  slowly  seeing  the  folly  of 
constant  bickering.  A  score  of  new  treaties,  politi- 
cal and  commercial,  have  been  signed  during  the 
past  four  years  clearing  away  antagonisms  and 
opening  the  channels  of  trade.  The  Baltic  states 
seem  to  be  on  fairly  good  terms  with  their  neigh- 
bors. Even  Czechoslovakia  and  Austria,  a  few 
days  before  last  Christmas  (1921),  reached  an  ac- 
cord respecting  political  and  commercial  relations. 
The  members  of  the  old  Austro-Hungarian  empire 
are  learning  that  wrath  of  man  produces  no  turnips 
and  that  pride  of  race  covers  no  nakedness.  Ger- 
man business  enterprise  is  swiftly  building  a  new 
'Middle  Europe,  economic  rather  than  political,  the 
harbinger  of  extensive  industrial  activity.  Russia 
for  a  long  time  sat  in  outer  darkness,  but  as 
many  separate  commercial  treaties  attest,  most  of 
Europe  seems  at  last  inclined  to  renew  its  connec- 
tions with  that  vast  empire  with  its  laborious  peas- 
antry and  its  undeveloped  natural  resources.  In- 
deed, the  Bolsheviki  have  abandoned  communism  as 
applied  to  the  land  and  are  swinging  toward  a  form 
of  state-capitalism  which  admits  of  pri\'ate  enter- 
prise and  individual  initiative.  Still  there  is  poli- 
tics mixed  with  this  economics.  The  new  alignments 
of  power  among  Poland,  Czeciioslovakia,  Hun- 
gary, Rumania,  and  Jugoslavia  are  closely  related 
to  the  encircling  policy  which  tiie  I'rench  intransi- 
gents have  in  mind  and  may  lead  to  war  rather  than 
to  peace. 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR       121 

Tn  German  affairs,  the  drift  in  finance  and  in  in- 
dustry is  unmistakable.  The  democratic  forces  of 
Germany  are  disconcerted  and  beaten.  The  peo- 
ple who  led  the  revolution  thought  that  the  over- 
throw ol  the  old  i':overnment  and  the  retirement  of 
the  bureaucrats  and  militarists  would  bring  easier 
terms  at  the  council  table.  That  hope  failed.  The 
Wilsonian  peace  was  not  realized,  and  the  anger 
that  accompanied  the  defeat  of  the  peace-makers 
fell  with  terrible  weight  upon  the  leaders  responsible 
for  signing  the  Treaty.  This  produced  the  inevita- 
ble reaction.  Taxes  are  never  popular.  Taxes  to 
pay  bills  presented  by  a  triumphant  foe  can  hardly 
be  characterized  at  all.  The  capitalists  will  not 
suffer  the  govx^rnment  to  levy  upon  their  huge  war 
prohts  and  the  revolutionary  working  class  will  not 
endure  Indirect  taxes.  Both  capitalists  and  laborers 
are  so  closely  organized  that  no  government  dares 
to  defy  them. 

Fhe  attempt  to  collect  a  heavy  reparations  bill 
in  (icrmanv  by  the  ordinar\'  political  processes  will 
proN'c  extremely  difficult.  That  truth  is  concretely 
illustrated  in  the  tragic  careci"  ot  I  lerr  l-.rzberger. 
He  came  to  the  head  ot  the  treasury  se\"eral  months 
after  the  \o\-ember  rc\-olutI()n  ot  19  iS  winch 
turned  dermanv  into  a  re]ni!)lic.  I  lis  predecessors 
under  the  democratic  regime  h;id  not  tlared  to 
touch  the  problem  ot  l;n:iiicc  tor  teai"  ot  letting  loose 
torces  u'hich  tlie\-  could  not  calculate.  ]-'.ivberger, 
\viiate\'er  ma\'  be  said  ot  his  \ersatilitv  and  it  was 
\'er\'  great,  was  a  man  ot  considerable  courage.  1  Ic 
had   been   an    imperialist    in   the   days   when    xictory 


122     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

perched  on  German  banners.  He  later  sensed  de- 
feat from  afar  and,  convinced  that  an  early  peace 
was  necessary  to  save  the  country,  he  took  the  lead 
in  advocating  a  peace  without  annexations  and  in- 
demnities. For  this  he  incurred  the  enmity  of  many 
of  the  militarists  who,  defeated  in  their  game,  did 
not  have  the  courage  to  face  the  inevitable.  When 
the  breakdown  finally  came,  Herr  Erzberger  forged 
to  the  front.  He  urged  the  ratification  of  the  Ver- 
sailles treaty,  in  spite  of  its  drastic  terms.  Soon 
afterward  called  to  the  ministry  of  finance,  he  set 
about  fiscal  reforms  with  a  zeal  that  shocked  the 
potential  taxpayers.  He  proposed  a  heavy  income 
and  profits  tax,  an  extraordinary  levy  on  inheritances, 
and  finally  what  he  spoke  of  as  "a  national  sac- 
rifice tax."  This  last  was  a  call  upon  all  Germans 
to  surrender  to  the  state  a  goodly  share  of  their 
private  fortunes — a  tax  ranging  from  ten  per  cent 
on  fifty  thousand  marks  to  slightly  more  than  fifty 
per  cent  on  an  estate  of  eight  million  marks.  To 
these  direct  taxes  were  to  be  added  indirect  taxes 
falling  heavily  upon  all  business  and  commercial 
transactions.  Furthermore  by  way  of  a  prelimin- 
ary a  complete  revolution  in  the  fiscal  relations  of 
the  national  government  and  the  states  was  devised 
and  executed. 

The  storm  of  wrath  that  broke  when  Herr  Erz- 
berger laid  his  program  before  the  country  was 
terrible.  The  possessing  classes,  capitalists  and 
landed  gentry  alike,  assailed  it  from  all  sides. 
Though  it  was  evident  that  some  such  prodigious 
fiscal  enterprise  was  necessary  to  make  even  the  nor- 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      1 23 

mal  budget  balance,  Hcrr  Erzbcrger's  plans  were 
cut  clown  and  modified  until  they  fell  far  short  of 
the  object  in  view.  The  attempts  to  execute  the 
laws  that  did  get  through  the  national  legislature 
met  with  every  kind  of  an  obstacle.  A  great  deal 
of  capital  fled  from  the  country,  the  bureaucracy 
blocked  the  efficient  administration  of  the  measures, 
taxpayers  devised  new  schemes  for  escaping  their 
burdens,  and  business  men  resisted  what  they  re- 
garded as  systematic  confiscation.  To  these  dif- 
ficulties were  added  others.  All  the  natural  hatred 
of  taxpayers  for  the  authors  of  their  miseries  was 
mingled  with  the  wrath  of  the  militarists  and  landed 
aristocracy  of  the  old  regime.  Beaten  and  dis- 
couraged, Herr  Erzberger  gavx  up  the  task,  and  re- 
tired only  to  meet  his  fate  at  the  hands  of  an  assas- 
sin. His  successor.  Dr.  Wirth,  fell  back  upon  the 
good  old  expedient  of  printing  paper  money  to  pay 
the  bills,  with  results  already  widely  advertised. 
If  such  was  the  outcome  of  a  sincere  attempt  to  re- 
store order  in  German  finances  before  the  imposi- 
tion of  the  reparations  burden,  what  is  to  be  ex- 
pected from  new  efforts  along  that  line? 

In  casting  about  for  a  scapegoat,  the  Germans 
sei/.ed  upon  the  authors  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
To  that  fateful  document  they  traced  the  origins  of 
their  financial  ruin.  A  congress  of  bankers  held 
in  Berlin  during  October.  1920,  solemnly  decided 
that  there  was  no  salvation  for  Germany  outidc  of 
a  revision  of  the  treatv.  If  they  had  looked  east- 
ward tliCN'  would  have  found  a  country  laboring  un- 
der no  obligations  for  reparations,  namely  Poland, 


124     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

with  finances  in  still  greater  disorder.  If  they  had 
looked  at  the  victorious  P  rench  republic  they  would 
have  found  deficits  almost  as  staggering  as  their 
own.  But  it  was  easier  for  the  taxpayers  to  con- 
demn the  settlement  of  Versailles  than  to  make  out 
checks  for  their  taxes.  So  the  world  witnessed  a 
country  possessed  of  great  industrial  resources  and 
immense  private  fortunes  unable  to  pay  its  current 
expenses — a  nation  in  which  capitalist  corporations 
were  paying  from  ten  to  eighty  per  cent  profit 
while  the  government  was  impoverished. 

Although  the  Germans  resent  any  mention  of  re- 
parations, German  capitalists  forge  ahead  with  more 
zeal  and  efficiency  than  ever  in  organizing  their  eco- 
nomic Middle  Europe  and  in  reaching  out  for  world 
markets.  The  treaty  of  peace  was  hardly  signed 
before  this  renewed  economic  activity  attracted  the 
attention  of  all  observers.  A  few  German  leaders, 
like  Albert  Ballin,  director  of  the  Hamburg-Ameri- 
can Line,  withdrew  broken-hearted  from  the  com- 
mercial sphere  while  the  militarists  of  old  Prussia 
sulked  in  their  tents,  but  men  like  Hugo  Stinnes  and 
the  Kirdorfs,  the  Rockefellers  and  Garys  of 
Germany,  set  about  reconstructing  the  industrial  life 
of  their  nation  on  a  better  organized  and  more 
efficient  basis  than  ever.  In  July,  1920,  the  Ger- 
man-Luxemburg Mining  and  Smelting  Company 
combined  with  the  Geselskirchcn  Company  creating 
the  Rhine-I'Ibe-L  nion.  A  few  months  later  this 
vast  combination  acquired  the  Bochum  Company  en- 
gaged in  mining  and  manufacturing  cast  steel. 
About   the  same   time  the  gigantic  electrical  enter- 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      125 

prise  of  the  Siemens  Company  was  brought  into  the 
Stinnes  sphere,  thus  fusing  concerns  engaged  in  pro- 
ducing raw  and  fmished  products.  Then  copper, 
brass,  and  automobile  works  were  added  to  the  con- 
sobdation.  In  192 1  the  Stinnes  trust  went  across 
the  border  and  absorbed  the  Austrian  Alpine  Min- 
ing Company  which  owned  the  Styrian  ore  deposits 
and  before  the  war  suppbed  the  Balkans  and  Italy 
with  immense  amounts  of  iron  and  steel.  Thus 
part  of  the  loss  sustained  in  Alsace-Lorraine  was 
made  good,  and  a  fusion  of  (ierman  coal  and  Aus- 
trian iron  ore  facilitated.  Not  yet  satisfied,  Stinnes 
laid  hold  ot  the  wood  pulp  and  paper  industry  and 
then  having  possession  ot  the  raw  materials  he 
bought  u)3  a  string  ol  newspapers  and  book  publish- 
ing concerns.  It  was  rumored  that  he  had  in  his 
grip  no  less  than  sixtv  newspapers,  powerful  organs 
ol  opinion,  but  his  conservative  biographer  thinks 
that  the  number  probablv  does  not  exceed  twelve. 

Having  effected  a  mighty  combination  for  the 
manufacture  of  hundreds  of  difterent  articles  from 
dolls  to  dvnamos,  Stinnes  created  an  export  depart- 
ment in  his  transportation  and  Overseas  Trading 
Company,  llis  concern  ^^■as  licensed  "to  engage  in 
transportation  ot  e\'er\'  description  as  well  as  to 
build  and  manufacture  all  shipping  accessories 
whether  at  home  or  abroatl ;  to  deal  in  the  products 
of  the  mining,  smelting,  anil  metal  industries,  the 
chemical  and  electrical  industry,  and  agriculture;  to 
m;irkct  articles  ot  e\'erv  st;ige  ot  manufacture,  as 
v>cll  as  r;!w  materials  ot  all  kinds,  especially,  pro- 
visions   and    cattle    products,    mineral,    animal,    and 


126     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

vegetable  oils,  cotton  and  other  textiles  in  the  un- 
finished state,  hides,  jute,  wood,  cellulose,  paper,  and 
all  products  of  the  intermediate  industries;  and  to 
engage  in  the  reshipping  and  storage  of  all  these 
products,  especially  during  their  transmission  to  or 
from  foreign  countries." 

After  freight  come  passengers.  Having  estab- 
lished the  Hamburg  Travellers  Company,  Stinnes 
entered  into  an  arrangement  with  the  Hamburg 
American  Line,  rehabilitated  with  the  aid  of  Ameri- 
can capital,  to  reconstruct  the  tourist  and  hotel  busi- 
ness. Steamer  cabins,  sleeping  car  berths,  and 
hotel  rooms  were  organized  in  a  chain  and  operated 
as  one  system  giving  the  tourist  complete  relief  from 
all  the  bother  of  his  travelling  arrangements. 
Whether  he  wishes  to  visit  the  Italian  Riviera  or  the 
Canadian  Rockies,  the  Hamburg  Travellers  Com- 
pany will  look  after  his  needs  and  supply  him  with 
almost  every  thing  from  W'estphalian  ham  to  elec- 
tric lights.  All  this  has  been  brought  about  by  the 
wonder-working  Stinnes  who  in  the  fertility  of  his 
resources  and  the  sweep  of  his  imagination  is  worthy 
of  ranking  with  such  men  as  Edward  Harriman  and 
James  J.  Hill. 

A  special  feature  of  this  new  industrial  activity 
is  the  formation  of  the  vertical  as  well  as  the  hori- 
zontal trust.  The  latter  is  a  well  known  and  well- 
tested  organization.  It  consists  in  the  union  of  all 
the  industries  of  a  given  field,  such  as  coal,  steel,  or 
electricity,  in  a  single  coal,  steel,  or  electrical  com- 
bination. The  Cicrman  magnates  of  the  new  order 
are  not  content  with  any  such  simple  and  relatively 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      127 

easy  undertaking.  'Hiey  are  bringing  about  verti- 
cal as  well  as  horizontal  combinations;  that  is  to  say, 
they  are  creating  industrial  organizations  to  handle 
goods  in  all  stages  from  the  mines  and  forests  to  the 
finished  products.  The  same  concern  will  mine  coal 
and  iron,  make  steel,  manufacture  electrical  appli- 
ances, build  automobiles  and  ships,  and  carry  to  any 
part  of  the  world  the  finished  articles  in  its  own 
vessels,  financed  by  its  own  banking  corporation. 
Thus  the  profits  of  the  special  industries  which  con- 
stitute a  tribute  levied  at  ten  or  more  points  are 
abolished  and  the  wastes  of  competition  are  elimi- 
nated. Such  a  company  can,  If  it  will,  undersell 
any  competitors  who  are  sustaining  corps  of  prof- 
iteers attacheci  like  barnacles  to  the  various  indus- 
tries through  which  the  raw  materials  pass.  By  the 
horizontal  and  vertical  organization  of  industry 
German  capitalists  hope  to  outbid,  undersell,  out- 
maneuver  the  business  men  of  other  countries  who 
cling  to  the  archaic  methods  common  in  the  opening 
years  of  the  twentieth  century.  As  the  government 
owns  the  railways  and  waterways  and  is  in  point  of 
fact  dominated  in  such  matters  by  industrial  inter- 
ests that  look  upon  transportation  as  a  means  not 
an  end,  the  carriage  of  freight  to  the  sea  ports  is 
brought  into  harmony  with  the  requirements  of 
business. 

It  is  also  a  matter  ot  note  that  Germany  has  no 
Sherman  Anti-Trust  hu\s.  Smaller  business  men 
who  are  not  able  to  keep  the  pace  set  by  Stinnes 
and  Kirdort  are  not  permitted  to  run  to  tlie  legis- 
lature and  set  loose  a  pack  of  prosecutors  upon  the 


128      CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

rivals  who  have  beaten  them  in  the  great  game. 
On  the  contrary,  every  German  government  since 
the  revolution  has  either  been  a  Socialist  govern- 
ment or  one  sustained  by  Socialist  consent,  express 
or  implied.  Now  the  operations  carried  on  by 
Stinnes  and  his  colleagues  in  industry  are  exactly 
those  which  the  socialists  say  prepare  the  way  for 
their  order  of  things.  They  admit  that  they  can- 
not take  over  and  manage  a  host  of  petty  business 
concerns  with  any'degree  of  efficiency  or  success,  but 
they  do  contend  that  when  the  industrial  capitalist 
has  brought  a  business  to  a  certain  degree  of  "ma- 
turity" it  is  ripe  for  "socialization."  Therefore 
they  welcome  the  establishment  of  horizontal  and 
vertical  combinations  and  do  all  that  they  can  to 
smooth  the  path  for  the  organizers  of  gigantic  en- 
terprizes.  Aloreover  the  system  of  workers'  coun- 
cils and  economic  councils,  authorized  by  the  Ger- 
man constitution  of  19 19,  was  created  with  the 
thought  that  they  would  bring  about  intelligent  co- 
operation in  German  industries,  educating  working- 
men  in  their  sphere  and  capitalists  in  their  domain, 
and  preparing  the  way  for  a  highly  efficient  produc- 
tive organism. 

Indeed  this  course  is  openly  favored  by  a  large 
and  important  school  of  economic  thinkers,  among 
whom  Walther  Rathenau  and  Rudolph  Wissel  rank 
high  as  leaders.  This  school  accepts  as  inevitable 
and  as  conducive  to  productive  efficiency  the  system 
of  "co]lccti\e"  as  opposed  to  prl\"ate  economy. 
Their  ideas  are  summed  up  in  the  word  Plan-iiirt- 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR   1 29 

scfiaft,  national  economy  scientifically  planned  in  the 
collective  interest.  While  he  was  minister  of 
Public  li-conomy,  Ilerr  Wissel  laid  before  the  coun- 
try the  outlines  of  such  a  scheme.  There  was  to 
be  a  system  of  economic  and  labor  councils  organ- 
ized to  co(")perate  in  the  stimulation  of  industry. 
Certain  great  brandies  of  economy,  such  as  coal, 
potash,  and  electricity,  were  to  be  brought  under  the 
super\ision  ot  the  go\x'rnment.  Vhc  state  was  to 
take  a  larger  and  larger  part  of  the  profits  of  great 
industrial  enterprises,  in  the  form  of  stocks  and 
bonds  ol  the  various  companies.  The  industrial 
securities  held  by  the  state  were  not  to  be  adminis- 
tered by  a  political  officer  but  by  a  state  bank  con- 
ducted on  business  principles.  Large  funds  thus  ac- 
quired were  to  be  used  by  the  government  to  give 
employment  to  German  workingmen.  The  cost  of 
living  was  to  be  held  down  by  eliminating  the  mid- 
dlemen and  distributing  a  part  of  the'  wages  in  the 
forr.i  ot  material  goods.  The  right  to  strike  was 
to  be  closely  restricted  in  important  industries  by  re- 
quiring a  nine-tenths  vote  ol  the  employees  to  close 
a  shop..  Finallv  tb.cre  was  t(^  be  an  economic  minis- 
try free  from  political  control. 

This  scheme,  whicli  made  a  great  sensation  when 
it  was  announced  luuicr  important  auspices,  aroused 
an  intense  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  capitalists 
and  the  socialists.  It  went  too  tar  tor  the  former 
arul  not  tar  enough  tor  the  latter.  PlanzvirtscJiaft 
still  remains  on  }~)aiHM%  but  it  is  tlie  center  of  a  lively 
and    continuous   discussion.      Modified    in    some    re- 


130     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

spects  and  enlarged  in  others,  it  gains  steadily  in 
popular  support.  Capitalists  know  that  they  can- 
not absolutely  ignore  organized  labor  and  the 
socialists.  Labor  leaders  are  aware  of  the  services 
rendered  by  the  initiative  and  organizing  power  of 
the  new  capitalists.  Both  parties  know  that  the 
crude  and  naked  exploitation  of  the  public  through 
monopolies  over  primary  materials  is  likely  to  bring 
about  a  dangerous  situation.  So  Planwirtschaft  is 
the  order  of  the  day — in  discussions.  Meanwhile 
German  business  strides  forward  in  its  seven  league 
boots. 

On  all  sides,  German  business  men  aided  by  the 
government  have  labored  to  restore  their  export 
business.  The  ink  on  the  peace  Treaty  was  hardly 
dry  before  there  was  formed  a  Dutch-H.anseatic 
League  with  its  seat  at  Hamburg.  This  was  fol- 
lowed the  next  year  by  a  treaty  with  Holland  which 
brought  an  advance  loan  of  one  hundred  and  forty 
million  florins  to  German  industries.  German  busi- 
ness with  Switzerland  and  the  Scandinavian  coun- 
tries leaped  forward  when  the  blockade  was  lifted. 
In  1920  Germany  concluded  commercial  treaties 
with  Hungary,  Czechoslovakia,  and  Austria.  In 
that  year,  the  Czechs  bought  half  of  their  foreign 
goods  from  the  Germans  and  sold  almost  half  of 
their  exports  to  them.  The  next  year  a  commer- 
cial treaty  was  concluded  with  Bulgaria,  and  Cier- 
man  merchants  began  the  restoration  of  their  eco- 
nomic hegemony  in  the  Balkans.  At  the  same  time 
an  agreement  was  reached  with  Russia;  there  was  an 
exchange  of  commercial  delegations,  with  diplomatic 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR  13I 

immunities,  charged  with  the  duty  of  resuming  trad- 
ing relations.^  A  German  charge  d'affaires  was 
sent  to  Moscow  to  promote  friendly  intercourse. 
The  Hamburg-American  Company  and  the  commer- 
cial delegates  of  Russia  formed  at  Berlin  a  Russo- 
German  corporation  to  handle  the  purchase  of  rail- 
way and  steamship  materials  for  the  Soviet  govern- 
ment. Agents  of  the  Krupp  \v'orks,  now  engaged 
in  making  agricultural  implements  and  other  ma- 
chines of  peace,  hurried  to  Chili  while  those  of  the 
Kloeckner  combination  reopened  their  branches  in 
Argentine.  In  June,  192 1,  a  commercial  treaty 
was  negotiated  with  China  and  the  branches  of  the 
Deutsche  Bank  were  opened  again  in  that  country. 
The  wayfarer  in  the  streets  of  London  who  turned 
from  the  \'eterans  of  the  World  War  rattling  tam- 
borines  and  begging  In  the  streets  to  inspect  the 
shop  windows  could  sec  for  sale  toy  moving  picture 
machines  bearing  that  ominous  sign  "Made  in  Ger- 
many." 

While  German  capitalists  have  been  driving  ahead 
with  the  support  of  a  semi-soclallst  government, 
I',ngland,  the  classic  home  of  free  trade  and  laissez 
fiiirc  has  been  swinging  steadily  In  the  direction  of 
state  capitalism  with  Its  usual  concessions  to  labor  In 
the  form  of  pensions,  unemployment  insurance,  and 
similar  measures.  In  1916,  while  the  (ireat  War 
was  still  raging,  the  leading  British  manufacturers, 
looking  forward  to  the  trade  war  alter  the  war  ot 

1  The  treaty  between  (uTinany  ami  Russia  aiinounccii  at 
(ieiuia  in  April,  1922,  merely  lielpeil  along  a  proeess  already 
under  \\:\\. 


132     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

arms,  formed  a  powerful  Federation  of  British 
Industries.  Two  years  later,  the  British  Manu- 
facturers' Corporation,  a  great  trade  association, 
united  with  the  Federation;  and  the  consolidated 
society,  working  in  close  cooperation  with  the  gov- 
ernment, sent  business  agents  to  search  for  trade  in 
the  uttermost  parts  of  the  earth.  In  that  very 
year,  19 18,  a  new  branch  of  the  British  (jovern- 
ment,  the  Department  of  Overseas  Trade,  was 
created  to  press  British  commercial  interests  in 
foreign  and  colonial  markets.  With  this  Depart- 
ment were  associated  many  Britisli  industrial  leaders 
in  an  advisory  capacity.  The  next  year,  the  land  of 
Cobden  and  Bright  adopted  a  great  system  of  pref- 
erential tariffs.  Mr.  Culbertson,  of  the  Ameri- 
can Tariff  Commission,  is  quite  right  when  he  speaks 
of  signs  marking  "a  return  by  Great  Britain  to  the 
policy  of  colonial  exclusion  which  we  had  hoped  had 
passed  with  the  harsh  days  of  mercantilism." 

France  follows  steadily  in  the  same  path.  Most 
of  the  war  sentiment  and  rhetoric  have  been  dissi- 
pated. France  is  now  the  second  colonial  power  of 
the  world  and  one  of  the  first  investment  banking 
countries.  Books  are  flovv-ing  from  the  French 
press  recalling  the  ancient  commercial  rivalry  be- 
tween I^J'ngland  and  I'rance — the  rivalry  that  kept 
I^lurope  in  war  for  almost  two  hundred  vears  and 
died  down  tor  a  time  in  the  presence  ot  the  greater 
German  menace.  The  drift  of  Ircnch  tariff  policy 
is  toward  a  closed  colonial  union.  1  he  I'rench  gov- 
ernment \voi"ks  hand  m  hand  with  I  rench  bankers 
and  industrialists  in  their  search   tor  new  markets. 


ECONOMIC  OUTCOME  OF  THE  WAR   133 

A  very  large  I-'rench  party  dreams  ot  the  day  when 
France  may  hold  that  dominant  position  in  l"lurope 
and  in  world  trade  which  Cjermany  strove  tor  and 
missed.  What  nation  on  the  globe  dares  to  throw 
the  first  stone  at  I-'rance? 

Certainly  the  United  States  lives  in  a  glass  house. 
Our  huge  industrial  and  banking  corporations  are 
driving  hard  in  every  market.  Our  government 
modifies  its  anti-trust  laws  to  give  them  free  sway 
in  other  lands.  Our  government  builds  an  immense 
merchant  marine  at  the  expense  ot  the  tax  payers, 
turns  it  over  to  private  operating  companies,  and 
now  proposes  endless  millions  in  the  way  of  sub- 
sidies. Our  government,  finding  our  Eastern  trade 
menaced,  calls  a  world  conference  and  by  brilliant 
negotiation  forces  England  and  Japan  apart  and 
compels  the  reaffirmation  ot  the  open  door  for 
China — which  means  in  essence,  better  (opportuni- 
ties for  American  trade  in  China.  Our  govern- 
ment, with  Its  na\'y  and  marines,  helps  our  in\'est- 
ment  bankers  collect  their  debts  in  the  Caribbean. 
Our  government  gives  diplomatic  support  to  finan- 
cial and  commercial  enteri^riscs  evervwhere  on  the 
face  ot  the  earth.  Foreign  affairs  relate  principally 
to  in\-estments,  trade,  iron,  coal,  oil,  copper,  and 
rubber,  and  other  viwx  materials. 

Fikc  a  single  example,  the  contest  for  new  oil 
fields  now  raging  among  tlie  go\"ernments  of  the 
\\'()rld.  As  a  result  of  a  technical  revolution,  not 
less  Important  than  tliat  Introduced  b\-  gunpowde;- 
and  the  steam  engine,  petroleum  has  become  a  basic 
raw  material   as  essential   to  modern   industrial   and 


134     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

commercial  enterprise  as  coal  and  steel.  Crude  oil 
furnishes  more  heat  per  identical  volume  than  coal. 
It  requires  fewer  men  in  the  boiler  room.  It  is 
cheaper  to  use.  It  occupies  less  space.  It  is  easier 
loaded.  It  leaves  more  room  for  freight  for  it 
saves  about  thirty  per  cent  of  the  space.  Merchant 
ships  equipped  with  oil  burning  boilers  can  readily 
outstrip  those  that  rely  upon  coal  for  fuel.  The 
mistress  of  kerosene  will  become  the  mistress  of  the 
seas.     Petroleum  will  rule  the  waves. 

For  the  fighting  marine,  the  revolution  is  still 
more  important.  The  oil  burning  battleship  has  a 
far  larger  cruising  radius  and  is  less  dependent  upon 
coaling  stations.  The  space  saved  by  installing  the 
oil  apparatus,  permits  an  increase  in  the  weight 
and  range  of  the  guns  used.  Our  Superdread- 
noughts,  the  Nevada  and  Oklahoma,  can  outcruise 
and  outshoot  anything  now  upon  the  seas.  The 
ships  of  the  pre-oil  age  belong  to  the  wooden  hulks 
of  Nelson's  time. 

War  on  land,  as  war  on  sea,  has  become  an  oil 
war.  Tanks,  airplanes,  automobiles,  and  trucks  de- 
pend upon  oil.  Paris  was  saved  in  19 14  by  the 
Heet  of  automobiles  that  carried  the  new  fighting 
units  to  attack  the  Germans  from  the  west.  \tv- 
dun  was  saved  by  the  trucks  which  supplied  men  and 
materials  after  the  railways  and  yards  were  bombed 
out  of  existence.  Lord  Curzon  said  at  the  close 
of  the  war:  "Without  oil  how  could  we  have  pro- 
cured the  mobility  of  the  fleet,  the  transport  of  our 
troops,  or  the  manufacture  of  several  explosives? 
How  could  we  have  carried  out  the  necessary  trans- 


ECONOMIC    OUTCOME    OF    THE    WAR      135 

port  of  men  and  ammunition  to  the  various  theatres 
of  war?  All  the  products  of  oil,  gas  oil,  aviation 
spirit,  motor  transport  spirit,  lubricating  oil,  .etc., 
played  an  equally  important  part  in  the  war;  in  fact, 
I  might  say  that  the  Allies  floated  to  victory  on  a 
wave  ot   oil." 

Owing  to  the  high  development  of  the  American 
industry,  the  creation  of  a  vast  merchant  marine, 
and  the  growth  of  the  navy,  the  United  States  actu- 
ally threatened  to  dislocate  for  the  first  time  since 
the  battle  of  the  Armada  the  sea  power  of  the 
world.  England's  battle  fleet  and  commercial  fleet 
rested  upon  coal,  of  which  the  British  Isles  furnish 
an  abundant  and  excellent  supply.  England's  sea- 
power  was  built  upon  well  planned  and  distributed 
coaling  and  naval  bases  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Oil,  at  one  blow,  broke  up  the  perfection  of  this 
grand  network  for  commerce  and  war.  It  became 
necessary  for  England  to  reorganize  in  haste  her 
fuel  technique  and  to  cast  about  for  iuture  supplies 
in  all  parts  ot  the  world. 

British  commercial  leaders,  strongly  supported  by 
their  government,  set  to  work  vigorously  on  their 
appointed  tasks.  They  operated  through  the  chan- 
nels of  diplomacy  and  imperialism  and  through  the 
Shell  Transport  Company,  the  Pearson-Mexican 
l\agle  Company,  and  the  Ro\al  Dutch  Company. 
The  results  were  astounding.  To-day,  England  has 
recoverctl  her  toppling  balance  and  remains  as  be- 
tore  mistress  ot  oil  and  water.  Slie  has  two-thirds 
ol'  the  improN'cd  tields  ot  Central  and  South 
America  and  most  ol   the  concessions;  siie  has  two- 


136     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

thirds  of  the  holdings  in  the  Caribbean,  and  owns 
or  controls  interests  in  every  oil  field  on  the  five 
continents  and  the  islands  of  the  seas.  In  this  oil 
empire  France  has  a  province.  By  an  agreement 
made  at  San  Remo  on  April  24,  1920,  the  two  coun- 
tries distributed  the  visible  and  potential  oil  supply 
of  the  world  between  them,  England  getting  the 
lion's  share. 

This  places  the  United  States  with  its  great  navy 
and  merchant  marine  in  a  difficult  position  because, 
owing  to  the  high  rate  of  consumption  reached  in 
this  country,  the  drain  upon  the  available  oil  supply 
will  exhaust  our  resources  within  a  relatively  brief 
space  of  time.  English  leaders  in  oil  have  discov- 
ered this.  One  of  them,  Sir  Edward  INIackay 
Edgar,  Bart.,  speaking  of  the  superior  position  of 
his  country  in  this  respect,  recently  remarked: 
"We  shall  have  to  wait  a  few  years  before  the  full 
advantages  of  this  situation  shall  begin  to  be  reaped, 
but  that  the  harvest  eventuallv  will  be  a  great  one 
there  can  be  no  manner  of  doubt.  To  the  tune  of 
many  million  pounds  a  year,  America  before  long 
will  have  to  purchase  from  British  companies  and  to 
pay  for,  in  dollar  currency  in  progressively  increas- 
ing proportion,  the  oil  she  cannot  do  without  and  is 
no  longer  able  to  furnish  from  her  own  store.  I 
estimate  that  if  their  present  curve  of  consumption, 
especially  of  high  grade  products,  is  maintained, 
Americans  in  ten  years  will  be  under  the  necessity  of 
importing  500  million  barrels  ot  oil  yearly  at  S2 
a  barrel — a  very  low  figure — and  that  means  an 
annual  payment  of  .'^  1,000, 000, 000  per  annum,  most. 


ECONOMIC     OUrCOME    OF    TIIi:    WAR      137 

if  not  all,  of  which  will  lind  its  way  into  British 
pockets." 

The  government  of  the  L'nited  States,  or  rather 
the  executive  hranch,  was  quick  to  discover  the 
dilemma  in  which  it  had  been  placed  by  I'^nglish  op- 
erations in  oil.  In  a  report  transmitted  from  the 
State  Department  to  the  Senate  on  May  17,  1920, 
the  policies  of  the  I-'nglish  government  were  brought 
under  re\-iew  and  a  protest  was  lodged  against  them. 
The  President  ot  the  American  Petroleum  Institute 
shortly  afterward  hinted  in  an  important  address 
that  these  policies  were  "not  in  the  interests  of  the 
future  peace  of  the  world."  To  this  voice  of  pro- 
test and  warning  Mr.  Franklin  K.  Lane,  then  Secre- 
tary of  the  Interior,  added  his  significant  query: 
"Do  such  proceedings  lead  to  peace  or  war?" 

This  protest,  tor  the  moment  at  least,  was  un- 
heeded. Sir  I-'.dward  Mackay  Edgar,  speaking  of 
Tnglish  supremacy  and  American  objections,  stated: 
"The  I  niteel  States  experts  have  been  well  aware  of 
this  situation  for  more  than  a  year.  But  Congress 
and  public  opinion  were  not  on  their  guard.  The 
public  at  large,  convinced  that  .America  is  an  im- 
mense reser\-oir  ot  petroleum  and  never  having  seen 
its  engines  stop  tor  want  ot  oil,  took  it  tor  granted 
that  petroleum  is  a  product  which  grows  naturally, 
like  apples  on  ai'>j)le  trees.  I  nt  ortunately  tor  them 
—  tortunatelv  tor  us — then"  e\cs  have  been  opened 
too  late." 

It  ma\'  be  however  that  the  note  ot  tnumi^h  Is  pre- 
mature. I^ngbuul  aiul  li-aiicc.  It  Is  true.  ha\'e  ar- 
ranired  between  them  a  division  ot   the  \\-orld"s  oil 


138     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

supply.  They  have  agreed  on  the  methods  of 
financing,  piping,  and  handling  the  business.  They 
contemplate  reaping  a  generous  harvest  of  profits 
at  the  expense  of  their  less  fortunate  rivals.  But 
if  this  pressure  is  too  strong,  it  may  force  a  re- 
alignment of  industrial  powers.  It  is  not  probable 
that  the  great  nations  will  silently  acquiesce  in  the 
accidents  of  fortune  and  pay  an  unlimited  tribute 
to  the  masters  of  oil.  Indeed,  early  in  1922,  Eng- 
land made  some  concessions  to  American  pros- 
pectors in  the  Near  East  and  a  satisfactory  adjust- 
ment of  the  whole  business  was  promised.  Never- 
theless, the  affair  illustrates  the  intimate  connection 
between  government  and  business,  which  has  such 
a  fateful  bearing  upon  international  relations. 

If  the  last  World  War  grew  mainly  out  of  com- 
mercial rivalry,  and  the  weight  of  authority  supports 
that  view,  and  if  we  now  see  signs  of  a  more  intense 
rivalry  than  ever  supported  by  all  the  powerful 
agencies  of  government,  what  then  shall  we  say  of 
the  future,  of  the  restoration  of  Europe,  of  a  world 
safe  for  democracy,  of  a  chastened  and  enlightened 
mankind?  In  the  restrained  language  of  Mr.  Cul- 
bertson,  speaking  in  the  fullness  of  his  knowledge  as 
a  member  of  the  Tariff  Commission,  "if  no  stay 
is  given  to  the  discriminatory  and  exclusive  prac- 
tices which  now  mark  the  policy  of  almost  every  im- 
portant nation.  Aye  shall  go  forward  into  a  period  of 
trade  war  and  conflict  from  which  we  shall  look  back 
even  upon  the  conditions  of  this  day  as  the  happy 
state  of  a  golden  age  from  which  we  fell.'' 

Therein  seems  to  be  the  Inexorable  logic  of  the 


ECOXOMIC    OUlfOME    OF    Till:    WAR     139 

European  problem.  A  new  constitution  of  nations, 
a  grand  ]''.uropean  league,  appears  to  be  the  only 
alternatixe  to  new  combinations,  new  wars  more 
ghastly  and  deadly  than  ever.  It  is,  however, 
another  thing  to  say  that  tiie  I  iiited  States,  enjoying 
the  comparative  security  ol  this  hemisphere,  should 
attempt  to  take  part  in  the  conduct  of  a  co6perati\"e 
system  tor  all  the  nations  of  the  earth.  Certainly 
there  is  nothing  in  the  present  state  of  I'Airope  that 
gi\es  promise  ot  a  successlul  outcome,  even  if  Amer- 
ica had  the  courage  and  the  will.  Perhaps  it  we 
get  enougli  billions  in\ested  in  luirope  we  may  take 
a  practical  interest  in  the  establishment  ot  a  con- 
stitution of  law  and  order  for  her  teeming  millions; 
but  a  constitution  without  an  army  is  only  a  shadow 
ot  power. 


THE  NEIF  CONSTITUTIONS  OF  EUROPE 

/y~TO  the  outward  eye,  the  great  Austro-Hunga- 
jf  rian,  German,  and  Russian  empires,  on  the  eve 
of  the  World  War,  presented  a  solid  front  that  re- 
called the  substantial  masonry  of  old  Roman  days. 
Pomp,  ceremony,  and  circumstance  attended  upon 
the  rulers  of  these  mighty  states  as  upon  Augustus 
and  Constantine.  There  were,  of  course,  nationalist 
rumblings  in  Austria-Hungary  and  socialist  declama- 
tions in  Russia  and  Germany,  but  few  there  were 
who  dreamed  that  these  solid  monarchical  structures 
could  ever  be  pulled  down.  Still  fewer  were  there 
who  imagined  that  the  time  was  not  far  distant  when 
all  three  of  them  would  be  lying  in  the  dust.  Each 
of  the  sovereigns  had  an  army,  numerous,  well- 
equipped,  and  sternly  disciplined,  ready  to  march 
to  death  at  his  orders.  Police  and  secret  agents 
searched  out  despised  revolutionaries  and  hustled 
them  to  prison  or  exile.  Those  who  ventured  to 
criticise  the  majesty  of  the  sovereign,  except  possibly 
in  i\ustria,  were  in  pci-il  of  the  law's  penalties. 
Nicholas  II  and  W^illiam  II,  in  language  befitting 
James  I  or  I.ouis  XIV,  spoke  with  assurance  of  their 
heritage  from  Almighty  (jod  v.hosc  lieutenants 
they  were  on  earth.      A  few  cynics  laughed,  but  the 

140 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF     EUROPE        14I 

solcmn-visagcd  press  echoed  official  sentiments  with- 
out question.  The  monarchs  seemed  secure  in  the 
affections  of  their  people;  a  royal  procession  through 
the  streets  was  always  the  signal  for  a  dem- 
onstration and  a  royal  marriage  lor  a  na-- 
tional  festival.  When  the  Kaiser  celebrated 
the  twenty-fifth  anniversary  of  his  coronation,  even 
the  socialist  organ,  lor-ivdrls^  spoke  gently  of  his 
Royal  and  Imperial  Majesty,  merely  regretting  that 
he  had  associated  himself  with  the  reactionaries. 
Xot  long  afterward  a  distinguished  American  Uni- 
versity president,  profoundly  moved  by  a  visit  to 
the  Kaiser,  declared  in  a  burst  of  enthusiasm  that, 
if  Germany  were  a  republic,  a  grateful  people  would 
elect  William  of  HohenzoUern  to  fill  the  office  of 
chief  executive.  And  now,  how  the  mighty  have 
fallen ! 

If  constitutions  represent  accomplished  facts,  then 
divine  right  and  privileged  classes  are  dead  in 
Europe.  Some  echoes  of  the  old  order  may  be 
heard  in  out-of-the-way  places,  but  for  vast  masses 
of  l:'urope,  kings  and  ruhng  aristocracies  are  sym- 
bols of  a  regime  that  has  passed  away.  All  the 
states  that  have  arisen  troni  the  rums  of  the  three 
great  empires  are  republics:  (icrmany,  Austria, 
Finland,  Msthonia,  Lat\'ia,  i.itluiania,  S()\-iet  Rus- 
sia, and  C/echoslovakia.  tiot  to  mention  anomalies 
like  (ieorgia  and  A/crbaiian  and  Hungary.  Ru- 
mania ami  jug()sla\-ia,  enlarged  In'  additions  from 
tlie  former  Austro-l  lungai-ian  empire,  retain  their 
monarchs,  but  under  constitutions  marked  b\-  the 
outward  siiins  of  eicmocracw      l-,\'er\'\\here,  e\"cn  in 


142     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Hungary,  it  seems,  chambers  of  peers  speaking  for 
great  landlords  have  been  swept  away.  "Privileges 
or  discriminations  due  to  birth  or  rank  and  recog- 
nized by  law  are  abolished,"  run  the  words  of  the 
new  German  constitution.  "There  is  one  citizen- 
ship in  the  whole  kingdom  and  all  citizens  are  equal 
before  the  law,"  proclaims  the  Jugoslav  constitution. 
By  one  of  the  strangest  paradoxes  of  history,  the 
Great  War  which  was  supposed  to  demonstrate  the 
supremacy  of  the  supreme  masculine  virtue — valor 
in  battle — has  marked  the  triumph  of  feminism  in 
politics.  It  is  true,  the  woman  movement  was  well 
under  way  before  the  conflict  began,  but  instead  of 
being  checked  by  war  it  was  actually  accelerated. 
Nearly  all  the  new  constitutiom  grant  suffrage  to 
women,  and  several  of  the  old  constitutions  have 
been  amended  to  the  same  effect.  During  the  past 
few  years  the  vote  has  been  given  to  w'omen  in 
Austria,  Czechoslovakia,  Denmark,  England,  Estho- 
nia,  Finland,  Germany,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  the  Neth- 
erlands, Norway,  Poland,  Sweden,  and  the  United 
States.  Of  the  great  powers  that  took  part  in 
"the  war  for  democracy,"  England  and  Russia  have 
made  suffrage  universal.  France  and  Italy  alone  re- 
main obdurate.  The  German  constitution,  while 
establishing  political  equality,  adds  a  sweeping 
declaration  to  the  effect  that  "men  and  women  have 
fundamentally  the  same  civil  rights;"  that  "mar- 
riage is  based  on  the  equal  rights  of  both  sexes"; 
and  that  "all  discriminations  in  ci\il  service  are 
abolished."      Divine  ri.'zht  is  dead.       I'hou^h  there 


NEW    COXSl  ITU  r  IONS    OF     l-.l'ROl'l, 


143 


m:iy  be  restorations,  the  solid  structure  of  auto- 
cratic rule  is  hadlv  shattered.  The  economic  and 
social  foundations  of  the  old  order  ha\-e  been  swept 
away. 

In  examinino;  the  results  of  this  great  cataclysm, 
for  such  it  truly  was,  one  cannot  help  coiiiparing 
them  with  the  outcome  ot  the  I-rench  revolution 
more  than  a  hundred  years  ago.  Until  19 18,  the 
written  constitutions  of  I'.urope  were  founded  on 
the  classic  model  shaped  hv  the  authf)rs  ot  the  Decla- 
ration of  the  Rights  of  Man.  Complex  as  these 
many  constitutions  were  one  deep  note  ran  through 
them  all.  1  hat  note  is  usually  summed  up  in  the 
words  Idisscz  fciirc.  The  individual  owes  obliga- 
tions to  the  -state,  but  bc\ond  national  defense  and 
the  maintenance  of  public  f)rder,  the  state  owes  no 
positive  duties  to  the  indi\idua1.  On  the  contrary, 
that  state  is  best  which  governs  least  and  iiiterreres 
least  with  indi\'idu;d  affairs.  The  rights  ol  i.:)ri\-ate 
property  and  of  free  contract  are  in\-io!atc,  save 
when  due  compensation  is  iTiade  tor  infringement. 
There  \\'ere,  of  course,  man\'  modifications  of  this 
rigid  doctrine  under  theories  of  public  welfare  and 
what  Americans  call  the  "p"^'*-'^'  p<>^^'el^"  but  such 
modifications  were  for  the  most  part  resti"icted  in 
character.  dhe  new  doctrines  of  social  solidarity 
and  social  ser\"ice  h;ul  ni:uL'  little  impression  on 
formal  constitutional  law  In  the  Near  19  iS.  Judg- 
ing b\"  tlie  written  Vv'nrtl  ol  the  constitutions  tiie 
world  still  stootl  in  the  \ear   17S9. 

I  nder  the  pressure  ot  maiu'  intUiences.  mi^st  ot 
them  socialistic,  the  constitutions  created  dunuL:"  the 


144     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

rev'olutions  of  our  day  have  introduced  a  new  con- 
cept of  the  relation  of  the  citizen  to  the  state. 
What  Herbert  Spencer  called  "  the  coming  slavery" 
has  almost  arrived.  The  Russian  constitution  says 
nothing  about  the  "rights  of  man."  It  proclaims 
only  the  "rights  of  laboring  and  exploited  people." 
There  is  a  grand  flourish  about  "the  rights  of  all 
citizens  irrespective  of  their  racial  or  national  con- 
nections," but  this  is  immediately  offset  by  a  pro- 
vision that  the  Soviet  Republic  "deprives  all 
individuals  and  groups  of  rights  which  may  be 
utilized  by  them  to  the  detriment  of  the  socialist 
revolution."  The  rights  of  private  property,  in- 
stead of  being  guaranteed,  are  destroyed.  The 
obligation  to  work  is  laid  upon  all  citizens  and  there 
is  embodied  in  the  text  of  the  fundamental  law  the 
ancient  injunction  :  "He  that  will  not  work,  neither 
shall  he  eat."  There  is  to  be  a  free  press  and  the 
right  of  public  meetings  is  announced,  but  only 
for  "the  working  people  and  the  poorest  peasantry." 
The  right  to  bear  arms  is  mentioned,  but  it  is  limited 
to  the  toiling  masses.  The  propertied  class  is  ex- 
pressly disarmed.  Although  universal  military  serv- 
ice is  prescribed,  "the  honor  of  defending  the  revo- 
lution with  arms  is  accorded  only  to  the  workers, 
and  the  non-working  elements  are  charged  with 
the  performance  of  other  military  duties."  The 
state,  instead  of  being  a  mere  police  constable 
charged  with  keeping  order  and  protecting  property, 
becomes  the  master  of  all  economic  and  intellectual 
life.      Under  its  iron  rule,  all  must  operate. 

The   other  constitutions  produced   in   our   revolu- 


NEW    COXSTITUTIOXS    OF     EUROPK 


145 


tlonary  times,  bear  no  sucli  heavy  impress  of  the 
proletarian  hand;  yet  all  of  them  show  marked 
traces  of  the  socialist  concept  of  society.  Indeed 
there  is  a  curious  blending  of  the  old  and  the  new. 
The  rig'hts  ot  man  How  steadily  into  the  duties  of 
man.  In  the  (ierman  constitution  we  can  pick  out 
the  N'ery  words  inserted  by  the  advocates  of  doc- 
trines diametrically  opposed.  The  laisscz  fahc 
school  was  in  the  convention  with  its  gospel  of 
economic  liberty.  This  is  what  it  got  when  it  had 
linished  with  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Catho- 
lic party:  "llie  regulation  of  economic  lite  must 
conform  to  the  principles  ot  justice,  with  the  object 
of  assuring  humane  conditions  for  all.  Within  these 
limits  the  economic  liberty  of  the  individual  shall 
be  protected."  Freedom  of  trade  and  industrv  is 
guaranteed,  but  only  "in  accordance  with  the  na- 
tional laws."  \Vhilc  freedom  of  contract  is  as- 
sured, that  freedom  is  restrained  "m  accordance 
with  the  laws."  The  right  of  pri\ate  propertv  is 
proclaimed,  but  "Its  nature  and  limits  are  detincd 
bv  law."  Wlien  private  property  is  taken  tor  pub- 
lic purposes,  there  shall  be  compensation  and  due 
process,  onlv  "in  so  tar  as  not  otherwise  provideil 
bv  national  law."  Inheritance  Is  made  secure,  but 
"In  acconlance  with  the  ci\il  law."  The  clause 
that  exalts  pi'opertv  rights  declares  tliat  the\- 
"impK'  propei-tN-tluties.  l-.xercise  thereot  shall 
at  the  sa!iie  time  ser\"e  the  gcnci'al  v,-cl- 
tare."  I  he  owner  ot  the  soil  Is  required 
to  culti\'ate  and  use  it,  ;!iul  anv  increnicnt  not 
due   to   ne'.\-   labor   and    ca'^ital    accrues   to   the   com- 


146     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

munity.  Provision  is  made  for  the  "transfer  to 
public  ownership  of  all  private  business  enterprises 
adapted  to  socialization."  The  rights  of  labor 
organizations  are  made  as  secure,  if  not  more  se- 
cure, than  the  rights  of  capitalist  corporations. 
Labor  is  not  only  recognized  by  the  constitution; 
the  organization  of  labor  to  participate  in  the 
control  of  industry  is  expressly  provided  for  in  an 
elaborate  separate  article. 

Society  is  no  longer  viewed  as  a  mere  aggrega- 
tion of  individuals  struggling  with  one  another  for 
wealth  and  power,  protected  in  their  possessions  by 
the  state,  and  without  claims  of  right  upon  the  com- 
munity. In  the  light  of  the  new  constitutions, 
"duty"  and  "service"  are  the  watchwords  of  con- 
stitutional law  as  well  as  "rights"  and  "privileges" 
and  "immunities."  The  state,  born  of  power,  jus- 
tifies itself  by  the  discharge  of  social  obligations. 
As  the  able  French  commentator,  M.  Brunet  says, 
of  the  German  constitution,  the  old  doctrine  of 
lahsez  fa'irc  has  disappeared  and  for  it  there  has 
been  substituted  the  concept  that  man  while  enjoy- 
ing a  certain  number  of  individual  rights,  "must 
place  them  at  the  service  of  the  collectivity."  He 
goes  on  to  add  that  "in  whatever  concerns  liberty, 
strictly  speaking,  property,  the  intellectual  develop- 
ment of  man,  or  the  means  of  production,  there  is 
found  everywhere  this  dominant  idea  of  the  social 
function  of  man.  Individual  liberties  are  no  longer 
an  end  in  thcmscK'cs,  nor  do  they  constitute  any 
longer  an  independent  good.  They  are  limited 
and   conditioned  by    the   duty   of   the    individual   to 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF    EUROPE         147 

cocipcratc  in  the  wcll-bcinjjj  and  development  of  the 
coninuinlty.  They  ha\e  no  value  and  are  not  pro- 
tected except  in  the  measure  that  they  serve  in  the 
fulfillment  ot  this  social  duty."  This  is  not  only 
true  in  (Germany  where  a  fusion  of  socialist  and 
Prussian  ideals  has  exalted  the  state.  It  is  true 
in  the  other  countries  of  eastern  Europe,  even  those 
that  are  more  largely  agrarian  than  the  German 
republic.  I  low  far  these  new  concepts  will  affect 
political  practice  and  political  ethics  the  future  alone 
can  determine,  but  there  they  stand  to  challenge 
the  whole  gospel  of  the  French  revolution. 

For  Americans  especially  and  for  all  students  of 
politics  who  once  thought  that  the  remedy  for  the 
disease  of  centralization  and  bureaucracy  w'as  of- 
fered by  the  federal  system,  the  new  German  con- 
stitution will  ha\'e  a  particular  interest.  During 
the  old  regime  commentators  neva^r  wearied  of 
pointing  out  the  rights  of  states  and  emphasizing  the 
separatist  tendencies,  particularly  in  South  (Ger- 
many. Many  of  them  Hatly  declared  that  sover- 
eignty was  not  in  the  German  people  but  in  the 
Bundesrat  composed  ol  representati\'es  of  the  princes 
and  the  cities.  Some  Frenchmen  were  wont 
to  think  of  the  South  (icrman  states  as  readv  at 
almost  any  time  to  break  the  bond  that  bound  them 
to  Prussia.  In  the  structure  and  operations  of  the 
oKl  s\stem,  the  princijile  ot  federalism  was  everv- 
wherc  applied.  I  he  Pnintlcsrat.  \\  hich  corresponded 
in  a  wav  to  our  senate,  consisted  of  delegates  from 
t!ie  states  and  cities,  ami  it  enjox'ed  in  the  making 
and    enlorcement    of    laws   powers    far   in    excess   of 


148      CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

those  given  to  the  Reichstag  or  lower  chamber. 
The  representatives  of  the  states  in  the  Bundcsrat 
were  in  fact  ambassadors  acting  under  instructions 
from  their  home  governments  and  the  delegates  of 
each  state  were  compelled  to  vote  as  a  unit.  The 
Bundesrat  alone  could  declare  war  and  in  practice 
it  alone  initiated  all  the  important  projects  of  legis- 
lation. In  administration,  civil  and  military,  its 
powers  were  important  and  far-reaching.  In  ad- 
dition to  the  impress  of  states'  rights  on  the  struc- 
ture and  functions  of  the  national  government,  cer- 
tain of  the  states  had  special  prerogatives,  extending 
in  some  instances  to  the  appointment  and  reception 
of  ambassadors  and  ministers.  There  were,  it  is 
true,  powerful  centralizing  forces  at  work  in  the  old 
order,  but  federalism  was  deeply  rooted  in  the  en- 
tire political  structure. 

This  system  was  vigorously  attacked  in  the  Ger- 
man constitutional  convention.  Some  of  the  dele- 
gates went  so  far  as  to  adyocate  the  complete  de- 
struction of  the  states  as  such  and  the  establishment 
of  a  unitary  system  like  that  of  England  or  France. 
While  these  extremists  did  not  prevail,  little  was 
left  of  the  rights  and  dignities  of  states  when  they 
got  through  with  their  work.  In  the  course  of  the 
revolution  several  of  the  smaller  states  combined; 
and  the  new  national  constitution  made  provision  for 
additional  unions  and  for  changes  of  boundaries. 
The  frontiers  of  the  states  were  made  mobile  with 
the  consent  of  the  populations  aiiected.  While  a 
republican  form  of  government  and  uni\'crsal  suf- 
frage were  unj^oscd  upon  them,  the  states  were  so 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF    EUROPE        I49 

reduced  in  power  that  they  may  he  said  to  exist 
merely  on  sufferance.  I'\:)r  practical  purposes  the 
division  of  legislative  power  hetw^een  the  states  and 
the  federal  government  is  gone.  Ihe  latter  is  su- 
preme. A  national  council,  which  takes  the  place 
of  the  old  Bundesrat,  is  mocked  by  the  mere  shadow^ 
of  authority.  The  idea  of  giving  equal  representa- 
tion in  the  upper  chamber  to  states  as  geographic 
entities,  such  as  prevails  in  the  United  States,  is 
utterly  rejected.  It  is  true  that  the  members  of  the 
new  Reichsrat  are  not  apportioned  among  the  states 
exactly  on  the  basis  of  population,  but  any  discrimi- 
nation that  remains  is  offset  by  the  fact  that  the 
Reichsrat  is  little  more  than  an  advisory  council.  It 
is  not  an  upper  chamber.  It  does  not  have  equal 
legislative  rights  with  the  national  parliament.  It 
has  none  of  the  administrative  powers  of  the  former 
Bundesrat.  It  is  a  chattering  ghost  of  former  fed- 
eralism. The  go\'ernment  of  Cicrmany  is  based 
upon  population;  not  on  geographical  and  historical 
reminiscences.  For  practical  purposes  Germany 
might  as  well  be  a  unitary  state. 

\Miilc  discartling  the  ancient  iloctrine  of  inalien- 
able individual  rights  and  federalism  along  with 
It,  the  new  constitution  makers  of  liAirope.  have  also 
refused  to  follow  the  American  model  In  shaping 
the  structures  of  their  governments.  Our  presi- 
dential s\stem  Is  e\'er\\vlu'rc  debberatelv  rejected  as 
conferring  powers  too  regal  and  too  extensK'e  upon 
one  man — upon  a  single  ofliccr  who  cannot  be  called 
to  account,  during  his  term,  bv  the  voters  of  tlie  land. 

The  American  concept  of  a  senate  as  representing 


150     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

the  federal  principle  and  embodying  the  idea  of  a 
conservative  balance  in  the  government  is  likewise 
put  aside  by  the  new  architects.  Some  upper  cham- 
bers are  left  standing,  it  is  true,  but  they  possess  no 
such  prerogatives  as  those  enjoyed  by  the  senate  that 
sits  at  Washington.  The  Germans  were  so  afraid 
of  secret  treaties  and  secret  diplomacy  that  they 
wrote  this  special  clause  in  their  constitution :  "The 
national  assembly  shall  appoint  a  standing  committee 
on  foreign  affairs  which  may  act  outside  of  the  sit- 
tings of  the  national  assembly  and  after  its  expira- 
tion or  dissolution  until  a  new  national  assembly 
convenes."  This  committee  is  given  the  great  pow- 
ers conferred  upon  committees  of  investigation. 
The  American  idea  that  a  judicial  court  can  better 
interpret  the  will  of  the  people  as  expressed  in  the 
constitution  than  a  legislative  body  has  not  found 
general  acceptance.  One  of  the  new  republics, 
Czechoslovakia,  has  adopted  it,  but  for  very  special 
reasons.  Thus  the  pendulum  in  the  great  clock 
tower  of  time  swings  forever  forward  and  back  be- 
tw^ecn  liberty  and  obligation;  between  the  individual 
and  the  state.  Perhaps  it  w^ill  never  come  to  rest. 
Descending  to  particulars,  we  may  take  note  of 
the  fate  which  the  American  presidential  idea  met 
at  the  hands  of  the  new  draughtsmen.  The  new 
republics  have  titular  heads  who  in  some  instances 
are  called  presidents;  but  when  we  pass  beyond  ver- 
biage to  reality  we  find  that  there  is  no  resemblance 
to  the  American  concept.  Europe  has  adopted  par- 
liamentary, not  presidential,  government.  This  is 
not  an  accident.      Neither  is  it  due  to  ignorance  of 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF    F.UROPK 


151 


American  experience.  On  the  contrary,  the  whole 
problem  was  thoroughly  discussed  in  all  its  bear- 
ings, especially  in  (Jermany.  "Many  Cjermans," 
says  Brunet,  the  I'rench  commentator,  "wished  to 
establish  a  cliiet  ot  state  who  could  act  and  repre- 
sent the  state  with  the  independence  and  authority 
ol  a  Wilson,  but  their  view  did  not  prevail."  The 
Independent  Socialists,  at  the  other  end,  fearing  a 
Bonaparte,  strenuously  opposed  the  presidential 
system.  They  said  that  the  president  must  either 
go\ern  in  accord  with  the  wishes  of  the  people  as 
expressed  by  ministers  responsible  to  the  parlia- 
ment, or  become  substantially  an  autocrat  during  his 
tenure  of  power.  In  the  llrst  case,  they  added,  he 
would  be  useless;  and  in  the  second  case  danger- 
ous. For  this  reason  the  Independents  did  not 
want  anv  president  at  all,  but  merely  a  council  of 
responsible  ministers. 

Bet^^■een  these  two  extremes  lav  the  tinal  compro- 
mise. The  (ierman  president,  luilike  the  I- rench 
president,  is  not  electeil  bv  the  national  legislative 
bodies  in  joint  session.  I  le  is  elected  by  the  people. 
1  le  has  large  powers  but  practicalK  all  of  them  are 
exercised  througli  ministers  responsible  to  the  par- 
liament. There  are  a  tew  instances  in  which  he 
may  act  on  his  own  initatixe  in  colhiboration  \\-ith 
the  \'oters.  I  nder  no  cii'ciimstances  can  he  exer- 
cise such  regal  powers  as  those  enjoved  hv  tlie 
chiel  cxecuti\'e  ot  the  I  nitctl  States.  \Mu'n.  for 
example,  there  is  a  tlcadlock  between  the  tu'o  houses 
(>t  the  legislature,  he  nia\'  inter\'ene  but  onl\'  to 
submit  the  law  In  contro\ei's\'  to  a  i)()pulai-  I'eteren- 


152      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

dum.  The  German  president  does  not  have  an  in- 
dependent veto  power  such  as  that  enjoyed  by  our 
president.  He  may  however  place  a  check  upon  leg- 
islation by  referring  any  bill  to  the  voters  for  de- 
cision. 

Thus  it  w^ill  be  seen  that  the  Germans  sought 
to  carry  out  a  very  definite  idea.  They  saw  that 
a  president  elected  by  the  legislature  could  not  fail 
to  become  a  figure-head  or  subservient  to  the  body 
that  elected  him.  So  they  provided  for  popular 
election.  Thus  the  idea  of  the  check  and  balance 
system  is  introduced;  but  neither  the  executive  nor 
the  legislative  department  is  set  free  to  exercise  its 
powers  for  a  term  of  years  uncontrolled  by  popular 
scrutiny.  The  president  may  check  the  legislature 
by  submitting  its  proposals  to  a  referendum.  Even 
in  this  case  the  legislature  is  not  without  recourse 
against  autocratic  action.  The  Reichstag  may  pro- 
pose the  recall  of  the  president  and  submit  it  to 
the  people.  If  he  is  rejected  at  the  polls  he  goes 
out  of  office.  If  the  ballot  is  in  his  favor  the 
Reichstag  is  automatically  ciissolved. 

So  a  new  experiment  in  popular  government  is 
made.  The  (jermans  have  attempted  to  create  "an 
executive  strong  enough  to  form  a  counterweight 
to  the  legislature  and  to  control  the  latter  in  the 
name  of  the  people  without  giving  him  a  power  so 
great  that  he  may  ov^erride,  transcend,  or  destroy  tlie 
rights  of  parliament  and  institute  an  anti-democratic 
regime."  In  short  the  Germans  reject  the  presi- 
dential system  with(HJt  instituting  a  pure  form  of 
parlimentarv  go\ernmcnt.      llicy  ha\'e  created  what 


NEW    CONS  riTUTIOXS    OF     F.l'ROPi:        153 

may  be  called  a  ''hair-tri's^crcr"  government.  In 
theory,  at  least,  it  is  easy  to  force  a  submission  of 
contcsteil  issues  to  popular  \'ote.  Whatever  may 
be  said  ot  this,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  it  represents 
democrac}-  in  an  extreme  form.  Ihe  reaction  which 
such  a  proposal  would  call  forth  in  conservative 
circles  In  the  United  States  can  readily  be  imagined. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  a  point  that  is  often  over- 
looked :  it  is  minorities  not  majorities  that  are  radi- 
cal. 

While  parliamentary,  not  presidential,  govern- 
ment prevails  in  I-'urope,  changes  have  been  intro- 
duced in  the  representative  idea.  In  the  classical 
homes  of  represcntati\'e  government — F.ngland  and 
the  United  States — democracy  was  working  all 
through  the  nineteenth  century  toward  a  standard 
based  on  Rousseau's  formula  that  sovereignty  is 
in  the  people  and  that  all  heads  arc  equal  and  for 
political  purposes  of  the  same  value.  This  meant 
that  the  number  ot  members  of  anv  particular  legis- 
lature should  be  apportioned  among  geographical 
districts  approximately  according  to  the  number  of 
inhabitants  without  reference  to  their  wealth,  their 
occupations,  or  their  peculiar  interests.  All  repre- 
sentatives were  to  be  elected  b\-  majorities  or  plurali- 
ties as  the  case  might  be.  Minorities,  no  matter 
\]()\y  large  or  important  m  tlie  economv  of  the  state, 
had  to  go  without  tlieir  spokesmen  in  the  government 
that  taxed  theiii  and  interfered  with  tlieir  affairs. 
Inhere  \\"ere.  it  Is  true,  exccjitlons  to  the  rule  and  the 
prlncljtles  were  not  alwavs  applied  with  mathemati- 
cal   precision;    but    broadly   speaking    this    was    the 


154     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

concept  of  representative  democracy  accepted  as 
axiomatic — as  representing  the  final  stage  in  many 
centuries  of  political  evolution. 

No  one  can  run  through  the  political  writings 
that  appeared  in  the  two  hemispheres  during  the  dec- 
ade previous  to  the  Great  War  without  being  struck 
by  the  critical  note.  In  parliaments  and  outside 
there  were  lively  debates  over  "the  failure  of  repre- 
sentative government."  This  was  the  one  thing  on 
which  conservatives  and  radicals  agreed.  In  Europe 
a  large  number  of  influential  publicists,  of  varying 
political  tendencies,  challenged  the  whole  system  of 
artificial  territorial  districts  and  numerical  major- 
ities. They  declared  that  the  doctrine  of  abstract 
political  equality  was  false  and  in  plain  contradiction 
to  the  facts  of  modern  life.  That  was  not  all.  They 
asserted  that  in  practical  operation  it  was  a  menace 
to  society.  It  placed  the  management  of  difficult 
and  technical  public  affairs  in  the  hands  of  politicians 
who,  by  the  force  of  circumstances,  had  to  be  phrase- 
makers,  rhetoricians,  and  "brokers  in  opinion." 
Inasmuch  as  anyone  of  the  politicians,  in  order  to 
accumulate  the  majority  necessary  to  election,  had 
to  command  the  suffrages  of  electors  holding  widely 
divergent  views,  he  could  not  escape  the  necessity 
of  employing  double-meaning  terms  and  making 
vague  promises.  Such  being  the  necessities  of  poli- 
tics under  the  old  system,  it  followed  that  practical 
men,  men  of  affairs,  could  not  hope  to  be  elected 
themselves  and  were  compelled  to  entrust  the  busi- 
ness of  the  state  to  orators  \\!iose  stcKk  in  trade 
was   high-sounding   rhetoric.      Such   was   the   indict- 


Ni;\v   coxsii  ri  iioNS  of   i.  uroi'e      155 

merit  hr()Li<2;ht  ai^ainst  tlic  gospel  of  Rousseau  by 
those  publicists  accustomed  to  cry  "a  plague  on  both 
your  houses." 

\\'hen  called  upon  for  their  remedy,  the  critics  of 
representative  go\ernment  made  this  answer.  They 
pointed  out  that  until  the  modern  democratic  age, 
representation  had  in  point  of  fact  been  based  upon 
the  idea  of  elrawing  into  the  work,  of  government 
men  from  every  class,  order,  or  estate.  The  old 
I'Vench  national  assembly  represented  the  clergy, 
nobility,  and  the  third  estate.  The  Swedish  parlia- 
ment, until  1 866,  spoke  for  the  nobility,  clergy, 
burghers,  and  peasants.  The  b'nglish  parliament 
from  mediae\-al  times  until  the  advent  of  democracy 
represented  the  nobility,  clergy,  landed  gentry,  and 
the  burgesses.  The  remedy  for  Rousseau's  disease, 
the  critics  said,  was  to  apply  again  the  old  idea  in  a 
new  form  and  summcMi  to  the  management  of  public 
affairs  the  representatives  of  industrv,  commerce, 
business,  professions,  crafts,  and  other  orders  of 
society. 

When  they  were  called  upon,  however,  to  elabor- 
ate their  scheme,  the  critics  fount!  considerable  em- 
barrassment. The  old  rules  of  law  that  sharply  di- 
vidci.1  societv  into  economic  classes  hatl  disappeared; 
and  while  it  was  easv  to  show  trom  the  census  re- 
turns that  there  were  so  many  peasants,  so  many 
merchants,  and  so  manv  workingmen,  it  was  impos- 
sible to  draw  the  lines  between  them  anil  to  force 
all  of  them  into  a  lew  distinct  economic  categories. 
Moreo\'er,  it  was  extrenieU'  difficult  to  work  out  any 
d.lstrihutiim    ot    represcntati\'es    amonu;   tlie    wirious 


156      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

orders  that  would  be  generally  acceptable.  For 
various  reasons  no  practical  attempts  were  ever 
made  to  reestablish  representative  government 
along  occupational  lines.  Advocates  of  propor- 
tional representation  argued,  however,  that 
their  proposal  allowed  citizens  to  group  themselves 
naturally  and  voluntarily  according  to  their  voca- 
tional interests,  if  they  so  desired,  without  at  the 
same  time  introducing  rigid  class  divisions  or  vio- 
lating the  accepted  principle  of  political  equality. 
Debate  over  representative  government  was  in 
a  purely  academic  stage  when  revolution  broke  in 
upon  mankind  in  19  17  and  19 18.  Owing  to  pecu- 
liar circumstances,  the  revolution  both  in  Russia  and 
Germany  took  a  course  that  had  a  direct  bearing 
upon  the  idea  of  representation.  In  both  countries 
in  the  first  instance,  power  was  seized  by  provisional 
governments  when  the  old  regime  collapsed.  This 
was  true  to  form,  for  democratic  revolutions  had 
usually  proceeded  along  a  similar  course.  The  next 
step  would  have  been  a  national  assembly  of  some 
kind  to  begin  the  new  legal  order.  In  Russia,  how- 
ever, the  provisional  government  created  by  the 
first  revolution  showed  no  particular  hurry  in  ap- 
pealing to  the  people,  and  before  it  got  a  national 
assembly  in  working  order  it  was  overthrown  by  a 
radical  party  which  completely  rejected  political 
democracy  of  the  old  tvpe.  Indeed  side  by  side 
with  the  provisional  government  there  had  existed 
from  the  first  days  of  the  revolution  in  Russia  a 
soldiers,  peasants,  and  workers  council  speaking  in 
the  name  of  these  interests  and  sharing  the  sover- 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF    EUROPE        157 

cignty  of  the  state.  This  was  the  organ  which  the 
Bolsheviki  used.  Bent  upon  an  economic  revolution, 
they  declared  that  the  end  justified  the  means  and 
so  they  cast  aside  representative  government  of  the 
old  type  and  instituted  class  government  operating 
through  an  elaborate  system  of  peasants  and  workers 
councils.  Putting  the  economic  revolution  first  they 
chose  the  means  which  they  deemed  best  fitted  to 
realize  it — namely  the  dictatorship  of  the  prole- 
tariat. They  thrust  aside  parliamentary  govern- 
ment and  majority  rule — those  "bourgeois  devices," 
as  they  were  pleased  to  term  such  instruments  of 
political  democracy.  To  this  day  they  have  man- 
aged to  hold  to  power  by  methods  so  well  known  as 
to  call  for  no  comment. 

In  Ciermany  as  in  Russia,  the  revolution  was  ef- 
fected through  the  agency  of  soldiers  and  workers 
councils  which  sprang  u.p  like  magic  in  the  industrial 
cities  during  the  early  days  of  November,  19 18. 
This  uprising  was  undoubtedly  engineered  by  the  In- 
dependent Socialists  whose  leader,  I'.rnest  Daumig, 
had  visited  Moscow  and  studied  the  methods  of  the 
Bolsheviki  on  the  ground.  So  powerful  did  the 
workers  and  soldiers  council  become  in  Berlin  that 
the  pro\'isional  go\'ernmcnt  ot  Social  Democrats,  to 
whom  Prince  Max  turned  over  the  reins  of  author- 
itv,  had  to  come  to  terms  with  the  extremists. 

For  a  time  tlie  control  of  affairs  was  vestetl  in  the 
hands  of  a  joint  committee  representing  the  two 
wings  ot  socialism,  one  ot  which  openly  ad\'ocated 
follo\\-int':  the  luissian  cxami>lc  with  mixlitications. 
I-'or  a  tew  u'ccks  these  two  t;icrions  in  common  coun- 


158      CROSS    C  UKRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

cil  wrangled  and  debated,  the  Independents  seeking 
to  postpone  indefinitely  the  calling  of  a  national  as- 
sembly elected  on  the  basis  of  universal  suffrage. 
In  the  end  the  conservative  wing  triumphed.  On 
December  19,  19 18,  at  a  convention  of  delegates 
from  the  councils  that  had  risen  in  all  parts  of  Ger- 
many, it  was  decided  to  summon  a  national  assembly 
to  determine  the  future  constitution  of  Germany. 

Having  lost  this  battle  and  having  failed  to  elect 
many  delegates  to  the  new  assembly,  the  radicals 
nevertheless  proposed  in  the  constitutional  conven- 
tion to  substitute  a  system  of  Soviets  or  workers 
councils  for  the  parliamentary  regime.  Still  the 
conservative  Social  Democrats  utterly  rejected  the 
idea.  The  Scheidemann  cabinet  in  January,  19 19 
officially  declared  against  the  council  system,  and 
announced  that  it  would  not  permit  the  introduction 
of  the  scheme  into  the  constitution.  A  few  weeks 
later,  however,  there  came  a  wide-spread  strike  and 
a  committee  of  the  strikers  delivered  an  ultimatum 
to  Scheidemann  calling  for  "the  anchorage  of  the 
councils  in  the  constitution."  The  cabinet  yielded 
and  a  compromise  provision  was  inserted  in  the 
fundamental  law  of  Germany. 

The  system  instituted  by  this  compromise  is  far 
different  from  the  Russian  model  or  the  scheme  pro- 
posed by  the  Independent  Socialists.  The  political 
and  reprcscntatlxc  parliament  is  retained  and  en- 
dowed with  complete  sovereignty.  There  is  insti- 
tuted however,  along  with  it,  a  double  set  of  eco- 
nomic councils.  The  constitution  declares  that 
"wage    earners    and    salaried    employees    are    quali- 


Ni:\V    CONSTITUTIONS    OF     MUROPK        159 

heel  to  co-opcr;itc  on  c(]ual  terms  with  employers  In 
the  regulation  of  wages  and  working  conditions,  as 
well  as  in  the  entire  economic  development  of  pro- 
ductive forces.  The  organization  on  both  sides  and 
the  agreements  between  them  will  be  recognized." 

In  accordance  with  constitutional  provisions  and 
statutory  enactment,  an  elaborate  set  of  economic 
councils  was  instituted  in  (lermany.  The  employees 
of  all  factories  ot  any  size  are  organized,  beginning 
at  the  bottom  with  the  factory  councils  and  rising 
to  a  grand  organization  known  as  the  national 
workers  council.  Parallel  to  this  organization  of 
employees  is  a  system  of  economic  councils,  composed 
of  representatives  of  employers,  employees,  and 
other  interested  classes  of  the  population.  I'hese 
economic  councils  are  formed  on  a  district  basis  and 
are  crowned  h\  a  national  economic  council.  When 
the  first  session  of  this  national  economic  council 
was  held,  on  June  30,  1920,  enthusiasts  declared 
that  the  council  incUuled  in  Its  membersliip  the  ablest 
business  men  and  labor  leaders  In  the  country  and 
would  inex'itably  become  In  tlie  course  of  time  a 
genuine  economic  parliament  absorbing  the  so\'er- 
elgntv  of  the  two  political  assemblies,  the  Reichstag 
and  the  Reiclisrat.  Fills  predictuMi  has  not  been 
fulfilled  and  indeeel  the  signs  are  now  all  to  the  con- 
trarv.  Most  of  the  actlxe  woi-kers  prefer  their 
regular  trade  unions  to  ollicial  tactorv  councils  and 
most  emp!()\ers  piTter  operating  as  a  class  rather 
than   as   members   <tf    a   grand   economic  parli;!ment. 

This  does  not  mean,  'howex'cr.  that  economic  m- 
l]:iL'nces  ha\e  been  withdrawn  and  that  the  political 


l6o    CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

government  is  supreme.  The  employers  of  Ger- 
many are  independently  organized  in  a  Federation 
of  German  Industries  and  the  employees  are 
equally  well  organized  in  their  Federation  of  Trade 
Unions.  When  in  March,  1920,  the  old  military 
party  attempted  its  coup  d'  etat,  the  political  govern- 
ment, frightened  and  powerless,  fled  from  Berlin 
under  the  cover  of  darkness.  Nothing  but  a  swift 
and  deadly  general  strike  of  the  workers  paralyzed 
the  counter-revolutionary  action  of  Kapp  and  Liitt- 
witz.  On  this  occasion  the  political  government 
owed  its  very  existence  to  an  economic  organiza- 
tion. 

Later  In  192  i  when  the  political  government  was 
wrestling  with  the  thorny  problem  of  money  for  In- 
demnities, the  capitalists,  speaking  through  their 
Federation,  laid  down  the  terms  and  conditions  on 
which  they  would  grant  their  economic  support. 
This  amounted  in  effect  to  a  capitalist  dictatorship 
for  the  moment.  The  Ire  of  the  working  classes 
was  now  aroused.  Speaking  through  their  Federa- 
tion of  Trade  Unions  they  called  upon  the  political 
government  to  "reject  unconditionally  the  demands 
made  by  the  industrialists."  Threatened  by  eco- 
nomic paralysis  from  the  side  of  the  capitalists  and 
financiers  and  a  general  strike  from  the  side  of  the 
working  classes,  the  political  government  of  Ger- 
many was  in  doubt  as  to  which  way  to  turn.  For 
the  moment,  it  seems  that  the  promise  of  reconcilia- 
tion and  gradual  evolution  Into  a  new  industrial 
democracy  offered  by  the  system  of  councils  has 
vanished  and  warfare  along  the  old  lines  Is  restored. 


NEW    CONSTITUTIONS    OF    EUROPE        l6l 

Between  the  two  opposing  forces  and  confronted  by 
the  demand  for  reparations,  the  government  of  Ger- 
many is  proiiahly  the  weakest  in  the  world. 

In  the  midst  of  the  changing  currents  of  European 
politics  it  is  difficult  to  discover  tendencies  that  give 
promise  of  permanence,  hut  it  seems  established  be- 
yond a  doubt  that  the  enthusiasm  for  economic 
councils  is  on  the  wane.  It  was  found  by  experience 
that  economic  as  well  as  political  assemblies  were 
given  to  rhetoric  and  did  not  produce  wheat  or 
shoes.  Broadly  speaking,  therefore,  we  may  say 
that  outside  of  Russia  the  general  drift  of  things  is 
toward  parliamentary  go\ernment  modelled  on 
British  lines.  I'xonomic  councils  still  exist  and  may 
yet  play  an  important  role,  but  it  does  not  appear 
that  they  give  promise  of  superseding  political  coun- 
cils. 

There  is,  however,  this  important  development  to 
note.  rhe  principle  of  proportional  representation 
has  rccei\'ed  a  remarkable  extension  during  the  past 
live  \ears.  The  (ierman  constitution  provides  that 
representatives  in  the  national  parliament  shall  be 
elected  "in  acconlance  with  the  principles  of  pro- 
portional representation."  A  subsecjuent  law  elab- 
orates the  tletails.  l-'rance,  Belgium.  Xorwav,  Fin- 
land, Lat\'ia,  I'sthonia,  and  Czechoslovakia  have 
adopted  the  de\-ice  in  one  form  or  another  and  Jugo- 
sbnia  assures  representation  to  minorities.  This 
sx'stem.  as  pointed  out  alioN'c.  makes  possible  group- 
ings ot  \"oters  along  econoniic  lines,  and  in  its  pure 
form  assui'cs  to  each  group  a  number  of  representa- 
ti\-es  proportioned  to  its  strength  at  the  polls.      In 


l62      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

practice  the  election  results  under  proportional  rep- 
resentation are  in  rough  accord  with  the  principle 
of  group  representation,  but  while  economic  groups 
as  such  are  thus  drawn  into  the  political  parliament, 
economic  conflicts  are  by  no  means  eliminated.  In 
Germany,  with  proportional  representation  strictly 
applied  and  with  economic  councils  elaborately  or- 
ganized, the  old  antagonism  between  organized  capi- 
tal and  organized  labor  is  by  no  means  abated.  In- 
deed it  appears  to  grow  in  intensity.  So  it  seems 
that  men  may  rouse  from  their  slumbers  and  shake 
their  chains  to  earth  like  dew  only  to  find  in  the 
rights  of  self-gov^ernment  problems  more  baffling 
than  those  of  old  faced  by  kings,  lords,  and  priests. 


VI 

THE  RUSSLIX  RIJOLUTION 

IT  is  hazardous  to  weit^h  current  events  in  the 
scales  ot  the  future  but  there  is  i2;oocl  reason  for 
tliinkinji;  that  the  historian  of  the  next  century  will 
count  the  Russian  revolution  amontj;  the  most  signif- 
icant acts  in  the  great  drama  of  the  present  age. 
There  has  been  no  socin.l  convulsion  like  it  since 
ancient  times  when  victors  utterly  destroved  the 
vanquished  as  Rome  ravaged  Carthage.  The  proc- 
ess was  so  terrible  and  so  deep-penetrating  that  no 
imaginable  restoration  could  wipe  out  the  ruin 
wrought  in  the  okl  order  ol  things.  \\\c  economic 
system  which  it  challenged  may  be  in  a  great  measure 
reestablished;  indeed  this  seems  to  be  coming 
about,  but  the  open  renunciation  of  imperialism  and 
the  revelations  of  the  old  diplomatic  methods  will 
stantl  among  the  historic  events  ot  our  epoch.  Idle 
I'.nglish  re\"()luti()n  ot  the  sc\"enteenth  centur\',  as 
Macaulav  has  pointed  out  in  one  ot  his  best  pas- 
sages. A\';is  a  superticlal  attair  compared  witli  the 
widc-s\\eeplng  and  tle\"astating  holocaust  kno^^'n  as 
the  b  rench  revolution.  It  one  h:id  the  gifts  ol  Ma- 
caula\',  one  could  di-aw  cnuiparison  ei]ua!lv  striking 
between  the  b  rench  upbea\;d  n'ith  its  Dantons  and 
Robespierres  and  the  Russi;in  holocaust  with  its 
1  enms  and    Frot/kvs. 


164     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

In  both  of  these  revolutions,  an  old  and  powerful 
monarchy  was  extirpated,  a  church  disestablished, 
a  clergy  overthrown,  a  nobility  subverted,  an  im- 
mense amount  of  property  confiscated,  a  Hood  of 
paper  money  turned  loose  only  to  be  repudiated,  and 
an  ancient  order  of  thought  and  economy  challenged 
and  defied.  But  the  French  revolution  wrought  no 
such  havoc  in  the  ranks  of  the  clergy  and  nobility  as 
the  Russian  revolution  has  brought  to  pass.  The 
French  radicals  left  the  clergy  with  large  revenues 
from  the  state  and  they  firmly  fixed  the  rights  of 
private  property  in  land  at  the  very  moment  when 
they  overthrew  the  church  and  dissolved  feudal  ob- 
ligations. Though  in  the  days  of  the  Terror,  the 
Paris  proletariat  made  itself  felt  in  the  councils  of 
state,  the  final  outcome  was  a  triumph  for  the  bour- 
geoisie, a  class  with  experience  in  the  management  of 
property  and  the  direction  of  affairs,  if  not  skilled 
in  the  arts  of  government.  In  Russia  on  the  other 
hand,  the  power  of  the  state  passed  into  the  control 
of  a  laboring  class  that  had  not  the  slightest  famil- 
iarity, through  practice,  with  the  exigencies  of  gov- 
ernment. Moreover  that  class  not  merely  seized 
the  trappings  of  the  state;  it  assumed  responsibility 
for  the  administration  of  the  complicated  organism 
of  industry,  transportation,  and  agriculture.  It  pro- 
fessed a  desire  and  attempted  in  fact  to  destroy  the 
upper  classes  root  and  branch. 

As  Macaulay  wrote  of  the  returning  French  prin- 
ces in  1815,  so  one  might  write  of  the  emigrants 
after  a  possible  restoration  In  Russia:  "They  came 
back  to  a  land  In  which  they  could  recognize  nothing. 


TIIR     RTSSIAX    REVOLUTION  165 

The  seven  sleepers  of  the  legend  who  closed  their 
e)'es  when  the  Pagans  were  persecuting  Christians 
and  woke  when  tlie  Christians  were  persecuting  each 
other,  did  not  fiiul  theniscKes  in  a  world  so  com- 
pletely new  to  tliem.  I'lvents  had  come  thick  and 
fast.  Twenty  years  had  done  the  work  of  twenty 
generations.  The  old  institutions  and  the  old  feel- 
ings had  heen  torn  up  hy  the  roots.  .  .  .  The  revo- 
lution in  the  laws  and  in  the  form  of  government 
was  but  an  outward  sign  of  that  mightier  revolution 
which  had  taken  place  in  the  heart  and  brain  of  the 
people.''  Communism  is  an  admitted  iailure  in 
agriculture.  A  form  of  state  capitalism  is  in  proc- 
ess of  establishment.  But  the  days  of  the  Ro- 
manovs and  Stolypins  are  no  more  likely  to  return 
than  the  days  of  the  Bourbons  and  Richelieus. 

It  is  not  merely  as  one  of  the  great  cataclysms  of 
historv  that  the  Russian  revolution  arrests  our  at- 
tention. There  are  lessons  in  it,  no  doubt,  for  all 
those  who  have  occasion  to  deal  with  human  nature 
in  politics,  but  there  are  more  practical  reasons  for 
seeking  to  discover  its  underlving  forces.  The  re- 
lations of  the  United  States  to  the  Russian  govern- 
ment are  as  vet  uadetermlned ;  they  are  in  a  state  of 
flux.  \\'e  ha\e  mo\"ed  ii-om  armed  interventioii  to 
homiletic  rexieus  and  are  still  in  motion.  If  the 
Russian  rcN'olution  was  brouglit  about  bv  a  hand- 
ful of  agitators  bought  bv  (lerman  gold,  then  one 
policN'  seems  appropriate.  It  it  was  eftected  bv  a 
few  designing  men  who  imj^osed  their  will  upon 
more  than  a  huncbwl  milbon  Russians  against  all 
popular  interests  and   leclings,   then  another  policy 


l66      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

seems  appropriate.  If  there  is  a  class  in  Russia,  now 
oppressed,  that  is  strong  enough  and  intelligent 
enough  to  supersede  the  existing  government,  then 
still  a  third  policy  might  be  adopted.  Conceivably 
the  policy  of  non-intervention  might  be  followed  but 
that  does  not  seem  to  fit  in  with  the  temper  and 
methods  of  the  new  epoch  in  our  history. 

At  all  events  those  citizens  who  want  to  see  things 
as  they  really  are  will  try  to  penetrate  the  mists  that 
surround  the  Russian  situation  and  find  out  why  the 
present  group  of  men  came  to  power  and  how  they 
have  managed  to  hold  it.  The  following  pages  are 
built,  not  upon  the  frothy  essays  of  frenzied  propa- 
gandists, but  upon  the  soberest  accounts  given  by 
Bolshevik  and  anti-Bolshevik  writers.  In  them  an 
attempt  is  made  to  discover  the  nature  of  the  forces 
which  precipitated  the  Bolshevik  revolution  and 
have  kept  its  authors  so  long  in  authority. 

Until  they  were  actually  charged  with  the  respon- 
sibilities of  administration,  the  Bolsheviki  had  given 
little  or  no  attention  to  the  actualities  of  their  com- 
munist designs;  that  is,  to  the  technical  questions  of 
production  and  distribution.  Their  leaders  had 
^^•^ittcn  scores  of  books  and  pamphlets  on  the  evolu- 
tion of  capitalism,  on  the  state,  on  agriculture,  and 
on  ecf)n()mics,  Marxian  and  orthodox;  but  they  con- 
sidered it  academic  for  a  small  and  obscure  minor- 
ity ot  revolutionaries  to  consider  in  detail  what  they 
would  actualh'  do  when  they  grasped  the  reins  of 
authority.  1  heir  one  and  fundamental  aim  was  the 
conquest  ot  }:iower — the  possession  oi  the  agencies 
ot  the  state;  nanicK',  the  armv,  the  police,  the  public 


THE     RTSSIAN    RKVOLUTION 


167 


huildings,  the  railways,  and  other  outward  signs  of 
government. 

riiis  is  evident  I  roni  the  writings  of  the  leaders 
themselves.  .\  glimpse  into  the  psychology  of  revo- 
lution is  given  us  by  /inoviev  in  his  little  booklet  on 
the  lite  and  work  of  I.enin.  lie  tells  us  that  it 
was  customary  for  simple-minded  labor  members  of 
the  Duma  to  go  to  Lenin  for  ad\ice  and  counsel  dur- 
ing the  winter  of  191  1-12.  One  of  them  on  a  cer- 
tain occasion  said  to  Lenin:  ''We  want  to  engage 
in  serious  legislative  work;  we  want  to  consult  you 
about  the  budget,  about  such  and  such  a  bill,  about 
certain  amendments  to  certain  bills,  introduced  by 
the  Cadets,  etc."  To  this  questicKi  Lenin  replied, 
in  a  burst  of  laughter:  "My  dear  man,  what  do 
you  want  a  budget,  an  amendment,  a  bill  for?  "^'ou 
are  workmen  and  the  Duma  exists  for  the  ruling 
classes.  ^  ou  simply  step  forward  and  tell  all 
Russia  in  simple  language  about  the  life  and  toil  of 
the  working  class.  Describe  the  horrors  ot  capi- 
talist rule,  summon  the  workers  to  make  a  revolu- 
tion, and  Hing  into  the  face  ot  this  reactionarv  Duma 
that  its  members  are  scoundrels  and  exploiters. 
"^  ou  had  better  introduce  a  'bill'  stating  that  in 
three  vears'  time  we  shall  take  \-()U  all,  landlords  and 
capitalists,  and  hang  xou  on  the  lamp-posts.  That 
would  be  a  real  bill  !" 

1  he  concjuest  ol  power,  not  the  execution  of 
a  caret  ullv  detailed  program  ot  communism, 
tliat  was  the  tirst  and  essential  element  in  the 
theorv  and  practice  ot  the  BolsheN'iki.  Ac- 
cordintjlv    the\    made    use    ot    the    concrete    historic 


l68      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

forces  at  work  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  19 17 
for  the  purpose  of  raising  themselves  to  power. 
The  first  of  those  forces  was  the  wide-spread  and 
growing  passion  for  peace  among  the  Russian  masses. 
It  is  not  necessary  to  recapitulate  here  the  sufferings, 
losses,  and  agonies  out  of  which  the  bitter  cry  for 
peace  sprang.  There  was  the  fact.  It  appeared 
among  the  soldiers  at  the  front  and  the  peasants  at 
home.  And  it  will  be  remembered  that  the  army 
was  composed  mainly  of  peasants. 

By  following  the  course  of  events  from  the  over- 
throw of  the  Tsar's  government  In  March,  1917,  to 
the  triumph  of  the  Bolsheviki  in  November,  one 
can  see  how  insistent  was  the  popular  demand  for 
an  end  to  the  war.  The  new  Provisional  Govern- 
ment had  hardly  got  under  way  before  it  was  com- 
pelled to  bow  before  the  storm.  On  March  27  the 
Petrograd  soviet  issued  its  historic  address  denounc- 
ing the  war  as  an  imperialist  enterprise  and  demand- 
ing an  immediate  peace  on  the  basis  of  no  annexa- 
tions, no  indemnities,  and  the  right  of  self-deter- 
mination. So  great  was  the  popular  pressure  be- 
hind this  manifesto  that  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment was  compelled  to  give  heed.  It  was  even 
forced  to  announce  this  as  the  official  program  of 
Russia  and  to  transmit  it  to  the  allies.  In  carry- 
ing out  this  promise,  howe\'er,  the  Foreign  Minister, 
Aliliukov,  added  a  communication  of  his  own  which 
in  effect  repudiated  the  peace  program.  As  IMiliu- 
kov  conscientioush'  belie\"ed  in  the  annexationist 
policies  of  the  former  imperial  government,  he  could 
hardly  ha\"e   done   otlierwise;   but   the   effect   of  his 


THE     RUSSIAN     REVOLUTION 


169 


virtual  repudiation  of  the  soviet  program  was  an 
uprising  in  Petroo;racl  wliicli  brought  about  his  resig- 
nation   I  roni  oilice. 

Still  uiulcrcstiniating  tlie  revolutionary  force  of 
the  peace  partv,  tlie  i'i-o\isional  ( io\ernment,  on  the 
insistence  ot  the  Allies,  undertook  the  fateful  of- 
fensi\-e  of  July  i,  which  ended  in  the  rout  of  the 
Russian  arniv.  lliis  was  followed  by  another  up- 
rising in  IV'trograd'  an  uprising  under  Bolshevik  in- 
fluence if  not  under  that  leadership.  The  revolt 
A\as  jiut  down  and  the  Bolshexik  chiets  were  either 
imprisoned  or  exiled.  Peace  agitiition  continued  un- 
abated. The  advocates  of  war  thereupon  decided 
that  the  Pro\"isional  (Jo\'ernment  was  too  weak  for 
the  occasion.  Choosing  as  tlieir  agent,  Kornilov, 
t!ie  commander-in-chiet,  they  attempted  an  uprising 
of  their  own.  This  stroke  which  tailed  utterly, 
owing  to  the  want  ot  popular  support,  merely 
strengthened  the  hands  of  those  bent  on  peace  at  all 
costs,  and  naturally  their  avowed  friends,  the  Bol- 
she\'iki. 

The  latter  made  the  most  of  the  oppcM-tunity.  In 
their  attempt  to  coiKjuer  power,  they  summoned  to 
tlieir  sitle  all  those  who  wisheel  to  stop  the  war  at 
once.  And  tlie  peasants  and  soldiers  answered 
ihem.  Alter  tlieir  da\-  dt  triumjili,  the  H()lshe\"iki 
adopted,  as  their  first  article  ot  taitli,  peace  among 
the  wai'i'ing  nations.  I  lie  Sox'u't  ( io\ernment  issuctl 
an  official  inx'itation  to  all  tlie  belligerents  to  susiH-iiiJ 
hostilities,  conchule  an  armistice,  and  make  a  peace 
on  tlie  basis  ot  no  a.niiexations  and  no  indemnities. 
]-"ailing    tn    secure    a    la\orab!e    response    li"om    the 


lyO     CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Allied  governments,  the  Bolsheviki  assumed  full  re- 
sponsibility lor  taking  Russia  out  of  the  war.  They 
concluded  the  treaty  of  Brest-Litovsk  with  Germany 
and  Austria.  Those  Russians  who  wanted  peace 
with  the  Central  Powers  got  it.  They  had  the 
Bolsheviki  to  thank  for  it.  Thus  Lenin  and  Trot- 
zky  made  use  of  one  of  the  great  historic  forces 
that  was  sweeping  through  Russia  in  the  summer 
and  autumn  of  19  17 — the  passion  for  peace. 

The  second  great  historic  force  with  which  those 
who  hoped  to  govern  Russia  had  to  reckon  was  the 
passion  of  the  peasants  for  the  land.  We  are 
not  now  concerned  with  the  origin  and  development 
of  that  movement.  The  Russian  peasants  had  been 
emancipated  in  1861,  but  the  terms  of  emanicpation 
imposed  heavy  burdens  upon  them.  Russia  in  19  17 
was  still  a  country  of  great  estates.  The  peasants 
struggled  under  a  load  of  rents  and  taxes  that  had 
grown  heavier  with  the  passing  years.  Many  an 
angry  uprising  had  borne  witness  to  the  intensity 
of  their  desperation.  In  the  old  regime,  the  peas- 
ants saw  only  slavery.  There  was  promise  in  the 
new  Provisional  Government,  but  the  spring  and. 
summer  of  19 17  passed  without  bringing  to  the 
peasants  their  coveted  land.  The  Proxisional  (jov- 
ernment,  controlled  as  it  was  mainly  by  bourgeois 
and  liberals,  had  neither  the  hot  desii-e  nor  relentless 
will  needed  lor  the  revolutionary  stroke  ot  destroy- 
ing landlordism  absolutely  and  without  cc^npensa- 
tion.  7'his  rcijuirctl  the  same  kind  of  reckless  antl 
indomitable  will  tliat  had  made  peace  at  all  costs. 

Nevertheless  it  was  patent  to  all  thought!  ul  Rus- 


tin:    RissiAN    Ri.  \()i.  i:  rioN  171 

sians  that  some  solution  ot  the  land  (]ucstion  coiiKl 
not  be  a\()iclctl  without  peril  to  the  existing  order. 
The  Bolsheviki  knew  well  enou_u;h  that  the  peasants 
were  historically  no  Irieruls  ot  communism.  ^  et 
they  were  bent  on  the  conquest  of  power  and  the 
peasant  moxement  was  a  living,  dri\ing  force  that 
ottered  to  sweep  them  on  to  success.  I'or  this  we 
ha\'e  the  wor^.is  ot  I^-ot/.ky  himselt.  "The  war 
has  assigneel  a  decisive  role  in  the  events  of  the 
rexolution  to  the  army.  1  he  old  army  meant  the 
peasantr\'.  Had  the  revolution  developed  more 
normally — that  is,  under  peace! ul  circumstances  as 
it  had  in  19  12 — the  proletariat  would  always  have 
held  a  dominant  position  while  the  peasant  masses 
would  gradualh'  ha\'e  been  taken  in  tow  bv  the  pro 
letariat  and  drawn  into  the  whirlpool  of  the  rexolu- 
tion. But  the  war  produced  an  altogether  difierent 
succession  ot  events.  The  army  welded  the  peas- 
ants together,  not  by  a  political  but  by  a  military 
tie." 

Is  it  not  significant  that  at  the  verv  tlrst  session 
ot  the  council  ot  the  sox'iets  at  tor  the  November 
re\'oluti()n.  Lenin  introduced  ami  carried  two  decrees 
— one  ot  them  tor  ]U'ace  and  the  second  on 
the  hind  (]uestion?  Numlier  two  on  the  Bol- 
shc\ik  program  was  the  decree  nationalizing  all 
the  land  held  b\-  the  Iinpei-ial  tamily,  the  church,  and 
the  great  landlorils.  d  lie  small  peasants  and  tlie 
Cossacks  were  exempted  troni  the  operation  ot  the 
law.  All  rlie  land  so  iiat  loiiali/etl  was  trans!  erred, 
to  use  the  Bolshex  ist  euphemism,  "to  the  peasantry 
at  la  rue." 


172      CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Thus  the  second  great  historic  force  of  which 
the  Bolshevists  made  use  was  no  more  inherently 
communistic  than  the  first.  On  the  contrary,  it  was 
in  spirit  and  form  diametrically  opposed  to  all  com- 
munistic devices.  It  was  founded  on  deep-seated 
individualism  and  it  nourished  the  spirit  of  egoism. 
No  one  knew  this  better  than  the  socialists.  A 
thousand  pamphlets  and  treatises  attest  this  fact. 
Surely  no  Bolshevik  leaders  were  deceived  by  the 
phrase  "transferred  to  the  peasantry  at  large."  If 
any  of  them  was  so  innocent  as  to  suppose  that  it 
meant  anything  more  than  peasant  proprietorship  in 
practice,  he  was  certainly  undeceived  before  the  lapse 
of  many  months. 

Third  and  last  upon  the  immediate  program  of 
the  Bolsheviki  was  a  decree  appealing  directly  to 
labor.  It  instituted  a  system  of  shop  control  by 
labor  committees.  According  to  the  Bolshevik 
formula  it  was  intended  to  establish  "a  control  of 
production  by  working  class  committees  supervising 
all  the  industrial  establishments  of  their  respective 
localities  in  conjunction  with  the  local  Soviets  and 
under  the  control  of  the  Supreme  Economic  Coun- 
cil, iormed  by  representatives  from  various  people's 
commissions.  This  latter  was  a  measure  for  com- 
batting war-profiteering,  speculation,  conspiracies  of 
manufacturers  against  the  revolution  and  other  capi- 
talist practices  as  well  as  a  first  step  towards  the  tak- 
ing o\'er  of  all  means  of  protiuction  by  the  people." 
Though  avowedly  a  step  in  the  direction  of  social- 
ism, it  did  not,  either  on  its  face  or  in  intent,  pro- 
pose an  immediate  communistic  solution  ot    the  in- 


Till:     RUSSIAN     RE\'OLUTION  1 73 

dustrlal  problem.  It  tlid  not  attempt  to  destroy 
the  general  framework  of  capitalist  society.  The 
position  ot  the  existing  owners,  the  compensation  of 
technicians,  and  the  methods  of  exchange  were  still 
unsolved  problems.  Banks,  securities,  foreign 
loans,  and  the  general  scheme  of  capitalist  finance 
still  stood,  d'he  system  was  in  mortal  peril,  no 
doubt.  rhe  re\'olutionary  go\"ernment  had  an- 
noLinced  its  ultimate  doom,  but  in  November,  19  17, 
many  roads  to  doom  were  theoretically  open.  It 
was  not  imtil  three  months  later,  namely,  I-ebruary 
10,  1918,  that  the  foreign  and  domestic  debt  was 
repudiated,  and  even  then  with  conditions.  It  was 
not  until  April  23,  1918,  that  shipping,  private 
banks,  and  foreign  trade  were  completely  national- 
ized. By  May  15,  19 18,  only  about  two  hundred 
and  thirt\-  inelustrial  enterprises  had  been  national- 
ized— "half  of  them  for  resistance  and  sabotage." 
How  the  communists  would  have  dealt  with  the 
capitalistic  structure  and  processes  of  the  old 
society  if  they  had  enjoyed  an  opportunity  to  work 
out  their  late  in  peace  is  a  matter  ot  pure  con- 
jecture. Having  ridden  into  pcnver  on  a  storm  of 
passion  and  distress,  they  tound  themselves,  after 
the  morning  ot  \'Ict()r\-,  still  tossed  about  on  a  sea 
of  uncertalnt}-.  \  he\'  had  yet  to  reckon  with  his- 
toric forces  not  of  their  oun  choosing.  The  man- 
agers ol  factories,  technicians,  telephone  operators, 
go\ernment  clerks,  bank  otlicers.  and  the  rest  ot  the 
bourgeoisie  "sabotagctl"  the  Bolshex'Iki;  gave  them 
an  abuiulance  of  their  o\\'n  medicine.  Kerensk\-  at- 
temptctl    a   counter    rex'olutlon.      Kolchak,    Denlkln, 


174      CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Yudenitch,  and  Wrangel  raised  civil  wars  against 
them,  British,  Japanese,  and  American  forces 
penetrated  Siberia  while  British  and  American  forces 
landed  at  Archangel.  The  governments  of  F  ranee, 
England,  and  the  United  States  in  effect,  whatever 
the  theory,  waged  war  on  Russia.  They  blockaded 
Russia.  They  gave  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemies 
of  the  Bolshevik  government.  Thus  the  leaders 
who  had  been  carried  into  power  by  historic  forces, 
not  by  the  appeal  of  a  carefully  laid  program,  found 
themselves  compelled  to  take  up  arms  against  a  host 
of  enemies,  domestic  and  foreign.  War  was  the 
outstanding  fact  that  confronted  them  on  the  day 
after  their  nominal  triumph.  Now  war  is  a  fact, 
not  a  theory.  It  calls  for  men,  supplies,  and  move- 
ment. Prolonged,  sustained,  high-tension  action 
springs  from  deep,  unshakable  passion.  In  a 
period  when  action  is  the  dominant  note,  the  most 
passionate,  the  most  radical  come  to  the  front. 
That  is  what  happened  in  Russia. 

It  was  in  the  midst  of  such  circumstances  that  the 
extreme  communist  decrees,  one  after  the  other, 
were  issued  by  the  Soviet  Government.  The  facts 
of  chronologv  are  not  to  be  disputed.  That  the 
Bolsheviki  had  preached  class  hatred  and  extreme 
measures  in  and  out  of  season  for  \  cars  is  not  to  be 
questioned.  That  fact  stands.  That  they  had  ad- 
\'ocated  social  or  common  ownership  of  the  means 
of  production  is  likewise  a  fact.  But  it  was  not  their 
program  that  carried  them  into  power.  It  was 
their  unrelenting;  will  to  make  peace  and  gi^'e  land  to 
the  peasants  that  drew  to  them  a  force  sufficient  for 


Till::     RUSSIAN     RI^VOLUIION  1 75 

the  conquest  of  the  state.  I  I:ul  they  been  per- 
mitted to  work  out  their  program  without  interrup- 
tion hv  foreifj;!!  and  ch)niestic  wars  it  is  impossible  to 
say  just  what  processes  they  would  have  followed. 
Anyway  that  is  a  matter  of  idle  speculation.  7^hc 
truth  is  that  they  had  to  move  forward  day  by  day 
in  the  mitlst  of  powerful  and  well-nigh  baffling 
forces,  llieir  conduct  during  the  revolution  and 
immediately  afterward  shows  them  to  be  oppor- 
tunists in  matters  of  politics  and  economics.  They 
did  not  attempt  to  appK'  at  one  blow  the  entire  com- 
munist program.  Thc\'  dela\ed  and  temporized 
within  the  limits  ot  the  maintenance  of  their  do- 
minion. Their  extreme  measures,  as  chronology 
shows,  were  born  in  the  midst  of  extreme  dangers 
and  difHculties.  T'liat  these  measures  A\ould  have 
come  anyu'a\'  may  be  ai'guei.1  by  all  and  sundry,  but 
the  discussion  of  such  a  theorem  is  a  sheer  waste  of 
time. 

I>ong  afterward,  when  the  many  failures  of  their 
communist  policy  were  only  too  e\'ident,  the  Bol- 
slievik  leaders  declared  that  the\'  had  been  forced 
into  their  L  toplan  devices  b\-  e\ents  beyond  their 
own  control.  In  a  speech  ilelix-ei-ed  in  October,  1921, 
I.enln  took  this  position.  "It  one  recalls  our  pre- 
\  lous  economic  literatui-e  and  wliat  our  communists 
were  writing  betoi'e  our  assumption  ot  power 
.  .  .  ,  "  he  said,  "one  will  see  that  m  this  pei'Iotl, 
when  we  IkuI  not  tinislied  the  first  task  of  buiUling 
up  the  soN'iet  po^^■er  and  had  onl\-  just  emei-ged  from 
the  imperialist  war.  we  talketl  of  our  tasks  of  eco- 
nomic reconstruction  mucl'i  nnv.-c  guardedU"  and  cir- 


176     CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

cumspectly  than  during  the  second  half  of  1918  and 
during  the  whole  of  1919  and  1920.  One  may 
refer,  for  instance,  to  such  decisions  as  the  decree  of 
the  All-Russian  Central  Executive  Committee  of 
April  29,  19 1 8  which  pointed  out  the  necessity  of 
reckoning  with  village  economy,  dealt  with  the  role 
of  state  capitalism  in  the  construction  of  socialism, 
and  laid  stress  upon  the  significance  of  one-man  re- 
sponsMbility  in  civil  administration  as  distinct  from 
the  tasks  connected  with  political  and  military 
power.  .  .  .  Partly  under  the  influence  of  the  mili- 
tary tasks  with  which  we  were  suddenly  over- 
whelmed and  partly  owing  to  the  desperate  position, 
as  it  seemed,  of  the  Republic,  we  made  the  mistake 
of  trying  to  bring  about  an  immediate  transition  to 
communist  production  and  distribution.  .  ,  .  A  brief 
experience  served  to  convince  us  that  this  was  a  mis- 
take and  contrary  to  what  we  had  formerly  written 
on  the  transition  from  capitalism  to  socialism,  and 
that  if  we  did  not  pass  through  the  period  of 
socialist  accounting  and  control  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  pass  even  to  the  lowest  stages  of  commun- 
ism." 

If  it  be  said  that  Lenin  is  here  indulging  himself 
in  a  happy  after-thought  in  defence  of  his  reversion 
to  a  semi-capitalist  system,  still  it  must  be  conceded 
on  his  behalf  that  he  never  was  deceived  by  the  child- 
ish phantasy  that  paper  decrees  would  establish  the 
new  heaven  and  the  new  earth.  In  his  famous  speech 
on  "The  Soviets  at  Work,"  dclivciTcl  In  the  spring 
of  19 1  8,  he  had  warned  his  fellow-communists  that 
they  then  confronted  the  real  problem  of  the  revolu- 


r hi:   r i: s s i a x   r i: \' o l u  r i o x 


177 


tion,  naiiicl}-,  that  of  manajj;cnicnt,  administration, 
production.  '"Ihis,"  he  said,  "is  the  most  difficult 
problem.  It  means  tlic  organization  of  the  cco- 
ncmiic  foundations  ot  life  tor  millions  of  people  on 
a  new  basis.  And  it  is  the  most  promising  problem, 
for  only  alter  its  solution  shall  we  be  able  to  say  that 
Russia  has  become  not  only  a  soviet,  but  a  socialist 
republic." 

Again  in  the  course  of  the  same  address,  he  ex- 
pressed his  hri7i  conviction  that  "the  possibility  of 
socialism  v/ill  be  determined  by  our  success  in  com- 
bining scniet  rule  and  the  so\'iet  organization  of 
management  with  the  latest  progressive  measures  of 
capitalism."  This  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  fanatic 
who  believes  that  his  system  can  be  applied  and  will 
lie  maintained  though  the  heavens  fall.  It  is  the 
doctrine  of  the  pragmatist  who  asks  of  a  svstem : 
'AA'ill  it  work.'"  It  shows  that  even  the  communist 
ma\'  learn  bv  experience. 

Again  recognizing  the  difficulties  of  prophecy  in 
this  rapidlv  changing  world,  it  appears  fairlv  safe 
to  guess  that,  in  the  absence  of  another  x^iolent  over- 
turn in  Russia,  two  great  economic  results  will  flow 
from  the  re\ olutio'i.  Russia  will  become  a  iuige 
peasant  democracy  assimilated  in  t\'pe  to  the  democ- 
racies of  Rumania.  Bulgaria,  and  Jugoslavia.  That 
much  appears  cei'tain.  A  restoi-ation  of  semi-feudal 
tenures  seems  out  ol  tlie  i]uestion.  It  the  Bolshe- 
\-iki  C(Mit!nue  to  hold  the  i-eiiis  ol  j'xiwer.  namelv  tlie 
go\-eriiincnt  and  the  arnn,  with  th.e  supj^oi't  ol  the 
peasantr\'.  a  \nrm  ot  state  caiiitalism  will  take  the 
place  (A   C()i7imunism.      Petty  Industries  will  flourish 


178      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

under  private  initiative  and  the  large  industries, 
railways,  and  natural  resources  will  be  exploited  by 
concessionnaires  under  state  supervision.  A  new 
middle  class  may  thus  be  created  to  dispute  the  sov^- 
ereignty  of  the  Bolsheviki.  Such  a  turn  in  events 
would  of  course  admit  of  renewed  economic  inter- 
course with  the  capitalistic  nations  of  the  world. 
But  all  this  may  prove  to  be  mere  speculation. 

Whatever  course  the  domestic  economy  of  Rus- 
sia may  take  in  the  future,  however  deep  may  be  the 
influence  of  the  Bolshevik  revolution  on  the  internal 
affairs  of  Russia,  one  of  the  most  striking  things 
about  it  all,  at  least  so  far  as  the  United  States  is 
concerned,  is  the  new  direction  given  by  the  Russian 
cataclysm  to  the  diplomacy  and  international  policies 
of  Europe.  It  is  now  conceded  that  the  old  Imperial- 
ist Russia  was  one  of  the  most  disturbing  forces  of 
the  modern  age.  We  know  from  the  secret  docu- 
ments recently  made  public  that  Russia  was  a  rest- 
less, aggressive  agent  in  the  organization  of  forces 
in  the  Balkans  which  precipitated  the  Great  War, 
Russia  was  active  in  stirring  France  and  J^'ngland  to 
take  sides  in  her  behalf.  Hating  democracy  and 
finding  both  glory  and  profit  in  imperial  and  mil- 
itary adventures,  the  Russian  oligarchy  was  one  of 
the  most  dangerous  elements  in  the  world.  Its 
return  to  power  would  be  a  disaster  so  great  that 
the  mind  ot  man  could  hardly  encompass  it.  I'he 
profits  that  American  business  men  might  make 
from  trade  with  such  a  system  ol  "hiw  and  order" 
would   be   a  mere   bagatelle   as   compared   with   the 


THE     RUSSIAN     REVOLUTION 


179 


costs  ox*^  future  wars  likely  to  be  let  loose  by  Russian 
inii)erial  policies  of  the  oKl  type. 

J'A'en  more  important  than  the  liuropean  com- 
plications created  by  a  revival  of  the  old  order  in 
Russia  would  be  the  disturbance  reintroduced  into 
the  aftairs  ol  the  I-ar  I'.ast  by  an  imperialist  restora- 
tion. We  now  know  1  rom  the  secret  papers  and 
treaties  taken  trcjm  Russian  archives  that  the 
I'sar's  t2;o\  ernment  was  a  relentless  foe  of  the  i\meri- 
can  polic)-  ot  "the  open  door."  When  the  revolu- 
tion broke  in  Petrograd,  the  imperialist  party  was 
actually  arranging  to  settle  scores  with  the  United 
States  m  the  matter  of  China.  I  lad  the  Russian 
government  emerged  Irom  the  world  war  intact  and 
with  enhanced  prestige,  no  one  can  doubt,  after 
reading  the  secret  archi\"es  now  available,  that  Rus- 
sia would  ha\e  taken  the  lead  in  the  formation  of  a 
combination  to  oust  the  L  nited  States  from  the  Far 
I'.ast.  It  seems  harillv  necessary  to  point  out  the 
import  ol  a  conjuncture  so  fraught  with  danger  for 
this  nation. 

A  less  ponderable  result  ol  the  Russian  rc\'olution 
in  the  sphere  of  intei^national  relations  has  been  the 
merciless  exposure  of  the  methods,  tactics,  and  de- 
signs of  secret  diplomac)'  as  pursueel  by  all  the 
great  powers  ot  h.urope  without  a  single  exception. 
B\  tcainng  open  the  ai-chi\'es  ot  Petrograd  and  pub- 
lishing the  Secret  Treaties  and  the  secret  corres- 
pondence relating  to  the  e\ents  that  leil  up  to  the 
(ii-eat  War,  the  Holsliexiki  ga\'e  a  shock  to  tiie  solid 
structure  of  Jfiplomatic  intrigue  and  chicanery  trom 


l8o       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

which  it  will  hardly  recover.  The  full  effect  of  this 
exposure  has  not  yet  been  felt.  In  the  course  of  the 
next  ten  or  twenty  years  it  will  have  reached  the 
mind  of  the  vast  masses  of  mankind.  It  is  doubtful 
whether  any  government  will  then  be  able  to  pursue 
the  discredited  methods  with  the  same  reckless 
disregard  for  consequences.  The  old  diplomacy 
will  by  no  means  disappear,  but  the  sword  of 
Damocles  will  hang  over  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment which  practices  methods  that  have  wrought 
such  wreckage  in  Europe.  Another  concussion  such 
as  that  which  shook  the  world  from  19 14  to  1918, 
arising  from  the  same  imperialist  intrigues  and 
deceptions,  woulci  doubtless  produce  new  revolutions 
that  would  stagger  the  imagination.  By  the  expo- 
sure of  secret  diplomacy,  the  Bolsheviki  contributed 
immeasurably  to  enlightening  mankind  on  the 
methods  and  devices  so  perilous  to  peace  and  human 
welfare.  Whatever  their  m.otives,  the  result  has 
been  tremendous.  When  the  slow  moving  but  ter- 
rific forces  of  public  opinion  set  in  train  by  this  ac- 
tion come  to  bear  with  full  force  on  the  governments 
of  the  world  a  peaceful  revohition  will  be  wrought 
in  international  relations.  I'his  may  be  the  most 
momentous  outcome  of  the  Russian  cataclysm.  The 
diplomat  of  our  time  may  well  learn  from  Butler's 
lines  on  Shaftesbury: 

Our  stalc-artificcr  forc'saiv 
JFIi'icJi  Tcv/v  the  ICO  rid  hcijan  lo  draiv. 
For  as  old  sinners  haz'r  all  llw  points 
O,  ih'  compass  in  their  hones  and  joints, 


THE     RUSSIAN'     Ri:  VOLUTION 


i8i 


Can  by  llirir  pains  and  aches  find 
/lit  turns  and  clunujcs  of  ihc  zcind, 
And  belter  than  by  Napier's  bones 
Feel  in  their  ozm  the  aye  of  mooiis: 
So  yiiilty  sinners  in  a  state 
Can  by  their  crimes  prognosticate 
A nd  in  their  conscioices  feel  pain 
Some  days  before  a  shoner  of  rain. 


VII 

THE  RISE  OF  NEJF  PEASANT 
DEMOCRACIES 

THOUGH  bread  remains  as  of  old  the  very 
staff  of  life  and  must  come  as  of  old  from  the 
open  fields,  the  thought  of  the  modern  world  is 
mainly  urban.  The  cities  are  the  centres  of  modern 
discussion.  There  are  to  be  found  the  writers,  the 
makers  of  books  and  newspapers,  the  politicians  and 
the  statesmen,  the  clergy,  the  various  organs  of 
opinion  and  propaganda,  the  libraries,  the  parlia- 
ments, the  cabinets,  and  the  forums  for  debate  and 
discussion.  Since  most  of  the  thinkers  whose  ideas 
find  expression  in  print  are  urban,  naturally  the 
city  is  the  object  of  their  interest  and  their  specu- 
lation. The  problems  of  finance,  business,  com- 
merce, industry,  and  labor  thus  inevitably  occupy 
the  foreground  of  modern  thought.  Por  every 
editorial  that  touches  the  widestretching  fields  ol 
the  countryside  there  are  a  hundred  bearing  upon 
the  conflicts  of  capital  and  labor,  the  methods  of 
municipal  goNcrnment  and  politics,  and  the  foun- 
dations of  stocks  and  bonds.  Tor  every  book  on 
agrarian  econonn-,  there  are  a  score  on  industrial 
economy,  finance,  and  socialism.  The  news  that 
crowds  the  pages  ol"  our  daily  journals,   sa\e  in   a 

1S2 


RISE    OF    Ni:W     PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES       I  83 

time  of  populistic  disturbances,  is  the  news  of  the 
city  and  its  industries.  J'.ven  the  plots  ot  the  mov- 
ing pictures,  excepting  the  Wild  West  shows,  are 
mostly  laid  in  cities  and  depict  urban  rather  than 
country  lite.  When  the  farmer  and  his  wife  ride 
to  town  in  a  I'Ord  to  see  the  fleeting  film,  they  do 
not  look  upon  Cincinnatus  at  the  plow,  but  Douglas 
hairbanks  climbing  a  twenty-story  office  building. 
So  the  mind  of  the  tarmer  and  peasant  becomes 
submerged  in  and  subdued  by  the  urban  mind.  To 
the  natural  economic  forces  driving  the  rural  popu- 
lation into  the  cities  is  added  the  powerful  drawing 
force  of  urban  thought  which,  superficially  at  least, 
colors  all  news,  all  art,  all  economic  discussion,  all 
literature,  all  politics. 

And  yet  though  this  is  true,  the  country  remains 
as  in  the  davs  of  Solon  and  the  days  of  the  (iracchi 
the  basis  of  all  life.  Many  a  melancholy  spectacle 
demonstrates  this  axiomatic  truth  with  terrible  em- 
phasis. If  you  v.ill  read  carefully  I'owler's  inter- 
esting book  on  Roman  Society  or  Davis'  equally 
fascinating  work  on  Wealth  in  Ancient  Rome  you 
Avill  find  a  marvellous  picture  of  daily  life  in  the 
homes,  banking  houses,  and  streets  of  the  immortal 
citv  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber.  In  these  books  you 
can  learn  how  a  \ast  urban  population  was  brought 
togetlier  and  sustainetl.  onU'  to  be  dispersed.  '^  ou 
can  see  with  v(ku-  mind's  eye  the  great  banking 
houses  along  the  Appian  Wa\-  from  which  bills, 
drafts,  and  orders  went  out  to  the  ends  of  the  known 
world.  Vou  can  see  the  tnai-kets  tlirongcd  bv  the 
merchants  of  e\'erv  clime  dealing  in  tin  and  lead  from 


184       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Britain  and  silk  and  spices  from  the  Far  East.  The 
vast  structures  of  business,  finance,  commerce,  in- 
dustry, Hke  the  huge  deep-founded  arches  of  the 
Augustan  palace,  seemed  eternal.  And  yet  how 
ephemeral  it  was  after  all!  An  invading  army  in 
a  few  hours  could  sack  and  burn  the  city,  kill  or 
scatter  its  population,  and  paralyse  its  business  oper- 
ations. Violence  and  decay  restored  to  the  open 
country — to  the  fields  of  Italy — the  sceptre  that 
had  been  wrested  from  it.  The  cities  of  the  ancient 
world  fell  into  decay,  Augustan  palaces  grovelled  in 
the  dust,  grass  grew  in  the  streets;  but  life  in  the 
open  country  remained.  There  were  disturbances, 
forays,  and  disorders,  of  course,  after  the  rule  of  the 
Eternal  City  was  broken  but  even  invading  barbar- 
ians knew  that  bread  was  the  staff  of  life.  So  it 
happened  that  the  people  of  Italy  today — those  that 
pursue  their  callings  now  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber 
or  labor  with  the  vine  and  olive  under  the  endless 
cloud  that  steams  from  Vesuvius — are  descendants, 
not  of  the  orators  and  merchants  of  Cicero's  day, 
but  of  the  men  and  women  who  tilled  the  soil  of  Italy 
while  politicians  tickled  the  multitude  and  the  mer- 
chants chaffered  in  their  counting  houses.  Again,  in 
our  own  time,  we  see  the  great  city  of  Petrograd 
sink  down  In  desolation  and  people  Beeing  from  It 
into  the  country  as  from  a  plague,  because  it  offers 
only  misery  and  starvation.  With  the  causes  we 
are  not  now  concerned,  but  with  the  fact — the  funda- 
mental fact  that  every  city  In  tlie  world  might  be 
levelled  to  the  dust  and  countless  millions  could 
still  live  on  the  eartli  in  a  fair  de^irce  of  comtort  and 


RISE    OF     Xi:\V     PEAS  A  XT    DEMOCRACIES       1 85 

with  a  f^ootl  deal  more  security  than  the  masses  of  our 
cities  today.  On  the  other  hand,  let  destruction 
spread  over  the  countryside  and  every  city  would 
sink  down  in  liopeless  decay.  Its  huildings  and  its 
counting  houses,  its  tenements  and  its  factories  would 
be  the  tombs  of  its  inhabitants.  This  is  a  common- 
phice  too  often  forgotten  by  those  who  hav^c  occa- 
sion to  write  and  speak  in  these  days. 

It  matikind  is  to  endure,  the  country  must  endure 
and  while  it  endures  it  will  exert  a  deep  influence  on 
the  economy  and  policies  of  nations  in  the  long  run 
in  spite  of  our  superficially  urban  thought.  When 
once  the  city  state  was  ruled  by  the  crowds  that 
gathered  in  the  open  forum,  the  opinion  of  the 
countryside  perhaps  did  not  matter  so  much.  Aris- 
totle thought  that  an  agrarian  democracy  was  after 
all  far  better  and  safer  than  an  urban  democracy. 
It  was  not  subject  to  the  inliuences  of  crowd  psy- 
chology, nor  was  it  the  source  of  so  many  turbulent 
disputes  and  conflicts.  Vhe  (ireek  philosopher, 
therefore,  flatly  declared  that  "  the  best  material  for 
a  democracy  is  an  agricultural  population.  .  .  . 
Being  poor,  they  have  no  leisure  and  therefore  do 
not  often  attend  the  assembU'  and  not  ha\'ing  tlie 
necessaries  of  life  they  ai'c  alwaxs  at  \\'ork  and  do 
not  C()\et  the  property  of  others." 

bVom  Aristotle's  da\'  to  our  own.  the  agricultural 
population  has  figured  in  the  thought  and  }:»olicy  of 
tlic  most  far-sighted  statesmen.  It  is  sometimes 
assumed  tliat  Aristotle's  ilictum  about  the  soil-tillnig 
people  is  of  genei-al  a}V|ilication  in  all  times  ami  all 
places.      Again  and  again  in  political  literature  there 


l86       CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

appears  the  notion  that  an  agricultural  population  is 
essentially  conservative — a  secure  and  stable  foun- 
dation for  a  state.  Such  was  the  view  of  Thomas 
Jefferson.  Even  Daniel  Webster,  far  m-ore  urban 
in  his  thinking,  looked  upon  landed  property  widely 
distributed  as  the  best  guarantee  for  republican  in- 
stitutions. 

"Widely  distributed."  There  is  the  rub,  A  con- 
tented peasantry,  not  too  heavily  burdened  with 
taxation,  allowed  to  pursue  its  course  in  peace  is 
usually  a  s-table  and  orderly  population.  But  all 
peasants  in  all  times  have  not  been  contented.  His- 
tory affords  numerous  examples  of  terrible  uprisings 
led  by  tillers  of  the  soil.  The  Peasants'  Revolt  in 
England  in  the  year  1383  was  a  historic  outbreak 
from  the  countryside.  Again  in  Martin  Euther's 
day  the  peasants  in  many  parts  of  Germany  rose 
against  their  lords  and  wrought  havoc  far  and  wide, 
calling  down  upon  their  heads  the  stern  wrath  of 
the  Wartburg  reformer.  Eong  afterward  the  peas- 
ants of  Erance  laid  their  urgent  grievances  before 
the  king  and  ruling  classes,  and  in  the  stirring  days 
of  the  great  renvolution  made  known  their  passion 
for  the  soil  by  raiding  and  burning  the  chateaux  of 
their  lords  and  masters.  -\s  a  result  ol  their  up- 
risings, about  one  half  of  the  land  of  Erance  passed 
into  peasant  proprietorship.  The  direct  exploita- 
tion of  the  tillers  of  the  soil  on  a  large  scale  disap- 
peared o\er  half  the  superficial  area  o\'  land.  Then 
an  era  of  contentment  set  in.  The  peasants,  once 
the  source  and  support  of  revolutionary  }er\"()r,  be- 
came the  stabilizers  of  society — (be  one  element  that 


RISE    OF    NEW    PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES       187 

could  be  counted  upon  to  rally  to  the  support  of 
^()\-ernmeiit  in  any  contest  with  the  proletariat. 
1  la\ing  got  their  portion  o(  the  earth's  goods  by 
revolution,  they  were  tor  propriety  and  property  and 
public  order. 

In  central  and  eastern  Murope,  however,  the  ideas 
of  the  Irench  agrarian  revolution  were  slow  in 
coining  into  force.  It  is  true  that  in  western 
and  southern  Germany  serfdom  was  on  the  wane  in 
17S9  and  a  free  tenantry  was  taking  the  place  of 
bondmen.  It  is  true  also  that  the  lamous  agrarian 
retorms  of  Stein  and  Hardenberg  begun  in  1807 
transformed  the  feudal  regime  of  old  Prussia. 
Long  afterward  by  many  decrees  and  laws  the  peas- 
ants of  eastern  lAU'ope  were  Ireed  from  the  more 
irksome  and  degrading  badges  ol  servitude.  This 
tor  example  is  what  happened  in  1861  when  the 
Tsar  of  Russia  by  a  sweeping  imperial  edict  declared 
the  old  bondage  at  an  end.  When  the  Great  Wdv 
broke  upon  the  world  in  1914,  the  servile  incidents 
of  feudalism  as  a  legal  system  hael  disappeared  in 
even  tiie  most  remote  parts  of  eastern  I'.urope. 

But  we  should  not  mistake  the  sign  tor  the  sub- 
stance. In  point  ot  tact,  wliile  the  peasants  of  Rus- 
sia were  nomlnalK'  ti-ee  alter  1S61,  they  were  biu"- 
dencd  bv  hea\'\-  economic  obligations.  Fhev  had  to 
pav  tlearl\-  tor  their  supposcLl  treedom.  I'he  Rus- 
sian goxernmcnt  undertook  to  compensate  the  land- 
lords tor  their  lost  ngiits  and  in  turn  the  go\ern- 
ment  set  alidiit  the  odmus  task  ot  collecting  trom  the 
peasants.  It  so  happened  tlieretore  that  the  state 
wa>   a   more   tcri'ihle   mastei"   than   the   old   landlord. 


l88        CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Often  the  latter  was  tender-hearted  and  in  times  of 
distress  could  be  moved  by  pleas  of  poverty,  but 
the  officers  of  the  state  were  inexorable.  So  the 
peasant  of  Russia  found  his  cup  of  freedom  filled 
with  bitter  dregs.  Moreover  vast  estates  owned  by 
landlords  and  by  the  imperial  family  were  not  dis- 
solved by  the  act  of  emancipation.  The  peasant 
proprietors  were  loaded  with  taxes  and  idemnities 
and  wide  reaches  of  arable  land  were  tilled  by  ten- 
ants and  laborers.  Here  were  the  seeds  of  that 
revolutionary  zeal  that  flamed  up  again  and  again 
in  the  Tsar's  realm  with  such  ghastly  effects — revo- 
lutions and  reprisals  which  for  sheer  horror  deserve 
comparison  with  the  servile  revolts  and  crucilixions 
of  ancient  times. 

In  East  Prussia,  Hungary,  and  Rumania,  as 
in  Russia,  the  system  of  great  estates  remained  un- 
disturbed by  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs.  East 
Prussia  was  the  home  of  the  Prussian  Junker,  the 
bulwark  of  the  Hohcnzollern  family,  professional 
militarism,  and  autocratic  pretensions.  In  Hungary 
and  Rumania  the  position  of  the  peasantry  was  even 
worse  than  in  Prussia  where  at  least  some  efforts 
were  made  to  lift  the  tiller  of  the  soil  by  education. 
An  enlightened  I'nglish  traveller  sa\s  of  liungary 
in  19 14:  "Hungar\'  was  a  mediae\"al  state  vav- 
nished  over  with  an  appearance  of  modernity.  Real 
power  was  in  the  hands  of  the  great  nobles  and 
the  smaller  landowners,  and  the  great  landlord 
ruled  on  his  estate  with  almost  unlettered  authority, 
having  his  own  court  ot  justice  whci-e  his  own  peas- 
ants would  be  tried  and  condemned  tor  acts  otien- 


Risi:  OF   Ni.w   ri:As.\.\T   democracies     189 

si\'C  to  his  rule.  It  was  customary  to  consider  and 
treat  the  peasant  as  an  interior  species  of  creature 
with  whom  the  only  arguments  which  would  avail 
were  blows.  .  .  .  The  prixileged  classes  had  all 
the  dress,  manners,  and  appearance  of  civilized 
Wx'stern  l''ur(5peans,  but  on  their  estates  feudal 
homage  was  paiei  to  them,  their  peasants  were  kickeel 
and  Hogged  like — peasants."  In  Rumania,  still  fur- 
ther east,  the  state  of  the  peasant  was  perhaps 
worse,  it  an\thing,  than  in  Hungary.  A  terrible 
revolt  in  1907  bore  witness  to  the  tierce  discontent 
of  the  laborers  on  the  land.  The  single,  elociuent 
fact  tiiat  eleven  thousand  ot  them  were  killed  bet  ore 
"order  could  be  restored"  re\-ealed  both  the  des- 
peration of  the  peasant  and  the  tenacity  of  land- 
lordism. 

Without  taking  time  to  go  into  greater  details 
as  to  the  surviving  areas  oi  servitude,  we  may 
conclude  with  the  general  statement  that  in  19 14 
millions  of  Russians,  i\)les,  Prussians,  Hungarians, 
anel  Rumanians  li\'cd  on  the  land  in  a  state  ot  econo- 
mic bontlage — tar  remo\-ed  from  that  ot  the  tree 
peasant  proprietor  of  I- ranee  or  the  Rhme  country. 
W'b.oex'cr.  in  his  urban-mindedness  o\'erlooks  that 
\"ital,  basic  fact,  o\'erl()oks  a  matter  ot  ti^anscen- 
dent  importance  in  the  economic  and  political  lite 
ot   the  modei'ti  world. 

()f  all  the  revolutions  wrought  bv  the  cataclysm 
of  tlie  (ii^eat  War  none  was  more  trauglit  w'tli 
signiticancc  tor  tbe  muUitude  than  the  agrarian 
re\'oluti(in  m  Ixussia  \\hich  was  the  toi-eiumner  ot 
other  re\"olutIons,  less  dr:\st:c  but  IcadmLi:  tmallv  to 


190      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

similar  results  in  wide  sections  of  eastern  Europe. 
All  accounts  of  the  Russian  revolution  of  November, 
19 1 7,  those  that  condemn  as  well  as  those  that 
praise,  show  the  revolutionary  zeal  of  the  peasant 
soldiers  fused  with  that  of  the  workingmen  of  the 
cities.  Had  the  provisional  government  set  up  under 
Kerensky  dared  to  take  the  harsh  and  revolutionary 
step  of  destroying  landlordism  without  compensation 
at  one  blow,  it  seems  that  the  later  Bolshevist  up- 
rising would  have  been  without  the  support  neces- 
sary to  success.  Be  that  as  it  may,  all  agree  that  the 
peasants  furnished  a  strong  support  for  the  Novem- 
ber or  Bolshevik  revolution  of  1917.  According 
to  Trotzky,  the  avowed  champion  of  the  proletariat, 
"the  war  assigned  a  decisive  role  in  the  events  of 
the  revolution  to  the  army.  The  army  meant  the 
peasants." 

Why  did  the  Russian  peasant  differ  from  the 
French  peasant  in  19 17  and  furnish  the  materials 
for  a  radical  social  revolution?  Was  it  because  he 
understood  the  abstruse  theories  of  Karl  Marx  bet- 
ter than  did  Jacques  Bonhomme?  Was  it  because 
the  eloquence  of  Trotzky  e-xcelled  the  eloquence  of 
Marcel  Cachin?  Not  at  all.  The  Russian  peasant, 
like  the  French  peasant  of  August  4,  17S9,  wanted 
the  land  to  till  and  was  ready  to  resort  to  violence 
to  get  it.  By  19  I  7  howc\'er  the  working  classes  of 
the  Russian  cities  had  grown  in  numbers,  in  organi- 
zation, in  power,  and  in  solidarity  so  that  it  was  with 
the  proletariat  rather  than  the  bourgeois  that  the 
Russian  peasant  united  in  attaining  his  ends.  The 
driving  force  of  the  land-lust  is  shown,  as  we  have 


RISE    OF    NEW     PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES       19I 

seen  above,  in  the  early  decrees  of  the  Bolshevik 
government.  I-'irst  \\as  peace.  The  second  was 
land  for  the  peasants.  The  third  was  workers'  con- 
trol in  the  factories — not  socialism  or  even  com- 
munism as  yet. 

After  peace,  the  land.  Therein  lies  the  secret  of 
the  Bolshevik  revolution.  The  Marats  and  Robes- 
pierres  of  I'etrograd  were  daring  enough  to  give 
soil  to  the  peasants  without  indemnities  to  the  ex- 
propriated. After  peace,  the  very  first  domestic 
measure  of  the  Bolsheviki  was  the  ousting  of  the 
landlords.  To  use  again  the  language  of  a  Bolshe- 
vik, Litvino\-,  this  momentous  decree  "transferred 
to  the  peasantry  at  large  all  lands  hitherto  in  pos- 
session of  private  landlords,  of  the  imperial  family, 
of  the  church,  etc.,  to  be  administered  and  distrib- 
uted for  use  by  peasant  committees  acting  in  conjunc- 
tion with  the  local  Soviets,  on  such  a  basis  that  no  one 
should  receive  more  land  than  he  and  his  family 
could  cultivate  efficiently  without  hired  labor  or  less 
land  than  is  required  for  his  own  and  his  family's 
needs."  The  fundamental  law  ot  socialization 
which  went  into  effect  in  September,  1918,  did  but 
elaborate  this  general  principle.  It  is  true  that  in 
juridical  theorv  the  ownership  of  the  land  "passes 
over  to  the  use  of  the  entire  laboring  population  with- 
out anv  compensation,  open  or  secret,  to  the  former 
owners,""  but  in  practice  the  peasant  who  tills  the 
soil  possesses  it  in  spite  ot  parchment,  seals,  and 
decrees.  Thus  b\-  one  ot  the  Irotiles  of  historw  a 
vast  tree  peasantry,  tlie  Inilwark  ot  conservatism, 
will  be  created  b\-  the  oi-dei's  ot  the  w()rld"s  extreme 


192       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

radicals.     The  irony  may  pass.      The  fact  remains. 

While  the  revolutionary  crisis  was  engineered  in 
Germany  by  the  spokesmen  of  the  working  class  as 
in  Russia  it  was  not  supported  to  the  same  extent  by 
the  peasantry.  As  we  have  seen  the  system  of 
great  estates  did  not  prevail  extensively  outside  of 
Prussia.  The  peasants  of  Saxony  and  Bavaria,  for 
example,  were  as  contented  as  any  agricultural  popu- 
lation in  the  world.  A  close  examination  of  the 
records  shows  moreover  that  the  German  re-volution 
of  19 1 8  was  due  to  a  breakdown  of  the  old  ruling 
class  rather  than  an  impassioned  uprising  of  the 
masses  in  town  and  country.  Nevertheless,  the  Ger- 
man revolutionists  looked  upon  the  great  estates 
of  Prussia  with  feelings  akin  to  those  entertained 
by  the  Bolsheviki.  The  left  wing  of  the  Socialist 
party  advocated  immediate  and  unconditional  na- 
tionalization of  those  estates,  but  its  views  were 
rejected  by  the  Majority'  Socialists.  The  latter, 
afraid  to  lay  hold  of  the  great  industries,  showed 
even  more  hesitation  when  confronted  with  a  prop- 
osition to  apply  socialization  to  the  land. 

Nevertheless,  with  the  aid  of  the  bourgeois,  espe- 
cially of  the  liberal  persuasion,  and  with  the  aid  of 
the  Center  or  Catholic  party  which  entertained  no 
love  for  the  Protestant  Junkertum  of  Prussia,  the 
Socialists,  under  whose  auspices  the  direction  of  at- 
fairs  fell,  at  least  made  an  attack  on  the  land  prob- 
lem. The  Jiational  convention  embodied  in  the 
new  constitution  of  19 19  a  general  clause  relative 
to  the  land.  "The  distribution  and  use  of  the  land 
are  supervised  by  the  state  in  such  a  way  as  to  pre- 


RISK    OF    Ni:W    PEASANT    DE.MOCRACIES       193 

vent  its  misuse  and  promote  the  object  of  ensuring 
to  every  German  a  healthful  dwelling  and  to  all 
(jcrnian  lamilics,  especially  those  with  numerous 
cliildren,  homesteads  corresponding  to  their  needs. 
War  veterans  shall  receive  special  consideration  in 
the  enactment  of  a  homestead  law.  Landed  prop- 
erty the  acquisition  of  which  is  necessary  to  satisfy 
the  demand  for  housing,  to  promote  settlement  and 
reclamation  or  to  improve  agriculture  may  be  ex- 
propriated. Kntailments  shall  be  dissolved.  The 
cultivation  and  utilization  ot  the  soil  is  a  duty  of 
the  landowner  towards  the  community.  An  in- 
crease in  the  \'alue  of  land  arising  without  the  ap- 
plication of  labor  or  capital  to  the  property  shall 
inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  community  as  a  whole. 
All  mineral  resources  and  all  economically  useful 
forces  of  nature  are  subject  to  the  control  of  the 
state."  Such  are  the  terms  of  Article  155  of  the 
V\  cimar  Constitution  of  19  19. 

TIic  general  language  of  tlie  fundamental  law  of 
the  land  was  supplemented  by  decrees  and  legisla- 
tion. In  Julv  of  1 9 19,  even  before  the  national 
assembly  had  concluded  its  work,  the  federal  govern- 
ment issued  a  decree  on  small  gardens  and  small 
farms  pro\iding  tor  the  rental  or  lease  of  lands  not 
uscel  profitnbh'  In'  the  present  owners.  Bv  a  federal 
law  of  the  same  \'car  an  obligation  was  laid  upon 
tb.e  Cicrman  states  to  undertake  land  settlements  and 
to  encourage  the  creation  ot  small  farms.  Provision 
\\'as  made  tor  transt  erring  state  lands  to  settlement 
associations  and  for  con t erring  upon  them  the  right 
of  preemption  in  tile  sale  of  tracts  of  land  (d  less 


194      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

than  twenty-five  hectares.  The  law  went  further. 
It  stipulated  that  in  those  districts  in  which  more 
than  ten  per  cent  of  the  arable  land  is  in  the  hands 
of  large  holders  possessing  more  than  one  hundred 
hectares  each,  associations  of  landlords  for  the  dis- 
posal of  lands  must  be  formed.  Such  associations 
were  required  to  turn  over  to  settlement  associations, 
on  the  basis  of  fair  compensation,  a  certain  propor- 
tion of  their  estates.  The  government  of  Prussia, 
following  the  injunction  thus  issued,  served  notice  on 
the  great  landlords  that  compulsory  expropriation 
would  follow  if  they  did  not  voluntarily  cut  up  and 
sell  their  estates.  The  ultimate  effect  of  these  legal 
provisions  remains  to  be  seen.  The  revolution  in 
Germany  was  not  so  thoroughgoing  as  in  Russia. 

Still  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  appetite  of 
the  peasants  for  the  land  was  whetted.  The  old 
order  with  the  old  spirit  will  be  difficult  to  restore. 

Between  Prussia  and  Russia  lies  Poland,  long  the 
paradise  of  great  landlords.  Swept  by  war  and 
wracked  by  revolution,  the  agricultural  system  of 
that  unhappy  land  was  shaken  to  the  foundation, 
but  the  feudal  estate  survived  the  storm  in  many 
sections  and  the  Polish  aristocracy  recei\cd  no  such 
blow  as  that  dealt  to  the  nobility  of  Russia.  The 
revolutionary  feeling  in  town  and  country,  however, 
made  untenable  the  old  position  of  the  landlords. 
L'nder  strong  and  insistent  radical  ]:)rcssure  two  sig- 
nificant land  laws  were  enacted  by  the  Polish  Diet, 
the  first  in  1919  and  the  second  (hiring  the  following 
\-ear.  The  ()})ening  sections  of  the  latter  law  re\'cal 
the  spirit  of  the  new  order:      "The  agricultural  j)ol- 


RISF.    OF    NEW     PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES        195 

icy  of  the  I\)llsh  republic  sliould  be  based,  above  all, 
on  ^ood,  well-orn^ani/ed  peasants'  farms  of  different 
types  aiul  acreao;e,  capable  of  intensive  culti\ation 
antl  based  on  pri\ate  ownership.  .  .  .  ^Ihe  owners 
of  the  latul  may  only  be  persons  who  will  work 
themsehes,  or  their  heirs,  with  the  exception  of  that 
land  which  will  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  land- 
less proprietor  and  which  is  exploited  by  municipal 
or  rural  bodies."  The  technical  provisions  of  the 
leu;islation  carr\ino;  these  principles  into  effect  need 
not  detain  us  here.  We  mav  conclude  with  the 
()bser\ation  ot  a  student  well-versed  in  Polish  af- 
fairs, Dr.  Guest,  that  "land  reform  in  Poland  will 
certainK  ^o  on  because  there  is  no  wav  of  resisting 
it  except  bv  sheer  reaction  and  as  the  peasants  have 
the  sup{")ort  ot  the  socialist  town  workers,  the  two 
winiji;s  of  democracy  are  united."  Still  this  is  proph- 
ecv. 

To  the  southwest  of  Poland  the  new  republic  of 
C  zechos]o\akIa  was  carried  into  the  current  of 
land  retorm  In-  re\'olutionary  fervor.  With  a  so- 
cialistic President  and  ;i  jiarliament  composed  in 
lar<2;e  part  of  socialist  and  radical  members,  it  was 
inex'itable  that  t!ie  teudal  rcL!;ime  shouKl  be  attacked. 
Within  a  tew  weeks  alter  the  wreck  ol  Austria  in 
\o\  ember,  i';iS,  the  Czechs  IkuI  undertaken  many 
luiuhimental  chai\u;es  in  tlie  old  re_u;ime.  All  titles 
ot  nobilir\',  orders,  ami  ilistmctions  were  swept 
awav  111  one  decree.  Anotlier,  ado[ited  bet  ore  the 
tIeJaration  ot  iiulependeiue  was  two  weeks  old,  pro- 
\-ided  tor  tiie  tli\ision  ol  the  u;reat  estates.  I  he 
domains    lield    b\-    tlie    lor'ner    reiLTninLX    tamilies,   bv 


196       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

enemies  of  the  state,  and  by  offenders  against  the 
republic  were  confiscated  without  compensation. 
The  technical  details  of  land  distribution  were  set 
forth  at  length  in  a  great  land  law  enacted  on  Jan- 
uary 30,  1920,  based  upon  the  broad  principle  that 
*'the  land  shall  be  given  in  the  first  place  to  those 
able  to  cultivate  it."  The  execution  of  the  law  was 
vested  in  local  commissions  representing  the  various 
political  groups,  with  a  view  to  assuring  the  effec- 
tive enforcement  of  its  terms.  V.  hile  this  had  an 
unfortunate  effect  upon  scientific  administration,  it 
seemed  to  give  a  guarantee  that  the  redistribution  of 
the  land  would  be  thoroughgoing.  Czechoslovakia 
is  destined  to  have  its  rich  and  diversified  indus- 
tries complemented  by  a  large  landowning  peasantry. 
Already  it  seems  to  offer  more  promise  of  stability 
than  any  of  the  new  creations  of  central  and  eastern 
Europe. 

How  different  was  the  fortune  of  Czechoslovakia's 
former  partner  in  the  Hapsburg  empire,  Hungary. 
One  of  the  most  conservati\"e  and  mcdiae\al  coun- 
tries of  Europe  in  19  14,  it  fell  for  a  short  time  into 
the  hands  of  Bolshevik  extremists  after  the  revolu- 
Uon  of  19 1 8.  Though  the  communist  regime  was 
soon  liquidated  and  a  White  Terror  inaugurated,  the 
great  landlords  did  not  quite  recover  their  former 
power  or  their  serene  indifference  to  the  peasant 
movement.  On  the  contrary,  frightened  within  an 
inch  of  tb.eir  lives  bv  their  experience  witli  the  dic- 
tatorship of  the  proletariat  and  bv  the  course  ol 
events  in  Russia,  they  decided  to  fight  lire  with  lire. 
B}    a  law  enacted  in    1920,  they  jirox  Idcd  in  rather 


RISE    OF    NEW     PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES        197 

generous  terms  for  a  division  of  estates  and  a  peas- 
ant proprietorship.  As  the  law  was  not  self-en torc- 
ino;  and  the  government  was  in  the  hands  of  land- 
lords the  future  of  the  promised  agrarian  rexolution 
seemed  in  doubt.  However,  a  trained  T'nglish  ob- 
server who  has  recently  journeyed  through  Hungary 
says:  ''Universal  suffrage  gained  by  the  revolution 
plus  a  peasant  proprietor  program,  forced  by  fear  of 
B(ilshe\ism,  has  made  the  peasants  into  a  very 
strong  power  and  much  stronger  than  the  land- 
owners bargained  for.  Some  of  the  best  observers 
in  Hungary  think  that  politics  tor  years  to  come 
will  group  around  the  light  between  big  landowners 
and  the  peasants  over  the  land.  All  other  politics 
will  depend  on  that.  The  question  ot  the  return  of 
the  Hapsburgs  is  only  a  mo\-e  in  this  contest  for, 
to  the  big  landlords,  the  Hapsburg  lamilv  represents 
the  old  regime,  as  it  does  to  the  military  class  who 
support  the  pcjlicy  of  return,  because  without  it, 
their  own  orders  and  distinctions  no  longer  have  the 
same  value  and  importance.  Anti-Semitism  is  only 
a  moN'c  in  this  contest,  easilv  to  be  explained  when 
one  learns  that  the  Church  is  one  of  the  greatest 
landlords  in  Hungary  and  one  ot  the  most  wordly." 
Like  Hungary,  the  neighboring  state  ot  Rumania 
passed  through  the  dissojxing  and  liquidating  pro- 
cess o\  defeat  and  rcN'olution.  It  had  long  been  the 
home  ot  an  ox'erbcanng  ruling  class  and  an  o{')prcssed 
pcasantr\-,  perhaps  the  most  benighted  in  i'.urope 
outside  ol  Russia.  1  he  tires  ot  the  peasant  re\"olt 
that  had  bi-oken  out  in  ifj<»7  were  still  smoldering 
when   the    Rumanian   annii's  were  defeated   and   the 


198       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Germans  took  possession  of  the  capital.  Then  the 
old  regime  became  bankrupt  and  Rumania  was  sud- 
denly transformed  into  the  semblance  of  a  peasant 
democracy.  Sweeping  decrees  established  universal 
manhood  suffrage  and  ordered  the  redistribution  of 
the  land,  nearly  half  of  which  was  concentrated  in  the 
hands  of  about  4000  landlords.  The  Bolshevik 
rev^olution  in  Bessarabia  facilitated  the  process; 
when  that  province  was  later  annexed  a  new  revolu- 
tionary virus  was  added  to  that  already  existing  in 
Rumania.  The  ferment  grew  from  day  to  day.  The 
Rumanian  parliament,  subject  to  irresistible  pres- 
sure, then  made  the  first  land  law  still  more  radical 
by  adopting  many  of  the  extreme  provisions  of  the 
Bessarabian  settlement.  According  to  the  latest  re- 
ports, the  4000  landlords  were  vigorously  fighting 
for  liberal  compensation  with  small  prospect  of  col- 
lecting it.  The  landlords  were  dethroned  and  the 
process  of  distribution  was  taking  place  in  a  crude 
fashion  under  the  eyes  of  the  village  mayors  and 
schoolmasters.  Reaction  is  on  the  horizon,  no 
doubt,  but  the  old  order  of  19 14  is  shaken  to  its 
foundations. 

Thoroughgoing  as  was  the  revolution  in  Rumania, 
it  can  hardly  be  compared  with  the  sweeping  char- 
acter of  that  in  Bulgaria.  When  the  Bulgarian  gov- 
ernment went  into  bankruptcy  with  tlie  exhaustion 
of  the  Central  Powers,  the  whole  governing  class 
was  shattcretl.  Those  who  had  conspired  to  bring 
the  war  about  and  had  profiteered  during  the  strug- 
gle were  trieil  and  im]Trisoned.  I'he  vigorous  leader 
of  the  opposition  to  war,  the  spokesman  of  the  peas- 


RISE    OF    NEW    PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES       199 

ants,  Stamboulisky,  who  had  been  imprisoned  for 
his  activities  and  views,  was  released  and  made 
prime  minister  of  his  stricken  country.  Bulgaria 
became  a  peasant  nation.  Its  government,  its  cabi- 
net, and  its  chief  minister  were  peasants.  Next  in 
number  in  the  parliament  were  the  communists  and 
socialists,  while  the  bourgeois  could  hardly  muster 
enough  to  make  any  impression  on  the  course  of 
politics. 

The  leaders  of  the  Bulgarian  peasants  have 
launched  a  "Green  Communism"  and  issued  a  ring- 
ing call  to  the  tillers  of  the  soil  everywhere  to  form 
a  "Green  International."  With  swinging  periods 
that  sound  like  the  Communist  Manifesto,  the 
Bulgarians  call  upon  the  peasants  of  all  lands  to 
unite  and  enter  upon  their  inheritance.  "Across 
the-  vista  of  human  progress  there  runs  like  a  white 
thread,"  opens  the  Green  Manifesto,  "  the  his- 
tory of  a  class  which  has  everywhere  and  always 
been  compelled  to  submit  to  unjust  and  evil 
treatment."  It  closes':  "The  international  union 
of  the  peasant  masses  of  all  lands  will  be  founded, 
and  the  voice  of  the  peasant  too  long  silent  will  be 
heard.  This  union  is  the  great  event  of  the  new 
era  and  the  importance  of  an  understanding  and 
close  relation  among  the  peasants  will  have  a  vast 
significance  in  the  international  affairs  ot  the  future. 
We  wait  for  this  with  joylul  heart  and  cherish  the 
hope  that  the  Union  will  improve  the  hard  lot  of 
the  peasants  of  the  world.""  A  military  dictator- 
ship is  the  only  alternatix  e  to  peasant  government  in 
Bultiaria. 


200       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Across  the  border  in  Jugoslavia,  the  ferment  is  at 
work.  Already  a  land  of  peasant  proprietors,  it  is 
being  stirred  by  the  new  currents  of  thought  that 
run  fast  among  the  long  silent  tillers  of  the  soil. 
In  the  convention  which  drafted  the  constitution  of 
192 1,  the  radicals,  communists,  and  agrarians  were 
in  an  overwhelming  majority.  The  fundamental 
law  framed  by  them  strikes  a  blow  at  landlordism  of 
the  old  type.  The  feudal  relationships  existing  on 
the  estates  in  the  regions  wrested  from  Austria- 
Hungary  are  dissolved  and  the  vassals  on  those 
estates  are  given  their  lands  without  compensation 
to  the  former  owners.  It  is  decreed  that  the  ex- 
propriation of  the  great  estates  and  their  division 
into  properties  for  the  benefit  of  tillers  of  the  land 
shall  be  effected  by  law.  No  compensation  is  to  be 
granted  to  former  reigning  families  and  to  those 
who  received  their  land  from  foreign  authorities. 
Entails  are  abolished.  The  large  forests  are  na- 
tionalized and  state  aid  is  to  be  given  to  producers 
on  the  land.  The  Serbs,  Croats,  and  Slovenes, 
therefore,  are  moving  rapidly  toward  a  democracy  of 
the  peasant  type,  thus  lending  their  powerful  en- 
couragement to  the  vast  mass  of  tillers  of  the  soil 
who  occupy  a  broad  belt  of  land  stretching  from  the 
Adriatic  to  the  Baltic. 

Can  it  be  doubted  that  the  events  just  recited  will 
have  a  far-reaching  influence  on  the  course  of  politics 
in  Eastern  Europe  during  the  years  to  come? 
Prophecy  is  not  the  business  of  the  historian,  but  one 
cannot  help  comparing  these  events  with  the  mo- 
mentous  record   of   the   French   revolution.      While 


RISE    OF    NEW     PEASANT    DEMOCRACIES      201 


the  economist  may  inquire  whether  the  system  of 
peasant  proprietorship  is  as  productixe  as  enhp;ht- 
ened  landlortiism,  the  inquiry  seems  academic.  If  a 
contented  peasantry  can  be  established,  will  it  not 
work  In  the  lon^  run  for  stability  and  peace?  In- 
deed, can  there  be  social  peace  without  it?  At  all 
events  here  is  a  power  with  which  statesmen  must 
reckon  as  surely  as  they  must  reckon  with  organized 
labor  and*  combined  capital. 


VIII 

SOCIALISM  AND  THE  LABOR 
MOVEMENT 

THE  influence  of  the  war  upon  socialist  thought 
and  activity  was  so  deep  and  so  far-reaching 
that  no  single  phrase  may  be  safely  employed  to  de- 
scribe it.  Undoubtedly  division,  dissension,  and 
disillusionment  were  among  the  outstanding  char- 
acteristics. But  these  do  not  exhaust  the  subject. 
During  the  war  all  the  belligerent  governments  em- 
ployed the  principles  of  state  socialism  on  a  large 
scale  to  obtain  the  national  cohesion  and  degree  of 
production  necessary  for  carrying  on  the  conflict. 
In  laying  taxes,  parliaments  made  distinctions  among 
the  various  kinds  of  incomes,  which  only  served  to 
emphasize  one  of  the  cardinal  points  in  the  socialist 
indictment  of  the  capitalistic  order.  Organized 
labor  secured  a  weight  in  the  councils  of  nations  and 
in  the  conduct  of  affairs  so  great  that  even  the  fate 
of  cabinets  depended  upon  its  decisions.  While 
labor  relaxed  its  rules  and  restrictions  in  the  man- 
agement of  industry  it  developed  ideas  and  prac- 
tices of  factory  control  that  were  new  in  the  history 
of  economy.  Trade  unionists  of  the  old  type,  accus- 
tomed to  consider  only  hours  and  wages  and  equally 
accustomed  to  carrying  on  war  against  socialistic 
doctrines,  found  themselves  compelled  by  the  stress 

2Q2 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVEMENT      203 

of  circumstances  to  accept  the  idea  of  compulsory 
labor  and  to  cooperate  more  and  more  with  socialist 
leaders.  The  Cjcrman  government,  long  the  open 
foe  of  the  Social  Democrats,  was  forced  with  the 
passing  months  ot  war  to  rely  more  and  more  upon 
their  support  and  in  the  end,  it  seems,  escaped  a 
domestic  revolution  by  relinquishing  all  authority 
into  their  hands.  Since  the  war,  naturally,  the  tide 
has  receded  but  the  old  landmarks  do  not  bear  just 
the  same  aspect. 

On  the  subject  of  disillusionment,  though  it  is 
subtle  in  its  essence,  much  can  be  said.  The  first 
great  dream  to  be  dispelled  was  the  power  of  the 
socialists  to  prevent  war.  'J'he  feeble  attempt  of 
the  (jerman  and  French  socialists  to  come  to  com- 
mon terms  in  the  fateful  August  days  of  1914  was 
a  complete  failure.  The  1- rench  socialists  sup- 
ported their  gON'crnment  because,  they  said,  the  war 
was  one  of  defence  against  Imperialist  Germany 
and  their  government  had  kept  them  informed  of 
the  course  of  events.  The  (Serman  Social  Demo- 
crats gave  a  support  equally  loyal  to  their  govern- 
ment on  the  ground  that  the  war  was  one  of  defence 
agairist  Imperialist  Russia,  although  they  could  not 
sav  with  truth  that  they  had  enjoyed  the  confidence 
of  fhe  Chancellor  or  his  colleagues  during  the  rhe- 
torical nourishes  that  preceded  it.  Minorities  dis- 
sented and  fought  to  the  bitter  end,  paying  the  tuU 
penaltv  tor  their  temerity,  but  official  socialism 
proxed  no  barrier  to  the  war  passions  that  swept 
Europe  into  the  niaclstroni  and  held  it  tliere  tor 
four  long,  bitter  vears. 


204       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

It  may  be  urged,  of  course,  that  no  one  familiar 
with  the  numerical  strength  of  the  socialists  and  with 
their  pre-war  policies  expected  them  to  muster  the 
power  necessary  to  stop  war.  Indeed  this  is  often 
urged.  Statesmen,  it  is  said,  had  correctly  estimated 
this  force  in  making  their  calculations.  But  we  have 
high  authority  for  the  proposition  that  some  astute 
socialists  counted  on  no  such  outcome.  We  are  told 
by  Zinoviev,  in  his  brief  life  of  Lenin,  that  neither 
of  them  expected  the  complete  breakdown  of  the 
German  Social  Democrats.  These  two  men  were 
together  in  Galicia  when  the  war  broke  out.  As 
soon  as  the  news  reached  them  Zinoviev  said  to  his 
friend:  ''You  will  see,  the  German  Democrats  will 
not  dare  to  vote  against  the  war,  but  will  abstain 
in  the  vote  on  war  credits."  To  this  Lenin  replied: 
"No,  they  are  not  such  scoundrels  after  all.  They 
will  not,  of  course,  fight  the  war,  but  they  will,  to 
ease  their  conscience,  vote  against  the  credits  in 
order  that  the  working  class  may  not  rise  against 
them."  Zinoviev  then  goes  on  with  the  story: 
"In  this  case  Lenin  was  wrong  and  so  was  I. 
Neither  of  us  had  taken  the  full  measure  of  the 
flunkeyism  of  the  Social  Patriots.  The  European 
Social  Democrats  proved  complete  bankrupts. 
They  all  voted  for  war  credits.  When  the  first 
number  of  Fonvarts,  the  organ  of  the  German 
Social  Democrats,  reached  us  with  the  news  that  they 
had  voted  the  war  credits,  Lenin  at  first  refused 
to  believe.  'It  cannot  be,'  lie  said,  'it  must  be  a 
forged  number.  Those  scoundrels,  the  German 
bourgeois,  have  specially  published  such  a  number 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVF.MF.NT      205 

of  the  f'orzicirts  in  order  to  compel  us  to  go  against 
the  International.'  Alas,  it  was  not  so."  Thus  at 
least  two  leaders,  long  associated  with  international 
socialism,  agitators  and  students,  were  disillusioned. 

I.     s  0  c  1  A  I.  I  s  r  s    V  0  X  F  R  o  X  r  k  n    h  v 
r  n  i:    r  i.  a  l  i  i  i  i,  s    o  f    p  o  w  i:  r 

It  also  happened  in  the  economy  of  things  that 
the  two  men  who  thus  saw  a  grand  mirage  fade 
before  their  eyes  In  August,  19 14,  were  destined 
themseK'cs  to  play  leading  roles  in  a  drama  which 
lifted  socialist  hopes  to  high  heaven  and  dashed  them 
again  to  earth.  In  this  connection  It  is  not  neces- 
sary to  make  use  of  any  statements  made  by  enemies 
of  Soviet  Russia.  The  course  of  affairs  can  be 
traced  In  the  writings  of  Lenin  and  his  supporters. 
i\Ve  may  also  accept,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  the 
Bolshevik  contention  that  the  counter-revolutionary 
movements,  the  wars  waged  against  the  Bolshevik 
government  by  enemies  within  as  well  as  withtnit, 
and  the  Iron  blockade  Imposed  by  the  great  powers 
were  mainly  responsible  for  the  further  deteriora- 
tion in  the  ruin  left  by  the  old  regime.  The  Rus- 
sian rcxolution  ot  November,  19 17,  opened  with 
conlulent  appeals  ta  the  proletariat  of  the  world 
to  follow  the  example  ot  Pctrograd.  The  hopes 
of  the  extremists  were  raised  eyerywhere.  In 
Italv,  Spain.  Hungary,  and  (lerman)-.  attempts  were 
made  to  enuihite  the  Musco\'ite  example.  All  this 
stands  upon  tlie  open  record.  All  these  ettorts 
failed.  As  the  months  passed  Moscow  \\as  forced 
to  ailmit  that  It  had  been  tleccixcd.   that  the  world 


206       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

was  not  ripe  for  a  proletarian  revolution.  Thus 
one  great  fiction  was  dissipated. 

Equally  significant  was  the  failure  of  the  Bol- 
shevik system  as  a  recuperative  and  reconstructive 
force.  It  did  not  call  forth  the  productive  energie^s 
of  the  Russian  people.  The  task  of  overturning 
the  provisional  government  and  seizing  the  power 
of  the  state  was  relatively  simple  and  easy.  On  the 
morning  of  victory  came  the  real  test,  namely,  that 
of  producing  and  distributing  goods.  In  this,  the 
Bolsheviki  confronted  new  and  baffling  undertak- 
ings for  which  neither  their  philosophy  nor  their 
technical  knowledge  fitted  them.  It  has  been  said 
that  the  ruin's  they  inherited  were  almost  beyond  re- 
pair. That  may  be  granted  also  for  the  sake  of 
argument.  Still  with  all  the  machinery  of  the  state 
in  their  hands,  the  Russian  socialists  failed  to  start 
Russia  on  the  path  to  recuperation.  Hence  the  nec- 
essity of  falling  back  upon  capitalism,  modified  and 
restrained,  if  you  please,  but  still  capitalism. 

For  this,  too,  we  have  the  words  of  the  Russian 
premier,  Lenin.  In  a  speech  delivered  early  in 
192 1  he  laid  before  his  communist  colleagues  two 
alternatives.  "We  can,"  he  said,  "completely  pro- 
hibit and  prevent  the  development  of  private  non- 
state  exchange,  that  is,  comm.erce,  or  in  other  words 
capitalism,  which  is  inevitable  with  the  existence 
of  millions  of  small  producers.  Such  a  policy  would 
be  stupid  and  suicidal  for  the  party  which  attempted 
to  carry  it  out.  It  would  be  stupid  because  it  is 
economically  impossible.      It  would  be  suicidal  be- 


SOCIALISM     AND     LABOR    MOVKMKNT 


207 


cause  the  party  that  attempted  to  carry  It  out  would 
Inevitably  collapse.  It  Is  useless  trying  to  conceal 
the  sin  Into  which  some  communists  'in  thought,  in 
word  antl  in  deed,'  have  fallen  with  regard  to  this 
policy.  \\c  shall  attempt  to  rectify  this  error.  It 
is  essential  that  we  rectify  this  error  or  else  It  will 
go  hard  with  us." 

Then  Lenin  presented  the  other  alternative: 
''Or  (and  this  is  the  only  possible  and  sensible 
policy)  we  can  refrain  from  prohibiting  and  pre- 
venting the  dc\elopment  ot  capitalism  and  strive  to 
direct  it  in  the  path  of  state  capitalism.  This  is 
economically  possible,  for  state  capitalism  exists  in 
one  form  or  another  everywhere  that  elements  of 
free  trade  and  capitalism  in  general  are  to  be  found." 

The  implications  ot  this  are  clear  enough.  Ihc 
Bolshe\'Iki  comjuered  the  power  ot  the  state  and 
found  themseb  es  practicall}'  helpless  in  the  presence 
of  technical  problems  of  production.  It  was  one 
thing  to  seize  the  tactories:  It  was  another  thing  to 
manage  them  and  to  carr\-  on  all  the  intricate  proc- 
esses of  production  and  distribution.  But  with 
all  the  symbols  and  trappings  ot  state  In  their  hands 
they  could  not  find  the  secret  spi'ings  t  rom  which 
productive  energies  flow.  riie\-  could  not,  with  all 
their  decrees  ami  parcfiment  and  sealing  wax.  pre- 
\-ent  the  peasant  from  holding  the  soil  that  he  tilled. 
7"he\  could  not  set  mills,  mines,  and  lactorics  in  the 
full  swing  ot  operation.  1  lie\-  laid  the  cause  ot 
their  defeat  upon  the  teihnic.d  and  clerical  forces 
that  committed  sabotau'c  auamst  their  orders.       I  hat 


208       CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

too  may  be  conceded  for  the  sake  of  argument. 
But  the  fact  remains  that  the  first  great  communist 
state  established  in  the  world  had  to  go  back  to  a 
modified  form  of  capitalism  within  the  brief  period 
of  four  years. 

The  disillusionment  that  marked  this  process  was 
accompanied  by  the  practical  lesson  that  decrees  are 
not  bread  and  that  phraseology  makes  no  boots.  If 
the  return  was  resisted  by  any  considerable  body  of 
communists  in  Russia,  the  news  of  the  fact  has  not 
reached  the  western  hemisphere.  As  far  as  the 
English  were  concerned,  a  visit  of  the  delegates  of 
the  British  Labor  Party  to  Petrograd  was  sufficient 
to  dissipate  any  ardent  hopes  for  an  immediate 
millenium  on  the  Russian  principles.  Only  a  small, 
intransigent  party  in  Germany,  the  Communist 
Labor  party,  clung  to  the  primitive  gospel  of  the 
pure  word.  It  declared  solemnly,  late  in  192 1, 
that  "the  Soviet  Government  of  Russia  has  ceased  to 
be  a  Proletarian  government  by  reason  of  its  con- 
cessions to  the  peasants.  .  .  .  The  Soviet  Govern- 
ment, forced  by  economic  circumstances  to  intro- 
duce capitalism  into  the  country,  becomes  itself  the 
representative  of  capitalism."  As  for  the  rest  of 
the  socialist  world,  the  fond  hope  that  the  conquest 
of  power  by  the  proletariat  would  automatically 
bring  something  like  the  millenium  or  at  all  events 
an  endurable  system  ol  production  has  vanished. 
Little  groups  of  obdurate  communists  may  defy 
AIoscow,  but  facts  are  what  they  are.  And  it  is 
with  facts  that  the  historian  has  to  deal. 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVIIMEXT      209 


11.       S  O  C  I  A  1.  I  S  M      A  X  D     T  II  i:     C  E  N  T  R  A  L 
POWERS 

Scarcely  less  (.lisappointint^  to  the  socialists  of  all 
countries  was  the  tailure  of  the  Cierman  Democrats 
to  make  the  most  of  their  power  in  the  days  of  their 
revolution.  On  the  9th  ot  November  the  author- 
ity ot  the  Cierman  state  in  eftect  passed  into  the 
hands  ot  an  extra-leiral  council  composed  of  Social 
Democrats  and  Independents.  1  he  first  revolution- 
ary government  was  composed  entirely  of  socialists. 
Nevertheless  no  steps  were  taken  in  the  direction 
of  socialization.  I  he  proposal  that  the  socialists 
should  proceed  to  an  economic  revolution  by  means 
of  soldiers  and  workers  councils  was  rejected  imder 
Social  Democratic  pressure.  Instead,  a  national  as- 
sembly was  summoned  \\ith  the  full  knowledge  that 
there  would  not  be  a  socialist  majorit\'  in  such  a 
bcnlv.  That  was  not  all.  Leaders  among  the 
Social  Democrats,  linding  themscK-es  in  the  seats  of 
the  mig!it\-,  in  positions  of  full  responsibilitv.  openly 
opposeil  all  radical  j'ti-ograms  for  socialization. 
On  No\-emher  19.  191  S,  tlie  I'li-iJirit  declared  that 
thci'e  was  no  doubt  about  tlic  possibilitx'  ot  trans- 
forming the  great  Imlustrial  monopolies  into  com- 
mon propcrtw  A  lew  da\s  later  l.bert,  the  social- 
ist chancclb)!",  replied  b\'  denouncing  the  "\'isii)n- 
aries"  who  demaiule  I  an  ininicdiate  socialization  of 
(u'rnian  iiukistries  and  warned  the  people  against 
"exiierimcnts.""  fbe  ottKiul  commission  on  social- 
ization declared  that  tlie  "lirst  condition  of   all  eco- 


2IO       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

nomic  reorganization  was  the  revival  of  production,'' 
as  if  to  say  that  socialization  would  not  lead  to  such 
a  revival  or  was  not  even  necessary  to  it,  as  urged 
by  socialists  of  the  left.  This  negative  position 
was  defended  on  many  grounds.  It  was  said  for 
instance  that  the  socialists  should  not  become  the  re- 
ceivers for  bankrupt  capitalism  and  that  the  time 
was  not  ripe  for  the  transition. 

The  truth  is  that  the  German  socialists,  instead 
of  presenting  a  compact  front  to  capitalism  on  the 
day  of  the  revolution  were  hopelessly  divided  as  to 
goals  and  tactics.  They  had  been  divided  all  dur- 
ing the  War.  Party  rules  made  the  vote  for  mili- 
tary credits  on  August  4,  19 14,  appear  unanimous  on 
the  record,  but  it  was  known  that  fourteen  votes  had 
been  cast  against  the  government  in  the  party 
caucus  at  which  the  action  had  been  decided  upon. 
The  division  thus  made  manifest  increased  with 
time.  In  19 16  a  separate  group  known  as  the 
Social  Democratic  Alliance  made  its  appearance.  In 
April  of  the  next  year,  an  Independent  Social  Demo- 
cratic party  was  organized.  In  the  meantime  there 
had  grown  up  a  formless  and  illegal  group  still 
more  radical  and  bearing  the  name  of  Spartacus. 
The  failure  of  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Inde- 
pendents to  bring  about  the  long-heralded  proleta- 
rian revolution  in  19 18,  led  to  the  formation  of  a 
German  Communist  party  modelled  on  the  Russian 
lines  and  advocating  Russian  methods. 

The  Communist  party  was  only  a  little  more  than 
a  year  old  when  signs  of  cleavage  began  to  appear 
within    its    ranks.       These    became    marked    in    the 


SOCIALISM    AND    LABOR    MOVEMENT     211 

spring  of  1920  just  after  the  attempt  of  Kapp  and 
Liittwit/  to  restore  the  monarchy.  Seeing  that  the 
radicals  were  likely  to  play  into  the  hands  of  the 
reactionaries,  the  executixe  committee  of  the  Com- 
munist party  issued  a  statement  (March  21,  1920) 
to  the  effect  that  the  time  was  not  ripe  for  a  dic- 
tatorship of  the  proletariat  and  that  political  action 
was  appropriate  for  the  hour.  7'his  incensed  a 
large  number  of  the  intransigents,  who  clung  fer- 
vcnth  to  the  Moscow  program.  The  result  was  the 
formation  of  the  (jerman  Communist  Labor  party 
at  a  Congress  held  on  April  4,  1920.  The  new 
organization  approached  the  authorities  of  the 
Third  International  and  while  not  formally  admitted 
was  at  first  treated  kindly  and  granted  a  consultative 
vote. 

Not  convinced  that  a  proletarian  dictatorship 
was  yet  a  forlorn  hope  in  Germany,  the  extreme  com- 
munist left  wing  undertook  to  overtlirow  the  capi- 
talist system  by  a  general  uprising  in  March,  192  i. 
There  was  serious  fighting  in  a  number  of  industrial 
centres,  but  the  revolt  was  put  down.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  right  wing  in  tlie  Communist  party  de- 
nounceil  the  attempt  as  foolish  and  as  the  inevitable 
result  of  "iiit  antlle"  tactics.  Fhe  extremists  an- 
swered b\-  sa\'ing  that,  altliough  it  failed,  the  upris- 
ing marked  another  battle  in  the  grand  world-wide 
canifKiign  against  ca(^italism. 

In  tliis  state  of  ait  airs,  an  appeal  was  made  to 
.Moscow,  and  in  a  letter  of  August  14,  1921.  Lenin 
read  the  ( ierman  communists  a  lesson.  He  a^U'ised 
theiTi   to  close   up  their  ranks  and  cjuit   iiuarrelling. 


212       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

He  urged  them  not  to  give  so  much  attention  to  the 
new  Communist  Labor  party,  not  to  advertise  it, 
not  to  attack  it.  "They  are  too  lacking  in  sense," 
he  said,  "to  be  taken  seriously,  whilst  it  would  be 
wrong  policy  to  be  angry  with  them.  .  .  .  The  in- 
fantile disease  of  'Leftism'  will  pass  and  will  be 
completely  overcome  with  the  growth  of  the  move- 
ment." He  also  informed  them  that  although  the 
March  uprising  had  added  to  their  knowledge,  the 
communist  movement  in  the  majority  of  countries 
was  far  from  the  goal  of  its  endeavors  and  not  pre- 
pared for  a  successful  overturn  of  the  established 
order. 

This  letter  stirred  the  Communist  Labor  party  to 
wrath.  At  its  congress  held  in  September,  1921, 
it  accused  the  Russian  Soviet  Government  of  desert- 
ing its  post  and  acting  as  manager  for  the  bourgeois 
revolution.  The  congress  therefore  proposed  a 
Fourth  International  based  on  left-wing  communism. 
In  its  official  organ,  the  Communist  Labor  party  laid 
down  three  propositions:  (  i)  The  Third  Literna- 
tional  has  betrayed  the  proletariat  and  has  become 
the  instrument  of  the  bourgeois  against  the  proletar- 
iat. (2)  The  Third  International  betrayed  the 
proletariat  by  handing  over  the  leadership  of  the 
Proletarian  International  to  the  Russian  state  and 
its  leaders.  (3)  The  Soviet  government  of  Russia 
has  ceased  to  be  a  proletarian  government  by  reason 
of  its  concessi(Kis  to  the  peasants.  .  .  .  The  soviet 
government  forced  by  economic  circumstances  to  in- 
troduce capitalism  into  the  country,  becomes  itself 
the  representative  of  capitalism."      Proceeding  from 


SOCIALISM    AND    LABOR    MOVEMENT      213 

these  lundcirnental  propositions,  the  (jerman  Com- 
munist Labor  party  feels  obliged  to  establish  a  new 
international,  to  "build  upwards  from  below  a  real 
so\iet  international."  Tlie  strength  of  the  party 
was  reported  as  being  36,000  in  October,  192 1. 
^rhe  confidence  ot  its  leaders  is,  however,  unshak- 
able, rhe  conquest  ot  the  world  is  still  their  tixed 
goal. 

So  tor  one  reason  or  another,  the  German  social- 
ists, (.li\"ided  into  fiercely  contending  factions,  let  the 
crisis  of  the  revolution  pass  by  without  making  a 
concerted,  determined  effort  to  bring  about  the 
great  socialist  transtormation  which  thev  had  h^ng 
promised.  I'he  Social  Democratic  goxernment 
turned  all  the  forces  of  state  loose  upon  the  ex- 
tremists who  sought  to  follow  the  Russian  example. 
By  the  Irony  of  circumstances,  private  projierty  was 
protectee!  by  socialist  bavonets  and  communist  up- 
risings were  suppressed  by  socialist  troops.  It  is 
true  that  the  Social  Democrats  nKule  a  deep  impress 
upon  the  new  constitution  drawn  up  at  Weimar,  in 
1919,  but  it  will  not  be  forgotten  that  they  were 
dri\-cn  to  the  tiiost  radical  proposals,  nameU',  those 
creating  workers'  councils.  b\'  11  general  strike.  It 
is  true  also  that,  sul\iect  to  similar  [iressure,  the 
principle  ot  nationalization  tor  coal  mines  was  ac- 
cepted, bur  declarations  and  executions  are  two  elit- 
terent  things.  \\'lien  due  recognition  is  gi\"en  to  the 
socialist  clauses  and  plii"ases  m  the  new  constitution, 
it  remains  a  tact  that  tlie  Social  Democrats  ot  (icr- 
man\-,  with  all  their  [lower  m  the  state,  made  little 
or  no  impress  upon  tlie  s\stein  ot  capitalist  economv. 


214       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

With  good  reason  could  a  socialist  writer  lament  In 
192 1  :  "The  chief  characteristic  of  our  present 
economic  condition  is  not  only  Increased  profits  for 
capitalists,  but  the  extraordinary  concentration  of 
capital  in  the  hands  of  individual  industrial  magnates 
who  have  actually  become  the  sovereigns  of  our  eco- 
nomic life."  Ebert  Is  the  president  of  Germany. 
Stinnes  Is  the  ruler  of  Germany. 

In  the  other  defeated  countries,  socialists  and 
communists  had  a  slight  taste  of  power.  The  down- 
fall of  the  old  empire  in  Hungary  was  followed  by 
the  formation  of  a  coalition  government  under 
Count  Karolyi,  which  included  three  socialist  minis- 
ters. This  administration  did  not  last  long.  De- 
feated In  Its  efforts  to  obtain  Allied  aid,  the  Karo- 
lyi group  turned  the  government  over  to  the  com- 
munists, headed  by  Bela  Kun,  in  March,  1919.  A 
soviet  republic  was  then  established,  accompanied  by 
great  disturbances  and  extreme  measures.  It  was 
assailed  by  Rumanian  and  Czechoslovak  troops.  It 
was  attacked  by  a  royalist  faction.  It  was  under- 
mined by  the  Allied  representatives  in  Hungary 
who  entered  Into  communication  with  the  more 
moderate  socialists  and  held  out  hopes  of  recogni- 
tion from  foreign  powers  In  case  the  Kun  gov- 
ernment were  ousted.  On  promises  of  Immunity 
from  prosecution,  the  Kun  ministry  retired  in  favor 
of  the  Social  Democrats.  Immediately  a  white 
terror  was  Inaugurated  which  ended  In  the  reaction- 
ary dictatorship  of  Admiral  Horthy.  The  persecu- 
tion and  punishment  of  radicals  was  then  carried  to 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVEMENT     215 

great  length.  Militant  socialism  was  stamped  out 
in  blood. 

In  Austria,  the  Social  Democrats  played  a  role 
similar  to  that  of  their  cc^lleagues  in  Germany. 
Though  they  had  opposed  the  declaration  of  war  on 
Serbia,  they  came  to  the  support  of  their  govern- 
ment as  soon  as  Russia  entered  the  lists.  If  they  ac- 
complished less  in  the  political  sphere  than  did  their 
brethren  in  Berlin,  it  was  largely  because  the  Aus- 
trian ministry  carefully  avoided  calling  parliament 
together  during  the  early  period  of  the  war.  It 
was  only  after  a  socialist,  Adler,  had  shot  the 
premier  that  the  representatives  of  the  people  were 
summoned  once  more  to  take  part  in  the  go\ern- 
ment.  By  that  time  the  movement  in  favor  of 
peace  had  grown  to  immense  proportions.  In  Janu- 
ary, 19  I  8,  there  was  an  ominous  general  strike.  In- 
dustrial disorders,  mutinies,  and  elesertions  marked 
the  months  that  followed  until  the  collapse. 

In  the  new  proxisional  government  formed  after 
the  downfall  of  the  monarchy,  the  leadership  was 
taken  bv  a  Social  Democratic  premier  and  untd  the 
autumn  of  1920  the  socialists  participated  in  the 
adi7iinlstrati()n.  During  this  period  socialists  and 
trade  unionists  were  In  \irtual  possession  ot  the 
capital  but  the  capital  had  been  paralv/ed  by  the 
ellsruittlon  ot  the  Austi^o-l  lungarlan  empire.  I  he 
radicals,  in  these  circumstances,  cnuKl  do  little  more 
than  operate  the  presses  and  print  paper  monew  P)V 
repeated  strikes  the\  kept  their  wages  rising  with 
the   tlood  o!    currencv  leaving  the  bourgeois   to  sut- 


2l6       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

fer  as  the  buying  power  of  their  salaries  diminished. 
There  was,  of  course,  a  limit  to  this,  and  as  time 
went  on  the  sociaHsts  found  out  that  they  were  help- 
ing to  serve  as  the  receivers  of  a  bankrupt  system 
which  they  could  not  reconstruct.  Powerless  even 
when  possessing  the  symbols  of  power,  they  at 
length  gave  up  the  prerogatives  of  office  and  assumed 
the  more  congenial  role  of  opposition.  This  may 
have  been  good  party  tactics,  but  it  did  not  advance 
the  socialist  commonwealth  of  which  they  had  so 
long  dreamed. 

III.       SOCIALISM     AMONG     THE 
VICTORS 

Among  the  victors  in  the  war,  Italy  alone  wit- 
nessed an  active  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
munists to  socialize  industries  by  seizing  the  fac- 
tories. This  was  not  a  novel  thing  in  that  ki-ng- 
dom.  As  far  back  as  1904,  there  had  occurred  a 
general  strike  in  the  north  of  Italy  which  culmi- 
nated in  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Milan  by  the 
socialists.  Giolitti,  who  was  then  prime  minister, 
refused  to  get  excited.  He  would  not  use  the  troops 
against  the  strikers.  In  fact  he  employed  them  in 
preventing  improvised  citizen  guards  from  attack- 
ing the  radicals.  His  Fabian  tactics  proved  to  be 
successful.  The  strikers  could  cut  off  water,  light, 
and  power  and  they  could  seize  the  factories,  but 
they  found  that,  when  they  had  the  machinery  of 
production  without  the  markets,  raw  materials,  capi- 
tal, or  technical  leadership,  they  had  nothing  which 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVF.MLXT      217 

would  produce  food  and  clothing.  After  a  lew  days 
they  surrentlered. 

Sixteen  years  later,  the  Italian  radicals  made  a 
similar  attempt  with  identical  results,  'idle  Social- 
ist party  of  Italy  adopted  communist  principles  and 
in  the  elections  of  19  19  captured  2^00  communes  as 
against  about  400  carried  in  the  campaign  of  19  13. 
Thus  encouraged  the  Italian  communists,  in  several 
industrial  cities,  thought  the  time  ripe  to  follow  the 
Russian  example.  So  they  seized  the  factories,  ex- 
pelled the  proprietors,  and  proclaimed  the  dictator- 
ship of  the  proletariat.  Strange  to  say,  Giolitti 
was  then  enjoying  once  more  a  brief  tenure  of  power 
and  he  resorted  to  the  tactics  that  had  been  so  effec- 
tive in  the  earlier  crisis.  He  shed  no  bh^od.  He  let 
the  communists  hold  the  undisturbed  possession  of 
machinery  and  brick  walls  for  several  days  until  their 
ardor  cooled  under  the  stress  of  managerial  ex- 
periences. 

The  Italian  citizens,  however,  were  not  as  cool  as 
the  go\-ernment.  All  over  the  country,  sell -styled 
patriots,  known  as  I'ascisti,  formed  bands  and  made 
war  on  the  radicals,  ddicre  was  a  great  deal  oi 
street  tigliting  aiul  manv  outrages  were  committed 
on  both  sides.  In  this  ci\'il  conllict  also,  the  Italian 
go\'ernment  usualK'  assunied  the  role  ot  a  disinter- 
ested spectator.  At  the  close  ot  192 1  a  tentati\e 
accord  \\'as  reached  between  the  leaders  ot  the  las- 
cisti  and  the  socialists,  but  the  rank  aiul  tile  Iku'c  not 
alwa\-s  ()bser\-ed  the  pi-ecise  tci-nis  ot  the  truce. 

In  IVance.  the  iiistoric  home  ot  rex'olution,  social- 
ist enterprises  since   1914  haN'c  been  cd  a  mild  char- 


2l8       CROSS     CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE     TO-DAY 

acter.  In  the  election  of  November,  19 19,  the 
socialists  polled  300,000  more  votes  than  in  19 14, 
but  owing  to  the  operations  of  the  new  "propor- 
tional representation''  law,  the  number  of  their 
seats  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  was  cut  from 
101  to  6^.  Their  strength  was  further  dissipated 
by  internal  troubles.  Long  before  the  war  there 
had  grown  up  in  the  socialist  and  labor  movements 
of  France  a  party  known  as  "Syndicalists"  whose 
principles  foreshadowed  those  of  the  Russian  revolu- 
tion of  November,  19 17.  This  group  opposed 
parliamentary  politics.  It  held  that  politicians 
could  not  transform  a  capitalist  society  into  a 
socialist  order.  It  declared  that  the  revolution 
could  only  be  effected  by  organized  workingmen 
prepared  to  seize  the  means  of  production  through 
a  general  strike  and  direct  action.  In  practice  this 
meant  a  soviet  government  purely  economic  in  char- 
acter. It  is  not  surprising,  therefore,  that  with  such 
a  movement  under  way,  the  French  socialists  voted 
in  their  national  convention  of  December,  1920, 
to  adhere  to  the  Moscow  program  and  the  new  In- 
ternational. The  only  thing  approaching  direct  ac- 
tion, however,  was  a  general  railway  strike  which 
failed  and  called  forth  a  decree  dissolving  the  Gen- 
eral Confederation  of  Labor.  Four  years  of  war 
and  three  \ears  of  peace  left  socialism  and  organ- 
ized labor  in  France  torn  by  internal  dissensions 
and  weakened  in  both  the  economic  and  political 
fields. 

In  contrast  to  the  broken  lines  ot  socialism  in  (Ger- 
many, Italy,   and   France,   the  I''nglish  labor  move- 


SOCIALISM    A\D     LABOR    MOVI'.MENT      219 

meiit,  once  the  despair  of  the  continental  social 
democrats,  presented  extraordinary  unity  and 
stren(j;th.  During  the  war  its  numerical  gains  were 
lar<^e.  In  the  election  of  191  i,  the  Labor  Party 
candidates  received  370,000  votes;  in  19 18  they 
polled  2,244,000,  an  immense  Increase  even  when 
allowance  is  made  tor  woman  suffrage.  In  addition, 
the  Labor  Party  strengthened  its  position  by  adopt- 
ing a  carefully  worked-out  and  moderate  program 
which  appealed  to  a  wide  constituency  not  identified 
with  labor  in  the  strict  sense  of  the  term.  It  an- 
nounced as  its  aims:  (  i  )  to  secure  for  the  producers 
by  hanel  and  brain  the  full  fruits  of  their  industry 
and  the  most  equitable  distribution  thereof  that 
may  be  possible,  upon  the  basis  of  common  owner- 
ship of  the  means  of  production  and  the  best  obtain- 
able system  oi  popular  administration  and  control 
of  each  mdustrv  or  ser\'ice;  and  (2)  generally  to 
promote  the  political,  social,  and  economic  emancipa- 
tion of  the  people." 

The  Labor  Party  opposed  revolution  by  violence 
and  advocated  the  gradual  applicatit)n  of  its  pro- 
gramme through  education,  political  acti\'ity,  co- 
operation, and  labcM-  organization.  It  announced  a 
number  ol  specific  inca>urcs  designed  to  guarantee 
a  minimum  ot  subsistence  to  all:  democratic  con- 
trol ot  industries,  a  better  i^listribution  of  the  bur- 
dens <)l  taxation,  the  i>re\-cnti()n  ot  \-ast  ;iccumula- 
tions  ot  u'cahh  in  tlic  h;inds  ot  pn\"ate  [parties,  sell- 
go\'crnnient  tor  all  pcoj^lcs  under  Hritish  dominion, 
municipal  aiui  national  ownership  ot  public  utilities, 
and   peacetul    relations   with    other   nations.       J  here 


220       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

was,  of  course,  a  group  of  Communists  in  England 
that  rejected  this  moderate  program  and  adopted 
the  philosophy  of  Moscow,  but  the  members  of  this 
organization  were  few  in  number  and  slight  in  in- 
fluence. 

The  English  trade  unions  hitherto  very  conserva- 
tive have  more  than  tripled  their  numbers  since  19 14 
and  have  consolidated  many  of  the  crafts,  thus 
taking  long  strides  toward  the  realization  of 
the  "one-big-union"  idea.  The  leaders,  however, 
shrank  from  a  general  strike  in  192 1  when  the 
miners  called  upon  them  for  help  in  their  fight 
against  wage  reductions.  The  paralysis  of  foreign 
trade  and  industry  which  fell  upon  the  country 
in  1920  gave  the  labor  leaders  pause  in 
their  ambitious  plans  for  united  action.  It  may  be 
that  discretion,  viewed  in  the  large,  was  the  better 
part  of  valor  and  brought  strength  rather  than 
weakness  to  the  labor  movement.  At  all  events 
England  has  witnessed  no  disruption  and  disillusion- 
ment among  socialists  and  trade  unionists  compar- 
able to  the  state  of  affairs  on  the  continent.  This 
may  perhaps  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  fact  that 
the  English  socialists  have  attempted  as  yet  no  ex- 
tensive application  of  their  doctrines  and  in  part  to 
more  astute  and  ambitious  leadership.  Still  the 
fact  stands. 

IV.      IX  T  E  R  N  A  T  I  O  N  A  L    S  O  C  I  A  L  I  S  M 

The  war  and  its  aftermath  had  a  disastrous  effect 
upon  such  unity  as  the  international  socialist  move- 
ment possessed  before  the  cataclysm.      The  first  In- 


SOCIALISM    AND     LAHOR    MOVKMIINT      221 

tcrnational  Working  Men's  Association,  it  is  well 
known,  had  been  established  in  1864  with  a  program 
formulated  by  Karl  Marx.  That  association  lasted 
for  twelve  stormy  years.  It  adopted  a  definite 
socialist  policy  in  1869,  and  its  representati\'es  took 
an  active  part  in  the  Paris  commune  of  1871.  The 
disaster  which  overwhelmed  the  commune,  the 
wrath  generated  by  the  defeat,  and  the  conflict  be- 
tween the  socialist  and  the  anarchist  members  pro- 
duced a  bitter  internal  strife  in  1872  which  ended 
in  the  expulsion  of  Bakunlii,  the  anarchist  leader, 
and  the  disruption  of  the  Association.  1  he  socialist 
wing,  which  clung  to  the  sinking  ship,  moved  the 
lieadquarters  to  New  ^  ork  and  after  a  final  confer- 
ence in  1S76  gave  up  the  ghost.  The  I-Irst  Inter- 
national was  dead  and  there  seemed  to  be  no  possi- 
billtv  of  resurrection. 

More  than  ten  vcars  passed.  In  1S89,  six  vears 
after  the  death  of  Marx,  two  significant  interna- 
tional la!")or  conferences  were  held  In  Paris  and  In 
I  89  I  the  two  bodies  unlteel.  Thus  the  Second  Inter- 
national came  upon  the  scene.  It  atlmitted  to  mem- 
bership two  different  groups  of  persons.  In  the 
first  categorv  were  "all  associations  which  adhere  to 
the  essential  principles  of  socialism: — sociali/ation 
of'  the  means  of  production  ami  exchange.  Interna- 
tional union  and  action  of  the  workers,  conquest  of 
public  i^iowers  bv  the  proletariat,  organized  as  a  class 
parts."  In  the  secoml  categor\-  were  "all  labor 
organizations  which  accept  the  pi-inciples  of  tlie  class 
struggle  anil  recognize  the  necessit\'  ot  political  ac- 
tion (Iegislati\e  and  parliainentar\- )  but  do  not  par- 


222       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

ticipate  directly  in  the  political  movement."  The 
Second  International  held  world  conferences  every 
three  or  four  years  and  maintained  a  permanent  or- 
ganization consisting  of  two  delegates  from  each 
nation.  At  the  general  conventions  socialist  prin- 
ciples and  tactics  were  discussed  and  attempts  were 
made  to  draw  the  socialist  groups  of  the  world  into 
ever  closer  unity.  Many  and  bitter  were  the  de- 
bates at  these  assemblies  but  by  shrewd  parliamen- 
tary methods  and  the  clever  use  of  rhetorical 
devices  the  Second  International  held  together 
and  seemed  to  grow  stronger  with  the  lapse  of 
time. 

Among  the  questions  which  agitated  the  Second 
International  none  was  more  controversial  than  the 
attitude  which  socialists  should  take  toward  war. 
The  Communist  Manifesto  had  declared:  "The 
workers  have  no  country.  What  they  have  not  got 
cannot  be  taken  from  them."  On  this  general 
theory,  many  socialists  opposed  all  wars  under  all 
circumstances.  Extremists  of  this  type,  proposed 
to  the  Second  International  a  resolution  favoring 
the  general  strike  as  a  means  of  preventing  war. 
This  radical  solution  of  the  problem  was  hotly  de- 
bated at  the  Stuttgart  congress  of  1907  and  again 
at  Copenhagen  three  years  later.  Bitter  words 
were  passed.  Some  German  socialists,  seeing  the 
proposal  supported  ardently  by  the  English  socialist, 
Keir  Elardic,  even  suggested  that  it  was  an  English 
pacifist  scheme  to  weaken  the  defensive  power  of 
Germany, 

The  outcome  of  the  debate  was  a  rejection  of  the 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVi'.MLXT      223 

general  strike  by  a  vote  of  131  to  51.  Instead  ol 
approving  this  drastic  anti-war  weapon  the  conven- 
tion adopted  a  compromise  in  the  form  of  a  resoki- 
tion  containing  two  parts.  The  first  part  declared 
that  in  case  war  threatened,  the  working  chisses  and 
their  parliamentary  representatives  in  the  countries 
affected,  using  the  International  Bureau  as  a  means 
of  co(")rdination,  should  resort  to  "e\ery  effort  to 
prevent  war  by  all  means  which  seem  to  them  most 
appropriate,  having  regard  to  the  sharpness  ot  the 
class  war  ami  to  the  general  political  situation." 
The  second  part  of  the  resolution  declared  that  in 
case  war  actually  broke  out  it  would  be  their  duty 
"to  intervene  to  bring  It  promptly  to  an  end,  and 
with  all  their  energies  to  use  the  political  ami  econo- 
mic crisis  to  rouse  the  masses  ot  the  people  irom 
their  slumbers  and  to  hasten  the  tall  ot  capitalist  do- 
minion." Such  was  tile  veiled  and  \'ague  language 
in  which  the  socialists  ot  t!ie  world  reconciled  then- 
nationalist  aspirations.  Such  was  the  oflicial  war 
program  ot  the  Second  International  in  1914. 

In  the  last  days  ot  July,  1914,  the  long-dreaded 
black  clouds  \\cre  on  the  hon/on.  ( )n  July  31st, 
the  central  committee  ot  the  (lerman  Social  Demo- 
crats, expecting  the  order  tor  mobili/ation  every 
minute,  b.cld  a  meeting  to  consider  their  part  In  the 
crisis.  .A  decision  was  taken  to  send  a  representa- 
tl\'e  to  Brussels  to  see  the  secretary  ot  the  Interna- 
tional, I  luN'smans,  and  with  bini  to  make  a  journey 
to  Paris.  File  jnirpose  ot  the  expedition,  according 
to  Scheuleinann,  was  to  hold  a  coiilerence  with,  the 
hVench  socialists  aiul  to  reach  some  conclusion  with 


224      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

reference  to  a  common  declaration  in  the  Reichstag 
and  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The  conference 
was  held  during  the  evening  of  August  ist.  The 
spokesman  of  the  French  socialists  said  to  the  Ger- 
man representative  that  the  position  of  the  two 
socialist  groups  was  not  the  same,  that  the  French 
socialists  were  kept  fully  informed  as  to  the  course 
of  events  by  their  government  while  the  Germans 
were  not,  and  that  on  the  part  of  France  it  was 
a  defensive  war.  The  French  made  it  clear  to  the 
German  spokesman  that  they  intended  to  vote  for 
war  credits  and  to  support  their  government.  On 
August  3rd,  the  German  socialists  heard  the  report 
of  their  representative  and  after  a  lively  debate  de- 
cided to  sustain  their  own  government.  How  much 
weight  the  report  had  is,  of  course,  a  matter  for  con- 
jecture. There  is  evidence  in  favor  of  the  conclu- 
sion that  the  decision  would  have  been  the  same  even 
though  the  French  socialists  had  taken  the  other 
tack.  At  all  events,  the  German  socialists,  like 
the  French  socialists,  voted  for  war  credits.  They 
stuck  somewhat  at  giving  a  "Iloch''  for  the  Kaiser 
but  were  conciliated  by  the  generous  concession  of 
the  government  that  the  "Hoch''  should  be  for  "the 
Kaiser,  the  people,  and  the  Fatherland."  The  tide 
of  war  was  booming  in  along  the  shore. 

When  the  clash  of  resounding  arms  was  heard  in 
Europe,  the  socialist  parties  in  several  of  the  lead- 
ing countries  rallied,  as  did  other  patriot  organi- 
zations to  the  support  of  their  gov^ernments.  This 
happened  in  I^ngland,  France,  (iermany,  Austria, 
and  Belgium.      In    Russia,   Serbia,   Italy,    Rumania, 


SOCIALISM    AND    LABOR    MOVEMENT      225 

Hungary,  and  the  United  States,  however,  the  so- 
cialist parties  officially  went  on  record  against  the 
w'ar  and  the  gcn-ernments  that  waged  it.  Indeed 
in  all  the  belligerent  countries  there  were  groups 
that  opposed  the  official  action  of  their  parties, 
whether  tor  or  against  war.  In  Russia,  for  exam- 
ple, the  right-wing  Social  Revolutionaries  and  Social 
Democrats  split  off  and  sustained  the  government, 
while  in  Germany  in  the  course  of  time  an  intransi- 
gent group  of  Social  Democrats  broke  away  from 
the  official  position  of  the  party  on  the  war.  In 
France  two  lines  of  clea\"age  were  to  be  observed. 
There  was  a  \ery  small  anti-war  faction.  There 
was  a  still  larger  group  who  accepted  the  war  but 
believed  that  socialists  should  not  hold  office  in  the 
gov^ernment  during  the  conflict.  Finally  there  was 
the  majority  that  favored  both  the  war  and  direct 
participatloti  in  the  government.  As  the  conflict 
went  on  the  opposition  groups  grew  in  size,  and 
during  the  last  months  of  the  war,  a  majoritv  voted 
against  official  c()(')pcratIon  within  the  French 
ministry  while  still  sustaining  It  In  carrying  on 
hostilities. 

When  the  war  broke  out,  \'andervcldc,  the  presi- 
dent ot  the  International,  took  office  In  the  Belgumi 
ministry  ^^•hile  I  luNsmans,  the  sccretar)'  ot  the  Bur- 
eau moved  his  hcad(]uartcrs  to  llie  Hague. 
"T!ie  Second  Intei-natmnal  is  dead,"  exclaimed 
I.enin,  when  he  heard  that  the  Social  Democrats  ot 
(iermaiu'  had  \"()tcd  lor  \\]c  war  credits,  but  1  luvs- 
mans  chd  his  best  to  hold  tlie  retreating  regiments 
together.      I  le   e\"en   attempted  to  call   a   new   inter- 


226       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

national  congress,  and,  de*feated  in  that,  he  sum-- 
moned  the  socialists  of  neutral  countries  to  a  con- 
vention held  at  Copenhagen  in  January,  19 15. 
From  this  conference  an  appeal  went  forth  to  the 
socialists  of  the  warring  nations  to  stop  the 
bloody  conflict.  The  answer  to  this  call  was  em- 
phatic. The  socialists  of  the  Entente  powers  held 
a  meeting  in  London  and  declared  that  the  war 
must  go  on.  The  socialists  of  Germany,  Austria, 
and  Hungary  met  at  \^ienna,  a  few  months  later, 
and  held  an  academic  debate  on  the  international 
relations  that  should  prevail  after  the  war.  Against 
both  of  these  patriotic  conferences,  the  intransigent 
minorities  opposed  to  war  in  the  several  countries 
protested  in  vain.  If  the  Second  International  was 
not  dead,  as  Lenin  suggested,  it  was  at  least  in 
mortal  peril  of  death.  At  all  events  its  temporary 
dissolution  was  patent  to  all  mankind. 

Meanwhile  the  minorities  opposed  to  war  were 
active.  The  Italian  Socialist  Party,  which  violently 
objected  to  Italian  participation  in  the  war  and  re- 
mained dead  set  against  it  to  the  bitter  end,  took  the 
lead  in  welding  together  the  opponents  of  the  war 
in  all  countries,  belligerent  as  well  as  neutral.  On 
its  initiative,  a  conference  of  the  dissentients  was 
held  at  Zimmerwald,  in  Switzerland,  September, 
19  I  5.  This  assembly  was  attended  by  radical  sf)- 
cialists  from  Russia  (including  Lenin  and  Zinoviex') 
Germany,  IVance,  Italv,  Rumania,  and  some  other 
countries.  Attendance  for  many  of  them  was  easy 
for  they  were  exiles.  Representati\'es  of  the  Brit- 
ish Socialist  Party  and  the  Independent  Labor  party 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVF.MKNT      227 

would  have  gone  but  they  were  denied  passports  by 
the  I'jiglish  government. 

The  Zimnierwald  conference  was  itself  divided 
into  right  and  lett  wings.  All  were  agreed  in  their 
opposition  to  war  and  they  issued  an  impassioned 
denunciation  ot  the  belligerents.  But  there  was  a 
left  wmg,  headed  by  Lenin,  that  called  tor  a  revolu- 
ti(jn  as  well  as  an  end  to  the  war.  To  this  the  CJer- 
man  socialist,  Ledebour,  replied,  "It  is  all  right  for 
you  living  here  abroad  to  issue  appeals  tor  a  civil 
war.  I  should  like  to  see  iiow  vou  woukl  have  done 
it  if  you  had  lived  in  Russia."  To  this  Lenin  coolly 
answered:  "When  the  time  arri\es,  we  shall  know 
how  to  stand  at  our  posts."  \n  the  spring  ot  the 
next  vear,  another  conference  of  the  same  elements 
was  held  at  Kienthal.  I'here  the  extremists  tri- 
umphed. .\  call  went  torth  tor  peace  arul  re\"olu- 
tion.  A  bureau  lor  agitation  was  established.  I  he 
powder  train  tor  the  Russian  rcN'olution  was  laid. 
'J  he  (jerman  Lnpenal  (loxernment  \\as  pleased  at 
the  prospect  ot  an  upiMsmg  m  Russia  and,  it  seems, 
aideel  the  Russian  re\'()luti()nar\'  leaders  to  get  back 
Jiome.  ^At  a  later  date  the  pleasure  was  dissc^b'ed 
;n  tears. 

Lndisma\"ed  b\'  all  pre\-i()us  eiiorts  and  stirred 
to  action  b\'  tlie  /imriu'rwiilddxienthal  cofil  crences. 
the  oflicers  of  the  Second  I  Mtern;;tional  decided  to 
c;dl  ;'  ga'neral  conterence  at  Stockholm  tor  the  sum- 
mer ot  1917.  I  he  .\  larch  rcN'olution  m  Russia 
made  the  prospect  o!  succe^s  more  jH'omiMnLi:.  I  he 
a}->parent  stalemate  in  t'le  war  made  all  bel!igei-eiit 
cotuitiMcs  moi'e  wiIIiiil;  to  considei"  some  wa\    out  ol 


228       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

the  seemingly  hopeless  deadlock.  Departing  from 
their  previous  decisions,  the  French  Socialists,  the 
British  Labor  party,  the  German  Social  Democrats 
and  the  Austrian  socialists  voted  in  favor  of  sending 
delegates  to  Stockholm.  The  Petrograd  Soviet, 
which  had  called  for  an  armistice  and  for  peace  with- 
out annexations  and  without  indemnities,  greeted 
the  occasion  with  congratulations.  Representatives 
of  the  Zimmerwald  commission  migrated  to  Stock- 
holm to  take  part  in  the  proceedings.  The  stage 
seemed  set  for  the  extraordinary  spectacle  of  pri- 
vate citizens  from  warring  countries  engaged  in 
peace  negotiations. 

Naturally  enough  the  proposal  called  forth  vio- 
lent opposition  from  the  patriotic  sections  of  all 
countries.  Under  the  pressure  of  an  excited  public 
opinion,  the  French  and  British  governments  refused 
to  grant  passports  to  the  delegates  bound  for  Stock- 
holm. As  a  result  the  convention  never  met.  Dele- 
gates from  Austria,  Germany,  Russia,  Holland,  and 
the  Scandinavian  countries  appeared  upon  the  scene, 
and  many  conferences  were  held  among  them. 
The  German  Social  Democrats  presented  an  elabo- 
rate peace  program  based  upon  the  formula  of  no 
annexations  and  no  indemnities,  but  after  iruitless 
debates  all  the  delegates  gave  up  the  enterprise  as 
hopeless.  The  following  year,  other  Inter-Allied 
socialists  and  labor  conferences  were  called — the 
American  Federation  of  Labor  taking  part  in  the 
last — and  another  statement  of  war  aims  was 
drafted.  Ihis  however  only  served  to  emphasize 
the   hopeless   division    of   the   Second   International 


SOCIALISM    AXD     LABOR    MOVF.MF.XT      229 

and  to  demonstrate  the  futility  of  its  pacific  ettorts. 

The  tailure  ol  the  Stockhohii  coiilereiice  ^dvc 
the  signal  to  tlie  rachcals.  Denouncing  all  "social 
patriots,"  as  they  called  the  socialists  who  remained 
loyal  to  their  governments,  the  extremists  decided 
to  form  a  new  International  and  to  invite  only 
revolutionary  socialists  to  take  part  in  it.  Their 
plans  were  expedited  by  the  triumph  ot  the  Bcjlshe- 
viki  in  Russia.  On  January  24,  19  19,  a  call  for  the 
first  conference  went  out  by  wireless  trom  Moscow 
to  the  revolutionary  workers  ol  the  world.  All 
"chauvinist  socialists"  were  excluded  Irom  the  invi- 
tation. In  March,  radicals  trom  the  four  corners 
of  the  earth  arrived  in  Moscow  and  the  congress 
of  the  new  association  was  opened.  Then  and 
there  the  Third  International  was  organized  and  a 
program  calling  tor  revolution  on  the  Russian  model 
was  adopted.  At  a  second  congress  held  tlie  fol- 
lowing year,  twent\-one  theses,  or  coiulitions  ot 
membership,  were  (.irattcd  and  the  revolutionar\-  so- 
cialists ot  the  world  were  called  upon  to  adopt  the 
orthodox  creed  or  go  into  outer  tlai'kncss. 

These  conditions  were  |irecise  and  admitted  ot 
little  misinterpretation.  "  1  he  necessitv  <»t  the  pro- 
letarian dictatorship""  \\'as  proclaimed  and  adherents 
\\'ere  retjuired  to  denounce  "not  onK'  tlie  capitalists, 
but  ;ilso  tlieir  allies,  tlie  retormers  ot  e\'erv  shade 
aiul  color."  All  the  ir'w  taitlitul  were  called 
upon  to  "renounce  not  onl\  social-i)atnotism  but  the 
talse  and  lupocntical  soual-pacilism  as  well."" 
-All  prnpagaiula  and  agitation  had  to  be  ot  "a  dct- 
inite    communist    character    and    correspond    ti»    tlie 


230       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

program  and  decisions  of  the  Third  International." 
A  relentless  war  on  the  Second  International  was 
proclaimed  and  made  obligatory  on  the  new  com- 
munion. An  iron  discipline  was  made  the  rule  of 
life.  No  weaklings,  no  doubters,  no  reformers 
were  to  be  tolerated.  All  offices  were  to  be  filled 
and  all  papers  edited  by  men  who  deviated  not  a 
hair's  breadth  from  the  prescribed  articles  of  faith. 
A  highly  centralized  form  of  government  was  pro- 
vided for  the  Third  International  and  all  members 
were  bound  by  the  resolutions  promulgated  by  the 
International  itself  and  by  its  executive  committee. 
"The  Communist  International  has  declared  war 
on  the  whole  capitalist  system  and  the  old  yellow 
Social  Democratic  parties."  The  domestic  revolu- 
tion is  to  be  wrought  by  a  disciplined  working  class 
not  afraid  of  violence  and  dictatorship.  Imper- 
ialism is  to  be  renounced  and  the  various  countries 
are  to  grant  independence  and  self-government  to 
the  dominions.  Parliamentary  action  is  to  be  per- 
mitted but  merely  as  a  form  of  propaganda.  Such 
was  the  program  of  the  Moscow  International. 
Socialists  of  the  world  were  called  upon  to  accept 
or  reject  it  as  a  whole  without  quibblings  or  reser- 
vations. Within  a  few  months  the  French  Social- 
ist party,  the  (jerman  Independents,  a  section  of 
the  Italian  Socialist  party,  and  small  socialist  frag- 
ments in  many  other  countries,  accepted  the  terms 
and  entered  the  Third  International,  but  by  that 
time  the  power  of  revolutionary  socialism  had  begun 
to  wane. 

Meanwhile   the   Second   International  liad  begun 


SOCIALISM    AND     LABOR    MOVI.MKXT      23I 

to  show  signs  of  renewed  vitality.  In  I-'ebruary, 
19  19,  a  general  conference  was  held  at  Berne  with 
the  representatives  of  nearly  all  the  old  affiliated 
organizations  in  attendance.  Little  was  accom- 
plished at  this  convention  beyond  a  searching  debate 
on  the  responsibility  for  the  war  and  the  merits  of 
Bolshevik  tactics.  The  conference  went  on  record, 
however,  as  opposing  dictatorship  by  a  section  of 
the  working  class  and  favoring  accepted  democratic 
methods  for  establishing  the  socialist  order.  A 
second  convention,  held  at  (ieneva  during  the  next 
year,  worked  out  a  new  and  elaborate  statement  of 
socialist  aims  and  tactics,  following  the  program  of 
the  British  Labor  I-'arty  rather  than  that  of  Mos- 
cow. The  dictatorship  of  the  proletariat  was  ut- 
terly rejected  and  the  methods  and  processes  of 
modern  democracy  were  declared  appropriate  and 
essential  to  the  realization  of  a  socialist  common- 
wealth. At  the  same  time,  the  idea  ot  a  vocational 
parliament,  representing  trades  and  professions,  was 
endorsed  on  the  understanding  that  ultimate  sover- 
eignty must  rest  in  the  political  assemblv  elected  by 
universal  suffrage. 

.Alter  the  (ieneva  conference  ot  1920,  negotiations 
were  started  for  a  union  of  the  two  internationals. 
Moscow  became  less  pontifical.  The  right  wing 
moderated  its  criticism.  On  April  2,  1922.  repre- 
sentati\"es  of  the  Second  and  the  Third  Intcrna- 
tioiKils.  A\ith  spokesmen  tor  the  middle  group,  known 
as  tlic  rwo-aiul-onc-lialf  International,  met  in  the 
RciL'listng  r)Uili.lIng  in  Berlin  and  adopted  pro\'isional 
measures  lookinij  toward  a  reunion. 


232       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

V.  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE 
UNIONISM 

In  making  a  survey  of  the  labor  movement  as  a 
whole  It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  sharply  between 
the  socialist  or  political  phase  and  straight  trade 
unionism.  By  no  means  all  the  trade  unionists  of  the 
world  were  socialists  in  19 14.  In  America  and  in 
England  relatively  few  of  them  were.  In  Ger- 
many the  unions  were  divided  into  groups  according 
to  their  political  affiliations.  There  were,  for  ex- 
ample, Social  Democratic  unions  and  Catholic 
unions.  In  spite  of  their  great  divergences  in  poli- 
tics, however,  the  trade  unions  of  the  various  coun- 
tries often  cooperated  closely  in  economic  and  politi- 
cal battles  and  they  were  united  in  a  grand  Interna- 
tional Federation  of  Trade  Unions,  formed  at  Co- 
penhagen in  1 901.  This  world  organization  was 
able  to  hold  together  and  function  only  by  abstain- 
ing from  debates  about  controversial  political  and 
social  questions.  It  declared  that  the  object  of  its 
conferences  was  "to  consider  the  closer  union  of 
the  trade  unions  of  all  countries,  uniform  trade 
union  statistics,  mutual  help  in  economic  struggles, 
and  all  questions  in  direct  connection  with  trade 
union  organization  of  the  workers."  It  was  ex- 
pressly agreed  that  "all  theoretical  questions  and 
those  which  affect  the  tendency  or  tactics  of  the 
trade  union  mova^ment  in  the  separate  nations  will 
not  be  discussed."  Under  this  program  7,394,- 
CJQO  trade  unionists  were  federated  in  1912,  those 
of  the  United  States  being  included. 


SOCIALISM    AXD     LABOR    MOVLMLNT      233 

During  the  Cireat  War,  this  International  Fed- 
eration of  Trade  Unions  was  practically  dormant,  al- 
thou|2;h  a  tew  conferences  of  neutrals  were  held. 
In  tact  it  was  split  alon^  definite  lines.  There  was 
a  Central  l\)wers  section,  an  Allied  section,  and 
a  neutral  section.  In  these  circumstances  nothing 
could  be  accomplished.  Within  the  several  nations, 
however,  the  trade  unions  made  strides  in  seven 
league  boots.  Iheir  nunibers  were  immensely  in- 
creased. In  Germany  tlie  membership  atiiliated 
with  the  International  rose  trom  2,^:; 3, 000  in  19  12 
to  8,500,000  in  1920.  In  (jreat  Britain  the  affili- 
ated membership  grew  from  874,000  to  6,5uij,(juo 
during  the  same  period.  In  the  meantime  the  trade 
unionists  had  augmented  their  powers  through  the 
terms  and  conditions  which  the\-  had  been  able  to 
wring  from  the  belligerent  g()\ernments.  In  a  war 
of  steel  and  chemicals,  the  {)roducers  and  carriers 
of  goods  are  as  essential  as  the  soldiers  at  the 
front — and  not  subjected  to  the  same  iron  discipline. 
So  the  trade  unions  of  I'.'urope  emerged  trom  the 
war  more  numerous  and  more  influential  than  ever. 

Shortlv  after  the  signature  of  the  Treaty  at  \'er- 
sallles  in  1919,  the  dismantled  International  Trade 
Lriion  I-\'ek'ration  was  restored  to  working  (M'der. 
The  new  organization,  contrarN'  to  tradition,  did  not 
restrict  itself  to  unionism  pure  and  simple.  It 
calletl  tor  a  complete  program  of  labor  legislation, 
for  the  socialization  and  international  control  of 
raw  materials,  and  tor  ratlical  measures  against  wdv 
in  the  future.  It  fa\'ored  "international  m;!ss  ac- 
tion   in    the    assault    on    reaction,    in    declaring    \\:iv 


234       CROSS    CURRENTS     IN    EUROPE     TO-DAY 

against  war,  and  for  the  realization  of  a  new  social 
system."  This  was  too  extreme  for  Mr.  Samuel 
Gompers,  head  of  the  American  T'ederation  of 
Labor,  and  he  carried  his  organization  out  of  the 
world  Federation,  denouncing  it  in  round  terms. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  too  conservative  for 
Moscow;  so  the  Russian  unions  proceeded  to  form 
a  "revolutionary  international  trade  union  organiza- 
tion." This  effort  bore  little  fruit.  The  regular 
International  announced  that  its  membership  in 
1920  without  the  United  States  was  23,662,000 
against  a  membership  of  7,394,000  in  191 2  when 
it  included  the  2,000,000  American  unionists.  The 
"Red"  trade  union  international  seems  to  have  made 
no  gains  worthy  of  record. 

VI.       SOME     GENERAL     REFLECTIONS 

After  this  general  survey,  it  must  be  conceded 
that  it  is  perilous  to  draw  any  very  large  conclusions 
as  to  the  present  status  of  the  socialist  and  labor 
movements  throughout  the  world.  Over  against 
slight  retrocessions  in  political  strength  in  some 
countries  must  be  set  immense  gains  in  others.  Or- 
ganized labor  has  multiplied  its  membership  more 
than  four  fold  bringing  up  the  world  total  to 
nearly  thirty  millions.  Notwithstanding  the  so- 
called  "liquidation  of  labor"  during  the  business 
crisis,  there  has  been  no  such  reduction  in  member- 
ship as  has  occurred  in  previous  panics.  The  in- 
ternational organization  of  trade  unionists  is  far 
more  radical  in  its  economic  views  than  before  the 
Great  War  and  labor  from  only  one  country,   the 


SOdAI.ISM    AMI     LABOR    MO  VI,  MI.  XT      235 

L'nited  States,  rejects  its  program.  If  the  failures 
of  communism  In  Russia,  Italy,  and  Hungary  and 
the  shortcomings  of  the  Social  Democrats  in  Ger- 
many and  Austria  seem  to  warrant  the  rejection  of 
socialism  as  an  impossible  dream,  the  voters  in  the 
working  class  (]uarters  of  I^urope  tlo  not  seem  to 
have  disco\-ered  it.  It  mav  be,  as  many  writers 
contend,  that  Karl  Marx  is  dead;  but  the  rejoinder 
may  also  be  made  with  e(]ual  force  that  Cobden  and 
Bright  are  dead  also. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  a  large  number  of 
socialists  who  hoped  to  spring  into  the  millenium  by 
means  of  a  siulden  revolution  have  been  disillu- 
sioned. It  is  equally  true  that  there  has  come  about 
as  a  result  of  the  past  seven  vears'  experience  a 
thoroughgoing  reorganization  ot  socialist  thought. 
When  socialists  were  mere  obstructionists  and  op- 
ponents, thev  could  talk  grandlv  about  the  great 
dav  in  the  tlistant  future  when  the  cociperative  com- 
monwealth was  to  be  established.  Their  programs 
had  little  relation  to  reality.  Their  platforms  had 
ncvej"  been  shaped  with  reference  to  the  contingency 
of  an  actual  revolution  that  would  sweep  socialists 
Into  power.  1  heir  manifestos  usuall\-  consisted  ot 
two  parts.  In  one  part  were  included  their  imme- 
diate demainis,  sucli  as  the  eight  hour  d:\y.  uni\"ersal 
suttrage.  and  other  "bourgeois  reforms."  In  the 
other  part,  m  some\'-,  hat  pontifical  st\le.  appeared 
the  philosoplu'  of  ine\'irabiht\' — the  re\'elation  of 
the  io'.tul  tla\  when  the  death  knell  of  capitalism 
would  be  rung  out  and  tlie  new  world  would  be  born 
in   the   shell    of    the   old.      If    an\-one.   of    a   practical 


236       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

turn  of  mind,  asked  what  actually  would  be  done 
on  that  great  day,  he  was  set  down  as  a  doubter 
in  the  house  of  the  faithful.  He  was  answered  by 
references  to  "natural  processes,"  "the  disappear- 
ance of  the  state,"  and  "the  end  of  class  distinc- 
tions." "In  the  place  of  the  old  bourgeois  society," 
ran  the  prophecy  of  the  Communist  Manifesto, 
"with  its  classes  and  class  antagonisms,  an  associa- 
tion appears  in  which  the  free  development  of  each 
is  the  condition  for  the  free  development  of  all." 

When,  howev^er,  Ebert,  Scheidemann,  Lenin, 
Trotzky,  and  their  comrades  were  swept  into  power 
by  forces  not  conjured  up  by  their  oratory,  they 
found  the  great  day  at  hand  and  with  it  taxes  to 
collect,  pay  rolls  to  meet,  railways  to  manage,  fac- 
tories to  operate,  and  few  hundred  thousand  other 
things  to  do.  In  all  the  vast  range  of  socialist 
literature  there  was  scarcely  a  hint  as  to  the  line  of 
actual  conduct  to  pursue.  Such  was  the  irony  of 
fate  that  they  had  to  turn  to  capitalist  rather  than 
to  socialist  literature  for  guidance.  They  laid 
Marx  on  the  shelf  and  took  a  course  in  the  Taylor 
system  of  efficiency  management.  They  found  that 
the  wrath  of  man  might  praise  the  Creator  but 
could  not  produce  a  potato  or  move  a  freight  engine. 
Rhetoric  does  not  build  houses.  Party  programs 
do  not  make  plows.  Logic,  philosophy,  and  He- 
gellanism  do  not  install  power  plants.  The  social- 
ists learned  that  they  had  been  thinking  in  terms 
of  the  old  politics  and  the  old  statescralt  and  that 
the  possession  of  the  pomp  and  circumstances  of 
power  did  not  automatically  set  in  motion  the  com- 


SOCIALISM    A\D     LABOR    MOVI.MLNT      237 

plcx  productive  processes  of  national  life.  The 
effect  of  this  experience,  hitter  and  disillusioning  as 
it  was,  had  a  (.Icep  influence  upon  socialist  thought. 

This  influence  can  he  traced  fully  in  the  economic 
literature  of  (lermany  s^nce  19  18.  Before  the  revo- 
lution, the  German  socialists  seldom  used  the  word 
"socialization,"  and  perhaps  never  the  verb  "so- 
cialize." Now  Socialis'wniug  is  the  order  of  the 
day.  The  failures  in  Russia  and  Germany  forced 
the  Socialists  to  accept  the  bourgeois  challenge  to 
produce  e\-idences  of  practical  power  and  practical 
understanding,  and  they  ha\e  been  busy  recasting 
their  literature.  They  are  writing  on  exactly  how 
industries  may  be  taken  over  by  society,  organized, 
managed,  and  made  more  productive.  They  are 
discussing  the  role  of  workers  councils,  technicians, 
entrepreneurs,  and  capitalists.  They  are  writing  on 
foreign  trade,  productivit\',  wages  under  socialism, 
the  distribution  of  output,  autonomous  industrial 
corporations,  the  dangers  of  bureaucracv,  vertical 
and  horizontal  trusts,  finance,  transportation,  and 
agriculture.  There  is  now  a  new  note  ot  realitv  in 
their  speculations.  T!ic\'  know  by  experience  that 
the  red  flag  mav  proutIK'  waxc  over  a  starving  popu- 
lation and  all  power  does  not  proceed  t  rom  occu- 
pants ot   swivel  chairs  in  go\"ernment  buildings. 

What  will  be  the  ettcct  of  this?  Who  can 
answer?  One  or  two  suggestMuis  mav  be  x'enturctl. 
As  the  socialists  lav  nsule  the  i-hetonc  ot  academic 
philoso|ih\'  and  politics  aiivl  adopt  tlie  language  ot 
protluction  and  management,  the\-  will  bo  wi-iting 
and  talking  about  things  which  capitalists  and  busi- 


238       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

nessmen  can  understand.  Their  Ideas  will  begin  to 
circulate  in  spheres  hitherto  closed  to  them.  If 
there  is  reality  in  what  they  have  to  say,  if  there  is 
force  of  fact  behind  their  argument,  they  cannot 
fail  to  produce  a  profound  impression  on  the  eco- 
nomic thought  of  all  classes.  On  the  other  hand, 
this  very  process  of  hard  thinking  about  reality,  will 
itself  have  a  disintegrating  influence  upon  the  pon- 
tifical assurance  of  socialist  dogma.  Thus  the 
philosophy  of  capitalism  and  socialism  will  have  new 
points  of  contact  and  a  larger  spirit  of  compromise 
may  enter  into  the  contests  of  the  future. 

Whatever  may  be  the  influence  of  social  philo- 
sophy upon  the  conduct  of  human  affairs,  two  facts 
appear  indelibly  upon  the  record  of  the  recent  past. 
When  the  ruling  classes  of  two  great  empires — 
Russia  and  Germany — went  into  bankruptcy  as  the 
outcome  of  the  F'lrst  World  War,  it  was  only 
socialist  parties  that  had  the  power  and  will  and 
organization  necessary  to  seize  and  hold  the  gov- 
ernment. Those  who  are  given,  with  Volney,  to 
meditations  upon  the  ruins  of  states  will  be  moved 
to  speculate  upon  the  possible  role  of  socialism  and 
organized  labor  at  the  end  of  the  Tenth  World 
War. 


IX 


AMERICA  A\D  THE  BALAXCE  OE 
POIIER 

"T\  the  beirinnin^  \v;is  the  (.iecd,"  wrote  the  wise 
X  poet.  Activity  yet  remains  the  essential  thint^ 
in  the  life  oi  mankind.  Political  speeches,  ad- 
dresses on  foreign  policies,  aiul  I'ourth  of  July  ora- 
tions exert  little  influence  on  the  course  ot  human 
affairs,  save  occasionally  in  time  ot  a  crisis  when  the 
spoken  word  indicates  a  line  ot  action  to  be  fol- 
lowed. The  tate  ot  a  nation — its  destin\' — l:es  not 
in  words  but  in  deeds,  llie  nation  lues  b\'  work 
not  by  rhetoric.  It  is  no  detraction  trom  the  high 
honor  rightlv  ascribed  to  the  I'athers  ot  this  re- 
public to  say  that,  wvW  as  the\-  built,  thev  alone  did 
not  make  America.  Our  America  \\as  made  h\  the 
pioneers,  men  and  women,  who  le\elled  the  torests, 
laid  out  the  roads,  tilled  the  lields,  and  earned 
American  lite  to  the  Pacific,  and  hv  the  capitalists 
and  laborers  who  constructed  and  ojX'rated  tiie  steel 
mills  \\'ith  their  roaring  turnaces  and  the  spinning 
mills  with  their  (l\ing  spindles.  1  do  not  mean  to 
sa\'  that  concepts  ot  htc  and  dut\'  do  not  underlie 
this  tabric  ot  luiman  cndea\'oui",  but  merel\-  that  the 
majestic  signs  ot  power  are  the  outC(nne  ot  acti\'it\'. 
S(^  \\hoe\er  tain  would  di\'inc  the  tate  ot  a  na- 
tion must  poneler  deepK   its  acti\ity.       It  is  not  what 


240       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

we  say  about  the  sea  that  counts;  it  is  what  our 
sailors  do  upon  the  seas.  It  is  not  our  academic 
theories  about  finance  that  carry  weight  in  the  coun- 
cils of  nations;  it  is  our  dollars  and  our  cents  that 
imperatively  command  the  attention  and  wholesome 
respect  of  those  engaged  in  the  counting  houses  of 
the  earth's  great  cities.  It  is  not  what  President 
Harding  thinks  about  China  or  what  John  Hay  has 
written  about  China  that  will  shape  the  coming  fate- 
ful years  in  the  Pacific;  it  is  what  our  merchants,  our 
capitalists,  our  railway  builders,  and  our  money 
lenders  do  in  China  tbat  will  set  the  problem  for 
the  rising  generation. 

Now  America  is  primarily  an  industrial  and  a 
trading  nation.  Its  prime  activities  are  connetted 
with  the  production  and  sale  of  goods.  It  has  no 
landed  nobility  to  cultivate  the  graces  of  leisure. 
It  has  no  military  aristocracy  devoted  to  the  exer- 
cise of  arms.  Napoleon  once  sneered  at  the  nation 
of  shopkeepers,  but  it  was  the  sneer  of  jealousy,  and 
the  Anglo-Saxon  is  proud  of  the  term  of  contempt 
thus  flung  at  him.  \Yhether  this  pride  is  warranted 
or  not,  whether  the  virtues  of  trade — those  bour- 
geois virtues  so  scorned  of  the  emancipated — are 
really  virtues,  is  a  matter  for  the  theologian  and 
the  ethical  teacher.  The  fact  remains.  America 
is  an  Industrial  and  trading  nation.  Our  activities 
at  home  and  abroad  are  mainly  related  to  these  es- 
sential elements  In  our  national  life.  Here  then 
is  the  key  to  our  domestic  history  and  to  our  future 
foreign  policies.  Our  empire  of  trade  extends  to 
the    four   corners   of   the   world.      It   stretches   out 


AMERICA    A\M)    BALANC'K    OF     POWI.K      24 1 

under  many  flags  and  many  governments.  Those 
working  at  its  periphery,  under  the  pressure  of  eco- 
nomic laws,  make  the  conditions  with  which  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  must  deal.  They  create  the  stern 
and  solemn  tacts  with  which  statesmen  and  poli- 
ticians must  reckon. 

Moreover,  recent  circumstances  have  given  a  new 
turn  to  the  significance  of  business.  Manv  nations 
ot  antiquity  in  the  course  ot  their  history  came  to 
rely  upon  the  food  supplies  brought  from  distant 
lands.  Rome  in  her  imperial  (.lays  was  ted  by 
wheat  carried  from  her  uttermost  provinces;  when 
this  supply  was  cut  oft  and  the  fields  of  Italy  tailed 
to  make  gootl  the  shortage,  the  staft  ot  lite  tailed. 
The  new  nations  and  new  states  that  rose  upon  the 
toundations  of  Rome  were  almost  selt-suthcing.  At 
all  events  they  could  teed  their  population  by  food 
grown  within  their  own  borders.  W  ith  the  ath-ent 
of  the  machine  age,  this  tortunate  condition  \\'as 
lost  bv  the  leaders  in  invention  and  manutacture. 
In  19  14  neither  I'.ngland  nor  (jcrnianv  could  main- 
tain a  standard  of  living  for  the  laboring  population 
without  drawing  hea\-ily  ujion  the  granaries  ot 
America  and  Russia.  The  iuigc  populations,  called 
into  beitig  bv  the  oj^portunitics  ot  iiuiustr\',  consti- 
tuted a  growing  pi'cssure  upon  the  agencies  ot  busi- 
ness and  of  gox'crninenr  conipellwig  them  to  extend 
and  maintain  foreign  markets.  I  his  naturalK' 
drove  the  seekers  foi-  nia:-kets  into  the  backward 
places  of  the  enrth  wliere  iiiJustrv  had  not  pene- 
trated or  had  made  little  ;ul\-;iiK'e.  \  or  nc;!r!v  a 
centurv    l-'.nirland    had    no    lornrdable    ri\-al    in    tliis 


242       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

imperial  enterprise,  then  one  after  another  com- 
petitors appeared  upon  the  world  stage — Germany, 
Japan,  Italy,  France,  and  the  United  States.  Even 
in  China  and  India  the  whirr  of  the  spindle  and  the 
clank  of  the  loom  were  heard  ringing  out  the  fate 
of  Lancashire  cotton  mills.  Here  were  the  roots  of 
imperialism,  armaments,  and  warfare.  Those  who 
asked  where  this  all  would  finally  lead  and  what 
would  be  the  outcome  when  every  nation  became  in- 
dustrial were  silenced  by  the  inexorable  demands  of 
current  business.      After  us  the  deluge  I 

In  this  swiftly  drifting  world  economy,  the 
United  States  occupies  a  peculiar  position.  From 
one  point  of  view  it  is  very  fortunate.  It  can  feed 
its  immense  population  with  almost  every  kind  of 
product  from  oranges  and  sugar  to  wheat  and 
bacon.  It  can  clothe  its  people  with  the  cotton  of 
the  South  and,  did  exigencies  again  demand,  with 
wool  from  the  sheep  ranges.  Considered  abstractly 
it  could  be  a  self-sufficing  nation.  But  considered 
practically,  it  is,  as  things  now  stand,  dependent 
upon  foreign  trade,  if  not  for  a  livelihood,  at  least 
for  what  is  called  "prosperity."  It  is  the  city  popu- 
lations of  England  and  Germany  that  must  have 
markets  abroad  and  import  food  supplies.  In  the 
United  States,  the  wheat  and  corn  grower  of  the 
West,  the  cotton  grower  of  the  South,  as  well  as  the 
maker  of  silks  in  Patterson  or  the  manufacturer  of 
steel  in  Pittsburg,  all  depend  upon  foreign  business 
for  that  margin  of  trade  which  spells  prosperity. 
In  short  ha\'ing  an  enelowment  of  agricultural  re- 
sources bevond  the  strength  of  our  domestic  mar- 


AMF.RKW     AXD    H  A  I.  A  X  C  F.    OF     POWFR      243 

kets  for  the  produce  we  must  jK'rforce  sell  the  for- 
eigner foodstufts  ;is  well  as  boots  and  clothes. 
Mere  is  a  paradox  which  seems  to  ha\'e  received 
small   attention   1  rom  professional   economists. 

In  every  respect,  the  World  War  has  increased 
the  dependence  ot  the  Lnited  States  upon  world 
markets  even  tor  the  profitab-le  disposal  of  its  sur- 
plus capital.  It  has  discharo;ed  a  very  large  por- 
tion of  its  indebtedness  abroad  and  has  become  an 
insistent  money  lender  itseli.  In  191^,  bJuropean 
capitalists  held  S2,704,0O(),(:hjo  worth  of  .American 
railway  stocks  and  securities;  two  years  later  more 
than  half  of  these  holdings  had  been  transferred  to 
America;  and  the  stream  still  continues  to  How  west- 
ward. In  1Q14  more  than  one-tourth  of  the  stocks 
of  the  United  States  Steel  Corporation  were  held  in 
b'urope;  to-da\"  less  than  one  tenth  are  in  foreign 
hands.  Fhe  crisis  induced  in  London,  long  the 
money  center  ot  the  world,  bv  the  exigencies  of 
the  war,  led  to  the  phenomenal  rise  ot  New  "i'ork. 
To  sustain  their  credit  here  tor  huge  borrowings, 
b.ngland  and  I'rance  ofU'ned  their  strong  boxes  and 
sent  across  the  sea  the  \'er\'  tmest  ot  their  gilt  edge 
securities.  As  a  keen  b  rench  economist  puts  it: 
"One  tact  dominates  all  others:  the  rise  ot  the 
Lnited  States  to  world  hegenionv.  Lord  Robert 
Cecil  h:is  compared  the  iiosition  ot  the  I  nited 
States  after  t!ie  (.re;it  War  with  that  of  ( treat 
Hrit;iin  atter  the  Napoleonic  wars.  That  compari- 
son IS  not  cjuite  exact;  because  the  British  hegemony 
w;is  tlicn  e>sent!all\-  I'urope;!!!  while  that  ot  the 
I   nited     States     tod.iv     is    uni\'ei"sal.      .\ii     immense 


244      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

reservoir  of  raw  materials,  of  manufactured  prod- 
ucts, and  of  capital,  the  United  States  has  become 
an  economic  centre  and  financial  centre  in  connection 
with  which  all  the  world  must  work  and  trade." 
Fact,  stern,  and  tremendous  as  Carlyle  might  say, 
indubitable  and  fateful.  Beside  it  all  rhetoric 
fails.  The  loom  on  which  is  woven  the  texture  of 
world  politics  has  been  brought  across  the  sea  and 
the  picks  of  its  flashing  shuttle  can  be  counted  in  the 
financial  columns  of  any  great  New  York  daily. 

The  United  States  has,  therefore,  entered  upon 
the  role  long  played  by  England  and  France  as  an 
international  banker  and  money  lender.  The  vis- 
ible signs  of  these  new  activities  are  the  numerous 
American  banking  houses  which  are  to  be  found  in 
the  principal  streets  and  squares  of  European  cities. 
The  Morgan  House  and  the  Bankers  Trust  Com- 
pany look  upon  the  monument  erected  to  Napoleon's 
glories  in  Place  Vendome.  If  you  will  turn  to  the 
financial  section  of  such  a  metropolitan  paper  as  the 
New  York  Times,  you  will  see  the  statistical  record 
of  American  operations  in  foreign  finance.  Only 
recently  the  transactions  in  foreign  government 
bonds  upon  the  Stock  Exchange  have  become  so 
great  as  to  require  a  separate  section  of  the  daily 
statement.  Often  such  transactions  occupy  one- 
fourth  of  the  space  given  to  the  day's  record.  The 
list  of  bonds  bought  and  sold  on  a  single  day  is  both 
interesting  and  full  of  meaning.  The  list  includes 
Argentine,  Chinese  Railway,  City  of  Berne,  Bor- 
deaux, Christiania,  Copenhagen,  Lyons,  Marseilles, 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  Tokio,  Zurich,  Danish  Municipali- 


AMERICA    AND    BALANCE    OF     POWER      245 

ties,  Department  of  the  Seine,  Dominican  Republic, 
Dominion  of  Canada,  Dutch  F.ast  Indies,  I-Vench 
(iov^ernment,  Japanese  Government,  Belo;ium,  Den- 
mark, Italy,  Sweden,  Chile,  Cuba,  'L'rufj;uay,  San 
Paulo,  Queensland,  Rio  Grande  do  Sul,  Swiss  Con- 
federation, United  Kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  Brazil,  and  Haiti,  not  to  mention  the  de- 
faulted securities  of  Russia  and  Mexico.  When  to 
the  sales  of  these  government  bonds  are  added  the 
transactions  in  the  currency  and  bonds  of  Central 
and  luistern  I'Airopean  powers  and  the  transactions 
in  the  stocks  and  oblii^ations  ot  toreinjn  industrial 
corporations,  it  becomes  apparent  that  Ameri- 
can investors  are  deeply  invoU'CLl  in  the  tate  ot  ii,ov- 
ernments  and  enterprises  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Almost  everv  week  records  the  Hoatinti;  ot  a  new 
loan  to  some  torei^n  citv  or  countrv  or  railwav  al- 
readv  stagi2;ering'  under  a  burden  ot  debt.  1  he 
rates  are  hi<2;h,  the  commissions  enormous,  and  the 
risks    correspondin<2;ly   great. 

In  accordaiice  with  a  custom,  consecrated  bv  time, 
the  bondholders,  whcne\'er  a  disturbance  is  threat- 
ened or  a  default  is  at  hand,  look  eagerly  to  the 
government  at  Washington  to  suj^port  tlieir  inter- 
ests diplomaticalK'  it  not  more  x'lgorouslw  \  he 
genial  American  |iublic,  tliat  takes  up  millions  ot 
oil  stocks  e\"er\"  \car,  sci/es  eagcrU'  at  the  oppor- 
tuniU'  to  get  se\-en  and  eight  per  cent  on  the  bonds 
ot  loreign  countries  and  so  e\'ery  new  loan  is  re- 
cei\'cd  ^\•it!l  eiuhusiasm.  Let  this  process  go  on  tor 
tiftv  N'ears,  and  the  [leoplc  ot  the  I  nited  States  will 
have    reconditioned    '.urope    and    Asia,    and    at    the 


246       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

same  time  created  an  interest  obligation  that  will 
either  flood  our  markets  with  European  goods  by 
way  of  repayment,  or  raise  the  dollar  to  a  ruinous 
height  in  the  exchanges  of  the  world.  They  will 
also  have  incurred  a  gigantic  financial  risk  which 
a  new  war  or  a  social  revolution  in  Europe  would 
transform  into  widespread  ruin  with  its  correspond- 
ing effects  on  our  political  issues.  In  short,  the 
L^nited  States,  through  the  investment  of  capital, 
has  become  a  silent  partner  in  the  fate  of  every  es- 
tablished order  in  the  world.  Unless  we  are  to  as- 
sume on  the  basis  of  the  experience  of  the  past  three 
hundred  years  that  there  will  be  no  more  World 
Wars  or  social  cataclysms,  it  is  safe  to  conjecture 
that  days  of  greater  trouble  are  ahead,  whether  we 
enter  the  League  of  Nations  or  stay  out  of  it.  Once 
a  great  European  war  merely  deranged  our  foreign 
trade;  in  the  future  it  will  disturb  every  investor  in 
every  village  Main  Street.  Entangling  political 
alliances  may  be  pieces  of  paper,  as  the  past  has 
shown,  but  the  texture  of  the  economic  alliance  is 
woven  of  tougher  materials.  Politics  comes  after 
the  fact.  The  gilt-edged  pieces  of  parchment 
handed  out  to  American  investors  will  speak  louder 
than  the  silver  tongues  of  professional  orators. 

In  industry,  as  in  finance,  the  upward  swing  of 
the  United  States  after  19 14  was  incredible  in  its 
swiftness  and  majestic  in  its  range.  Our  old  com- 
petitors in  I'urope  were  not  only  paralysed  by  war 
activities;  they  clamored  louder  and  louder  for 
the  products  of  American  mills,  mines,  and  factories. 
Measured  in  tons  of  steel,   pounds  of  copper,  and 


AMERICA    AND    B  A  LA  XCF.    OF     POWE.R      247 

b()lts  of  cloth,  the  sales  of  the  L'nited  States  abroad 
between  19  14  and  19  iS  were  nothing  short  of  stag- 
gering. We  supplied  not  only  belligerents  in  I'.urope, 
but  their  former  customers  in  South  America,  Asia, 
and  the  Islands  of  the  seas.  Colossal  factories 
sprang  up  on  our  soil.  Old  plants  were  enlarged  and 
extended.  7  housands  ot  new  workers  were  drawn 
into  the  cities  from  the  countryside,  especially  as 
immigration  fell  off.  .American  capital  was  amassed 
in  stupendous  quantities  and  preparations  were 
made  to  seize  the  empire  of  world  trade.  Having 
an  mimense  home  market  witli  the  corresponding 
advantages  of  large-scale  production,  American 
business  men  prepared  to  lead  the  worUl  in  Industrv 
and  finance.  They  were  even  able  to  induce  a 
Democratic  Congress,  in  spite  ot  its  in\-eterate  sus- 
picion, to  enact  the  Webb  law  autliori/ing  tlie  for- 
mation of  gigantic  combinations  to  de\'elop  anel  ex- 
ploit  foreign   markets. 

In  the  normal  course  ot  things,  it  the  history  of 
I''ngland  and  (iermanv  is  our  guide,  a  merchant 
marine  anel  sea  power  toll()\\'  the  growtli  ot  toreign 
business.  In  this  sphere  also  the  trend  ot  Ameri- 
can economic  development  is  true  to  form.  On  the 
e\"e  of  the  \\\)rld  War,  the  American  merchant 
marine  \\'as  an  almost  negbgible  tactor  upon  the 
high  seas.  It  is  true  that  long  ago  our  A\-oodcn 
ships  \\'ere  upon  every  ocean  and  our  sailors  riwilled 
in  skill  anel  daring  the  best  upon  the  wa\'e:  but  the 
glor\"  ot  our  enterprise  upon  the  waters  \"anished 
during  the  Cix'il  War.  Alter  \s();  the  record  ot 
iiearK'     e\'ei"\'    \"ear     showed     a     decline.      In     1S61 


248       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

American  ships  brought  to  our  shores  more  than 
one-half,  in  values,  of  all  the  goods  imported;  in 
1 9 13  they  carried  only  about  eleven  per  cent  of 
the  values.  Meanwhile  the  tonnage  of  ships  for 
oceanic  trade  fell  from  2,547,000  to  1,928,999  re- 
ducing the  United  States  to  a  position  below  that 
of  England,  Germany,  and  Norway.  During  the 
same  period  the  proportion  of  exports  carried  from 
our  shores  in  American  ships  dropped  from 
seventy-two  per  cent  in  values  to  nine  per  cent. 
Americans,  busy  with  the  development  of  their  con- 
tinent, and  content  with  their  lake  and  coastwise 
trade,  let  foreign  ships  carry  their  exports  and  im- 
ports. The  planters  and  farmers  of  the  country  re- 
jected every  proposal  to  build  a  merchant  marine 
by  national  subsidies — the  only  device  which  Ameri- 
can capitalists  could  offer  as  a  means  of  bringing  the 
ocean  carrying  trade  into  American  hands. 

So  things  stood  in  19 14  when  the  war  drove  the 
German  merchant  marine  from  the  seas  and  com- 
pelled the  other  belligerents  to  commandeer  ships 
for  military  purposes.  Then  the  United  States 
found  itself  in  the  presence  of  a  crisis  similar  to  that 
induced  by  the  Napoleonic  wars.  One  hundred 
years  before,  cotton,  tobacco,  corn,  and  bacon  irom 
American  plantations  and  farms  lay  wasting  at  the 
docks  for  want  of  ships  to  carry  them  abroad.  In 
19 14,  the  owners  of  vast  masses  of  manufactured 
goods  as  well  as  the  owners  oi  farm  produce  clam- 
ored for  ships.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  Demo- 
cratic party,  which  many  years  before  had  with- 
drawn subsidies  trom  the  American  marine,   found 


AMERICA    AXD    BALANCE    OF    POWER      249 

Itself  confrcMitctl  by  a  trying  situation,  llic  cry 
for  sliips  went  up  on  every  hand.  It  was  no  longer 
the  steel  makers  and  the  owners  ot  ship  yards  alone 
that  were  heanl  in  the  lobbies  of  Congress.  The 
munition  makers  needetl  ships.  The  farmers  and 
planters  needed  them.  So  the  Democratic  party, 
the  party  of  the  less  government  the  better,  like  all 
parties,  laid  aside  theories  in  the  presence  of  com- 
pelling facts  and  set  about  creating  an  American 
marine.  Without  utterly  repudiating  the  teachings 
of  half  a  century,  it  could  not  openly  resort  to  the 
subsidies  and  bounties  it  had  so  long  and  scj  passion- 
atelv  denounced.  But  the  ships  had  to  be  built. 
There  was  another  alternative.  The  government 
itself  could  go  into  ship  building.  In  19 16,  the 
Shipping  Board  was  created  tor  that  purpose. 
Soon  the  war  came  to  America.  Then  with  lavish 
grants  from  the  public  treasury  ships  were  built 
with  a  speed  that  astonished  the  world. 

Thanks  to  what  appears  to  be  a  historical  ac- 
cident, the  United  States  has  now  become  one  of  the 
great  oceanic  carr\-ing  powers.  In  1914  our  ship 
yards  turned  out  2ot),o()(j  tons  ot  shipfiing  while 
those  ot  dreat  Britain  turned  out  i,6S_^,()()o  tons. 
In  19  I  S.  our  yards  launclied  3,()U(),()()()  tons  ^^"hlle 
tlic  I'.nglish  vards  set  atloat  i  ,;;4S,()()<)  tons.  .All 
around  our  long  coast  lines  American  ingenuity  was 
ajiplied  with  astounding  zeal  and  marvellous  i^esults. 
The  experiment  was  costK'.  tor  mone\'  \\-as  spent 
like  -water,  Init  "the  gootls  wei-e  de]i\'ercd." 
Within  tile  course  ot  ii\-e  \cars  the  American  flag 
was  restored  to  its  old  preeminence  on  the  high  seas. 


250      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

In  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  new  steamship  lines 
made  their  appearance  bidding  for  freight  and  pas- 
senger business.  New  shipping  offices  were  opened 
in  all  the  chief  ports  of  the  world.  An  ever  increas- 
ing proportion  of  our  exports  and  imports  was  car- 
ried in  American  bottoms.  The  steamship  compa- 
nies of  Europe  found  themselves  face  to  face  with 
a  new  and  formidable  competitor.  In  1920  the 
total  number  of  American  vessels,  registered  as  en- 
gaged in  foreign  trade  and  whale  fishing,  showed  a 
tonnage  of  9,928,595,  to  say  nothing  of  the  6,395,- 
429  tons  engaged  in  coastwise  and  internal  trade. 
In  19 1 8  the  entire  merchant  marine  of  the  United 
Kingdom  amounted  to  10,000,000  tons  in  round 
numbers.  Thus  It  happened  when  the  war  stopped 
that  the  world  was  overstocked  with  merchant  ves- 
sels and  In  every  harbor  steamers  and  sailing  ships 
lay  rusting  and  rotting.  Then  the  great  cry  went 
up  that  the  government  which  by  lavish  expenditures 
had  built  the  ships  should  subsidize  those  into  whose 
hands  they  passed  at  a  nominal  cost.  With  the  eco- 
nomics of  this  great  transaction,  we  are  not  con- 
cerned. The  striking  fact  is  established  that  the 
United  States  has  become  within  six  years  one  of  the 
first  oceanic  carriers  of  the  world,  a  formidable  com- 
petitor of  all  the  maritime  nations. 

Coincident  with  this  growth  In  the  merchant  ma- 
rine was  a  tremendous  stride  iorv,'ard  in  battleship 
construction.  Until  the  Spanish  war,  America  was 
not  reckoned  among  the  great  sea  powers,  although 
her  sailors  had  given  a  good  account  ol  themselves  In 
many  contests  upon  the  ocean.      Alter  Manila  Bay 


A  Mi:  RICA    AM)     1;ALANC'K    or     POWER      2nI 


antl  Santiago,  howcA'cr,  increasing  attention  was 
given  to  the  navy  and  in  19 14  the  L'nited  States 
ranked  third  in  naval  stren,ii;th.  Then  began  a  pe- 
riod ot  te\erish  activity  marked  bv  constantly  in- 
creasing acceleration.  In  1920,  the  Xa\-y  (ieneral 
Board  reported  its  grand  designs:  "A  navy  second 
to  none  recommended  bv  the  Cieneral  Board  in  19  15 
is  still  re(]Liired  today.  But  in  addition  the  great 
war  has  shown  the  importance  of  unimpeded  ocean 
transportation  tor  commerce.  If  either  belligerent 
loses  the  control  ot  the  sea,  the  national  tighting 
power  and  endurance  are  greatlv  aftected.  In  time 
ot  peace  a  gre'at  and  de\-elop!ng  country  nectls  a 
proportionately  great  merchant  fieet  ot  its  own  to 
insure  its  markets  and  preserve  its  commerce  from 
subservience  to  ri\'al  nations  and  their  business." 
That  report  struck  home  and  its  spirit  was  reflected 
in  the  new  building  program.  So  rapid  was  Anieri- 
can  progress  that  experts  were  able  to  calculate  that 
b\'  1926  the  tighting  power  ot  the  l'nited  States  on 
the  sea  would  surpass  that  ot  (ireat  I^ritam.  I  he 
long  supremacv  inaugurated  m  the  deteat  ol  t!ie 
Jruiiida  was  on  the  \'erge  ot  passing  to  America 
^^•he^  the  Washington  conterence  called  a  halt  m 
com pe t ! 1 1  ve  a r m ;; me n t s . 

So  out  ot  the  World  War  emerged  a  new  America, 
tirst  among  the  iinesting,  industrial,  commercial, 
maritime,  and  na\'al  iiowei-s  ot  the  earth — a  coun- 
trv  endo\\"ed  with  an  nniiiense  producti\'e  e(]uipment 
and  rcad\'  to  }tenetrate  the  most  inaccessible  mai"kets 
ot  the  most  ilistant  laiid'^.  At  the  same  time,  a 
paraKsis  ot  I'.urojU'  cut  down  the  (.lemanil  tor  Amen- 


252       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE     TO-DAY 

can  agricultural  produce  and  manufactured  goods, 
and  the  destruction  of  the  Russian  and  German 
empires  gave  a  new  and  startling  turn  to  events  in 
the  Orient,  leaving  Japan  without  the  support  of 
any  great  power  save  England.  It  was  inevitable, 
amid  these  circumstances,  that  we  should  witness  a 
burst  of  American  activity  in  the  Far  East. 

This  is  of  course  a  new  emphasis  rather  than  a 
new  factor  for  Oriental  trade  had  been  an  important 
element  in  American  economy  and  politics  since  the 
maturity  of  the  Pacific  seaboard  states,  especially 
since  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  and  the  open- 
ing of  the  Panama  canal.  The  Pacific  has  become 
the  new  theatre.  It  has  been  said  that  the  drama 
of  antiquity  was  played  on  the  shores  of  the  Medi- 
terranean and  that  the  drama  of  the  modern  world 
has  been  enacted  on  the  shores  of  the  Atlantic.  7  he 
drama  of  the  future  is  preparing  on  a  more  majestic 
stage  where  teeming  millions  stand  ready  to  take 
part  in  it.  The  curtain  has  risen  upon  this  new 
drama.  The  actors  are  in  their  places,  but  no  liv- 
ing mind  can  divine  even  the  first  act  to  say  nothing 
of  the  denouement.  Asia  is  old,  wise,  fertile  in 
ideas  and  rich  in  potential  resources.  It  had  its 
empires,  its  religions  and  philosophies  long  before 
the  geese  cackled  on  the  banks  of  the  Tiber.  Many 
conquerors  have  tried  their  fortunes  there.  Eng- 
land has  brought  the  vast  southern  peninsula  under 
her  imperial  dominion,  but  her  subjects  stir  ominously 
and  the  solid  structure  may  in  time  dissolve.  Japan, 
aroused  from  her  lethargy  by  Yankee  enterprise,  is 
equipped  in  wealth,   industrial  power,  and  military 


AMI.KICW     ,\N1>     I!AI.A\(M':     OF     POWKR      253 

strength  to  extend  antl  defeiul  !ier  mighty  hegemony. 
Cliina,  huge,  amorphous,  heset  hy  a  thousand  ills, 
tfireatened  with  dissolution,  and  restless  under  the 
inHuence  ot  western  leleas  lies  prostrate  but,  ha\"ing 
survived  a  hundred  conquests  aiul  conquerors,  may 
yet  smile  in  her  enigmatic  way  upon  the  Lilliputians 
who  assail  her.  Russia,  at  present  broken  and 
powerless,  seems  out  of  the  plav,  but  that  is  an 
illusion  exce[")t  to  those  who  reckon  human  atiairs  in 
terms  ot  Hags  and  states.  ihe  Russian  people 
multiply  with  the  passing  \ears  and  thev  push  out 
upon  the  .\siatic  plains  uith  the  relentless  force  of 
an  Alfiine  glacier.  Those  who  occupv  the  earth  and 
till  the  soil  at  their  feet  v\ill  in  the  long  run  possess 
it.  Russia,  the  land  ot  Tolstoi  and  Lenin  and 
Sazono\'  and  Nicholas  Romanox',  still  li\es  and  will 
again  pla\  a  leading  part  in  the  elrama  that  unrolls 
in  the  Racitic  basin. 

Vhc  first  speeches  ot  the  AiTierican  actors  have 
already  been  deli\-ei-ed.  ihe  jiolicy  ot  "the  ( )pen 
Door"  has  been  announced.  It  has  an  immense 
advantage.  It  lias  an  ethical  ring.  It  respects 
the  integritN',  s(n"ereigntv,  aiul  territor\-  ot  the  Chi- 
nese nation.  It  contemplates  no  militar\-  aggression, 
no  forcible  annexations,  no  political  power.  It 
mereU'  asks  that  all  nations  ha\-e  eijual  rights  to  go 
and  come,  bu\'  and  sell,  invest  and  collect  in  China. 
In  theory  it  corresponds  to  the  modern  ideal  of 
free  commerce,  thougdi  it  ma\-  mean  that  in  [irac- 
tice  immense  monojiolies  ma\-  be  built  up,  monopolies 
sui'li  as  have  :irisen  in  T'urope  and  the  I  nited  States 
(Hit  n\    the  same   freedom  {*t   commerce.      In  theorv 


254      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

it  meets  the  approval  of  China,  for  China,  naturally 
anxious  to  preserve  her  territorial  unity  against 
foreign  domination,  welcomes  assistance.  While 
thus  corresponding  to  China's  immediate  desires  and 
expressing  an  ethical  doctrine,  the  open  door  policy 
also  satisfies  the  practical  interests  of  the  United 
States,  at  present.  The  seizure  and  government 
of  Chinese  territory  would  involve  difficulties,  finan- 
cial and  administrative;  if  opportunities  of  trade 
may  be  secured  without  this  hazard,  territorial  an- 
nexations would  be  exercises  in  foolhardiness. 

The  belief  in  our  own  disinterestedness  in  the 
pursuit  of  the  open-door  policy  is  so  wide-spread  that 
any  opposition  to  it  on  the  part  of  other  countries 
concerned  in  the  Orient  is  viewed  as  a  manifestation 
of  unwarranted  ill-will.  Undoubtedly  American 
policy  offers  a  striking  contrast  to  the  policy  of  pene- 
tration and  aggression  followed  by  many  other 
powers.  Nevertheless,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  en- 
tirely benevolent  to  the  seasoned  diplomats  of  the 
Old  World,  as  the  papers  recently  published  from 
the  Russian  archives  show.  In  these  papers,  the 
American  State  Department  is  represented  as  aiding 
vigorously  in  the  economic  penetration  of  China 
and  as  supporting  American  banks  with  interests  hos- 
tile to  those  of  the  other  powers.  It  is  not  necessary 
to  accept  these  criticisms  at  face  value  or  on  the 
basis  of  them  to  entertain  doubts  as  to  the  correct- 
ness of  American  diplomacy.  That  is  not  the  point. 
The  heart  of  the  matter  is  that  neither  I^uropcans 
nor  the  Japanese  look  upon  American  imperial  meth- 
ods in  the   Orient  as  different  in  any  essential  re- 


AMKKICA     ANU    IJALAXCi:    OF     POWLR      2 


:>:> 


spcct  Irom  tliosc  of  other  jiowcrs.  The  American 
goal,  they  say,  is  the  same,  namely,  opportunities 
for  profitahle  trade  and  investment,  and  as  the  Phil- 
ippines hear  witness,  territorial  expansion  is  not 
avoided  when  it  heconvjs  necessary.  The  spirit 
of  cynicism  and  douht  as  to  the  ultimate  intentions 
of  America  in  the  Juist,  tliouij;!!  we  may  vigorously 
condemn  it,  must  nevertheless  he  understood  if 
we  arc  to  gauge  correctly  forces  of  the  future. 
Nowhere  is  this  spirit  inore  accurately  reflected  than 
in  an  article  hy  an  eminent  h  rench  jnihlicist,  in  the 
Mcrciirc  dc  Frana',  tor  January,  1922.  This  single 
passage  gives  the  heart  of  the  matter: 

"The  realist,  the  positixe,  and  especially  the  finan- 
cial, mentality  which  is  the  true  characteristic  of  the 
Yankee  and  his  raison  ereti^e,  has  heen  protoundly 
stirred  by  the  situation  created  in  the  Lnited  States 
during  and  after  the  war — a  situation  \\hich  he  liad 
not  toresecn  and  which  is  presented  under  the  lorm 
of  a  genuine  paradox.  I'.ni'iched  m  that  conflict 
to  the  point  of  securing  almost  :ill  the  golel  ot  the 
work],  Nortli  America  ne\'ert!iclcss  is  passing 
through  a  crisis  ot  appalling  proportions;  unemphn- 
ment,  a  par;il\sis  ot  the  expoi't  tr;ule,  and  all  the 
economic  cahimities,  now  oppressing  American  citi- 
zens, fell  u\)n\\  them  at  the  same  time  as  an  excep- 
tionally la\"oraMe  state  ol  exchange  and  an  unex- 
pected abundance  ot  treasure.  it  occurred  at  once 
to  the  minds  ot  these  practic.il  men  that  it  was 
necessar\'  hence!  or\\";i  rd  to  secure  a  market  other 
than  that  atlorded  b\  1  urope,  a  lield  ot  action  in 
A\liich  their  prepondci'ant  m"  semi-sox'creign  mtluence 


256       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

will  permit  them  to  sell  their  products  and  their 
primary  materials  under  conditions  of  exchange 
which  they  will  regulate  themselves.  Thus  they  will 
avoid  as  far  as  possible  the  economic  laws  which,  in 
their  operation,  have  become  so  dangerous  for  them 
In  Europe.  Since  they  were  powerless  in  Europe  to 
regulate  the  value  of  money  which  depends  upon 
a  number  of  circumstances — upon  a  state  of  affairs 
peculiar  to  the  Old  World  and  beyond  their  control, 
— it  was  urgent  that  they  should  have  at  their  dis- 
posal an  Asiatic  country  where  they  could  act,  direct, 
and  organize  at  their  pleasure  and  where  their  com- 
merce would  not  encounter  the  same  perils  as  among 
their  old  customers.  China  is  there,  immense  and 
ready,  they  think,  to  receive  all  authorities,  and  so 
disorganized  that  she  is  ready  to  accept  anything 
they  wish  to  impose  upon  her.  Hence  there  were, 
even  during  the  war,  missions  of  all  sorts,  economic, 
financial,  religious,  educational,  and  recreational 
sailing  from  Frisco  to  the  Aliddle  Kingdom. 

"At  that  moment,  Japan  began  to  be  disturbed. 
For  other  reasons  than  the  United  States,  even 
for  opposite  reasons,  Japan  felt  the  need  of  extend- 
ing her  influence  over  the  great  Yellow  Republic; 
abo\e  all  for  reasons  connected  with  natural  re- 
sources. Wanting  in  coal  and  iron,  Japan  must  of 
necessity  possess  these  things  without  depending 
upon  any  powerful  nation.  jMorcover  her  seventy- 
seven  million  people  arc  crowded  into  a  country 
about  as  large  as  France  and  at  any  price  it  was 
necessary  to  search  for  an  outlet  for  emigrants. 
In    short,    with    the    United    States    established    in 


AMF.KKA     AM)    HA  LA  NCI)    OF     rOWI.  R 


257 


China,  there  was  at  her  j^ate  an  enemy  which  had 
shown  a  tenacious  hatred  for  her  and  an  unchanging 
contempt  tor  the  yellow  race,  since,  according  to  the 
\  ankee  conception  ot  things,  the  yellow  man,  \vho  is 
only  a  charming  being  when  one  visits  him  to  get  his 
money,  becomes  intolerable  when  he  asks  for  simple 
reciprocity.  .  .  .  Mr.  1  lughes  has  proposed  that 
the  American  republic  should  dominate  the 
Pacific — twenty-eight  million  more  Inhabitants  than 
Japan  to  undertake  the  economic  conquest  of  China, 
eight  super-battleships  inore  than  the  Mikado 
possesses  to  curb  his  desires — there  are  the 
powerful  trump  cards,  and  if  America  succeeds 
in  making  them  serve  her  purpose,  she  will  ha\"e  a 
beautiful  party.  Although  officially  disinterested 
for  the  moment  in  the  affairs  of  luirope, 
she  sees  that  they  are  being  reintegrated  secretly 
in  general  policy  thrcnigh  financiers  who  meet 
'\n  their  prix'ate  chambers  and  associate  with  them 
sehes  at  the  council  table  some  Anglo-Saxon 
business  men  and  some  (lermans  who  more  than 
ever  divide  tlie  world."  Such  is  a  x'lew  of  American 
jiolicy  now,  bv  an  eminent  b  rench  publicist.  How 
much  untruth  there  is  in  it  each  mwv  decide  for  him- 
self accorilmg  to  his  knowledge.  Now  that  we 
iiave  set  out  upon  the  wav  it  is  wise  to  see  (Uirsel\-es 
as  our  critics  see  us,  for  it  is  our  critics,  not  our 
friends,  who  will  make  trouble  for  us. 

W'hetlier  we  accept  or  rL-ject  the  criticisms  of  the 
I'Vencli  obser\'er,  we  cannot  ox'erlook  the  fact  that 
the  wuk'l\-iieraKletl  \\  asliington  conference  was 
related  mamlv,   e\en   almost  exclusivclv,  to  Pacific, 


258       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

not  European,  problems.  Though  associated  in 
the  minds  of  some  with  various  world  enterprises 
such  as  the  League  of  Nations,  it  was  in  fact  con- 
fined in  its  chief  activities  to  the  practical  adjust- 
ment of  Pacific  matters  in  such  a  way  as  to  facilitate 
the  prosperity  of  American  trade.  When  the  con- 
ference was  first  called,  many  enthusiasts  began  to 
see  visions  of  general  disarmament  and  universal 
peace,  but  President  Harding  sharply  reminded 
them  that  nothing  of  the  sort  was  contemplated. 
He  had  in  view  reducing  the  cost  of  warlike  prepara- 
tions in  time  of  peace,  to  the  great  relief  of  the  bur- 
dened taxpayers,  and  settling  certain  specific  matters 
likely  to  cause  friction  among  the  powers  concerned. 
The  two  projects  were  closely  knit  in  the  realm  of 
fact.  As  President  Harding  said  in  his  address  to 
the  Senate  on  February  9,  1922,  in  submitting  the 
results  of  the  conference  to  that  body:  "Much  as 
it  was  desirable  to  lift  the  burdens  of  naval  armament 
and  strike  at  the  menace  of  competitive  construc- 
tion and  consequent  expenditures,  the  Executive 
branch  of  the  Government,  which  must  be  watchful 
for  the  Nation's  safety,  was  unwilling  to  covenant 
a  reduction  of  armament  until  there  could  be 
plighted  new  guarantees  of  peace,  until  there  could 
be  removed  probable  menaces  of  conflict."  Alter 
this  plain  declaration  of  prosaic  fact,  President 
Harding  went  to  the  heart  of  the  matter.  "We 
have  seen  the  eyes  of  the  world,"  he  said,  "turned 
to  the  Pacific.  With  Europe  prostrate  and  peni- 
tent, none  feared  the  likelihood  of  early  conflict 
there.      But   the   Pacific   had   its   menaces   and  they 


A  mi:  RICA    AND    HALAXC  1.    O  V     IMnVtR      259 

deeply  concerned  us.  Our  territorial  interests  are 
larger  there.  its  waters  are  not  strange  seas  to  us, 
Its  farther  sliores  not  unknown  to  our  citizens. 
.  .  .  We  C()\et  the  possessions  ot  no  other  j'jower 
in  the  hav  ]\ast  and  we  know  tor  ourselves  that  we 
crave  no  further  or  greater  governmental  or  terri- 
torial responsibilities  there.  Contemplating  what 
is  admittedly  ours,  and  mindful  of  a  long-time  and 
reciprocal  friendship  with  China,  we  do  wish  tiie 
opportunity  to  continue  the  development  of  our 
trade  peacefully  and  on  ecjuality  with  other  nations." 
When  all  the  rhetoric,  ceremonials,  and  tormalities 
are  laid  aside,  there  is  the  sum  and  substance  ot  the 
whole  business.  "  The  Pacific  had  its  menaces  and 
thev  deeply  concernetl  us." 

What  were  those  menaces  in  tact  and  eleed? 
Who  made  those  menaces.''  \o  intormcd  person 
is  under  anv  delusions  on  tins  matter.  ixussia,  long 
the  aggressor  and  high  chief  engineer  ot  intrigues 
against  Chinese  territorv,  is  paraly/ed  and  power- 
less for  the  present  and  the  indctinite  future. 
France,  though  possessed  ot  a  huge  Indo-Chinese 
empire,  offers  no  serious  challenge,  (lermany  is 
bankrupt  in  mllitarv  power  and  can  do  no  more  than 
make  commercial  gestures.  'I'liere  remain  k'ngland 
and  fapan.  Thev  are  the  onlv  power>  in  a  position 
to  encroacli  u]io!i  Chinese  territorial  integritv.  a.iul 
in  ig2i  these  t\\'o  powers  were  bound  by  an  alliance. 
"Tlie  Pacilic  had  its  menaces."  I  hcv  were  I'eal ; 
the\-  were  two-fold:  the\  were  uinted.  and  the 
I'nited  States  at  tlie  same  time  had  ]]n  intention  ot 
surrenderinL^  anv   o\    tlie  opportunities  ot    American 


26o       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

merchants,  manufacturers,  and  financiers  in  China. 

Thus  it  happened  that  the  desires  of  the  tax- 
payers for  relief  and  the  pacific  aspirations  of  the 
American  people,  coincided  with  a  genuine  crisis  in 
the  far  eastern  relations  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment. For  eight  years  conditions  had  been  abnor- 
mal. President  Wilson,  as  the  spokesman  of  plant- 
ers, farmers,  and  trade  unions,  did  not  continue  the 
aggressive  policy  pursued  by  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Philander  Knox,  in  the  advancement  of  American 
trading  and  inves.ting  interests  in  the  East.  More- 
over the  war  had  dislocated  forces,  engaged  the 
energies  of  England,  paralyzed  Russia,  eliminated 
Germany,  and  given  Japan  a  free  hand.  In  fact 
between  the  retirement  of  President  Taft  and  the 
inauguration  of  President  Harding,  Japan  had 
made  immense  strides  in  the  extension  of  her  hegem- 
ony over  China.  At  first  she  operated  in  con- 
junction with  Russia,  with  the  consent  of  England. 
Then  in  the  midst  of  the  war,  Japan  made  her 
famous  Twenty-one  Demands  which  in  effect  prom- 
ised to  destroy  the  remnants  of  Chinese  sovereignty. 
IVIr.  Wilson,  so  zealous  in  the  interest  of  universal 
peace  and  the  League  of  Nations,  approved  the 
Lansing-Ishii  doctrine,  let  Shantung  go  to  Japan, 
and  neglected  Yap. 

It  is  in  the  light  of  these  things  that  the  results 
or  the  Washington  conference  must  be  examined. 
First,  there  is  the  naval  holiday  and  the  Four  Power 
treaty.  As  all  conversant  with  naval  affairs  know, 
by  1924  or  1926  at  the  latest,  according  to  the 
prevalent    rate    of   construction    tiie    United    States 


AMERICA    AND    BALANCE    OF     POWER      26 1 

would  have  been  supreme  at  sea  over  (ireat  liritain 
111  Hghtintr  units  and  weight  of  metal.  But  Great 
Britain  was  united  to  Japan  by  a  treaty  of  alliance 
and  the  two  constituted  a  formidable  power.  By 
offering  debt-burdened  Britain  a  relief  in  naval  con- 
struction the  United  States  induced  her  to  cut  loose 
trom  a  separate  alliance  with  Japan.  Hence  the 
naval  holiday.  It  is  an  immense  gain  to  the  tax 
payers.  It  gives  experts  time  to  study  the  whole 
question  of  sea  fighting  in  view  of  the  great  prob- 
ability that  Dreadnoughts  and  Super-Dreadnoughts 
are  as  obsolete  as  wooden  walls. 

The  accompanying  F'our  Power  treaty  is  likewis<i 
susceptible  of  many  interpretations  as  to  origin,  pur- 
pose, and  implications.  The  terms  of  the  instru- 
ment are  very  general.  The  high  contracting 
parties  agree  to  respect  one  another's  insular  pos- 
sessions in  the  Pacific  and  to  enter  into  communica- 
tion in  case  any  disturbance  arises  in  that  connec- 
tion. On  its  face  that  declaration  appears  to  be  a 
truism.  President  Harding  informctl  the  Senate 
and  the  country  that  "nothing  m  any  ot  these 
treaties  commits  the  United  States  or  any  otlicr 
power  to  anv  kind  of  alliance,  entanglement  or  en- 
volvement."  But  as  if  baffled  by  liis  (»wn  state- 
ment, he  added:  "It  has  been  said.  It  this  be  true, 
tliese  are  meaningless  treaties  and  therctore  value- 
less. Let  us  accept  no  sucli  doctrine  ot  despair  as 
that."  It  has  been  stated,  but  not  otliciallv ,  tliat  tlie 
purpose  of  the  j-^uir  I'ower  treat\-  was  to  destroy 
the  Anglo- [apanese  alliance  and  it  this  is  true  tlie 
somewhat  uncertain  ternn  become   tull   oi    meaning. 


262       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

At  all  events  the  way  is  made  clear  for  the  pursuit 
of  the  open-door  trading  policy  in  China. 

More  precise  is  the  treaty  laying  down  the  prin- 
ciples to  be  pursued  with  regard  to  China.  The  high 
contracting  parties  once  more  proclaim  the  sover- 
eignty, the  independence,  the  territorial  and  ad- 
ministrative integrity  of  China,  and  free  and  equal 
opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry.  They 
agree  that  they  will  not  seek  or  support  their  na- 
tionals in  seeking:  (a)  any  arrangement  which 
might  purport  to  establish  in  favor  of  their  in- 
terests any  general  superiority  of  right  with  respect 
to  commercial  or  economic  development  in  any 
designated  regions  of  China;  (b)  any  such  mo- 
nopoly or  preference  as  would  deprive  the  nationals 
of  any  other  power  of  the  right  of  undertaking  any 
legitimate  trade  or  industry  in  China  or  of  partici- 
pating with  the  Chinese  government  or  with  any 
local  authority  in  any  category  of  public  enterprise, 
or  which  by  reason  of  its  scope,  duration,  or  geo- 
graphical extent  is  calculated  to  frustrate  the  prac- 
tical application  of  the  principle  of  equal  oppor- 
tunity. 

Two  things  are  to  be  noted  about  this  treaty. 
The  language,  though  perhaps  as  specific  as  circum- 
stances admitted.  Is  nevertheless  general  In  char- 
acter. It  Is  open  to  a  variety  of  interpretations  in 
the  application.  It  is  less  specific  and  pointed  than 
the  language  of  the  famous  Algeclras  compact 
which  was  supposed  to  put  an  end  to  friction  among 
the  powers  in  Morocco.  It  docs  not  contain  the  de- 
tailed provisions,  limitations,  prohibitions,  and  sped- 


AMERICA    AND    BALAXCi:    OF     POWER      263 

fications  laid  down  in  i9(j6  for  the  conduct  of  the 
Sultan's  estate.  That  is  the  first  point  to  be  nested. 
The  second  is  that  it  is,  like  the  Al^eciras  compact, 
applicable  to  a  country  in  disorder  and  revolution, 
to  a  rapidly  changing  situation,  not  to  a  settled 
society  like  the  United  States  or  England  where 
commerce  can  be  carried  on  without  recourse  to 
armed  force.  When  France  was  reproached  with 
having  torn  up  the  compact  of  Algeciras,  she  could 
with  justice  reply  that  local  conditions  were  such  that 
its  application,  according  to  the  ordinary  norms 
of  legal  procedure,  was  impossible.      So  it  was. 

c  o  N  c  L  r  s  I  0  X  s 

Any  one  who  has  given  two  or  three  vcars  to  the 
study  of  the  course  ot  affairs  iti  luirope  since  191  S 
will  hesitate  to  advance  with  lirm  assurance  very 
many  ''conclusions."  The  pages  \\hich  follow 
should  really  be  entitled  "A  Few  Cieneral  and  Ten- 
tative Reflections. "  h'.urope  is  in  an  unstable 
equilibrium  and  serious  changes  ma\-  take  place  an\- 
moment.  CJenerali/.ations  arc  dangerous.  Proph- 
ecy is  more  dangerous.  But  the  human  mind  long> 
for  something  more  positI\"c  than  a  ghmp^e  at  a 
swirling  tide.      I  Icncc  these  last  words. 

The  first  reflection  is  perhaps  the  easiest  to  for- 
mulate. There  are  many  signs  of  l-.uro}">ean  re- 
covery in  the  realm  of  fact.  The  reconstructum 
work  in  hVance  lias  been  trulv  mar\-ellous.  I  he 
basic  industrv,  agriculture,  though  disturbed  In- 
agrarian   changes   in   I'astern    hurope,   is   being    re- 


264      CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

Stored  and  a  decided  turn  upward  may  be  expected 
shortly.  The  quarrels  among  the  new  nationalities 
are  being  allayed  by  negotiations  and  treaties  and 
new  bonds  of  trade  and  intercourse  are  taking  the 
place  of  those  snapped  by  the  war.  In  this  sphere 
time  will  bring  healing. 

Secondly,  finance  and  industry  in  Europe  are  in  a 
state  of  chaos  and  conditions  are  growing  worse 
rather  than  better.  If  the  analysis  given  in  Chap- 
ter IV  is  sound,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  business  can 
be  brought  to  its  old  course  without  reducing  rep- 
arations and  inter-allied  debts,  scaling  down 
domestic  debts,  and  restoring  the  currency  to  a 
gold  basis.  Europe  must  soon  choose  between 
some  kind  of  a  general  economic  constitution  and  a 
re-alignment  of  powers  for  more  costly  and  deadly 
conflicts. 

Thirdly,  the  principle  of  conscious  and  systematic 
support  for  commercial  enterprise  has  been  adopted 
by  England,  France,  Germany,  and  Italy,  and  the 
capitalists  of  these  countries  are  driving  forward  to 
the  conquest  of  new  markets  with  a  greater  zeal 
than  in  the  days  before  the  war.  There  is  this  dif- 
ference: they  are  more  effectively  organized  within 
their  respective  countries  and  more  vigorously  sup- 
ported by  their  respective  governments.  The  res- 
toration of  Europe  without  a  constitution  designed 
to  mitigate  these  rivalries  will  mean  a  return  to 
secret  diplomacy  and  the  armed  peace,  preparatory 
to  a  reenactment  of  the  great  drama  which  we 
have  just  witnessed.  What  would  be  left  of 
European   civilization    after   several    repetitions   of 


C  0  X  C  L  I'  S  I  O  X  S 


26' 


this  cycle  may  he  left  to  the  imagination.  I^ut  if 
I'^urope  cannot  learn  from  experience,  it  is  hardly 
prohahle  that  more  pronunciamentos  from  Wash- 
ington will  have  any  ettect  upon  the  course  of  events 
there. 

lourthly,  there  seem  to  be  only  two  policies  open 
to  the  United  States.  The  first  is  to  enter  into  a 
general  h'uropean  council  and  attempt  by  interna- 
tional pressure  to  compel  a  readjustment  of  indem- 
nities, debts,  tariffs,  and  currencies;  that  is,  to  join 
in  forcing  the  various  nations  to  do  what  they  must 
do  betore  the  course  of  business  is  returned  to  a 
pre-war  basis.  If  any  one  will  read  the  European 
press  closely,  he  will  see  what  grave  complications 
this  would  mvolve,  what  new  hatreds,  what  new 
discords.  In  my  opinion  it  would  be  unwise  tor 
the  L'nited  States  to  attempt  to  play  the  part  of  a 
general  receiver  or  a  big  brother  tor  luirope  tor- 
tured by  the  ine\-itable  atter-war  hatreels.  This 
is  not  because  we  are  wanting  m  the  sj^irit  ot  help- 
fulness, but  because  in  this  case  Intermeddling  is 
likely  to  do  more  harm  than  good.  I  he  other 
course  is  that  now  pursued,  except  as  tar  as  Russia 
Is  concerneel.  It  Is  tlie  course  ot  allowing  I'.urope 
to  set  Its  own  house  in  ortlcr  under  the  stress  ot  its 
own  necessities  and  experiences.  Its  statesmen 
know  little  enough,  perhaps,  but  they  know  burope 
better  than   an\'  agents  sent  out   from  \\  aslungton. 

h'Ifthlv.  If  tile  Inlted  States  lea\-es  b'.urope  to  Its 
own  dexices  in  recox'enng  its  economic  prosperIt\", 
then  logic  as  well  as  common  decencx'  reijuires  our 
go\'ei'nment     to     retrain     trom     publisliin:.:;    period;- 


266       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN     EUROPE    TO-DAY 

cal  homilies  on  the  place  of  Russia  in  Europe's 
affairs. 

Sixthly,  new  loans  to  European  countries  by 
American  banking  houses,  though  they  yield  high 
commissions  and  high  interest  rates  at  present, 
merely  add  to  the  burdens  and  confusion  of  Europe 
and  help  postpone  the  day  of  fiscal  reckoning  which 
all  continental  countries  must  face  sooner  or  later. 
Indeed  these  very  loans  may  involve  us,  in  spite  of 
ourselves,  in  grave  problems  of  readjustment  now 
facing  European  statesmen. 

Finally,  the  menaces  that  confront  the  United 
States  today  are  not  European.  As  President 
Harding  has  said,  they  are  in  the  Pacific.  \Yhat 
does  that  mean?  What  does  it  imply  in  terms  of 
American  policy  and  of  obligations  for  American 
citizens?  President  Harding  has  given  us  the  key. 
He  says  that  we  do  not  want  any  more  territory 
in  the  Pacific,  but  that  we  want  trade.  That  means, 
in  plain  English,  that  we  want  markets  in  China  in 
which  to  sell  goods;  we  want  opportunities  to  in- 
vest money  with  good  commissions  and  high  rates  of 
interest;  and  we  want  concessions  to  build  railways, 
exploit  natural  resources,  and  develop  Chinese  in- 
dustries to  our  profit.  Assuming  that  the  open 
door  is  reallv  open,  that  means  intense  and  active 
rivalry  with  England,  France,  and  Japan  in  the  Far 
East.  So  the  great  question  is:  ''Shall  the  gov- 
ernment   follow    trade    and    investments?" 

That  is  the  crucial  question.  It  is  a  question 
fraught  with  momentous  significance  for  this  coun- 
try.     Behind   all   the   notes,   treaties,   speeches,   and 


COXC  LCSIOXS 


267 


declarations,  that  is  the  one  great  issue  in  foreij^n 
atiairs  before  the  people  ot  this  country.  It  must 
he  considered  without  hitterness  or  partisan  rancor 
in  the  li.ght  of  national  interests  and  national  des- 
tiny. I  here  must  he  no  sneerin^j;  criticism  of  our 
inanuiacturers  and  hankers.  7hev  are  following 
economic  opportunities  as  other  men  do.  Xothing 
short  ot  the  interest  of  the  whole  nation  should 
come  into  the  decisions  upon  policy. 

At  this  t;Uetul  juncture  in  American  history, 
there  are  three  courses  open  to  those  who  tain 
would  mould  the  world  to  their  hearts"  desires. 
7'here  is  tirst  the  policy  ot  posIti\'e  imperialism, 
naked  and  unashamed.  I  nder  it,  our  government 
would  gi\e  vigorous  support  to  merchants,  hank- 
ers, and  manufacturers  in  all  parts  ot  the  earth  in 
their  search  tor  traJe  and  investment  opportunities. 
It  presupposes  ariiiies  and  na\-ies  adcijuate  to  all 
exigencies  and  strong  enough  to  comjU'l  respect 
for  all  decisions  taken  m  hehalt  ot  national  eco- 
nomic interests.  I  he  Department  ot  State,  oper- 
ating mamlv  in  secret  through  a  corjis  ot  consuls 
and  tliplomats,  wouKi  become  the  adjunct  to  in- 
dustrial and  in\-estment  interests.  A  merchant 
marine  wouKl  be  subsuii/ed.  ami  go\"ernment  sup- 
port gi\'en  to  the  prosecution  ot  commercial  ad- 
vantages. I)iscrimin;!tor\  :iiui  pre!  erential  tantts 
wouKl  be  constructed  with  reterence  to  tlie  j)romo- 
tion    ot    American    iiuiustnes. 

This  po]ic\'  is  coinnionK  detended  on  two  grouiuls. 
Some  sa\'  tliat  it  is  the  natural,  inexitable,  ami  irre- 
sistible    de\"elopmeiit      ot      an     imperial     race — the 


268       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

manifest  destiny  of  every  nation  to  expand,  con- 
quer, and  dominate.  Possibly  it  is  the  decree  of 
fate.  If  so,  then  all  arguments  for  and  against 
it  are  equally  futile  and  irrelevant. 

Others,  brushing  aside  such  philosophy,  say  that 
imperialism  is  necessary  to  American  prosperity, 
that  we  mu-st  sell  more  and  more  manufactured 
goods  every  year  or  perish.  Let  us  examine  briefly 
that  hypothesis  in  operation.  More  billions  in 
trade  means  bringing  more  business  to  American 
manufacturing  industries  and  drawing  more  millions 
of  people  from  Europe  and  from  our  own  country- 
side into  mines,  mills,  and  factories.  It  means 
more  billions  in  stocks  and  bonds  in  strong  boxes 
and  more  millions  of  men,  women,  and  children  in 
industrial  cities — a  vaster  aristocracy  of  wealth  and 
a  hugher  proletariat.  Whoever  can  contemplate  the 
possibility  of  a  hundred  years  of  that  development 
without  thought  of  consequences  lying  beyond,  de- 
serves to  wear  the  badge  of  courage.  Still  the 
policy  involved  in  it  may  be  pursued  without  regard 
to  the  long  future. 

Imperialism  is  not  new.  It  offers  no  novel  fea- 
tures to  the  adventurous  spirit  of  man.  The  past 
affords  ample  records  for  the  study  of  its  processes, 
operations,  and  consequences.  It  cannot  however 
be  pursued  today  under  the  conditions  of  the  past 
three  hundred  years.  The  experience  of  the  British 
Empire  is  no  guide  to  us  now.  The  backward 
places  of  the  earth  are  all  staked  out  and  in 
the  possession  of  powers  bent  upon  the  kind  of  com- 
mercial   and    financial    imperialism    that    is    recom- 


CONCLUSIONS  269 

mended  to  us.  Imperialism  of  the  future  will  in- 
volve competitive  risks  far  more  danji^erous  than 
the  risks  of  Pitt,  Disraeli,  and  Sir  Edward  Grey. 
Still  the  policy  is  an  intelligible  one  and  is  defended 
by  some  of  the  ablest  minds  of  our  generation. 
Ample  support  for  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  volumi- 
nous literature  of  the  late  German  empire. 

There  is  before  us,  possibly,  a  second  policy.  It 
is  covered  by  that  term  of  opprobrium  hurled  at 
it  by  the  devotees  of  imperialism,  namely,  "Little 
Americanism."  Its  implications  are  likewise  clear. 
Let  us  examine  them.  According  to  this  philosophy, 
the  government  of  the  United  States  would  not  lend 
diplomatic  or  any  other  kind  of  support  to  invest- 
ment bankers  placing  loans  abroad,  either  in  making 
them,  collecting  the  interest,  or  insuring  the  prin- 
cipal. It  would  not  use  the  army  or  the  navy  in 
the  collection  of  debts  due  to  private  citizens.  The 
government  would  teel  under  no  greater  obligation 
to  a  banker  who  made  a  bad  loan  in  Guatemala  than 
it  would  to  a  banker  who  made  a  bad  guess  in  lend- 
ing money  to  a  dry  goods  merchant  in  Des  Moines, 
Iowa.  It  would  not  seize  any  more  territory.  It 
would  discontinue  the  policy  of  annexing  spheres  in 
the  Caribbean  and  would  invite  the  Latin-Ameri- 
can countries  into  a  co()perative  system  tor  settling 
all  disputes  in  this  hemisphere.  It  would  give  in- 
dependence to  the  Piiilippines  and  draw  back  upon 
the  Hawaiian  base.  It  would  maintain  an  army 
and  a  navv  adequate  for  the  iletense  ot  our  terri- 
tories, hv  universal  service  it  necessary,  and  per- 
haps   preferably.      It    might    possibly    contemplate 


270       CROSS    CURRENTS    IN    EUROPE    TO-DAY 

entering  a  League  of  Nations,  provided  all  other 
countries  were  prepared  to  adopt  a  similar  domes- 
tic policy.  It  would  bend  all  national  energies  and 
all  national  genius  upon  the  creation  of  a  civilization 
which,  in  power  and  glory  and  noble  living,  would 
rise  above  all  the  achievements  of  the  past.  This 
policy,  whatever  may  be  said  against  it,  has  on  its 
side  at  least  the  advantage  and  interest  of  novelty. 
The  great  power  that  pursued  it  might,  indeed,  sink 
down  into  dust  like  the  empires  of  Tamerlane  or 
Augustus,  but  at  least  the  world's  experiences  would 
be  enriched. 

There  is  finally  another  alternative,  that  of  no 
policy  at  all,  save  the  policy  of  drift  and  muddle. 
It  would  support  our  capitalists  and  merchants 
abroad,  but  not  adequately.  It  would  encourage 
them  to  pursue  their  economic  interests  and  then 
fail  to  sustain  them  in  a  crucial  hour.  It  would 
create,  inadvertently,  situations  calling  for  Imperial 
military  and  naval  forces,  but  would  not  have  the 
forces  ready  on  the  fateful  day.  It  would  follow 
in  the  paths  of  Alexander  and  Caesar  but  would  be 
content  with  the  philosophy  of  Buncombe  County. 
Yet,  under  Providence  many  things  might  be  accom- 
plished by  this  policy.  It  might  land  the  nation  at 
the  gates  of  destruction;  but  that  can  be  said  of  the 
imperial  policy  pursued  by  Rome  and  Germany. 
As  In  Individual  life  we  find  our  little  plans  and  pur- 
poses but  frail  reeds  in  our  hands,  so  In  national 
life,  the  wisdom,  understanding,  and  penetration  of 
the  best  and  most  practical  statesmen  often  prove  to 


("ONC  LISIOXS  271 

be  in  the  test  of  time  and  circumstance  the  weirdest 
of  delusions. 

Here  I  take  leave  of  the  subject,  saying  with 
Bossuet,  the  good  bishop:  "All  those  who  are  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  government  are  subject  to  a 
higher  power.  They  always  do  more  or  less  than 
they  intend  and  their  counsels  have  never  failed  to 
produce  unforeseen  effects.  They  are  not  the  mas- 
ters of  the  turn  given  to  affairs  by  the  ages  past. 
Neither  can  they  foresee  the  course  the  future  will 
take.  Far  less  can  they  force  it."  Still  who  would 
not  rather  have  the  heritage  of  Athens  than  the 
legacy  of  Caesar? 


AUTHORITIES 

NOTE     ON     SOURCES     FOR     \,     \  \,     AND     III 

The  best  account  of  English  diplomacy  before 
the  War  is  l^arl  Loreburn,  Ilozv  the  fTar  Came 
(Knopf,  1920).  Sir  Edward  Grey's  speech  on 
August  3,  1914  is  printed  as  an  Appendix.  For  a 
vigorous  indictment  of  English  diplomacy,  E.  D. 
Morel,  Ten  Years  of  Secret  Diplomacy  and  Truth 
and  the  Jf'ar  (Huebsch,  1912  and  1918);  also 
Francis  Neilson,  llozv  Diplomats  Make  II' ar 
and  Albert  Jay  Xock,  The  Myth  of  a  Guilty  \atinn 
(Huebsch).  A  general  brief  survey,  Reinsch, 
Secret  Diplomacy  (Harcourt,  1922). 

The  great  German  collection  is  Die  Deutschen 
Dokumente  zum  Kricgsaushruch  in  four  volumes 
(Charlottenburg,  19 19).  A  splendid  survey  of 
these  materials  is  given  by  Professor  Sidney  B.  1- ay 
in  the  American  Historical  Reziezv,  tor  July  and 
October,  1920.  In  19 19  the  (jerman  Government 
instituted  a  committee  of  in(]uiry  which  has  been  in- 
vestigating the  origins  ot  the  war.  Two  vo'iumes 
have  alreadv  been  printed  and  a  new  series  ot  tit  teen 
volumes  is  announced  as  in  press  ( .1  inerica}!  IIi>- 
torical  Reiiezi,  October  I92i,p.   17S). 

The  Austrian  materials  arc  not  (|uite  so  \'olumi- 
nous.  There  is  tirst  a  three  \"olunie  collection.  Dip- 
lomatische  .Iktenstiicke  zur  I  oriieschichtc  dt's 
Krieges,    IQI  f.      These    j^apei-s    cover    the    negotia- 


2  74  <-'  I^  ^  S  S    CURRENTS    IN   EUROPE   TO-  DA  Y 

tions  immediately  preceding  the  war.  They  have 
been  carefully  analyzed  by  Professor  Fay  in  the 
articles  cited  above.  A  second  group  of  papers  is 
A.  F.  Pribram,  The  Secret  Treaties  of  Austria-Hun- 
gary. These  go  back  to  the  treaty  of  alliance  of 
1879.  The  first  volume  embraces  treaties  and  the 
second  collateral  documents  and  notes.  They  ap- 
pear in  English  translation  uncier  the  editorship  of 
Professor  A.  C.  Coolidge  of  Harvard  University 
(Harvard  Press). 

The  most  important  French  contribution  is  the 
L'rcre  Jaune  de  igi8,  which  contains  materials  rel- 
ative to  the  Russian  Alliance.  Selected  and  pub- 
lished by  the  French  Government.  Most  of  them 
are  reproduced  with  comment  by  Welschlnger,  IJ Al- 
liance Franco-Russe  (Alcan,  1919). 

The  Russian  materials  are  widely  scattered.  Ap- 
parently there  has  been  no  such  grand  collection  as 
the  German  Government  had  prepared.  Shortly 
after  they  came  to  power,  the  Bolsheviki  began  to 
publish  treaties  and  notes.  The  so-called  Secret 
Treaties  revealing  the  agreements  among  the  En- 
tente Allies  as  to  territorial  dispositions  were  pub- 
lished in  November,  19 17,  and  shortly  afterward 
appeared  in  translation  in  the  New  York  Evening 
Post  and  the  Manchester  Guardian.  A  Russian  edi- 
tion in  English,  with  a  foreword  by  Eeon  Trotzky 
was  also  printed  about  the  same  time.  Copies  in 
the  New  ^  ork  Public  Library.  From  time  to  time 
additional  papers  from  the  Russian  archives  were 
published  in  the  official  organs  Iszestia  and  Prazda. 
Files  in   the  New  York  Public  Library.      Some  of 


SOURCES     I,      II,     AND     III  275 

these  papers  were  translated  by  the  German  Gov^ern- 
ment  and  included  in  its  Dciitschhind  ScJiiilduj? 
Dcitlschcs  Jt'cissbiicli  ilhcr  die  rcnintzvortlicliki'il 
dcr  UrJii'hcr  dfs  Kricgcs  (  1919).  'J'his  appears  in 
luiglish  translation  also  by  the  Germans:  Is  Gcr- 
man\  Guilty  f  German  JFliitc  Book  Concerning  the 
Responsibility  of  the  Authors  of  the  11  ar  (Berlin, 
Ileymanns,  19  19).  The  chief  collection  of  Russian 
papers  is  Siebert  and  Schreincr,  Entente  Diplomaex 
(Hid  the  fTorld,  a  volume  of  762  pages  in  I'.nglish 
translation.  Published  privately  in  New  \  ork  by 
the  Knickerbocker  Press  (1921)  and  for  sale  by 
Stechert  and  also  by  Brentano.  Baron  Siebert.  a 
former  secretary  of  the  Imperial  Russian  Embassy 
in  London,  brings  out  these  documents  and  vouches 
for  their  authenticity.  Manv  of  them  can  be 
checked  up  bv  notes  from  the  Cierman  archives  and 
by  papers  printed  in  Pra'jda  and  Is\:estia.  While 
it  is  not  possible  to  verify  and  authenticate  from  of- 
ficial evidence  all  these  papers  and  while  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  collections  are  Iragmentarv, 
the\'  do  seem  to  jix  bevond  all  (juestion  the  broad 
outlines  of  I'^uropean  diplomacv  between    i9i>S   and 

1917- 

A  new,  authentic  collection  of  Russian  documents 
has  just  come  t  roi7i  Paris:  f ';/  l.iire  \i)ir:  Dip'n- 
UKtlie  d' .ivcuil-Giterre  d'iipris  /es  Dai-;/ m ,)! [.■^  ile< 
.Ireliiies  Rn<S(S.  Preface  par  \\cnc  M;u\!kuk1. 
An  admirable  re\-ie\\-  In  P)ar()n  Korit  apjvar^  in  the 
.1  mericcin  1 1  istoriciil  Ri'iii  ■:.   Ii'i-   juK,   i')ii. 


276  CROSS    CURRENTS   IN   EUROPE   TO-DAY 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

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I'Europe. 
Angell,  Norman,  The  Fruits  of  Victory. 
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of  Europe  ( 1921 ). 
Baumont  et  Berthelot,  L'Allemagne:     Lendemains 

de  Guerre  et  de  Revolution  (1922). 
Boret,    v.,    La    Bataille    Economique    de    Demain 

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Bouton,  S.  M.,  And  the  Kaiser  Abdicates. 
Brailsford,  H.  N,,  After  the  Peace. 
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Translation  published  by  Knopf   (New  York) 

in  1922. 
Conference     on     the     Limitation     of     Armaments 

(Washington   Conference   Documents)    Senate 

Document,  67th  Congress,  2nd  Session,  Num- 
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Cumming   and    Pettit,   Russian-A merican  Relations 

(1920). 
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York  Nation  Reprint). 
Delaisi,  P.,  Oil:     Its  influence  on  Politics. 
Demangeon,  Le  Declin  de  I'Europe  (  1920) .      To  be 

had  in  English  translation. 
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book  (1921)  Allen  and  Unwin. 
Ferasson,  L.,  La  Question  du  Fer  (19  18). 
Gautier,  L'Anglcterre  et  Nous  (  1922). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  277 

Graham,  S.,  Europe — ffliithcr  Bound?  (1922). 
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(1917)- 

Guest,  L.  H,.  The  Struggle  for  Power  in  Europe, 
1917-1921     (1922). 

Jouhaux,  L.,  Le  Syndicalisme  et  la  C.  G.  T.  ( 1920). 

Keynes,  J.  \I.,  The  Economic  Consequences  of  the 
Peace  and  A  Revision  of  the  Treaty. 

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Anglais  e  ( 1916). 

Leger,  L.,  Le  Panslaiisme  et  I'fnteret  Francais. 

Lenin,  N.,  The  Proletariat  Revolution;  The  Soviets 
at  JVork;  The  Land  Revolution  in  Russia;  and 
Les  Bolchei'iks  et  les  Paysans. 

Lichtenberger  et  Petit,  L'Lmperialisme  Economique 
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Marx,  H.,  Handhuch  der  Revolution  in  Deutsch- 
land  (  1919). 

Morel,  Africa  and  the  Peace  of  Europe. 

Pasvolsky,  L.,  The  Econoinics  of  Communism  and 
Russia  and  the  Far  East. 

Pratt,  E.  A.,  Rise  of  Rail-Pozver  in  JJ'ar  and  Con- 
quest. 

Scheidemann,   P.,  Der  Zusa.mmenbrucJi   (1921). 

"Spectator,"  Das  Socialisierungsproblem  in  Dcutsch- 
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Spengler,  O.,  Preussentum  und  Sozialismus   (1921). 

Stier-Somlo,  Reichsverfassuny   (  1 9  i  9  ) . 

Streit,  C,  JFhere  Eon  is.  There  is  the  Fatlwrldud. 

Tarle,  A.,  La  Preparation  de  la  Lutte  Ecouimitjue 
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278   CROSS    CURRENTS   IN   EUROPETO-DAY 

Trotzky,  L.,  From  October  to  Brest  Litovsk;  Ter- 
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Wells,  H.  G.,  Washington  and  the  Riddle  of  Peace. 


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